











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THE REPUBLIC;
OR,
A HISTORY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
IN
THE ADMINISTRATIONS,

FROM THE MONARCHIC COLONIAL DAYS
TO THE PRESENT TIMES.

BY
JOHN ROBERT IRELAN, M. D.

IN EIGHTEEN VOLUMES.

Volume XVII.

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HISTORY
OF THE
LIFE, ADMINISTRATION,
AND TIMES
OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
Sixteenth President of the United States.

War of the Rebellion,
AND
Downfall of Human Slavery.

BY
JOHN ROBERT IRELAN, M. D.

IN TWO VOLUMES.
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LIFE, ADMINISTRATION, AND TIMES

OF

ABRAHAM LINCOLN,

SIXTEENTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

March 4, 1861, to April 15, 1865.

CHAPTER I.

1861—WAR OF THE REBELLION—BIG BETHEL—BUTLER AND WOOL—SCOTT'S PLANS—PATTERSON IN VIRGINIA—THE CRY OF "ON TO RICHMOND"—GENERAL McDOWELL—FIRST BULL RUN—LOSS OF THE FIRST GREAT BATTLE FOR THE UNION—"FORWARD TO WASHINGTON"—CORRECTING ERRORS.

MARYLAND having undergone a sudden change in favor of the Government, the great channels of communication with Washington being open, and Baltimore having become civil to Federal soldiers, some of the more treacherous, unyielding, and determined of the rebel citizens being confined at Fort McHenry, on the 22d of May General Butler took command of Fortress Monroe, with his department nominally embracing North Carolina and the tide-water region of Virginia, about the mouth of the Chesapeake. Several thousand troops were soon gathered under his command, but besides laboring

under the misfortune of being green soldiers, they had inexperienced and incompetent general officers. During the season General Butler undertook but one movement of much importance, and this resulted disastrously. On the 9th of June he sent out a strong force under E. W. Pierce, a Massachusetts militia general, who had never seen a battle, and had no skill as a soldier, hoping to drive the rebels from his front, and surprise and capture them at Little Bethel. Before daylight on the following morning, one of Pierce's regiments, taking another for a regiment of rebels, fell upon it, killing and wounding a number before the mistake could be corrected. This unfortunate occurrence, against which they had been especially warned, disconcerted the plans of the expedition. Still Pierce, sending back for additional troops, advanced to Big Bethel, where he found the rebels under John B. Magruder, a much superior officer, awaiting him. A fight ensued, in which the Union loss was considerable, while that of the rebels was hardly noticeable. Pierce succeeded in making a very reputable and orderly retreat, and here the matter ended, as did also his military career. Early in the fall General Butler himself was succeeded at Fortress Monroe by General John E. Wool, but not until he had taken another important step in his very remarkable war record, as will be seen farther on.

The Governor of Pennsylvania, with the quota from that State, under the President's first call, had sent into the field General Robert Patterson, who in his better days had made some reputation as a

soldier. With the three months' militia, General Scott believed nothing more should be expected or undertaken than opening the way to Washington, securing that city, holding Maryland and the Potomac, securing the long line of the border States, and, perhaps, recapturing Harper's Ferry. This was, indeed, an ambitious plan for an undisciplined army, to remain in service but ninety days. General Patterson's headquarters had been established at Chambersburg, a position affording him a good opportunity for watching the rebels in Virginia, and operating with expedition against them in an attempt to gain a foothold in Maryland, a purpose about which there was no doubt, however impossible its execution. Patterson deemed Harper's Ferry of great importance, if not destined to be the battle-field of the war, where the question of secession was to be speedily settled. There was both North and South a very erroneous stress put upon this point, and especially did Lee and Jefferson Davis consider it of great military value to them, and with much difficulty did Joseph E. Johnston, when sent to command the place, induce them to assent to his better judgment as to the error concerning its value. After a long and needless delay, Patterson crossed the Potomac at Williamsport about the middle of June to find, greatly to his surprise, that Johnston had on the 13th and 14th evacuated and burned the place, and withdrawn to Winchester. Patterson looked upon this conduct of the rebel general in the light of a victory to the Union army under him, and so reported. But he again

returned to the north side of the Potomac, where he could watch the further movements of Johnston with more safety. The newly developed project of a movement from Washington towards Manassas led General Scott to order Patterson to cross into Virginia again to engage the attention of, if not attack, and whip Johnston. This order he executed so far as to advance to Martinsburg and a place called Bunker Hill, where he remained until Johnston, concluding he was not going to offer fight, stole away on the 17th and 18th, and two days afterwards joined Beauregard with the greater part of his army at Bull Run, thus insuring the defeat of the Union army under McDowell. This was the very thing General Patterson was expected and urged to prevent, and so General Scott informed him. And yet after he had allowed Johnston with an army half the size of his own to run away, he ridiculously claimed that he had done more than the General-in-Chief meant for him to do. Patterson was then sixty-nine years of age, and it was a great mistake to look for a fight in this old man, or to risk the honor and safety of the Nation in his keeping on the field. It is needless or bootless to say that he was persuaded by Fitz John Porter and others at Bunker Hill to turn back without fighting Johnston. General Patterson was alone responsible for the utter failure of the campaign under him.

The purposes to be carried out under Patterson, to some extent gave rise to the movement toward Richmond, and finally the battle of Manassas or Bull

Run. It was, of course, seen at Washington, that a junction between Johnston's force at Harper's Ferry or Winchester, and that under Beauregard at Manassas Junction, only thirty-five miles from Arlington Heights, could easily be effected. The rebels were aware that a contingency of this kind might arise, and from the outset they provided for it as well as they could. Johnston's desertion of Harper's Ferry was based upon the possibility of this emergency as well as upon the movements of McClellan towards the Shenandoah Valley. Accordingly, when Patterson was ordered to cross the Potomac, General McDowell was ordered to make a feint movement from Arlington Heights to occupy the attention of Beauregard, who, since his wonderful achievement at Fort Sumter, had swelled with military importance. McDowell's movement was designed by General Scott simply as a diversion in favor of Patterson, and nothing more. But the Administration felt seriously the restless spirit of the loyal North at this juncture, where there was a general cry for something to be done. The three months' men should put down the Rebellion, or at least do something more toward it than was indicated by General Scott's program. "On to Richmond" became the cry of the country, and to some extent the project took shape at Washington. Late in June General Irvin McDowell in command at Arlington Heights presented to General Scott a plan for an attack on Manassas Junction with a view of clearing the way to Richmond, and in a war council at the President's house

on the 29th of June it was decided to make the move, General Scott at once issuing the necessary orders, and the preparation began.

General Scott believed that his former plans were sufficiently extensive, and in the council stubbornly opposed this new and doubtful adventure, and McDowell distinctly asserted that he could not whip Beauregard and Johnston combined. But General Scott thought he could relieve this feature of the case readily by forcing Patterson to his assistance. So on the 16th of July McDowell began his march with the purpose of attacking Beauregard on Saturday, the 20th. The army consisting of less than thirty-five thousand men of all lines was organized into five small divisions commanded in order of their numbers by General Daniel Tyler, Colonel David Hunter, Colonel S. P. Heintzelman, Colonel Theodore Runyon, and Colonel D. S. Miles. But Runyon's division numbering nearly six thousand was left behind on the line of march, no part of it going so far out as Centerville. A part of Miles's division was also not engaged.

McDowell took the Warrenton Pike, and as he advanced, Beauregard's outposts withdrew, until at last he discovered the rebel force somewhat less than twenty thousand strong posted back of Bull Run, a fordable creek meandering in a south-easterly course between Centerville and Manassas Junction, at the main fords in a broken line eight miles long from the Stone Bridge on Warrenton Pike to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.

On the 18th Tyler made a reconnoissance in force towards the center of Beauregard's position about Blackburn's Ford, and was worsted by it, the affair having reached the dignity of a battle, and gone far beyond his instructions. On this very day Johnston, by orders from Richmond, began his march from Winchester to join Beauregard, and about noon Saturday, with a few regiments reached his destination, and outranking Beauregard, assumed command of the army.

On Thursday night McDowell decided to cross the Run above the Stone Bridge, turn the enemy's left and get possession of Manassas Gap Railroad, contrary to his original plan of turning the right and clearing the way to Richmond directly by Manassas Junction. Two considerations led him to this change, first the difficulty of the route to Manassas Junction and the comparative smoothness of the country by the enemy's left, and the belief that this course would enable him to prevent Johnston bringing his army to the help of Beauregard. This change of plan would have been made even had he known when he made it that the junction of the rebel forces would have been effected before he could carry it out.

Friday was unfortunately spent in locating the crossings of Bull Run above Stone Bridge, and arranging the plan of battle, and Saturday he found himself unable to move owing mainly to the condition of his supplies. McDowell knew the importance of time at this juncture, having now been greatly delayed by the careless and unsoldier-like habits of

his army, chiefly composed of three months' militia. His orders for the battle were issued on Saturday night, and on Sunday morning between two and three o'clock the movement began. At this critical moment the time of service of two or three of his regiments expired, and these deliberately marched for Washington instead of towards the rebel position, and so unsatisfactory and tardy was the general movement that it was four hours after Tyler had fired his signal gun at the Stone Bridge before the other divisions were in place across Bull Run, and the battle begun. As the morning broke, the rebels, who had also prepared for an attack that day on McDowell, were not long in discovering the unexpected turn in his advance upon their left instead of their center, and speedily adapted themselves to the circumstances. Until noon the battle waged with somewhat unvarying indications of a complete triumph of the Union army, notwithstanding the loss of time and indifference of movements in the early morning. As yet McDowell knew nothing of the presence of Johnston and his troops on the rebel side, and had no reason to suspect that the day would close on his utter defeat.

The rebel line had by this time swung around with one end resting on Bull Run and the other toward Manassas Gap Railroad, facing the Warrenton Pike, and occupying the high level plateau above Young's Creek, a tributary of Bull Run. The advantage of their position was now very great, while the Union army having driven the rebels before it at

every point, occupied the low and broken ravine or valley along Young's Creek. Many of the rebels had been put to flight, and it was subsequently held by some military wiseacres that had McDowell continued after them to Manassas depot and abandoned his advance up the hill in the face of the well-posted force, the whole would have been turned into a rout, and the victory have been easy. Up to this time the rebel army had not been well handled, and, perhaps, this would have been so, as the generals on that side evidently considered their prospects very doubtful when they began to take position on the plateau above Young's Creek, and the rebel fugitives at the railroad declared unanimously that they were already totally defeated. Subsequent events did not sustain the appearances.

But McDowell overlooked the true position of affairs in his favor in this direction, and prepared to gain possession of the plateau, where the rebels soon massed a force equal to his own. Several desperate attempts were now made to accomplish his purpose with varying success, the national troops driving the rebels before them, and then in return being driven back on the broken ascent, and although the Ellsworth Zouaves had been knocked out of existence as an organization by mistaking an Alabama regiment for one of the Union, one of those singular accidents which often befall armies in the heat of conflict, and several other similar occurrences, the general outlook was still, perhaps, favorable to the Government. The demoralization was, however, quite apparent, and it

was very evident that any unforeseen event might instantly decide the day adversely.

At the critical juncture this event was not wanting. E. Kirby Smith with the remainder of Johnston's troops from Winchester now appeared on the ground, and, with a shout, rushed against the right flank of the Union army. This unexpected assault sent through McDowell's lines the cry that Johnston had come from the Shenandoah. Other rebel troops were thrown into the conflict at this moment, when the Union forces choosing to consider the attack irresistible, fled from the field, and the first great battle for the perpetuation of human slavery was ended.

McDowell covered the retreat as best he could with his small force of regulars, and that night abandoned the determination of making a stand at Centerville. The rebels made little or no pursuit, and McDowell leisurely returned to the neighborhood of Washington. The loss on the side of the Government was 481 killed, 1,011 wounded, and 1,460 prisoners, many of whom were wounded; on the rebel side 387 were killed and 1,582 wounded and a few prisoners were taken. Twenty-five or twenty-eight of McDowell's forty-nine guns fell into the hands of the rebels, chiefly on the retreat to Centerville, where they had to be abandoned by reason of the obstruction of the road by the army wagons, and considerable quantities of army stores, small arms and baggage. General McDowell deemed it advisable to leave his own dead to be buried by the rebels, a task not performed by them for several days.

The excitement caused throughout the entire country by this defeat of the national army was indescribably intense, but, of course, of entirely dissimilar character in the loyal and rebellious sections. Universal surprise, dismay, and sadness were felt among the loyal in the North, while shouts of exultation and triumph, exaggeration, willful misrepresentation, and boasting came from the victors. When the loyal section woke up to the realities of the defeat, and began to see that a large disciplined army and a long contest would be required to put down the Rebellion, reasons for this first defeat were eagerly and credulously sought. Many of those who had cried "On to Richmond," were now willing to take back seats, and keep their hands from meddling. But the great masses were still ready to pass judgment on the conduct of the campaign. What was then seen dimly was in time plain enough. It was a very difficult matter in the North to believe that Southern generals and Southern soldiers were superior, and few did believe it. While this idea went up at the South, it was justly scouted down in the loyal section. Everybody was blamed for the disaster, and everybody set out with a determination to see the disgrace wiped out. On the Union side this was a great advantage derived from the misfortune. Still the national cause suffered by the defeat both at home and abroad.

A great and, perhaps, unavoidable difficulty at this time, as in most others throughout the war, was that the world depended largely for information upon

the hundreds of newspaper reporters who followed the armies, and upon the unofficial and partisan newspapers. As a general rule, probably the reporters and letter-writers with the army were disposed to tell the truth, but they saw so little, and took so much for granted, and wrote amidst such limited circumstances that nothing better should have been expected of them. Many of the partisan newspapers started out willfully to distort, exaggerate, and misrepresent everything they touched in favor of their own side. The disposition to exaggerate was everywhere, both North and South, extreme and appalling, among all classes of people. There was no place, indeed, where this spirit was not found; not even in the pulpit, nor in the prayers of the most pious.

Perhaps the most notable case of foreign misrepresentation, of the most premeditated, determined, unmitigated, and wicked sort was that of "The London Times." Of this unprincipled but influential English paper, Samuel A. Goddard, of Birmingham, says in his work entitled "Letters on the American Rebellion:"—

"At the outbreak 'The London Times' declared with exultation that the 'great experiment had failed,' that the 'great Republic had broken up;' the success of the Rebellion being simply a question of time. Therefore, in accordance with its proverbial tactics of endeavoring to be on the winning side, it lent its whole weight and influence to the rebels, in order to obtain the result predicted and ardently wished, and its sophisms, its misrepresentations, its insolence throughout the conflict, in treating of American affairs knew no bounds. It sent its correspondent to

America for the express purpose of damaging the Union and bolstering up the rebel cause."

Wm. H. Russell, this correspondent, was quite successful in carrying out the exact purpose for which he was sent over here. He wrote up the South, and wrote down the Government, and the truth never constituted any fixed part of his inclinations or work, otherwise he would not have been executing his master's will.

In looking back from this remote date several more or less important things appear as causes of the loss of the first great battle on the Union side. Among these causes, it may not be necessary to mention the fact of the Union General moving out and beginning the assault on Sunday. If he had not taken this step the rebels would have done so on the same day. It is, however, certainly true that had he selected his position on the high lands about Centerville, it would have been greatly to his advantage and possibly led to his final overthrow of the enemy, had he awaited to be attacked. But the intelligence and judgment of him who holds to the belief that the misfortune of the national army was owing to its bringing on the battle on Sunday may well be questioned; nor does he demonstrate his claim to superior and commendable piety by such belief, perhaps. Still even in war, customary considerations, as well as religious verity, point to the voluntary observance of the Sunday.

Among the undebatable causes of the defeat were indecision and delays at Washington, and in the prog-

ress of the army when once set in motion; the inactivity, disobedience, and failure of General Patterson; the failure of Scott to send ten thousand fresh troops to McDowell from Washington; treachery, both civil and military; and, perhaps, superior generalship of the rebels on the field.

In his "Narrative of Military Operations," General Joseph E. Johnston, a writer altogether incomparably superior in wisdom and fairness to Jefferson Davis and A. H. Stephens, says of the battle of Manassas, or Bull Run:—

"If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy, we should have been beaten. If, instead of being brought into action in detail, their troops had been formed in two lines, with a proper reserve, and had assailed Bee and Jackson in that order, the two Southern brigades must have been swept from the field in a few minutes, or enveloped. General McDowell would have made such a formation, probably, had he not greatly underestimated the strength of his enemy."

And in speaking of the comparative advantages of his force, General Johnston says:—

"The Northern army had the disadvantage, a great one to such undisciplined troops as were engaged on both sides, of being the assailants, and advancing under fire to the attack, which can be well done only by trained soldiers. They were much more liable to confusion, therefore, than the generally stationary ranks of the Confederates."

It would have been but ordinary prudence for General McDowell to have made the disposition of his undisciplined troops here indicated. He did not

even organize a "proper reserve." Miles's division left at Centerville, and a part of it making a feint against the rebel center at Bull Run, was not called into use until the battle was lost, and, strangely enough, the division of Runyon, stretched out about Vienna and along the way to Washington, was allowed to remain inactive.

Patterson deserved all the censure he got for failing to engage and whip Johnston at Winchester, or give him an equal race to Bull Run; but the failure at Washington to send the greater part of the army there to McDowell's aid is little less reprehensible. At twelve o'clock on Sunday ten thousand fresh troops, including Runyon's division, should have rushed in mass upon the field from Washington, sweeping the rebel army before it, and deciding the fate of the day long before Kirby Smith came upon the ground, bringing the same good fortune to the rebels.

The discipline of the army was poor enough, and this difficulty was greatly augmented by the crowds of camp-followers, and the curious from Washington, who came out to see the end of the Rebellion. From the day of marching from Washington the army was, to a considerable extent, influenced by the groundless fancy that the task before it was an easy one. The men and the vast retinue of followers and sight-seers, to say nothing of some of the officers, looked upon the affair as a grand occasion, fit to be made the most of. This feeling was helped on by the fact that the term of enlistment was about to expire.

Taking all these things into consideration, the men were disposed to be easy and indifferent. Even on Sunday morning, when marching to engage in mortal combat, in a position wholly novel to the great mass of them, they amused themselves by strolling in and out of the ranks, in emptying and filling their canteens, and many of them actually took off their shoes to bathe their feet and wade and splash about in Bull Run. Still, most of these men were brave and patriotic, and fought like old soldiers, and, with all the disadvantages against them, it is not at all clear that the day would have been lost, had Kirby Smith not appeared suddenly on the scene, bringing a new moral and physical element into the contest.

This battle was long misrepresented and underestimated, yet it was, in a sense, decisive in the great struggle. The moral and political effect, at the outset, especially, was greatly against the Government, but in this, like everything else, the case was much exaggerated. The Nation gained in energy and determination and experience; and while the Rebellion was advanced politically, to some extent, perhaps, at the time, by its success in battle, it lost wonderfully in discipline and moral force at home, the only place it ever had any strength. General Joseph E. Johnston writes thus on this point:—

“All the military conditions, we know, forbade an attempt on Washington. The Confederate army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat. The Southern volunteers believed that the object of the war had been accomplished by the victory, and that

they had achieved all that their country required of them. Many, therefore, in ignorance of their military obligations, left the army not to return. Some hastened home to exhibit the trophies picked up on the field; others left their regiments without ceremony to attend to wounded friends, frequently accompanying them to hospitals in distant towns. Such were the reports of general and staff officers, and railroad officials. Exaggerated ideas of the victory, prevailing among our troops, cost us more men than the Federal army lost by defeat."

These men had started out with the idea that one Southern man was equal to three or five Northern ones, and the war was only regarded as a grand chivalrous adventure. Their habits of idleness, ease, and domineering independence, rendered it out of the question for them to entertain any other views until taught it by hard experience. Thousands of the private soldiers went into the army with servants, slaves, by their sides, or carrying ("toting") their baggage and camping and housekeeping outfit along in the necessary army train; and General Johnston says in his "Narrative" that when he ordered the evacuation of Harper's Ferry it was actually found that nearly every private soldier had a trunk with which to obstruct the progress of the movement. The wants and comforts of these luxuriant men of leisure were not to be limited to the narrow bounds of knapsack and canteen.

Notwithstanding the general sentiment as to having whipped the Yankees and accomplished so much conclusively, there soon arose a feeling of dissatisfaction in the South touching the result of the battle

of Bull Run. Long before the cry of "On to Richmond" was heard in the North, the general demand of the South was "Forward to Washington." There may have been little more thought of making Washington the capital of the slave confederacy than there was of making Richmond the seat of the Federal Government, but the moral and political, and perhaps military, effect of the capture of the National Capital would have been a stupendous send-off to the Rebellion. And now when the sense of satisfaction wore off, and it began to be seen that they were no nearer writing their terms in Faneuil Hall than when they first set out, complaints sprang up throughout the South. Every non-combatant, at least, thought he had discovered that Johnston's victorious army should have followed McDowell into Washington, and on to Maryland. And very soon even Johnston, Beauregard, and Jefferson Davis fell into a quarrel about the responsibility as to the failure to pursue the loyal army and run into Washington with it. The more they talked about it the further they went apart, and the more dissatisfied became the general public. After the battle was fought and won, Jefferson Davis came on the field, and although there is not much evidence that his presence was of any especial consequence, he claimed more to himself than Johnston and Beauregard were willing to admit. While the merits of this case can now be of no importance, if they ever were indeed, one thing is quite apparent, that few of these men ever lost the idea of self-glory, however gloomy their

cause or evil its purpose. Little General Johnston would not even engage in the battle of Manassas until he had first settled the matter of rank between himself and Beauregard; and a part of Beauregard's report was so offensive to Mr. Davis that he asked for its modification, and this not being done he made a counter statement; and the rebel "Congress" at Richmond struck the whole thing from the report. If more than this should have been expected from the leaders of a bad and hopeless rebellion, how much more should have been expected from the patriotic defenders of the Republic?

It has been said that the rebel generalship on the field was, perhaps, superior; but this is not a clear proposition. The rebel commander was unduly interested in guarding his right on Bull Run, where McDowell never meditated an attack. Although Johnston criticises McDowell's neglect as to his reserve corps, his own arrangement in this respect was equally wanting; the large reserve force he might have well utilized, he left idle miles down Bull Run and at Manassas Junction; and for failing to bring these troops up and throwing them, at the proper moment, on the disconcerted Federals, Johnston subsequently censured himself. The rebel generalship in this first battle was wavering and uncertain, with all its advantages, and wanting in that decision and rapidity which often distinguished it at a later date. So unbroken and strong was the Union army that Johnston considered himself unable to pursue it, and so equal appeared the fighting qualities of the com-

batants that this trial greatly changed the erroneous current of public opinion, and decided the fact that the contest was destined to be long and sharp. It should also have been the last battle, as when the equality of fighting capacity, man for man, had been demonstrated, leaders of ordinary wisdom and calmness, knowing where was the great preponderance of numbers and resources, should have seen the end. The certainty of the ultimate failure of the Rebellion was never more apparent than it was after the first battle of Bull Run, although this was not fully realized by the defenders of the Union, while, perhaps, no loyal man ever, even in the darkest hour, lost his faith in this result.

CHAPTER II.

1861—WAR OF THE REBELLION—"THIRTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS"—EXTRA SESSION—MR. LINCOLN'S FIRST MESSAGE — PERSONAL LIBERTY — HABEAS CORPUS—RIGHTS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

AT noon on the 4th of July, 1861, Congress assembled under the President's proclamation of April 15th. The Senate was now found to have forty-nine members, thirty-one being Republicans, thirteen Democrats, and five were called Unionists. John W. Forney, of Philadelphia, who four years previously had been anxious to fill a place in the Cabinet of Mr. Buchanan, was chosen clerk of this branch.

The House had one hundred and seventy-eight members, one hundred and six being Republicans, forty-two Democrats, twenty-six Unionists, and four vacancies. Galusha A. Grow, of Pennsylvania, was elected Speaker of the House, and Emerson Etheridge, of Tennessee, clerk. Of the border Slave States, Delaware, Maryland, and Kentucky were fully represented; Missouri and Virginia partially, and Tennessee had Andrew Johnson in the Senate, and Horace Maynard in the Lower House. On the next day President Lincoln's first message was received by Congress.

FIRST MESSAGE.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:—

Having been convened on an extraordinary occasion, as authorized by the Constitution, your attention is not called to any ordinary subject of legislation.

At the beginning of the present Presidential term, four months ago, the functions of the Federal Government were found to be generally suspended within the several States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida, excepting only those of the Post-office Department.

Within these States all the forts, arsenals, dock-yards, custom-houses, and the like, including the movable and stationary property in and about them, had been seized, and were held in open hostility to this Government, excepting only Forts Pickens, Taylor, and Jefferson, on and near the Florida coast, and Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. The forts thus seized had been put in improved condition; new ones had been built, and armed forces had been organized, and were organizing, all avowedly with the same hostile purpose.

The forts remaining in the possession of the Federal Government in and near these States were either besieged or menaced by warlike preparations, and especially Fort Sumter was nearly surrounded by well-protected hostile batteries, with guns equal in quality to the best of its own, and outnumbering the latter as perhaps ten to one. A disproportionate share of the Federal muskets and rifles had somehow found their way into these States, and had been seized to be used against the Government. Accumulations of the public revenue, lying within them, had been seized for the same object. The navy was scattered in distant seas, leaving but a very small part of it within the immediate reach of the Government. Officers of the Federal army and navy had resigned in great numbers; and of those resigning, a large proportion had taken up arms against the Government. Simultaneously, and in connection with all this, the purpose to sever the Federal Union was openly avowed. In accordance with this purpose, an ordinance had been adopted in each of these States, declaring the States, respectively, to be

separated from the National Union. A formula for instituting a combined government of these States had been promulgated; and this illegal organization, in the character of Confederate States, was already invoking recognition, aid, and intervention from foreign powers.

Finding this condition of things, and believing it to be an imperative duty upon the incoming Executive to prevent, if possible, the consummation of such attempt to destroy the Federal Union, a choice of means to that end became indispensable. This choice was made, and was declared in the Inaugural Address. The policy chosen looked to the exhaustion of all peaceful measures, before a resort to any stronger ones. It sought only to hold the public places and property not already wrested from the Government, and to collect the revenue; relying for the rest on time, discussion, and the ballot-box. It promised a continuance of the mails, at Government expense, to the very people who were resisting the Government; and it gave repeated pledges against any disturbance to any of the people, or any of their rights. Of all that which a President might Constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, everything was forborne, without which, it was believed possible to keep the Government on foot.

On the 5th of March (the present incumbent's first full day in office), a letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 28th of February, and received at the War Department on the 4th of March, was, by that Department, placed in his hands. This letter expressed the professional opinion of the writer, that re-enforcements could not be thrown into that fort within the time for his relief, rendered necessary by the limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than twenty thousand good and well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers of his command, and their *memoranda* on the subject were made inclosures of Major Anderson's letter. The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of the army and the navy, and, at the end of four days, came reluctantly but decidedly to the same conclusion

as before. He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient force was then at the control of the Government, or could be raised and brought to the ground within the time when the provisions in the fort would be exhausted. In a purely military point of view, this reduced the duty of the Administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort.

It is believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the *necessity* under which it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many, it would be construed as a part of a *voluntary* policy; that at home, it would discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that, in fact, it would be our national destruction consummated. This could not be allowed. Starvation was not yet upon the garrison; and ere it would be reached, Fort Pickens might be re-enforced. This last would be a clear indication of *policy*, and would better enable the country to accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter, as a military *necessity*. An order was at once directed to be sent for the landing of the troops from the steamship *Brooklyn*, into Fort Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the longer and slower route by sea. The first return news from the order was received just one week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself was, that the officer commanding the *Sabine*, to which vessel the troops had been transferred from the *Brooklyn*, acting upon some *quasi* armistice of the late Administration (and of the existence of which the present Administration up to the time the order was dispatched, had only too vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had refused to land the troops. To now re-enforce Fort Pickens, before a crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter, was impossible—rendered so by the near exhaustion of provisions in the latter-named fort. In precaution against such a conjuncture, the Government had, a few days before, commenced preparing an expedition, as well adapted as might be, to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition was intended to be ultimately used, or not, according to circumstances. The strongest anticipated case for using it was now presented; and it was resolved to send it forward. As had

been intended, in this contingency, it was also resolved to notify the Governor of South Carolina that he might expect an attempt would be made to provision the fort; and that, if the attempt should not be resisted, there would be no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort. This notice was accordingly given; whereupon the fort was attacked, and bombarded to its fall, without even awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expedition.

It is thus seen that the assault upon, and reduction of, Fort Sumter was, in no sense, a matter of self-defense on the part of the assailants. They well knew that the garrison in the fort could, by no possibility, commit aggression upon them. They knew—they were expressly notified—that the giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison, was all which would on that occasion be attempted, unless themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke more. They knew that this Government desired to keep the garrison in the fort, not to assail them, but merely to maintain visible possession, and thus to preserve the Union from actual and immediate dissolution; trusting, as herein before stated, to time, discussion, and the ballot-box, for final adjustment; and they assailed and reduced the fort for precisely the reverse object—to drive out the visible authority of the Federal Union, and thus force it to immediate dissolution. That this was their object, the Executive well understood; and having said to them, in the inaugural address, “You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors,” he took pains, not only to keep this declaration good, but also to keep the case so free from the power of ingenious sophistry as that the world should not be able to misunderstand it. By the affair at Fort Sumter, with its surrounding circumstances, that point was reached. Then, and thereby, the assailants of the Government began the conflict of arms, without a gun in sight, or in expectancy to return their fire, save only the few in the fort, sent to that harbor, years before, for their own protection, and still ready to give that protection in whatever was lawful. In this act, discarding all else, they have forced upon the country the distinct issue: “Immediate dissolution, or blood.”

And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family of man the question, whether a constitutional republic, or democracy—a government of the people, by the same people—can, or can not, maintain its Territorial integrity against its own domestic foes. It presents the question, whether discontented individuals, too few in numbers to control Administration, according to organic law, in any case, can always, upon the pretenses made in this case, or on any other pretenses, or arbitrarily without any pretense, break up their government, and thus practically put an end to free government upon the earth. It forces us to ask: “Is there, in all republics, this inherent and fatal weakness?” “Must a government of necessity be too *strong* for the liberties of its own people, or too *weak* to maintain its own existence?”

So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out the war power of the Government; and so to resist force employed for its destruction, by force for its preservation.

The call was made, and the response of the country was most gratifying, surpassing in unanimity and spirit the most sanguine expectation. Yet none of the States commonly called Slave States, except Delaware, gave a regiment through regular State organization. A few regiments have been organized within some others of those States by individual enterprise, and received into the Government service. Of course the seceded States, so-called (and to which Texas had been joined about the time of the inauguration), gave no troops to the cause of the Union. The border States, so-called, were not uniform in their action; some of them being almost *for* the Union, while in others, as Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, the Union sentiment was nearly repressed and silenced. The course taken in Virginia was the most remarkable, perhaps the most important. A convention, elected by the people of that State to consider this very question of disrupting the Federal Union, was in session at the capital of Virginia when Fort Sumter fell. To this body the people had chosen a large majority of *professed* Union men. Almost immediately after the fall of Sumter, many members of that majority went over to the original disunion minority, and, with them, adopted an ordinance for withdrawing the State from

the Union. Whether this change was wrought by their great approval of the assault upon Sumter, or their great resentment at the Government's resistance to that assault, is not definitely known. Although they submitted the ordinance, for ratification, to a vote of the people, to be taken on a day then somewhat more than a month distant, the convention and the Legislature (which was also in session at the same time and place), with leading men of the State, not members of either, immediately commenced acting as if the State were already out of the Union. They pushed military preparations vigorously forward all over the State. They seized the United States armory at Harper's Ferry, and the navy-yard at Gosport, near Norfolk. They received, perhaps invited, into their State large bodies of troops, with their warlike appointments, from the so-called seceded States. They formally entered into a treaty of temporary alliance and co-operation with the so-called "Confederate States," and sent members to their Congress at Montgomery. And, finally, they permitted the insurrectionary government to be transferred to their capital at Richmond.

The people of Virginia have thus allowed this giant insurrection to make its nest within her borders; and this Government has no choice left but to deal with it *where* it finds it. And it has the less regret, as the loyal citizen have, in due form, claimed its protection. Those loyal citizens this Government is bound to recognize and protect, as being Virginia.

In the border States, so-called, in fact the middle States, there are those who favor a policy which they call "armed neutrality;" that is, an arming of those States to prevent the Union forces passing one way, or the disunion the other, over their soil. This would be disunion completed. Figuratively speaking, it would be the building of an impassable wall along the line of separation, and yet not quite an impassable one; for, under the guise of neutrality, it would tie the hands of the Union men, and freely pass supplies from among them to the insurrectionists, which it could not do as an open enemy. At a stroke, it would take all the trouble off the hands of secession, except only what proceeds from the external blockade. It would do for the disunionists that which, of all things, they most desire, feed them well, and give them disunion without a

struggle of their own. It recognizes no fidelity to the Constitution, no obligation to maintain the Union; and while very many who have favored it are, doubtless, loyal citizens, it is, nevertheless, very injurious in effect.

Recurring to the action of the Government, it may be stated that, at first, a call was made for seventy-five thousand militia; and rapidly following this, a proclamation was issued for closing the ports of the insurrectionary districts by proceedings in the nature of blockade. So far all was believed to be strictly legal. At this point the insurrectionists announced their purpose to enter upon the practice of privateering.

Other calls were made for volunteers to serve three years, unless sooner discharged, and also for large additions to the regular army and navy. These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity; trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress.

Soon after the first call for militia, it was considered a duty to authorize the commanding general, in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, or, in other words, to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public safety. This authority has purposely been exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has been done under it are questioned, and the attention of the country has been called to the proposition that one who is sworn to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" should not himself violate them. Of course some consideration was given to the questions of power and propriety, before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were being resisted, and failing of execution in nearly one-third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the means necessary to their execution some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty, that practically, it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should, to a very limited extent, be violated? To state the question more

directly, are all the laws *but one* to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the official oath be broken, if the Government should be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it? But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not believed that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitution that "the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it," is equivalent to a provision—is a provision—that such privilege may be suspended when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety *does* require it. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the Executive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it can not be believed the framers of the instrument intended that, in every case, the danger should run its course until Congress could be called together; the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the Rebellion.

No more extended argument is now offered, as an opinion at some length will probably be presented by the Attorney-General. Whether there shall be any legislation upon the subject, and if any, what, is submitted entirely to the better judgment of Congress.

The forbearance of this Government had been so extraordinary and so long continued as to lead some foreign nations to shape their action as if they supposed the early destruction of our National Union was probable. While this, on discovery, gave the Executive some concern, he is now happy to say that the sovereignty and rights of the United States are now everywhere practically respected by foreign powers, and a general sympathy with the country is manifested throughout the world.

The reports of the Secretaries of the Treasury, War, and the Navy will give the information in detail deemed necessary, and convenient for your deliberation and action; while the

Executive and all the departments will stand ready to supply omissions, or to communicate new facts considered important for you to know.

It is now recommended that you give the legal means for making this contest a short and a decisive one; that you place at the control of the Government, for the work, at least four hundred thousand men and four hundred millions of dollars. That number of men is about one-tenth of those of proper ages within the regions where, apparently, *all* are willing to engage; and the sum is less than a twenty-third part of the money value owned by the men who seem ready to devote the whole. A debt of six hundred millions of dollars *now* is a less sum per head than was the debt of our Revolution when we came out of that struggle; and the money value in the country now bears even a greater proportion to what it was *then* than does the population. Surely each man has as strong a motive *now* to *preserve* our liberties as each had *then* to *establish* them.

A right result at this time will be worth more to the world than ten times the men and ten times the money. The evidence reaching us from the country leaves no doubt that the material for the work is abundant, and that it needs only the hand of legislation to give it legal sanction, and the hand of the Executive to give it practical shape and efficiency. One of the greatest perplexities of the Government is to avoid receiving troops faster than it can provide for them. In a word, the people will save their Government if the Government itself will do its part only indifferently well.

It might seem, at first thought, to be of little difference whether the present movement at the South be called "secession" or "rebellion." The movers, however, well understand the difference. At the beginning they knew they could never raise their treason to any respectable magnitude by any name which implies *violation* of law. They knew their people possessed as much of moral sense, as much of devotion to law and order, and as much pride in and reverence for the history and government of their common country, as any other civilized and patriotic people. They knew they could make no advancement directly in the teeth of these strong and noble sentiments. Accordingly they commenced by an insidious debauching of the

public mind. They invented an ingenious sophism, which, if conceded, was followed by perfectly logical steps through all the incidents to the complete destruction of the Union. The sophism itself is, that any State of the Union may, *consistently* with the National Constitution, and therefore *lawfully* and *peacefully*, withdraw from the Union without the consent of the Union or of any other State. The little disguise that the supposed right is to be exercised only for just cause, themselves to be the sole judge of its justice, is too thin to merit any notice.

With rebellion thus sugar-coated, they have been drugging the public mind of their section for more than thirty years, until at length they have brought many good men to a willingness to take up arms against the Government the day *after* some assemblage of men have enacted the farcical pretense of taking their State out of the Union, who could have been brought to no such thing the day *before*.

This sophism derives much, perhaps the whole, of its currency from the assumption that there is some omnipotent and sacred supremacy pertaining to a *State*, to each State of our Federal Union. Our States have neither more nor less power than that reserved to them in the Union by the Constitution, no one of them ever having been a State *out* of the Union. The original ones passed into the Union even *before* they cast off their British Colonial dependence; and the new ones each came into the Union directly from a condition of dependence, excepting Texas. And even Texas, in its temporary independence, was never designated a State. The new ones only took the designation of States on coming into the Union, while that name was first adopted for the old ones in and by the Declaration of Independence. Therein the "United Colonies" were declared to be "free and independent States;" but even then the object plainly was not to declare their independence of *one another*, or of the *Union*, but directly the contrary, as their mutual pledge and their mutual action before, at the time, and afterwards abundantly show. The express plighting of faith by each and all of the original thirteen in the Articles of Confederation, two years later, that the Union shall be perpetual, is most conclusive. Having never been States, either in substance or in name, *outside* of the Union, whence this magical omnipotence of "State

rights," asserting a claim of power to lawfully destroy the Union itself? Much is said about the "sovereignty" of the States; but the word, even, is not in the National Constitution; nor, as is believed, in any of the State constitutions. What is a "sovereignty," in the political sense of the term? Would it be far wrong to define it "a political community, without a political superior?" Tested by this, no one of our States, except Texas, ever was a sovereignty. And even Texas gave up the character on coming into the Union; by which act she acknowledged the Constitution of the United States, and the laws and treaties of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution, to be, for her, the supreme law of the land. The States have their *status* in the Union, and they have no other legal *status*. If they break from this, they can only do so against law and by revolution. The Union, and not themselves separately, procured their independence and their liberty. By conquest or purchase, the Union gave each of them whatever of independence and liberty it has. The Union is older than any of the States, and, in fact, it created them as States. Originally some dependent Colonies made the Union, and, in turn, the Union threw off their old dependence for them, and made them States, such as they are. Not one of them ever had a State constitution independent of the Union. Of course, it is not forgotten that all the new States framed their constitutions before they entered the Union; nevertheless, dependent upon, and preparatory to, coming into the Union.

Unquestionably the States have the powers and rights reserved to them in and by the National Constitution; but among these, surely, are not included all conceivable powers, however mischievous or destructive, but, at most, such only as were known in the world, at the time, as governmental powers; and certainly a power to destroy the Government itself had never been known as a governmental, as a merely administrative power. This relative matter of national power and State rights, as a principle, is no other than the principle of *generality* and *locality*. Whatever concerns the whole should be confided to the whole, to the General Government; while whatever concerns *only* the State should be left exclusively to the State. This is all there is of original principle about it. Whether the

National Constitution, in defining boundaries between the two, has applied the principle with exact accuracy, is not to be questioned. We are all bound by that defining, without question.

What is now combated is the position that secession is *consistent* with the Constitution—is *lawful* and *peaceful*. It is not contended that there is any express law for it; and nothing should ever be implied as law which leads to unjust or absurd consequences. The Nation purchased with money the countries out of which several of these States were formed. Is it just that they shall go off without leave, and without refunding? The Nation paid very large sums (in the aggregate, I believe, nearly a hundred millions) to relieve Florida of the aboriginal tribes. Is it just that she shall now be off without consent, or without making any return? The Nation is now in debt for money applied to the benefit of these so-called seceding States, in common with the rest. Is it just, either that creditors shall go unpaid, or the remaining States pay the whole? A part of the present national debt was contracted to pay the old debts of Texas. Is it just that she shall leave, and pay no part of this herself?

Again, if one State may secede, so may another; and when all shall have seceded, none is left to pay the debts. Is this quite just to creditors? Did we notify them of this sage view of ours when we borrowed their money? If we now recognize this doctrine by allowing the seceders to go in peace, it is difficult to see what we can do if others choose to go, or to extort terms upon which they will promise to remain.

The seceders insist that our Constitution admits of secession. They have assumed to make a national constitution of their own, in which, of necessity, they have either *discarded* or *retained* the right of secession, as, they insist, it exists in ours. If they have discarded it, they thereby admit that, on principle, it ought not to be in ours. If they have retained it, by their own construction of ours they show that to be consistent they must secede from one another whenever they shall find it the easiest way of settling their debts or effecting any other selfish or unjust object. The principle itself is one of disintegration, and upon which no government can possibly endure.

If all the States save one should assert the power to *drive*

that one out of the Union, it is presumed the whole class of seceder politicians would at once deny the power, and denounce the act as the greatest outrage upon State rights. But suppose that precisely the same act, instead of being called "driving the one out," should be called "the seceding of the others from that one," it would be exactly what the seceders claim to do; unless, indeed, they make the point that the one, because it is a minority, may rightfully do what the others, because they are a majority, may not rightfully do. These politicians are subtle and profound on the rights of minorities. They are not partial to that power which made the Constitution, and speaks from the preamble, calling itself "We, the People."

It may well be questioned whether there is to-day a majority of the legally qualified voters of any State, except, perhaps, South Carolina, in favor of disunion. There is much reason to believe that the Union men are the majority in many, if not in every other one, of the so-called seceded States. The contrary has not been demonstrated in any one of them. It is ventured to affirm this, even of Virginia and Tennessee; for the result of an election, held in military camps, where the bayonets are all on one side of the question voted upon, can scarcely be considered as demonstrating popular sentiment. At such an election all that large class who are at once *for* the Union and *against* coercion would be coerced to vote against the Union.

It may be affirmed without extravagance that the free institutions we enjoy have developed the powers and improved the condition of our whole people beyond any example in the world. Of this we now have a striking and an impressive illustration. So large an army as the Government has now on foot was never before known, without a soldier in it but who had taken his place there of his own free choice. But more than this: there are many single regiments whose members, one and another, possess full practical knowledge of all the arts, sciences, professions, and whatever else, whether useful or elegant, is known in the world; and there is scarcely one from which there could not be selected a President, a Cabinet, a Congress, and, perhaps, a Court, abundantly competent to

administer the Government itself! Nor do I say this is not true, also, in the army of our late friends, now adversaries, in this contest; but if it is, so much better the reason why the Government which has conferred such benefits on both them and us should not be broken up. Whoever, in any section, proposes to abandon such a Government would do well to consider in deference to what principle it is that he does it; what better he is likely to get in its stead; whether the substitute will give, or be intended to give, so much of good to the people. There are some foreshadowings on this subject. Our adversaries have adopted some declarations of independence, in which, unlike the good old one penned by Jefferson, they omit the words "All men are created equal." Why? They have adopted a temporary national constitution, in the preamble of which, unlike our good old one signed by Washington, they omit "We, the people," and substitute "We, the deputies of the sovereign and independent States." Why? Why this deliberate pressing out of view the rights of men and the authority of the people?

This is essentially a people's contest. On the side of the Union it is a struggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance of Government whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men; to lift artificial weights from all shoulders; to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all; to afford all an unfettered start and a fair chance in the race of life. Yielding to partial and temporary departures, from necessity, this is the leading object of the Government for whose existence we contend.

I am most happy to believe that the plain people understand and appreciate this. It is worthy of note that, while in this the Government's hour of trial large numbers of those in the army and navy who have been favored with the offices have resigned and proved false to the hand which had pampered them, not one common soldier or common sailor is known to have deserted his flag.

Great honor is due to those officers who remained true, despite the example of their treacherous associates; but the greatest honor and most important fact of all is the unanimous firmness of the common soldiers and common sailors. To the last man, so far as known, they have successfully resisted the

traitorous efforts of those whose commands but an hour before they obeyed as absolute law. This is the patriotic instinct of plain people. They understand, without an argument, that the destroying the Government which was made by Washington means no good to them.

Our popular Government has often been called an experiment. Two points in it our people have already settled—the successful *establishing* and the successful *administering* of it. One still remains—its successful *maintenance* against a formidable internal attempt to overthrow it. It is now for them to demonstrate to the world that those who can fairly carry an election can also suppress a rebellion; that ballots are the rightful and peaceful successors of bullets; and that when ballots have fairly and Constitutionally decided, there can be no successful appeal back to bullets; that there can be no successful appeal except to ballots themselves at succeeding elections. Such will be a great lesson of peace; teaching men that what they can not take by an election, neither can they take it by a war; teaching all the folly of being the beginners of a war.

Lest there be some uneasiness in the minds of candid men as to what is to be the course of the Government towards the Southern States *after* the Rebellion shall have been suppressed, the Executive deems it proper to say it will be his purpose then, as ever, to be guided by the Constitution and the laws; and that he probably will have no different understanding of the powers and duties of the Federal Government relatively to the rights of the States and the people under the Constitution than that expressed in the Inaugural Address.

He desires to preserve the Government, that it may be administered for all as it was administered by the men who made it. Loyal citizens everywhere have the right to claim this of their Government, and the Government has no right to withhold or neglect it. It is not perceived that, in giving it, there is any coercion, any conquest, or any subjugation, in any just sense of those terms.

The Constitution provides, and all the States have accepted the provision, that “the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government.” But if a State may lawfully go out of the Union, having done so,

it may also discard the republican form of government; so that to prevent its going out is an indispensable *means* to the *end* of maintaining the guaranty mentioned; and when an end is lawful and obligatory, the indispensable means to it are also lawful and obligatory.

It was with the greatest regret that the Executive found the duty of employing the war-power in defense of the Government, forced upon him. He could but perform this duty, or surrender the existence of the Government. No compromise by public servants could, in this case, be a cure; not that compromises are not often proper, but that no popular government can long survive a marked precedent that those who carry an election can only save the Government from immediate destruction by giving up the main point upon which the people gave the election. The people themselves, and not their servants, can safely reverse their own deliberate decisions.

As a private citizen, the Executive could not have consented that these institutions shall perish; much less could he, in betrayal of so vast and so sacred a trust as these free people had confided to him. He felt that he had no moral right to shrink, nor even to count the chances of his own life, in what might follow. In full view of his great responsibility, he has, so far, done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment, perform yours. He sincerely hopes that your views and your action may so accord with his as to assure all faithful citizens, who have been disturbed in their rights, of a certain and speedy restoration to them, under the Constitution and the laws.

And having thus chosen our course, without guile and with pure purpose, let us renew our trust in God, and go forward without fear, and with manly hearts.

JULY 4, 1861.

This simple and brief message introduces no subject but the one in every man's mouth, the Rebellion; and gives a clear view of the progress of the conspiracy and the condition and demands of the country at that moment. The message in a few

words disposes of the political nightmare, *habeas corpus*, and as sententiously handles several other questions in the destiny of the Republic brought to the test by the struggle for its overthrow. The loyal part of the country looked with profound interest upon this message, and approved it by word and deed. As in his Inaugural Address Mr. Lincoln had earnestly attempted to remove erroneous impressions touching the policy of his Administration in dealing with the South and slavery, so now he deemed it necessary to offer further conciliation to the South, and especially to that "rear-guard of the Rebellion" sprinkled through the North and now arrayed against every step of the Government, in Congress, as to his treatment of the South after the suppression of the Rebellion. In few words the message disposes of the utterly unstatesman-like, unpatriotic, foolish, and contemptible neutrality scheme of some of the border Slave States, notably Kentucky.

One or two very undignified expressions found their way into the message, and their appearance there can not be justified by any poverty of the American (English) language, or in any want of gravity in the subject; nor is it agreeable to hunt an apology for them in the peculiar character of their author. "Too thin" and "sugar-coated" are expressions hardly to be looked for in a Presidential message, at any time. Mr. F. B. Carpenter makes the following statement about this matter :—

"Mr. Defrees, the Government Printer, told me that, when the message was being printed, he was a good deal

disturbed by the use of the term 'sugar-coated,' and finally went to the President about it. Their relations to each other being of the most intimate character, he told Mr. Lincoln frankly that he ought to remember that a message to Congress was a different affair from a speech at a mass-meeting in Illinois; that the message became a part of history, and should be written accordingly. 'What is the matter now?' inquired the President. 'Why,' said Mr. Defrees, 'you have used an undignified expression in the message;' and then, reading the paragraph aloud, he added, 'I would alter the structure of that, if I were you.' 'Defrees,' replied Mr. Lincoln, 'that word expresses exactly my idea, and I am not going to change it. The time will never come in this country when the people won't know exactly what sugar-coated means.'"

Mr. Lincoln here refers to the charge made against him of violating provisions of the Constitution he was sworn to execute faithfully. This charge was made as to the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*. It was made in reference to his providing for the increase of the regular army; and, indeed, the people engaged in the Rebellion, and their virulent-spirited friends in the North looked upon every step of the Administration as unconstitutional. "Unconstitutional" was the cry from the beginning of the war to the end of it. This was one of the most remarkable features of the Rebellion, one of the strangest hallucinations of that evil time. Even Jefferson Davis and other Southern writers still talk with the utmost composure of Mr. Lincoln's unconstitutional acts. In the strange philosophy that controlled the minds of the rebel leaders only their own acts were

Constitutional and right. Secession was right, and everything involved under it, from the theft of a Springfield rifle to piracy on the "high seas," from the destruction of the property of the Nation to the destruction of the Nation itself; the ignoring of the Constitution and all laws to the setting up of a system in defiance of the Government and the will of the majority of the whole people. And yet these men talked of the unconstitutional course of the Administration and its loyal supporters; and in Congress, from the short session of the Senate in March, 1861, to the assassination of President Lincoln, there always were a few men constituting the most pestiferous and nefarious part of the Northern rear contingent of the Rebellion who opposed persistently every act of legislation and every purpose and step of the Executive looking to the restoration of the Union. Newspaper articles and even books were written on "illegal imprisonments," "illegal arrests," and other "illegal" acts of the Administration. A hue and cry rang from Maine to Missouri if the authorities raised a hand to suppress a loud-mouthed sympathizer and busy, secret aider and abettor of the Rebellion! The liberties of the American people were lost! Personal liberty was a mockery in the land of the free! Even from the South, where every form of national law had been set at defiance, and the will of the Richmond managers become the only law, strangely enough echo everywhere persistently answered this unreasonable cry from the North. In a conspiracy all things are fair, and on this principle the Southern leaders and

their friends in the North acted from the beginning of James Buchanan's Administration, indeed for a quarter of a century before, until the death of slavery and the virtual overthrow of the utterly false political, social, and moral sentiments on which the system was founded and maintained.

To talk of the Administration observing the Constitution or any of the laws of the United States under it in dealing with the Rebellion, was then and always has been folly to even every-day common sense and patriotism. The Rebellion set them aside, and refused to hear or obey them, and to attempt to apply them to it would have been idiocy and suicide on the part of the Government authorities. The Administration was only bound to use the instruments of self-preservation for the Government, all of them, without reference to Constitution or laws. Forced war created its own conditions, and nothing could rightfully modify these but the spirit of Christian civilization. If it was right to preserve this Nation, it was right to attempt to do it by every means at all countenanced by such civilization.

What the President did in reference to the loyal States was rightfully done under the sanction of the Constitution as far as the state of rebellion permitted such a course, and no patriot, no loyal man, ever had any real ground of complaint, or any disposition to complain. Modified as explained here, there was but one law which the Administration was bound to respect in the least and greatest act: the interests of the Nation require it, the public good demands it.

Although the innocent sometimes unavoidably suffered, arbitrary arrests and imprisonments were founded upon this principle, and they were perfectly right among the other means of putting down the Rebellion. No man's personal liberty was to be placed for a moment in the scale against the life or good of the Nation. Barring the mistakes of the Government of the United States, none but evil-doers then suffered, or ever have suffered, from its hands, and suffering should be the lot of the evil-doer. No government is worthy of a moment's respect which tolerates the demoniacal sentiment that any man or community has a right to do anything he pleases. Under a Christian, or even a moral civilized polity, no man is free to do anything but what shall conduce to the general good, or the good of the individual, or be in itself right. The demon of madness or badness no government and people have any right to respect.

Notwithstanding the cry of "military despotism," of "usurpations" in the Administration, a far more despotic system was set up by the rebel managers at Richmond. First went to the ground State Rights, the principle on which secession was based, and then followed the liberties of the sovereigns, the people. But all this was right, if the Rebellion was what it was claimed to be, a government. And even being what it was, it was but reasonable to suppose that it would use the obvious means of success, that it would remove from its path elements of mischief or poisonous influences. The imprisonment and hard-

ships of John Minor Botts, Henry S. Foote, and thousands of others, loyal from the outset, or sometime later opposed to the policy of the rebel authorities, or even the very existence of the Rebellion, were things to be expected, and even justifiable, as far as anything could be justifiable in the attempt to give success to an evil cause.

CHAPTER III.

1861—WAR OF THE REBELLION—"THIRTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS"—EXTRA SESSION—A FEW NAMES IN THE "REAR-GUARD"—POLITICAL GENERALS—THE NEGRO, HIS RELIGION—"CONTRABAND OF WAR"—THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE ARMY DEALING WITH SLAVERY—GENERAL BUTLER.

CONGRESS at once pledged itself to engage in no legislation not designed for the called session as indicated in the President's message, and the House showed the spirit by which it was actuated in passing the following resolution offered by John A. McClernand, a Democrat, from Illinois :—

"This House hereby pledges itself to vote for any amount of money and any number of men which may be necessary to insure a speedy and effectual suppression of the Rebellion, and the permanent restoration of the Federal authority everywhere within the limits and jurisdiction of the United States."

Against this resolution there were five votes, two from Kentucky, two from Missouri, and one from New York. The Senate subsequently passed a similar resolution, J. C. Breckinridge opposing. The first few days in the House were spent in considering the question of disputed seats, and in deciding upon the case of Virginia as represented by men

chosen west of the Alleghany under the view that the State Convention had not consulted the will of the people in taking the State "out of the Union." The Virginians were admitted; and on the 13th two Senators appeared from that State, and after some opposition from the two Senators from Delaware, one from Missouri, one from Kentucky, and one from Indiana, they were sworn in, and took the seats from which Mason and Hunter had been declared expelled. In his message the President had entirely ignored the question of slavery, and although Congress attempted to do the same thing in this session, it was by no means successful. Most of the border State men and the Democrats were exceedingly tender on this point. They were the main effective part of the Northern "rear-guard," and appeared to consider the sacred "institution" especially intrusted to their keeping. However distant the point of legislation it was almost sure to fall into slavery, the subject which for the last quarter of a century had been the politician's main reliance. And not until after the battle of Bull Run did the Republicans approach the subject with an air of freedom about them. On the 9th Owen Lovejoy, of Illinois, offered in the House this proposition:—

"Resolved, That in the judgment of this House, it is no part of the duty of the soldier of the United States to capture and return fugitive slaves."

This was passed only by a vote of ninety-two to fifty-five. To the Army Appropriation Bill, C. L. Val-

landigham proposed this startling and ridiculous addition :—

“ Provided, however, that no part of the money hereby appropriated shall be employed in subjugating, or holding as a conquered province, any sovereign State now or lately one of the United States ; nor in abolishing or interfering with African slavery in any of the States.”

William Allen, in campaign parlance known as “ Rise-up William Allen,” of Ohio, offered this resolution :—

“ Resolved, That it is no part of the object of the present war against the rebellious States to interfere with the institution of slavery therein.”

This piece of drivel was simply ruled as out of order. To the bill for the reorganization of the army, L. Powell, of Kentucky, proposed the following wonderful addition :—

“ And be it further enacted, that no part of the army or navy of the United States shall be employed or used in subjugating or holding as a conquered province any sovereign State now or lately one of the United States.”

John Sherman, of Ohio, offered this amendment to Powell’s proposition :—

“ And be it further enacted, that the purposes of the military establishment provided for in this act are to preserve the Union, to defend the property, and to maintain the Constitutional authority of the Government.”

This was passed with four dissenting votes, the Senators from Kentucky and Missouri. Whereupon

John C. Breckinridge immediately presented this addition :—

“ But the army and navy shall not be employed for the purpose of subjugating any State, or reducing it to the condition of a Territory or province, or to abolish slavery therein.

But this was rejected by a vote of thirty to nine.

During the debates on this bill the slavery question was quite extensively discussed, and especially as a cause, or the cause, of the war; as was also the new insincere and foolish distinction between the coercion of a State and the coercion of a State's rebellious citizens. On this momentous subject Mr. O. A. Browning, of Illinois, said :—

“ I will not stop to deal with technicalities; I care not whether you call it the subjugation of the people or the subjugation of the State, where all the authorities of a State, where all the officers, who are the embodiment of the power of the State, who speak for the State, who represent the government of the State, where they are all disloyal and banded in treasonable confederation against this Government, I, for one, am for subjugating them; and you may call it the subjugation of the State, or of the people, just as you please.”

There never was the shadow of a ground for an argument or distinction on this point, and the men who talked it were simply insincere or foolish. Where there were no people there was no State, and the administration in a State, by no mere political metonymy, the world over, stands for the State.

Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, in speaking of the purpose

of the war, and denying that the Administration meditated the abolition of slavery through it, said:—

“It is not waged for any such purpose, or with any such view. They have all disclaimed it. Why then does the Senator (Powell) insist upon it? I will now say, and the Senator may make the most of it, that, rather than see one single foot of this country of ours torn from the national domain by traitors, I will myself see the slaves set free; but at the same time I utterly disclaim any purpose of that kind. If the men who are now waging war against the Government, fitting out pirates against our commerce, going back to the old mode of warfare of the middle ages, should prosecute this Rebellion to such an extent that there is no way of conquering South Carolina, for instance, except by emancipating her slaves, I say emancipate her slaves and conquer her rebellious citizens; and if they have not people there enough to elect members of Congress, we will send people there.”

Further on, in discussing the bill for confiscating property used in the Rebellion, Thaddeus Stevens said:—

“I warn Southern gentlemen that, if this war is to continue, there will be a time when my friend from New York (A. S. Diven) will see it declared by this free Nation that every bondman in the South, belonging to a rebel—recollect, I confine it to them—shall be called upon to aid us in war against their masters, and to restore this Union.”

Mr. Vallandigham proposed to make the following astounding addition to the bill for calling out an army of half a million men:—

“*Provided, further,* that before the President shall have the right to call out any more volunteers than are now in

the service, he shall appoint seven commissioners, whose mission it shall be to accompany the army on its march, to receive and consider such propositions, if any, as may at any time be submitted by the executive of the so-called Confederate States, or of any of them, looking to a suspension of hostilities, and the return of said States, or any of them, to the Union, or to obedience to the Federal Constitution and authorities."

This person also introduced some resolutions condemning the increase of the army, the blockade of Southern ports, the seizure of telegraph dispatches, the arbitrary arrests of persons giving aid and comfort to or suspected of complicity with the rebels, and most acts of the Government authorities; and bitterly opposed the bill for legalizing all the acts of the President, rendered necessary by the progress of the Rebellion previous to the meeting of Congress.

So throughout this short session, ending on the 6th of August, these misguided and unwise men in vain attempted to place every obstruction possible in the way of the Administration, or to divert legislation into unreasonable and injurious channels. Prominent among these men were John C. Breckinridge and most of the Senators and Representatives from the border Slave States, with such men as Vallandigham, George H. Pendleton, William Allen, Jesse D. Bright, S. S. Cox, D. W. Voorhees, and others of less note. While it may be held that some of these men were patriotically aiming at the best interests of the whole country, two things are true and always have been true about them, namely: that their course in Congress gave

hope and courage to the rebel cause, and to some extent weakened and disturbed the Administration and the loyal supporters of the Government; and that had any great per cent, or all of their proposed measures, been sanctioned by Congress and carried out by the Administration and the people, the Rebellion would have succeeded, the Republic been destroyed, and political anarchy inaugurated in this country. Some of these men greatly modified their course subsequently, but there were always a few of them in Congress, and their influence, however trifling, pointed in the wrong direction; and, to a large extent, they constituted the head of that small column of Northern men who formed throughout the war a sort of Northern contingent of the Rebellion, and whose main duty it was to obstruct the way of the national army and fire upon its rear. Some exceedingly worthy men at other periods of their lives, now and then, dropped out of this column, while others remained in it, throwing the most notable part of their existence into the history of the Rebellion, the most inexplicable, indefensible, and offensive page of which is that telling their deeds and connecting their names with it.

There was but one thing for Congress to do at this time, and that it did, prepare for war. On the 22d of July, the following resolution, introduced by John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky, was passed without noteworthy opposition:—

“Resolved, By the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, That the present deplorable civil

war has been forced upon the country by the disunionists of the Southern States now in revolt against the Constitutional Government, and in arms around the Capital; that in this national emergency Congress, banishing all feeling of mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole country; that this war is not waged on our part in any spirit of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of the States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union, with all the dignities, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."

No special session of Congress had ever been more important and none ever did the work before it more expeditiously and satisfactorily. It sanctioned and legalized the acts of the President, provided for the payment of the militia and volunteers that had been called out, authorized the President to organize another army not over five hundred thousand strong, and laid down the necessary provisions for its organization; it provided for the collection of the revenue, declaring rebel ports closed, and the forfeiture of the vessels owned by rebels; it authorized a vast national loan, and made appropriations for the army and navy, and the civil service, then supposed to be sufficient for the emergency; it provided for the increase of the regular army, for the purchase of arms, and the increase of the navy, to indemnify the States for their outlay in arming the three months' men, and for punishing conspiracies and piracy; it provided for the increase of the rate of pay

for soldiers, for the construction of war vessels; and it provided for the confiscation of property used in the Rebellion, and in particular the forfeiture forever after of all claims on the part of rebels to slaves used in any way to the benefit of the Rebellion.

It was the great misfortune of the Government at the beginning and for the first half of the war that a large per cent of army officers was drawn from the various ranks of civil life, and wholly without military experience. This misfortune was very materially increased by the fact that most of these inexperienced general officers were politicians, who, besides being patriots and acting as such, seldom lost sight of their own political chances in the future. A regular and irregular business of these officers, in season and out of season, was haranguing the soldiers; and the opportunity of snatching an advantage to win a victory or complete a triumph on many a battle-field was lost by the faculty of these men to make speeches. In an analysis of General Grant's successful military career, the most admirable and first observable feature is the absence of speeches and verbose and extravagant proclamations. And not until the Nation got at the head of its armies generals, not politicians, men who were soldiers by habits of mind and life, and who left political considerations entirely out of their estimates of war power for crushing the Rebellion, and who preferred even to sign their orders by the points of their swords, there was little or no advance made toward the end in view. Yet, in the general conduct of the war, political considerations

could not be wholly ignored. The value of the border Slave States in the contest, and the tender regard of the Administration for their loyal people, gave rise to the undecided and temporizing policy pursued in reference to them, but that the evil of the policy was more than the good may well be doubted. The inevitable necessity of events, and not the disposition of the Administration, in the course of time changed this policy quite as soon as the power of the Government was available for the execution of a more determined and soldierly new one. It was difficult for the Administration and the country to distinguish between political and military necessities, and the disposition was general to test every step by old party standards. The conduct of the Administration and the loyal people could have been viewed in no other light, disinterestedly, than that it was the Republican party which was on trial in a test for an extended lease on the administration of the Government. All these things now, when looked at by themselves, appear like misfortunes great enough to have ruined the noblest cause. But their importance, to some extent, disappears, and their evil influence was lost, in the fact that the affairs of the Rebellion were conducted on the same plan.

One of the wisest features of the Military Bill of the special session of Congress was the provision for officering the volunteers to some extent with regularly educated soldiers, and bringing portions of the regular troops in contact with the vast volunteer army. At the time the war began it was supposed

that about twelve hundred and fifty graduates of West Point were living, and over eight hundred of them were yet connected with the army. Only one-fifth of these went over to the Rebellion. Of those who returned to civil pursuits, a greater proportion was believed to be disloyal. Still this left a large body of educated military men to become the drill-masters and disciplinarians, and finally the successful leaders of the magnificent armies of the Republic. In the navy the proportion of officers who remained loyal was somewhat greater, and among the men of both army and navy there were few who ever became untrue to the country.

Although there was a strong disposition at first to keep the negro out of the war, the possibility of doing so became evidently less day by day. He had constituted the chief political theme too long to be set aside so easily at the outset of a great conflict based entirely upon the question whether he should some time be free or forever remain a slave. Very different ideas existed in the two sections as to the course the negro would himself choose, and as far as practicable, carry out during the struggle.

About the almost universal desire among the slaves for freedom, there was no mistake, but it was a great error on the part of the North to suppose that they would constitute a source of internal weakness which would in itself go far toward the destruction of the Rebellion. The Southern leaders were better acquainted with the condition and character of their slaves. They feared no insurrections. And from the

day the first war note was sounded, this vast element of strength to the Rebellion was brought into requisition. There was no hesitancy about what should be done with the negro. While there was no thought of clothing him as a black knight and sending him forth to fight and win the right to forge an eternal chain for himself, with the spade and ax in his hands he was to bear the brunt of hardships, to lighten and ennoble the deeds of a race of chivalrous masters. He was to be the faithful guardian of the home when its lord was on the battle-field; he was to till the soil, and whiten the spacious plantations with cotton, still declared to be king, and erroneously set down as the unfailing source of wealth to back the Rebellion, and without which it must ultimately fail, no matter what else it might have to recommend it or bring to its aid. As to cotton, the rebels missed their calculations entirely, the very effective blockade of their ports by the Government, early forcing them to abandon its culture, to a great extent, to raise the grain they expected to import for the support of the army and country. The effectiveness of the blockade and the failure of their hopes as to cotton were well demonstrated by the fact that at the end of the war, in an utterly bankrupt country, there were found several millions of dollars' worth of the great staple which it had been impossible to convert into money, war material, or provisions.

But the negroes never betrayed their old masters. They only did one thing when they could, they ran away. As to the outcome of this step there seemed

to be little concern. It was the way to freedom; and that implied everything good in the world which they had never been able to taste. These slaves were divided into two classes by their pursuits and by their intellectual attainments: servants about the house and in mechanical pursuits, and field-hands of both sexes. As they approached the persons of their masters and came more in close relations with the whites, their skins became lighter, and their faces and forms became more perfect and pleasing, and their mental development and civilization were advanced. In both classes the negroes were faithful, mainly, to their masters' homes, which they always regarded as their own, and were more or less proud of them, according to the standing and wealth of the master, whose name they bore.

In all the arguments and talks, mainly foolish, great and entirely undue stress was always put upon the Christian civilization of the African by his enslavement in this country. And for the fine results reached in this way, of course, the credit has been chiefly given to the women and the clergy. The man who has lived in the South, or who has traveled well there, has made little use of his faculties, or had none for use which were worthy of respectable consideration, who has not observed and thought of the sham there is about negro morals, negro piety, and everything in the outward manifestation of negro Christian civilization. Follow a negro "revival meeting," in and out, for one week, even to-day no farther south than the famous Blue Grass region of Ken-

tucky, and then say that there is not something amazingly grotesque about it; that this much-lauded Christian civilization into which the poor African has been elevated is not the most absurdly and disgustingly grotesque, if not blasphemous and infamous, of all human burlesques; with only one mitigating circumstance, that it is better than nothing.

I do not, however, blame these people for their low grade of Christianity, but I shall never stand up as a warm eulogist of those who taught it. It is true that the simplest or highest thing which a child or a man of any grade can learn may be taught so as to take the most refined and elevated form; but it was never meant to teach the slave even the poor degree of religious intelligence and refinement known to the master. A higher idea of God he never reached than of a very all-seeing or very exacting "master." That view of it was best for all concerned. It was not uncommon for the so-called religious slaves to represent themselves in the most foolish ways, as holding frequent intercourse with the devil as a monstrous or personal form of evil, or with God in some form, and their theology was of the rudest, wildest, and most sensual kind. The fine morals of Christianity they were never taught, and did not possess. With the signs and forms of Christianity learned by example, police regulations, and otherwise, they mixed strange and inconsistent conduct. Their coarse, so-called, religious ecstasies were often mere cloaks and farces. After months of hard teaching the pious missionary asked his Fiji Island parishioners what,

after all, was the highest end of man, and received for a deliberate reply : "To steal oxen."

Many years ago I met a Winnebago Indian on the Minnesota River, and, after the usual salute, he invited me to go ashore and play a game of cards, adding the observation that he was an honest man and a good gambler. He was unable to see any incongruity in this brief eulogy. Was the Christian civilization of slavery much more than this? Put it all, or the remnants of it, to-day in the scales against a life of unrestrained, savage freedom, and how would the matter intrinsically stand?

But to resume the main point designed for this chapter. It was the sincere desire of the Administration at the outset, and for months subsequently, to put down the Rebellion without annoyance from the slavery question. Mr. Lincoln would have been glad if he could have restored the Union as it was in this particular, as well as others. Although he had said this Nation could not exist part slave and part free, he would not have settled the question in his time, perhaps, but put it in the way of certain settlement in the course of years by the consent of the people. Mr. Lincoln had no enthusiasm about this negro question, and was only conditionally a friend of the negro race. The whole matter was thrust upon him. He approached it with extreme caution, and got more credit, perhaps, for his final course than his original inclination or actual motive justified.

The troops under the President's first call were

especially noted also for similar caution in dealing with the negro. Burnside and other officers to whom slaves applied to be protected returned them to their masters, or refused to accept them in the camps, and in West Virginia McClellan appeared as a very champion of slavery, and seemed to be willing to turn his bayonets upon slaves who dared to mistake his army as the way to freedom. In this matter General McClellan had a policy, if the Administration and nobody else seemed to have.

But Congress entered its protest against engaging the army in the business of catching and returning fugitive slaves, and this infernal subject was evidently not to be quieted at the beginning of a war started on its account.

In May General Benjamin F. Butler, who had so effectually squelched the Rebellion in Maryland, but who had not done it in accordance with General Scott's very politic and conciliatory views, was sent down to Fortress Monroe, in some respects the most important military post in the Nation. In returning from his first warlike excursion from Hampton, after taking possession of that place his army was followed by many slaves, who had been deserted by their masters, or who had been employed in the rebel works, and these General Butler at once declared to be "contraband of war," and refused to deliver them to rebel owners. This matter, so easily disposed of at first by this lawyer-general, became in a short time a complex and serious question. And, recognizing the lack of any policy on the part of the Adminis-

tration covering the matter, in the forms in which it was likely to appear, on the 30th of July, 1861, Butler wrote to the Secretary of War, fully presenting the "contraband" question as it occurred to him then, and as he believed the Administration would have to see sooner or later. He said that a large number of slave men, women, and children had collected at Hampton, and he had employed the men on the fortifications, and the women washed and marketed for the camp; that when Hampton was abandoned, all these blacks appealed to him for protection; and that nine hundred of them were then in the camp. He then asked: What shall be done with them? What is their state and condition? Are they slaves? Are they free? Is their condition that of men, women, and children, or of property? or is it a mixed relation? He said their status under the Constitution and laws was well known; but then, he asked, what was the effect of a state of war and rebellion on that status? He stated that in adopting the plan of treating them as "contraband of war," on the ground of being property to be used in aid of the Rebellion, he considered the matter as standing on a right and legal basis.

But the case now presented new aspects. Were they property? Their owners had run away and deserted them to starve, themselves to engage in the Rebellion. If they were still property, were they not the property of their saviors, against whom the rebellious owners were at war? But these saviors had different views about the matter, and would not

hold them as property. Then, did not their property status cease? His reasoning led him, he said, to regard them as free. He referred to the order in General McDowell's army forbidding slaves entering the lines, or being harbored in any way, and wanted to know if this was to be the practice of all the armies for the war. If so, there then would arise questions as to who were slaves, who were not, how the many difficulties arising would be decided, and who would decide them. If the rule was to be general, as a soldier he would enforce it as best he could. But in a loyal State he would put down slave insurrections; in a rebellious one he would confiscate the slaves, and all else which the rebel would use as a force against the power of the Government, and if it turned out that these confiscated slaves went free, it would be a matter little to be regretted or discussed.

On the 8th of August Mr. Cameron answered this letter. He said the President desired all existing rights of the States to be respected; that the war was for the preservation of the Union, with all the rights of the States intact; hence there could be no question as to these fugitives from labor in States where the authority of the Union was in full force. But in rebellious States, the military exigencies stood before the rights of States and citizens, if these rights were not wholly forfeited by the Rebellion; and that by the act of the session of Congress, just closed, the right of persons in rebellion to slaves used in furthering the Rebellion was discharged.

The fourth section of this Confiscation Act read :—

“Whenever hereafter, during the present insurrection against the Government of the United States, any person claimed to be held to labor or service under the law of any State, shall be required or permitted by the person to whom such labor or service is claimed to be due, or by the lawful agent of such person, to take up arms against the United States, or shall be required or permitted by the person to whom such labor or service is claimed to be due, or his lawful agent, to work or to be employed in or upon any fort, navy-yard, dock, armory, ship, intrenchment, or in any military or naval service whatsoever, against the Government and lawful authority of the United States, then, and in every such case, the person to whom such labor or service is claimed to be due shall forfeit his claim to such labor, any law of the State or of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding. And whenever thereafter the person claiming such labor or service shall seek to enforce his claim, it shall be a full and sufficient answer to such claim that the person whose service or labor is claimed had been employed in hostile service against the Government of the United States, contrary to the provisions of this Act.”

The Secretary acknowledged the great inconvenience which might surround the case in determining between the loyal and the disloyal, and concluded that, on the whole, the rights of all would be best subserved by receiving all “contrabands” that came, of necessity or without invitation, and employing them as the circumstances might require, at the same time keeping a record of them, to enable Congress at the end of the war to compensate the deserving and amicably adjust the whole matter. According to

this timid and impossible plan General Butler was requested to conduct himself, not allowing any interference with the slaves of loyal masters, or preventing any who might desire returning to their old homes.

General Wool, who took command at Fortress Monroe, a month or two afterwards issued an order requiring these slaves to be paid, the men eight, and the women four dollars per month and fed and clothed, while they were employed by the Government. This plan was soon, for a time, adopted throughout the army; and to General Butler the credit of putting the Administration in the way to any policy at all on this evil subject was due. From his fruitful brain at Fortress Monroe sprang the exceedingly convenient term "contraband," which went into the general speech of the country as the conciliatory and humorous designation of the fugitive slave, indeed of the whole of the "peculiar institution" of the South. The plan of employing these slaves, registering their names, names of their owners, time of service, and so on, was one of immense labor, and one which, after occupying the time of a good-sized army itself, would have led ultimately to inextricable difficulties to the country. But all this ended by the famous Emancipation Proclamation and the continuation of the Rebellion.

The war had scarcely begun, indeed, until a great change came over the "institution." It was to be readily seen that a separation of the Union was not going to bind the slave forever, or rear an impene-

trable wall between him and freedom. Who had any right now to expect the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, and who had any right or disposition to want to execute it? Thousands now flocked across the vast Free-State border, and no record of them was even taken which would aid in returning them to slavery. Where one escaped in time of loyal peace, hundreds now went, never to be returned. It appears that from 1840 to 1850 but one thousand and eleven slaves escaped into freedom from all the Slave States; and from 1850 to 1860, only eight hundred and three, notwithstanding the constant political turmoil on the subject of the abuse of the fugitive law in the North, and the everlasting cry from the South of the impossibility of her holding and perpetuating her rights (negroes) in the Union. How was the case now?

General Butler's name was so connected with this "contraband" question from the outset of the war almost, that it would have lived in its history had he never lived to bear the distinction of "Beast Butler" at New Orleans. Although he was not an able and successful military chief, as an ingenious and skillful political general his record was unique and exceedingly interesting, and from the day he entered Maryland to the end he kept the rebels in mind of his power and enmity to their purposes. In proportion to their hatred of him, did he grow in the favor of his Northern friends.

CHAPTER IV.

1861—WAR OF THE REBELLION—PROGRESS OF THE REBELS
AT HOME AND ABROAD—McCLELLAN AT THE HEAD OF
THE UNION ARMY—"ALL QUIET ON THE POTOMAC"—
ROSECRANS IN WEST VIRGINIA—LYON AND FREMONT
IN MISSOURI—BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK—THE SEC-
RETARY OF WAR IN MISSOURI—THE BODY-GUARD.

ON the day of the bombardment of Fort Sumter, Jefferson Davis called the rebel leaders to assemble again at Montgomery, towards the last of the same month. The insurrection had now, as far as possible, assumed the form of a regularly executed government. Mr. Davis's message to the legislative body at this time was a singular mixture of artful misrepresentations, but on the whole the most complete presentation of his side from the well-known Southern point of view. His main arguments were that the Government of the United States had declared war against the seceding States because one of them had fired on and captured Fort Sumter; that the seceding States were only exercising their "reserved rights;" that government by the majorities was a fallacy; and, above all, the most foolish thing ever uttered under pretentious circumstances, that "All we ask is to be let alone." And one of Mr. Davis's biographers, with childish simplicity,

says that in this message Mr. Davis actually "established the doctrine of secession." That was a doctrine which could only be established by the sword and bayonet and not by the power of the tongue, and nobody believed otherwise in America or Europe except the rebels in the South and their sympathizers wherever they were found. That many of them held to the doctrine as a mere pretense, there can be no doubt. Those who did entertain it, with few exceptions, abandoned it, and no false doctrine was ever more completely and eternally annihilated than was this in the downfall of the Rebellion. The puerility with which Jefferson Davis yet seems to hold to it is pitiable in the extreme.

On the 21st of May the "Congress" decided that the next session of that body should be held in Richmond, Virginia, beginning on the 20th of the following month.

This removal of the government seat was at first opposed by Mr. Davis, as it was also by many of the Gulf-State leaders. But the Virginia authorities had made this removal a condition of the secession of that State, and there was no apparent alternative. In the Union, Virginia was only satisfied in being first, and well the Cotton State kings knew that she would expect to take this place in the "new government." In the Gulf States, at least, there was, probably, no thought that Richmond should remain the permanent seat of the government, if there ever should be one; and the capture of Richmond without the defeat and destruction of a great rebel army

would have been an event of no great political or military significance at any time during the war.

Not until the 22d of February, 1862, was Mr. Davis inaugurated as permanent chief of the Rebellion, the permanent "Congress," as it was termed, having assembled the first time four days previously.

The opponents of the location of the seat of government at Richmond were not, perhaps, justified in any of their objections to the removal from Montgomery, and doubtlessly saw afterwards that they had been unwise. That Mr. Jefferson Davis did so is quite certain. The rebel capital was throughout the war a matter of little or no importance only so far as it could be of the greatest possible advantage to the rebels themselves in conducting their military operations. Military success was "everything" with them. There could have been little moral or political loss to them in the loss of anything but victory in battle. The selection of Richmond as the capital aided materially in securing the earnest co-operation of a people who desired, if not deserved also, to be the first defenders and sufferers in a bad cause, and removed the power back of the army to the immediate neighborhood of the leading acts in the drama. The location of their capital at Richmond must doubtless be placed among the wise acts of the rebel leaders.

The early enthusiasm of the South was at this period somewhat broken by the unfavorable progress of events during the fall and winter, to some extent, as well as by a very wide-spread dissatisfaction with

the conduct of the managers at Richmond. But the "Congress" held its sessions mainly in secret, and the reins were constantly tightened in the hands of the leaders. Until the battle of Bull Run, the South still hoped, against the most open dictates of common sense, to be let alone.

"Jefferson Davis signed the order for the reduction of Fort Sumter, but he did not thereby invoke the calamity of war. That act was simply the patriot's defiance to the menace of tyranny." Were not the history of the Rebellion as written by its defenders and actors filled with such wordy nonsense, this singular expression from one of Mr. Davis's biographers might be given the place of honor in all the annals of stupidity. But the writer of plain matter-of-fact history can well afford to "let alone" these mad apologists of the "Lost Cause."

As the reins were tighter drawn at Richmond the dream of "State sovereignty" faded away. To prove and maintain secession became a stupendous undertaking, and the great mass of the people were disappointed. But those who had begun the work were not to be turned by complaints. A conscription law was now enacted, taking all men not disabled between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. And so the States were stripped, and the will of the few or the one at Richmond was found to be supreme. Still another and more sweeping conscription act followed, and compulsion took the place of volunteer enthusiasm. The rebel "Congress" kept pace with the will of the executive, and as the measures of the National

Government became more galling, the legislative body, called "the Congress," declared its disposition to sanction any retaliatory steps, however severe, which the "president" might adopt. The severe measures put in practice were not alone directed toward the people on the north side of the slave-line. All persons at home even suspected of being lukewarm in the cause were summarily handled. With all the pretensions of the Southern politicians as to State and personal liberty, there was no such thing in the South. There never had been. The thoughts of men were as offensive as their deeds, if they were never expressed. For years before the outbreak of the Rebellion there was no freedom in the South except in the adoration and blessing of the cause of slavery. Silent submission then and during the war was no security against personal abuse.

Henry S. Foote, in writing of the imprisonment of political and suspected persons, says:—

"As chairman of a special committee of the Confederate Congress, organized at my own motion for the purpose of inquiring into cases of illegal imprisonment, I obtained from the superintendent of the prison-house in Richmond, under the official sanction of the Department of War itself, a grim and shocking catalogue of several hundred persons then in confinement therein, not one of whom was charged with anything but suspected infidelity, and this, too, not upon oath in a single instance. Before I could take proper steps to procure the discharge of these unhappy men, the second suspension of the writ of liberty occurred, and I presume that such of them as did not die in jail, remained there until the fall of Richmond."

The same writer, who had as good grounds on which to justify himself for the part he took in furthering or impeding the rebel cause, as any other man, perhaps, says :—

“The Confiscation Act was opposed from the first in the House of Representatives by a considerable number, including myself, alike upon the ground of its unconstitutionality, injustice, and impolicy. This was carried also in secret session, under the abominable ten-minutes rule, which rule I labored in vain, session after session, to get repealed, but which was retained by the votes of individuals justly apprehensive of the censures of an outraged constituency, should all the dark machinations which had their origin in this disreputable conclave be ever made known through the public journals. The special supporters of Mr. Davis were always ready to go into secret session—a thing very easy to be effected, since a single member moving for it had it in his power to bring about the immediate closing of the doors.

“At the very last session of the Confederate Congress the Confiscation Law was made still more cruel and onerous, at the instance of individuals who have since shown themselves more than willing to save their own beloved estates from the forfeiture to which they were formerly so ferociously inclined to subject others who chanced to differ from them conscientiously, both in reference to the feasibility and propriety of the scheme of revolution. I do not know when my feelings were more outraged than they were only a few weeks anterior to the vacation of my seat in the Confederate Congress, by the heartless and unmanly attempt to confiscate the estates of all absentees, unless they had gone, or should thereafter go abroad with the consent of the Government officials. This was intended mainly to operate upon Dr. Duncan, of New York, and others of that class, who had been

sojourning for several years before the beginning of the war outside of the Confederate States, and who, it was known, had very large possessions in said States. It was confessedly designed, likewise, to reach the estates of certain ladies of considerable property who had thought proper to go to New York, to Philadelphia, or even beyond the ocean, for the purpose either of avoiding the horrors of internecine strife, or for the suitable education of their infant children. In looking back to the past, I confess that I am yet full of surprise and indignation that persons professing to be civilized men and Christians should have dared to attempt the perpetration of this double-damned iniquity.

“It is well known that Mr. Davis and his cabinet were originally opposed to the Conscription Law. They were notoriously dragooned by a portion of the Confederate press into a recommendation of its adoption. But when this rank, centralizing measure had been once put in operation, these gentlemen were not slow in perceiving how, by means of its rigid enforcement, and the general suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, they would be able to put down all opposition to their scheme of despotic domination. It is a remarkable fact that, even in the message of Mr. Davis, which first recommended to the Confederate Congress a resort to this anti-Republican expedient, he declared that there had been no abatement whatever of the volunteering spirit, which still, he said, rather needed repression than stimulation. How strange must it not now seem to all reasonable men, that in a war avowedly commenced by the people of the South for their own safety exclusively, it should have been deemed allowable, even had the volunteering spirit then altogether disappeared, to force the same people, under the most harsh and dishonoring penalties, to continue the war after they should have themselves grown weary of its prosecution!

"It is a fact worthy of notice, that nearly all the legislative enactments of the Confederate Congress most deleterious in their operation upon State Rights and popular freedom originated with ultra State-Rights men, and ultra Democrats in profession. One of the most maniacal and astounding propositions brought forward in that unfortunate body was the one introduced about eighteen months ago by Mr. Barksdale, of Mississippi, which was a bill to establish martial law generally throughout the Confederate States. The peculiar relations existing between this individual and Mr. Davis fully justified the presumption that this latter personage had been duly consulted before the bringing into the legislative hall this worse than political hydra. Did the Mountain party in the French Revolution ever manifest more ferocity than was indicated in this movement? Posterity will hardly believe the statement, and yet is it absolutely true that the ultra secessionists, who professed to have brought on the war chiefly to maintain the right of separate State secession, were the first to deny the existence of any such right when certain movements were understood to be in progress in North Carolina looking to peaceful secession from the Confederate States themselves; and these persons urged most vehemently the putting the whole country under military law, in order to counteract all such attempts at withdrawal. I well remember that certain fiery zealots from the 'Old North State' came to Richmond about two years ago, and openly urged the sending of a military force at once into that region, in order to suppress all efforts at counter-revolution. This course of proceeding was even urged upon me. What response I made to these secession-anti-secession worthies I shall leave to others to conjecture."

Mr. Pollard, in his "First Year of the War," declares that there was little opposition to the will of

Mr. Davis. As the necessities of the Rebellion became more pressing the vindictive spirit was strengthened. No better instance of this fact probably is to be gathered from the rebel records than the following statement from Mr. Pollard's "Third Year of the War:" "The Libby Prison was undermined, several tons of powder put under it, and the threat made that, if any demonstration on Richmond, such as Dahlgren's, was ever to occur again, the awful crime, the appalling barbarity, would be committed of blowing into eternity the helpless men confined in a Confederate prison."

The financial weakness of the Rebellion was felt from the outset, and on any other supposition than that of immediate success the case could only have been appalling to earnest and sensible men. But with all the so-called single-heartedness and enthusiasm of the people, there was not wanting a numerous class of persons, under the patronage of the "Congress" and the executive, ready to take advantage of the necessities of a people who were, willing or unwilling, compelled to devote themselves and all they had to a cause in which there never was any chance of success. Speculation seemed to flourish while famine and nakedness stood before the country.

One of the most strange and unparalleled features of the case was the utterly wonderful prices at which the very necessities of life were sold. And as the value of a purely foundationless and fictitious currency depreciated, the prices became fabulous. But while there were many avaricious speculators on the

recklessness and credulity, or connivance, of the rebel authorities, and who were deserving of all the censure they got, and who corresponded to a very extensive class of the same kind of people in the North who would have doubled the enormous debt of the country, if by doing so they could have secured their own fortunes, the case of merchants and even army sutlers in the South was not so bad, and has palliation enough for conscience' sake. The case of the trader was, indeed, most pitiable. What did it matter that a pair of shoes, a pound of tobacco or some other filth, brought him its weight in "Confederate" currency? A pound of that currency was as valuable as a ton. The more any man got the poorer he became, unless he stole it. If the trader parted with a pound of his salt, a paper of pins, or a horse, he was poorer for it, as one of these things was worth more than all the currency or all the credit of the "Confederacy." The faith of these men who put their property, even their land, everything but their negroes, into "Confederate money" was boundless and admirable; but, like many of the faiths of men, it lost its beauty by the unreasonableness or the utter baselessness of its foundation.

One of the first steps of Mr. Davis's government was to attempt to make this currency good, and establish diplomatic respectability in Europe. Commissioners were sent over there to negotiate to this end. And in this undertaking they were not wholly unsuccessful. From the very dawn of secession both England and France gave their sympathy to the

rebel cause, and although nothing more was done by the governments of those countries than to recognize the belligerent rights of the rebel States (a step resting on principles as false as they were mischievous), the attitude, to a great extent, assumed by the people of England especially, prolonged the Rebellion, as may be seen in a future chapter.

Previous to the battle of Bull Run the rebel executive had been authorized to accept from the States in the Rebellion such volunteers as he deemed necessary, and also empowered to call out one hundred thousand militia. Early in August he was again authorized to make a call on the militia, this time for a force of four hundred thousand men. Not until early the following spring was the first conscription promulgated. The work of organizing this force began effectively immediately after the fall of Fort Sumter, and with great rapidity the whole border line was occupied in what were supposed to be the main strategic points. Magruder with a considerable force was posted near Fortress Monroe; Beauregard at Manassas Junction, thirty-five miles from Washington; Joseph E. Johnston at Harper's Ferry; Leonidas Polk on the Mississippi; and Sterling Price and Ben McCulloch in Missouri. But the campaign of the fall of 1861 was, in the main, not favorable to the rebel cause, and the cry of discontent was loud throughout the South; while from Washington went constantly the unwelcome report that all was quiet on the Potomac.

The battle of Bull Run was fought on the Govern-

ment side by the three months' militia, and a few hundred regular soldiers, and soon after this disastrous engagement most of these men returned to their homes; and under the recent acts of Congress the formation of a new and formidable army now began.

Many brave men on both sides had fallen in the first great battle of the war; and although there was, perhaps, little in the conflict at Bull Run to develop the character which the emergency needed in the army, yet quite a number of men who fought there in subordinate places, subsequently rose to deserved distinction as soldiers. Among these may be especially named W. T. Sherman and T. J. Jackson ("Stonewall" Jackson). The leading generals in this engagement were not so fortunate. G. T. Beauregard, the second in command on the rebel side, received the greater part of the praise in the South; but himself and Johnston, the responsible general, both soon fell into an endless quarrel with Davis, and the people became dissatisfied when they came to sum up the results, on account of the little which had been done by these men when, it was claimed, their opportunity was so good. However General McDowell's case stood, he was not deemed satisfactory at the head of the army in the field in the present state of affairs. If the judgment of the country was not against him, it was not favorable to him, and this the Administration could not overlook, if it had desired to do so.

Among all the unknown and untried the Admin-

istration and the country fixed upon George Brinton McClellan as the coming man. His ringing, dashing reports from West Virginia were captivating and illusive, and when he announced, quite prematurely, that he had broken up the Rebellion there, it was believed and hoped at Washington that he was the man to give enthusiasm to the cause of the Union, and lead the army, gathering on the Potomac, to decisive victory. Although he was at the head of military affairs in West Virginia, the laurels he gained properly belonged to other persons. But it was supposed that there were good and sufficient grounds upon which to rest a very strong faith in his fitness. By such slender threads are the fortunes of men suspended in uncertain times. Future events too well exposed the weakness of the foundation on which the country reposed its confidence and hopes in General McClellan. The oblivion and rust of time can never so obscure the truth of history as to make it possible to build for him a reputation he did not hold among the majority of his countrymen, when, after a wonderfully patient and long test, he was, from sheer necessity, removed from his responsible and fruitless position as General of the army. As a systematic and endless organizer he was not excelled, perhaps, and in times of peace in a country sustaining a vast standing army, he would have been a superb soldier. His want of ability to lead a vast army to conquest, against a brave and able foe, was supplemented by political views unsuited to such a task or such an emergency.

When General McClellan took command on the 25th of July, immediately after the battle of Bull Run, he found an armed multitude nearly fifty thousand strong collected around Washington, but to the trained soldier it appeared little like an army. And it was found that poor old General Scott and his aids had done little towards preparing defensive works to secure the National Capital against the shot and shell of the enemy. Patriotic heat had yet made up for all deficiencies; the stern realities of the war were approached with caution and reluctance.

When the new Administration began its task it was found that the regular army contained but little over sixteen thousand men, and most of these had been dispersed throughout the Indian border, rendering them unavailable on any crisis in national affairs. The conspirators, during the last Administration, had taken every other step possible to render the Government powerless at the critical moment when the work of secession should begin. So the organization and equipment of the army became a work on original materials from the ground up. But McClellan set out with great spirit; every facility was afforded him; he was unstinted; the Administration lavished means upon him; he acted splendidly; the soldiers were pleased; the country was full of hope; and by the last of October an army of nearly one hundred and fifty thousand tolerably thoroughly equipped soldiers under the immediate command of General McClellan was ready for the field. By the first day of March, 1862, it had swelled to nearly seventy-five

thousand more, including, at that time, the troops in Maryland and Delaware and up and down the Potomac, and this estimate covered all officers and men, and all arms of "the service." After the battle of Bull Run there were about thirty field-guns belonging to the Army of the Potomac, while on the first day of March, 1862, the whole artillery force was over five hundred guns, over twelve thousand men, and eleven thousand horses. Long before this date, it began to be suspected throughout the country that, while McClellan had shown much skill and coolness in organizing this splendid army on which every expense had been lavished, still there was something about him that rendered him unable to command it successfully in active war.

Early in the fall a universal cry arose for the movement of this grand force, and General McClellan himself said this should not be delayed longer than the 25th of November. But it was delayed. One thing or another seemed to be in the way. The President became impatient, and pressed the matter; but still the Army of the Potomac remained quiet. Beyond a superb and unwieldy establishment nobody could detect that General McClellan had any plan, or knew what should be done. And so the winter passed, and the people came to expect nothing more than what the telegraph daily sent over the country: "All quiet on the Potomac."

On the last day of October, General Scott, burdened with disease and age, and feeling his inadequacy to a just and successful performance of the

onerous duties of General-in-chief of the armies, sent his resignation to the Secretary of War. The President, of course, accepted it, and on the following day put McClellan in his place. On the same day the General issued his order announcing that he had assumed command of all the armies of the Union. While this sudden advance in position seemed for a time to widen his views, and check his disposition to strip and neglect the armies in the West for the sake of that under his immediate direction, it appeared to render him still more cautious and "unready."

In the meantime General John Charles Fremont had been put at the head of the Department of the West; Nathaniel P. Banks had taken Patterson's place; Williams S. Rosecrans succeeded McClellan in West Virginia; John A. Dix was in command at Baltimore; and General Wool had relieved Ben Butler at Fortress Monroe. And while the superbly appointed Army of the Potomac was becoming of unmanageable proportions in the hands of its organizer, instead of being led against the rebels towards the close of September or October, it is proper to follow briefly the military events in these less important but more stirring fields.

In West Virginia the rebels were, in the main, unsuccessful. After the death of General Robert S. Garnett, a graduate of West Point, and a fine officer, the command of affairs in that region fell into the hands of Henry A. Wise and John B. Floyd, men of great pretensions and little military ability, who,

appearing to have their own glory under consideration more than that of the cause they were supporting, fell to quarreling, and weakened and divided the small force the rebel managers were able to send into that field, "neither being disposed to act a part subordinate to the other. It was impossible, under such circumstances, to secure harmonious action or united and spirited effort to resist the enemy."

From the outset the rebel cause had appeared hopeless in West Virginia, a loyal mountain region, where slavery had few devotees, but it was not to be given up without further effort. Soon after the battle of Bull Run, Robert E. Lee, who, after the removal of the rebel government to Richmond, seemed to be without employment, was sent over the Alleghany to take the direction of affairs. At Valley Mountain he joined General W. W. Loring, who was in front of the Federal forces under General Reynolds in Tygart Valley and about Cheat Mountain. After some delay, he made an unsuccessful attempt to surprise and defeat the Union force on the morning of the 12th of September. He now turned his attention to Floyd and Wise, farther to the south, in the valley of the Great Kanawha, who were confronting Rosecrans in the neighborhood of Big Sewell Mountain. He found Floyd at Meadow Bluff, and Wise a few miles off, at Little Sewell Mountain, a strong position, which he had named Camp Defiance, partly, perhaps, because he had taken it in defiance of Floyd's orders to the contrary. Lee, seeing the advantage of Wise's position, ordered Floyd up, but had some difficulty in

preventing the forces of these distinguished military geniuses from fighting among themselves over the merits of their leaders. Wise was soon called to Richmond, and matters took a better shape. A great part of Loring's division having joined him, Lee's effective force was now over ten thousand men. Rosecrans, however, who was aware of the change in the rebel army before him, having only between eight and nine thousand men himself, and having greatly exaggerated views as to the size of Lee's combined force, fell back to the Gauley River, without pursuit. And here the campaign virtually ended for the winter, West Virginia, to a great extent, remaining undisturbed throughout the war. There was little sympathy with the rebel cause in this part of Virginia, and the rebel army was at the disadvantage of operating in an enemy's country.

Lee returned to Richmond, and the cry at once arose against him throughout the South for his utter failure in West Virginia. Nobody regretted the failure more than Lee did himself, and, perhaps, nobody deserved censure less. It was greatly to the interest of the Rebellion at a later date, and to the credit of Jefferson Davis, that he knew Lee better and judged him more correctly than the people were able to do.

On the 25th of July, General Fremont took command of the Department of the West, at St. Louis, and, although it was considered that he had been culpably tardy and indifferent, under the pressing demands of the Department, he stood very high with the Unionists of Missouri, and was received with great

kindness. It was hoped that under him the Administration would sanction the energetic measures it appeared unwilling to do under Lyon. Notwithstanding the war had now begun in earnest, General Fremont soon stepped far beyond the expectations of the authorities at Washington, in some respects, and not a few of the loyal men of Missouri fell into the belief that the appointment of Fremont had been a calamity to the State and the cause. On the 3d of July, after some unavoidable delay, after driving Governor Jackson and his followers from the Missouri River, Lyon set out across the country with his little army toward Springfield, which he reached in ten days. He had previously ordered Sweeney, who was acting as a Brigadier-General, to move from St. Louis with all his available force to the same point. Sweeney's advance pushed on rapidly, and by the 1st of July Colonel Franz Sigel was at Neosho, near the extreme south-western part of the State. Sweeney having arrived at Springfield, and fearing that his divided force would not be able to cope with that of the rebels and their Indian allies gathering on the Arkansas border, ordered Sigel back. But Sigel was anxious to have a fight, and, although disposed to obey the order, he chose to do it by marching around by Carthage, on the Neosho River, where he met the rebels, and, in an engagement of some spirit, was worsted.

Lyon now began a struggle with the authorities at Washington, which he continued with General Fremont after he took charge of the Department, for

supplies, for cavalry, for other re-enforcements, and transportation. All of this amounted to but little, however, and as Lyon saw the rebels gathering with great strength on the south, he began to feel that fortune was against him, and that the only alternative was retreat or fight under hopeless odds. On the morning of the 9th of August he wrote quite despondently for the last time to General Fremont, saying that his position had become very embarrassing, with the force of the enemy daily increasing around him, and intimating that even retreat might be impossible. He now gathered most of his officers around him, and the questions of retreating and fighting were fully discussed, with a unanimous decision in favor of falling back to Rolla. Orders were accordingly given to pack up, but during the day Sweeney and others, who had not been in the council, threw their influence against this course, and the result was that with over five thousand troops, nearly all of his force at Springfield, on the evening of the same day Lyon turned his face toward the rebels, and marched to give them battle in the neighborhood of Wilson's Creek. Lyon was fully aware that Price had been joined by Ben McCulloch, and had every reason to believe that the force against him was at least two or three times the size of his own little army. Still, there was a kind of fate, he fancied, driving him to this conflict, in which he would himself fall.

At five o'clock on the following morning, the 10th, the battle began by Sigel striking the rebels in surprise on their right, and routing them. But

his men were not trained to the proper use of such deceptive good fortune, and while turning their attention to the booty the rebels fell upon them and whipped them, and utterly broke up the command. Sigel himself, without knowing the fate of Lyon, sought safety and repose at Springfield. In the meantime Lyon had engaged the rebels with his main force under his own direction, and before twelve o'clock he had possession of the field, and the battle was over. But poor, brave, patriotic Lyon's presentiment as to his own fate had been fulfilled. He had been everywhere exposed in the heat of the conflict, and was fighting on foot to avoid the rebel sharp-shooters. But bringing up his small reserve for the last onset, although then severely wounded, when he heard the cry along the line, "Who will lead us?" he mounted a horse, and waving his hand, shouted: "I will lead you; onward, brave boys of Iowa!" His word and presence were enough, but this was his last act. A ball pierced his heart, and in a moment "life's fitful dream was o'er."

His death was a national misfortune. His place could not be filled. There were no more Lyons. Had he lived to the end of the Rebellion his name would have stood among those of the brave who had served their country best. Among the rebels Stonewall Jackson, while being in some respects, perhaps, a superior man, would instinctively be placed by the side of Lyon, who, however, excelled Jackson as a trained soldier.

Over twelve hundred of the Union troops were put down as killed, wounded, and missing in this engagement, and of this number two hundred and twenty-three were killed.

Major S. D. Sturgis succeeded Lyon in the command, and soon afterwards ordered a retreat, although it was perhaps the opinion of Sweeney and Gordon Granger that a vigorous pursuit of the enemy should have been preferred, as they had drawn off, and were too badly handled to make any attempt against the retreating army. Subsequent light thrown on this battle did not at all show that Sweeney and Granger were not right in their judgment of the advantages of the fight and the ability of the small, effective, remaining Union force to produce the utter rout of the rebels and change the cast of events.

General Fremont claimed, in his defense, that he was not responsible either for this unsuccessful movement into the south-western part of the State, or the battle of Wilson's Creek; that all of this misfortune made no part of his administration of the affairs of the Western Department. Without opportunity to understand the true state of the case on his arrival in St. Louis, General Fremont was greatly perplexed by the demands made upon him from Cairo and Springfield, and he fell into the view that the former point deserved his attention at the time. The grounds for his position were, perhaps, maintainable, yet there may justly remain some doubt as to his want of ability to have re-enforced Lyon before it

was too late, however unjust it might be to accuse him of a lack of disposition to do so.

If General Fremont had been guilty of inactivity and uncertainty before, such a charge would have been groundless for some time subsequent to the battle of Wilson's Creek. General Prentiss at Cairo had been re-enforced, and the importance of that point had somewhat diminished. Fremont now telegraphed to Washington for men of all arms and for money, and notified the governors of the adjoining States to send on such troops as they had at command; and his preparations began on a scale which was proverbially grand and extravagant, somewhat in keeping with his own character.

In the meantime, although the rebel generals had quarreled, and McCulloch had gone south with his command, Price, the ablest officer they had west of the Mississippi, moved toward the Missouri River, his force augmenting as he advanced. What Lyon had gained and would have held, if he had been re-enforced as it was in the power of the Government to do, was now lost. The rebels overran a great part of the State, and the loyal citizens were driven from their homes, or killed and stripped of all they possessed.

Fremont now thought himself justified in declaring the whole State under martial law, and accordingly on the 30th of August he issued a very stringent general order to that effect, and in it stepped far beyond the spirit of the Confiscation Act of Congress and the policy of the Administration,

it was thought. It contained the following announcement :—

“ In this condition the public safety and success of our arms require unity of purpose, without let or hindrance to the prompt administration of affairs. In order, therefore, to suppress disorders, maintain the public peace, and give security to the persons and property of loyal citizens, I do hereby extend and declare established martial law throughout the State of Missouri. The lines of the army occupation in this State are for the present declared to extend from Leavenworth, by way of posts of Jefferson City, Rolla, and Ironton, to Cape Girardeau on the Mississippi River. All persons who shall be taken with arms in their hands within these lines shall be tried by court-martial, and if found guilty will be shot. Real and personal property of those who shall take up arms against the United States, or who shall be directly proven to have taken an active part with their enemies in the field, is declared confiscated to public use, and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby declared free men.

“All persons who shall be proven to have destroyed, after the publication of this order, railroad tracks, bridges, or telegraph lines, shall suffer the extreme penalty of the law. All persons engaged in treasonable correspondence, in giving or procuring aid to the enemy, in fermenting turmoil, and disturbing public tranquillity, by creating or circulating false reports or incendiary documents, are warned that they are exposing themselves.

“All persons who have been led away from allegiance are required to return to their homes forthwith. Any such absence, without sufficient cause, will be held to be presumptive evidence against them.”

A few days afterwards Fremont issued patents or deeds of manumission to two of Thomas L. Snead's

slaves. Snead had been one of Jackson's commissioners to negotiate with Jefferson Davis for placing Missouri under the rebel authorities. This proclamation created much excitement and ill-feeling in the border States, and the President considering it likely to be detrimental to his policy, all the policy he had at that time on the slavery question, sent this brief letter to General Fremont:—

“WASHINGTON, D. C., September 11, 1861.

“Major-General JOHN C. FREMONT:—

“SIR,—Yours of the 8th, in answer to mine of the 2d inst., is just received. Assured that you, upon the ground, could better judge of the necessities of your position than I could at this distance, on seeing your proclamation of August 30th, I perceived no general objection to it; the particular clause, however, in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves appeared to me to be objectionable in its non-conformity to the Act of Congress, passed the 6th of last August, upon the same subjects, and hence I wrote you, expressing my wish that that clause should be modified accordingly. Your answer just received expresses the preference on your part that I should make an open order for the modification, which I very cheerfully do. It is, therefore, ordered that the said clause of the said proclamation be so modified, held, and construed as to conform with and not to transcend the provisions on the same subject contained in the act of Congress entitled, ‘An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes,’ approved August 6, 1861, and that said Act be published at length with this order. Your obedient servant, A. LINCOLN.”

This was the beginning of the end of what had the general appearance of becoming a brilliant mili-

tary career for General Fremont. In all this time Price had been gathering a large force and having things his own way, and on the 11th, while General Fremont was creating his emancipation turmoil, the advance of his army reached Lexington and began the attack on the small force of twenty-seven hundred and eighty men just then in position on College Hill, under the command of Colonel James B. Mulligan, a brave but inexperienced officer, which ended in his capturing the whole force on the afternoon of the 20th. Fremont was greatly chagrined two days subsequently to hear of Mulligan's surrender, when he not only had good reason to believe he had been re-enforced by at least four thousand men by his own orders, but he had also made arrangements, as he thought, to intercept Price on his retreat. A few days after this event Fremont himself set forward to meet or pursue Price. But the rebel general showed no disposition to fight, preferring to retrace his steps toward Arkansas. Fremont halted at Tipton to collect and consolidate his army consisting of nearly thirty thousand men, about five thousand being cavalry. He had eighty-six guns. But with all his effort and the exaggerated statements as to his magnificent and expensive preparations, he was even now short of the proper means of transportation for a large portion of his army. Here on the 13th of October, he was overtaken by the Secretary of War, who had come out from Washington in company with Adjutant General Thomas and his staff, for a conference with him. Mr. Cameron then carried the

authority to remove Fremont from the command. But this he determined not to exercise at that time, notwithstanding the whole company returned to Washington greatly displeased with General Fremont's affairs, and fully under the conviction that he would be able to make little headway against the enemy. Nothing that occurred afterwards justified their predictions or their unfavorable opinions.

On the 27th Fremont's advance reached Springfield, and by the 1st of November the greater part of his army had arrived at that point, Pope's division having, in the two preceding days, marched seventy miles. On the 1st the order from Washington came relieving Fremont from the command and placing it temporarily under David Hunter, one of the division generals. But Fremont, from the best information he could gain, believing that Price was only ten miles distant on Wilson's Creek, after consulting with his officers, concluded to give him battle the next day, and issued his orders to that effect. That night, however, Hunter arrived and took command of the whole army. The next day he made a reconnoissance resulting in the discovery that the rebels were not on Wilson's Creek, but many miles to the South, beyond striking distance then. Hunter now ordered a retreat and the whole army fell back to Rolla and the line of the Kansas railroad, thus a second time abandoning the south-western part of the State unnecessarily to the horrors of a guerrilla warfare. Lyon had gone down there to stay, and had five thousand men been sent to his aid in time he would

have staid there; and had ten thousand more been put under his command he would, before the 1st of January, 1862, have cleared the country of rebel rule west of the Mississippi, and to the Arkansas River at least, and prevented the Cherokee and Creek Indians from falling a prey to the machinations of the rebel leaders. And now, although a considerable portion of Fremont's army was poorly equipped, and his means of transportation inadequate, these difficulties were not insurmountable, and even at the worst his facilities could never be worse than those of the rebels. Fremont had well digested all of these things, and he had passed through too much to think for a moment that a way would not open to the Pathfinder. He had gone down there, as Lyon had, to free the country of the rebels and make his way to the Mississippi, and who can say to-day that he would not have accomplished what he started out to do? To a great extent his army believed in him, and was full of enthusiasm, and in it was a vast amount of material peculiarly fit to be led by such a man as Fremont. An instance of this fact may be seen in the history of Major Zagonyi's capture of Springfield on the 26th of October. Fremont had formed a Body-Guard of three hundred men, led by this daring officer. They were especially organized with reference to a career of splendid deeds, and although they were foiled at the very outset, perhaps their action at Springfield was the most magnificent cavalry feat of the long conflict. The story of the Body-Guard must always stand as a brilliant passage in the history of

American wars. And yet, for some strange reason, although these brave men of the Fremont Body-Guard had enlisted for three years, General McClellan caused them to be mustered out soon after Fremont himself had been relieved of the command.

Whoever was responsible for the removal of Fremont at this important juncture, the evil of the step still remained the same. If his appointment had been of doubtful propriety, as some have held, his removal was a calamity. The management of affairs in Missouri had, from the first, been deplorably bad. The multitude and variety of the President's counselors and the temporizing policy he deemed it best to pursue had furnished the explanation to this state of affairs, and there had yet been little or no change for the better. Fremont committed some errors; but who did not do as much? His removal at the time was, to all appearances, a misfortune to the cause; and it was, without doubt, a shameful insult to the man who was making his first step in what had every prospect of being a brilliant military career.

General Hunter, in giving up all that had been gained at so great a cost, it has been claimed, only carried out the desire of the President; but were this true, the responsibility of committing another great error was merely shifted to wider shoulders. The day of blunders in the War Department, if not in the Administration also, was approaching an end. General Hunter was not deemed a suitable department commander, and only a week after he took the place of Fremont, General H. W. Halleck superseded him.

CHAPTER V.

1861—WAR OF THE REBELLION—BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE—
BELMONT AND COLUMBUS—GRANT AND HALLECK—
FORT HENRY—FORT DONELSON—MILL SPRINGS—
BALL'S BLUFF—THE NAVY—A GENERAL VIEW—ENG-
LAND—GENERAL BURNSIDE IN NORTH CAROLINA.

FOR the next month General John Pope got the credit of being the most active officer in Missouri. In this time he captured or broke up several small rebel forces, and finally drove Price back to Springfield and the Arkansas border. The species of warfare now carried on in Missouri, as throughout the whole border line, indeed, only bore upon the final result so far as the question of exhaustion was concerned. On the 23d of January, 1862, General Samuel R. Curtis, with twelve or thirteen thousand men, marched from Rolla toward Springfield on the third of these expeditions to Arkansas. Price, who was really one of the most successful of the rebel leaders, retreated before him to Fayetteville, in Arkansas, where he was again joined by Ben McCulloch, and they agreed so far as to retreat together to Boston Mountain. The rebel General, Earl Van Dorn, now arrived, and took the chief command, and on the 5th of March advanced to attack the Federals. With some difficulty Curtis drew in his much-scattered

forces, and formed his line of defense on the bluffs of Pea Ridge, overlooking the valley of Sugar Creek. On the 7th the battle began, and when night closed the work of the day, it was not easy to say where the advantage lay. Ben McCulloch and McIntosh had been killed, and there had been some successes on both sides. The next morning the conflict was renewed, but in a few hours the rebels had given way and retreated through the defiles of the Knobs, leaving the victors on the field. The Union loss in this battle was over thirteen hundred in killed, wounded, and missing. The rebels had the advantage in numbers, and suffered a greater loss. After a time Curtis resumed his march into Arkansas, but many of his men having been sent to the Tennessee River, he made little headway. Still he found little opposition, as the regularly organized rebel forces had also been mainly sent to the east side of the Mississippi, a field of more importance.

Curtis, toward the last of September, became commander of the Department of Missouri, with his head-quarters at St. Louis; but its affairs, although often serious, and always bad enough, from this on, by reason of the great events in other quarters, became of little note in the great conflict. The vast Department of the West had been divided into several separate commands. New Mexico was placed under General E. R. S. Canby; Kansas, under General David Hunter; Missouri was a department; and D. C. Buell was put at the head of the Department of the Ohio.

In the meantime matters had progressed somewhat in other parts of the country. On the 4th of September Bishop Leonidas Polk, with a considerable rebel force, took possession of Hickman and Columbus, in Kentucky, on the Mississippi River, and speedily began fortifications at the latter, with a view of commanding the river. U. S. Grant, who had just come into command at Cairo, hearing of the movements of Polk, sailed on the next night with a small force, and on the morning of the 6th landed at Paducah, Lloyd Tilghman and a few rebels under his command, who had also arrived for the purpose of claiming that place, withdrawing without resistance.

On the 6th of November, under instructions from St. Louis, General Grant left Cairo with about three thousand men aboard some transport boats, conveyed by two gun-boats, for the purpose of occupying the attention of the rebels about Columbus, but with no design of bringing on an engagement. Opposite Columbus, in easy range of the guns of General Polk, was Belmont, a river station. A rebel camp was located at this point, having a battery and several hundred men. Grant concluded to land several miles above, and, by a detour through the woods, fall upon and take this camp before assistance could reach it from Columbus. But Bishop Polk was not the kind of man to be caught asleep while an enemy was known to be lurking around. Early on the morning of the 7th Grant landed, and led his small force of less than three thousand men to attack Belmont. But Polk had discovered the movement, and sent

over several regiments under Gideon J. Pillow, who awaited his approach with a force outnumbering his own. A stubborn fight ensued, in which the rebels were defeated and put to flight, leaving their guns and camp material behind. Strangely enough, the victors now turned into speech-making, congratulating themselves, and gathering up such spoils as appeared worthy of attention. But all this time Polk, having discovered that no attack was designed on his side of the river, was sending re-enforcements to Pillow, whose routed troops were reformed, and increased to double the number Grant brought with him. With difficulty the Union troops were now thrown into line, and began to retrace their way to the transports. But Pillow was found ready to dispute the passage, and at this moment some of General Grant's pestiferous orators began to feel that the whole thing was likely to end in an ignominious surrender to the rebels. Grant had two remarkable qualities, then not very well known—one for getting into difficulties, and one for getting out of difficulties. He now said they had fought their way in, they would fight their way out. And this they did; and gained the transports and gunboats after a severe struggle, the General himself being among the last to quit the land. In this worthless affair nearly five hundred were lost on the Union side, and a greater number on the other.

Soon after Grant took possession of Paducah, General C. F. Smith, by the suggestion or order of General Fremont, stationed a small force at the

mouth of the Cumberland River, twelve miles above. The mouths of both the Tennessee and Cumberland were now in the hands of the Federals, as well as the whole of the Ohio; and military men began to get some glimpses of the course events were likely to take. Political considerations were dropped, to a great extent, and armies, battles, and results were mainly brought into the calculations. The location of the Federals at the outlets of the two Southern rivers greatly annoyed the rebels. This had been a very fortunate movement on the war board, and to Grant the credit of making it was due, and at least at so early a moment, and when it could be done without the expense of pushing anybody else out. This movement aided somewhat in defining the general situation in a military sense. On the Cumberland River the rebels had established themselves in an exceedingly strong position, called Fort Donelson, on the left or east bank of the river; and opposite the southern border of Kentucky, on the right or west bank of the Tennessee, they had built Fort Henry. The strip of country between these two points was not over twelve miles wide, and two rough roads connected them.

Soon after Polk planted himself at Columbus, Felix K. Zollicoffer, with a small force, entered Kentucky; and about the middle of September, Simon Bolivar Buckner, a West Point graduate, recently commander of Governor Magoffin's State guards, having become a general in the rebel cause, engaged in collecting an army at Bowling Green. It now began

to become evident that the key to the rebel front from the Mississippi to the Cumberland Mountains was in the two positions on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. Even Columbus, which they expected to make the Gibraltar of the West, and by which they believed they would effectually place under their control the Mississippi, it was seen, would have to be abandoned with the loss of Forts Henry and Donelson. The rebel leaders were gathering their main strength, political and military, in Virginia, with the purpose of making their greatest struggle there for the government they had set out to establish. The decision of the question could only be materially influenced by the success of the national army in breaking up the connection of Virginia with the great field of supplies in the Southwest and on the Gulf. The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson would open the way to Middle Tennessee, and at once, perhaps, cut the first line of supplies for Richmond.

It may be a question of doubt as to the originator or discoverer of this true line of operations for the Government. When the war had once really begun, and the country settled down to the conviction that the struggle would not end in a day or a single battle, it was no difficult matter to see that the region west of the Mississippi might, to a great extent, be left out of the calculations. Nor was the whole matter difficult of solution when the rebel line of policy had become certain. The map of the country and the condition of their affairs soon made the case

evident. On their part it was mainly to be a defensive war. There was no such thing to involve the situation as the rebels overrunning the West and Northwest, the great grain-fields of the Republic.

General Halleck may have, as has been claimed, drawn his pen over the route the Union army should take by way of Fort Donelson, Nashville, Chattanooga, Atlanta, etc., to break the back of the Rebellion. W. T. Sherman, who had become a general, may also have at an early day taken the true general view of the case; others began to have notions on the subject; and all these matters soon began to take form at Washington.

But if any one man should have more credit than another, or any one should be looked upon in the light of being credited for doing well and thinking wisely, on this subject, that man was, perhaps, General Grant. Through his persistency the movements against Forts Henry and Donelson were undertaken when they were. He had kept his own counsels. His views were his own. When, after a long time, he got permission to ask Halleck to be allowed to take Fort Henry, he was sent off as a military upstart. The true situation of affairs had not yet dawned upon Halleck. But Grant now began to display his dominant trait, pertinacity. He still continued to notify Halleck of his desire to take the fort, and press his views of the result of success. At last, after Commodore A. H. Foote had joined Grant in an appeal, on the 30th of January, General Halleck sent him word to get ready, and on the sec-

ond day of February he started up the Tennessee with seventeen thousand men on transports, conveyed by seven gun-boats under Commodore Foote.

On the 4th and 5th the troops were landed a few miles below Fort Henry, and the next morning started on a long, circuitous journey through mud and water to the fort, and just before noon Commodore Foote steamed up and began the bombardment. The place was commanded by Lloyd Tilghman, then ranking as a general. The course he chose to pursue was quite remarkable. After failing to bring re-enforcements from Fort Donelson, he determined to send the three thousand men under him over to the other fort, and with about one hundred remain and make such resistance as he could.

On the night of the 5th and the following morning, though compelled to leave the greater part of their baggage and supplies, these troops left the fort, and without much hindrance reached Donelson; and there was nothing in the world to have prevented General Tilghman doing the same thing with all the well men at Fort Henry.

Tilghman acted very bravely during the fight with the gun-boats; but a series of sad misfortunes befell his little garrison from the outset, and a little before two o'clock he pulled down his flag and surrendered to Commodore Foote, and an hour afterwards the head of General Grant's land force entered the fort. These troops had taken no part in the affair, except that some of them had captured a battery and a few prisoners from the retreating rebel force.

Grant had only asked permission to capture Fort Henry. Nothing had been said directly between him and General Halleck as to Donelson. But in his dispatches to Halleck, he simply said: "I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th, and return to Fort Henry." And so Halleck notified General Buell. Grant had something to learn yet. Although he was always characterized for what was termed the modesty of his reports, about this dispatch to General Halleck there was an evident air of inexperience as to the men with whom he had to contend, and the probable difficulties to be overcome otherwise, if it did not also say that what he undertook he did, and that was the end of it.

But two things changed the prospects at once, and when the 8th came, General Grant could only telegraph that the high stage of the water had rendered it about all he could do to hold what he had taken. Besides this unexpected cause of delay, Tilghman's good gunning had disabled some of Commodore Foote's gun-boats, and that officer had returned to Cairo for repairs. So that it was the 12th before Grant could begin his movement across the country, and by that time the rebel force at Fort Donelson had been raised to about twenty thousand men, ten or twelve thousand more than it was on the 8th, the day on which his promise would have been made good, no doubt, had he been able to move against it. As it was, he went into position before the rebels on the night of the 13th with only fifteen thousand men stretched out in a line nearly three miles long.

Of course, his force was greatly overestimated by the rebels, as is usual in such cases. This was especially fortunate for him. The rebels had, to some extent, realized that the capture of these forts would weaken or break up their advanced line from the Cumberland Mountains and Bowling Green to Columbus, and consequently extraordinary exertions were put forth for a desperate stake.

The notorious John B. Floyd had, much against his will, come in on the 12th, and was the senior officer at the fort. Floyd always seemed to go about in a kind of presentiment that he was wanted for his past deeds, and that something was going to befall him. He thought the people of the United States had an especial halter for him, and with no little feeling of dissatisfaction did he trust himself to the doubtful limits of Fort Donelson. But if Floyd had a naturally strong desire to avoid falling into the hands of the Federalists, he was not by any means a coward, though his military career had a rather ignominious ending soon after this historic event, notwithstanding the great service he had rendered in organizing the conspiracy, and putting the Rebellion on foot. Gideon J. Pillow also appeared to be uneasy about his position at Fort Donelson.

But the rebels had many good officers, among whom was S. B. Buckner, although it must be seen their affairs were not very wisely handled, perhaps. At all events they might have greatly annoyed General Grant in his march from the Tennessee, and their position was one of great natural strength.

The fort stood a hundred feet above the river, which it commanded for a long distance, and all of Commodore Foote's fleet of iron-clad gun-boats was little more than a fleet of tubs or bubbles before it. The strong and easily constructed abattis on the land side, with the high water in the surrounding creeks, and the broken condition of the country, rendered it almost impregnable, and certainly to an army at the last not overwhelmingly numerous.

On the 13th Grant completed his investment of the rebels; and on that night Commodore Foote arrived with his flotilla and bringing a large land reinforcement for the army, which by the next day or the day after amounted to nearly twenty-seven thousand men. From the moment Halleck received the intelligence of Grant's success at Fort Henry, and his design on the other and more formidable position, he made herculean efforts to forward troops and supplies. His achievement in this respect was admirable and fortunate. And even after all he had done, Grant came near allowing the rebels to run away, besides being badly whipped himself.

A great part of Thursday, the 13th, there was hard fighting, but the Federal troops pressed forward and took the positions assigned them for the final struggle on the succeeding days. On Friday morning the rebel generals in council decided to cut their way out that day before it would be too late, but for some cause this project was not attempted then, and the day was passed in comparative quiet by the Union army. In the afternoon, however, Commo-

dore Foote tried his power on the fort, and before night was knocked entirely out of the fight, his boats all disabled, and himself and many of his officers and men wounded, and quite a number killed. This night again the rebel commanders considered the question of cutting their way through the Union army, and decided as they had done before. Accordingly at early dawn on Saturday, the 15th, preparations for the sortie began. There had been a division in the council as to the course to be taken with the war material, baggage, and supplies, if the sortie proved successful, and so some of the troops appeared in the conflict of the day with knapsacks and rations for a journey, and others in whole regiments and brigades carried with them to the field only arms for the fight. The attack was made with skill and by noon the division of General John A. McClernand forming the Union right was pressed entirely back from the road on the river, and the route actually opened to the country beyond; several of the Union regiments had been seriously handled, and had retired from the contest; whole brigades were pushed back and for the time thrown out of the fight; the rebels had captured several guns and several hundred prisoners; in the midst of the confusion, with defeat staring them in the face, McClernand, Lewis Wallace, and others had applied to Grant for orders, but he was silent; General John McArthur, who had arrived the evening before, had not even been assigned a position, and had found one for himself, had fought, and been whipped, and

withdrawn from the field to rest and reform; Wallace at last assumed the responsibility, and ordered forward the reserves, checking the rebel advance, whipping and disheartening Pillow's command, and forcing a general retirement upon the intrenched positions; yet Buckner was in the place assigned him, and ready to make a strong movement forward which would in all probability have carried the day; but at this important crisis the rebels stood still; their right had suddenly appeared to be in danger; indecision had seized some of the leaders; there was another conflict of authority; and Grant for the first time that day had arrived on the field. In the night Commodore Foote had urged him to meet him on his boat, to apprise him of the shattered condition of his fleet, and inform him of his determination to return to Cairo. Here he had spent all the morning, and the firing which was on the extreme right several miles through the woods up the river, he supposed to be the usual skirmishing, and for some unaccountable reason he had not been notified of the true state of the case. He was but a moment in getting the situation. He announced to the broken troops that the three days' rations found on the dead bodies of some of the rebels truly indicated that they had been attempting to cut a way out; and seeing that a straw would turn the day for or against him, and that depended upon immediate action, he threw forward the great mass of his effective force, the spirit of the scene was changed; force after force was hurled upon the confused and wavering rebels,

and as night set in they were completely crushed back into their works, with parts of them occupied by the Federals, ready to finish the work on Sunday morning.

That night there were strange scenes in Fort Donelson. Pillow was disposed to think there was still ground for believing they could cut their way out; at all events he would not surrender. Floyd declared he would rather die, but agreed with Buckner that the contest was at an end. So it was agreed that Floyd, Pillow, Forrest, and as many others as could, should run away, and Buckner should surrender in the morning. Forrest went out through the mud and water on the Union right with most of the cavalry before daylight, and Pillow and his staff got over the river, as did also Floyd and a considerable portion of his brigade. Many had slipped away during the day and night, and when Buckner's bugle blew the surrender at dawn on Sunday his army had been decreased by five thousand of these fellows of all ranks.

On Sunday, February 16th, Buckner wrote to General Grant proposing the appointment of commissioners to settle the terms of surrender. To this proposition Grant replied immediately in his celebrated words: "No terms other than an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works."

Nearly fifteen thousand men were surrendered, with sixty-five guns and about eighteen thousand small arms, and a large quantity of stores. But it

was not a cheaply bought victory. Over three thousand were "killed, wounded, and missing" on the Union side; and about two thousand of the rebels. But nothing had yet happened to the Government side which gave it such a set forward; the whole loyal country was in ecstasies. This was a severe blow to the rebels which they were not slow to realize, and its fruits were soon widely visible. Bowling Green and Columbus were evacuated, and before the week the Union line had been extended to Nashville. For all of this Halleck said that he must have the command in the West, and Grant, the brave old C. F. Smith, John A. McClernand, and Lewis Wallace must be major-generals. Asking, and even pressing, for the laurels was not inconsistent with General Halleck's modesty or patriotism.

Only three days after this event, the battle of Mill Springs, near Somerset, Kentucky, was fought. In this the Federals under George H. Thomas, were again victorious, whipping and driving the whole rebel force several miles to their camp on the Cumberland River. During the night, General George B. Crittenden, the rebel commander, succeeded in conveying his whole army across the river, and when morning dawned General Thomas, to his great chagrin, discovered that the foe had escaped, leaving, however, a camp full of valuable material and livestock which the Rebellion could hardly afford to spare. In this battle fell Felix K. Zollicoffer, who in October had been whipped by General Albin Schoepff in a stubborn engagement at Rockcastle Hills,

or Camp Wildcat, in Kentucky. This important stroke, coming so quickly on the heels of Fort Donelson, greatly excited the enthusiasm of the loyal North, and advanced the reputation of her soldiers and general officers. While, in the ordinary sense, there was cause for rejoicing, there was also abundant cause of sorrow to the friends of the country. Many a brave man had fallen, and it required a grand and heroic philosophy to be able to say that to die for the country was no sacrifice, that to live amidst its ruin would be eternal ignominy.

On the 22d of October there had been a great tragedy, hardly a battle, at Ball's Bluff above Harrison's Island in the Potomac, where three hundred men were pushed over the bluff and shot or drowned in the river, and seven hundred captured in what was designed as a simple reconnoissance about Leesburg. In this wretchedly managed affair fell Colonel Edward L. Baker, an officer of great promise.

Many other engagements of little direct moment in settling the great conflict had occurred here and there along the extensive war border, by the first of March, 1862, but these can not be noticed here.

On the day of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration the American navy proper was composed of forty-two vessels, steamers and sailing-ships, carrying five hundred and fifty-five guns and seven thousand six hundred men. These were distributed far and wide over the world, so that when the moment came for the Government to strike for its life, it was deprived of the assistance of even this little navy. With the

army on the frontier and the forts mainly in the hands of disloyal officers, it was an easy matter for the conspirators to seize the arms and property of the Government. It had never been a part of the policy of the Democrats, long mainly dominant in the administration of the Government, to strengthen the army and the navy; and during the last Administration, and to some extent, the preceding one, both of these peculiarly national features of the Republic were either systematically neglected, or purposely weakened, and as far as possible officered by men who would be willing to desert or betray the Nation under a political creed which had no place with the "privates" in the army or the common sailors of the navy. And especially was it true that the "sailor boys" knew no politics which divided their allegiance to "Uncle Sam." On the ocean, in the American Navy, there were no State lines, no State sovereignty. And in the vast marine force now rapidly organized, there were no State quotas, no State between the people and the Government, no State companies, crews, ships, or squadrons. This was yet emphatically the American Navy, and as such, during the War of the Rebellion, it acquired a fame which startled Europe, excited the rage of England, and left little chance for doubt as to the claim of "mistress of the sea," in a foreign contest.

Gideon Welles, a native of Connecticut, whom Mr. Lincoln put at the head of the Naval Department, was admirably suited to the position. No man connected with the Government during this

great trial ordeal through which it passed performed the task intrusted to him with more fidelity and ability than did Gideon Welles. Under James K. Polk he had been at the head of a branch of the same department, and until the organization of the Republican party and the end of the old issues he had been a Democrat. He was well advanced in years, and he bore a large share of the ridicule which at first attached to a Cabinet believed to be composed of men too old for the emergency. From the very nature of his Department, notwithstanding so much was expected of the navy, it was void of that noise and show which belonged to the army, and its affairs were conducted throughout with an unostentatious quietness no less admirable than the wonderful dispatch and determination by which a magnificent river and sea-going marine of nearly five hundred vessels sprang into effective service by the 4th of March, 1862.

Mr. Welles was fortunate, as was the country, in having by his side as Assistant-Secretary of the Navy and Chief Clerk, Gustavus Vasa Fox and William Faxon. Captain Fox had given General Scott and the Administration a lesson in energy and adventure in a perfectly feasible plan for resupplying Fort Sumter, which failed through no fault of his, and which might have been executed on any one of fifty preceding dark nights.

The general work of the navy was divided into two branches, service on the seas, and service on the rivers; and hence these two features were made the

foundation of its organization. And what was it expected to do? It was to blockade effectually the entire Southern coast from the Chesapeake Bay to the Rio Grande; to protect the sea-board; to look after rebel pirates on the ocean, in the harbors, and on the hundreds of broad-mouthed inlets of the coast; to patrol the rivers, as the Potomac, Ohio, and Mississippi; to transport troops on these rivers, and co-operate in battles; to convey vast land expeditions to points on the coast, and aid in capturing and guarding them; to assail the foe in whatever condition found, on its own account; to be ready for any foreign issue which might arise; and to fulfill the enormous demands for army supplies on the coast and the inland waters. To prepare and organize this vast force was a task which the country little realized, where the pomp and tumult of the army absorbed the common interest.

In the construction of war-vessels the well-known American system, not the English, was pursued; and the spirit of the people and the extraordinary demands of the times were made the basis of new inventions, new models, and new principles in naval structure and armament. Three general principles long recognized in America were now made prominent in the great work of ship-building entered upon with all the energy and resource of the Government. These were: the highest possible conditions of speed, the greatest concentration of projectile force, and the least possible exposure of surface in armored vessels. Were it my disposition to follow out minutely the

history of the Government in the purchase of merchant ships and steamers of every grade and class; of their remodeling and adaptation; of the construction of a vast blockading fleet; of experiments and new models; of the iron-clad gun-boats and the wonderful turreted monitors, the overgrowth of these volumes would prevent, it having already rendered a mere bird's-eye view of the battle-field an absolute necessity. At the actual inauguration of the war the navy was as destitute of heavy guns as it was of war-ships. At Gosport alone there had been lost by treason, imbecility, or cowardice, enough to equip a vast navy. At the beginning of 1864 there were over three thousand great guns, some of them carrying enormous projectiles a distance of three or four miles; and at the end of this year the number of steamers and sailing-vessels actually in commission in charge of the Department of the Navy was nearly five hundred.

At the outset there were technically two ways open to the Administration in the treatment of the coast question. It chose to take that one which did not meet the approval of the Secretary of the Navy; that is, to declare a blockade instead of that all the rebel ports were closed. If the blockade were decided upon, it was argued, the national authorities did for themselves what they censured England and France for doing: they virtually acknowledged the rebels to be a belligerent power, to be treated as such, and not as domestic traitors. According to the custom of nations, upon the closing of the ports a

different construction would be placed; one in harmony with the intentions of the Government in treating the rebels as domestic foes, with all rights forfeited, and from which there was another departure in the exchange of prisoners. The exchange of prisoners did, of course, become a necessity as a matter of humanity, but this act by no means declared the independent belligerent power of the Rebellion. Nor did the blockade do anything of the kind. That English writers, friendly to the Rebellion, would twist and overestimate this matter, was to be expected. But the distinction between a blockade and a closing of the ports was without practical difference. And it was a mistake to suppose that had the President simply declared the rebel ports closed, that would have lessened the work of the blockade to the navy, or materially, if at all, simplified the foreign feature of the case. This whole matter was in the diplomatic imagination, and on paper.

Nothing but a thorough and fearless blockade would in any case have prevented English piracy, or thwarted England's ravenous lust for Southern cotton and Southern traffic. The Administration wisely saw that between this blockade and war with England, as an ignominious ally of the Slavery Rebellion, there was no alternative. In amazement this envious and unchristian power saw the growth of the American Navy, its successful blockade of the vast coast, and its wonderful feats of war. At the shrine of her cupidity England was ready to offer up all her former hypocrisy and pretensions to Abolitionism. In the

society of the free North there was nothing to correspond to her brainless aristocracy. To this thing and mammon, not right and God, has not England ever been ready to bow down? Her "press" during the Rebellion was uncommonly licentious, and it breathed, unmistakably, but one sentiment as to the Government of the United States, its utter and eternal overthrow. A success of the South she regarded as her own success; and when, one by one, the efforts of the rebel leaders to build and maintain a navy gave way before Yankee ingenuity, she looked upon it as her own calamity. The success of the American Navy was a success over England. The conquest of the Rebellion was a victory over England.

Early in the summer of 1862, with an eye to the uncertain attitude of England, Secretary Welles said to the Chairman of the Naval Committee of Congress:—

"No nation can have an advantage over us if we avail ourselves of our means and opportunities, and it is no longer doubtful that our future safety and welfare are dependent on our naval strength and efficiency. It is a duty as well as a necessity that we make these United States a great naval power. We owe it to ourselves to commence this work at once, and the present Congress should, in my opinion, take the preliminary steps for laying the foundation for the construction of a navy commensurate with the wants and magnitude of the country. . . . The experience we have had admonishes us not to permit a war to come upon us unprepared, yet such an event may be pending, and the responsibilities and calamities that

would follow neglect should be a warning for us to be prepared."

This was the sentiment which gave life and strength to the American Navy at this critical period, and so materially aided England in recollecting her past experiences with America when no such spirit controlled the administration of public affairs.

Long before the first blow was struck by the army toward crushing the Rebellion, the navy was active in some part of the vast work allotted to it, but the first considerable naval expedition was not sent out until August, 1861. On the 26th of this month a fleet of seven war vessels, and a number of transport steamers and others, under the command of Commodore S. H. Stringham, and carrying nine hundred troops under General Benjamin F. Butler, left Fortress Monroe to begin the work of repossessing the Atlantic coast, and breaking up the system of blockade running in the patronage of England. On the following day this formidable squadron arrived off Hatteras Inlet, on the coast of North Carolina. This is the main inlet to Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, and the considerable inland water-system connected with them. North of this inlet is the long, narrow, low, sandy Hatteras Island, on which the rebels had built two forts, Clark and Hatteras, commanded by Samuel Barron, a man whose false pretensions a few months before had nearly gained the confidence of the President, and, thereby, an important post in the Navy Department.

On the 28th three hundred of General Butler's

troops, with one gun, and very little ammunition and no provisions, were landed a few miles above the forts, the condition of the surf absolutely preventing either the landing of supplies, or of more troops that day. The attack on the forts was immediately begun, and the next day, before noon, Barron surrendered unconditionally, with seven hundred men, twenty-five cannon, and a thousand small arms. This was an exceedingly valuable stroke to the national cause, breaking, at the outset, the most easy and direct road for the British supplies to reach Richmond.

But this work was not yet fully accomplished. The shallow channels connecting Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds were still held by the rebels, strongly fortified at several points on Roanoke Island. On the 11th of January, 1862, a considerable fleet of war-vessels, under Flag-officer L. M. Goldsborough, carrying twelve thousand troops, commanded by General A. E. Burnside, sailed from Hampton Roads, and two days after reached Hatteras Inlet. Here it was found that many of the transport and other vessels which had been smuggled into the Government service for this expedition were not only of too great draft for the shallow inlet, but were also unseaworthy; and not for two weeks was the fleet able to get into Pamlico Sound, and not then without serious losses. At last, however, all obstacles were overcome, and the attack on Roanoke Island began on the 7th of February by the fleet. That night Burnside landed with the greater part of his force, and on the 8th, after several sharp conflicts, the island with its forts

and the greater part of the rebel troops, under Henry A. Wise, fell into the hands of the Federals. The rebel fleet was destroyed, and Elizabeth City, Winton, and other depots on the main-land soon after were captured. Thus, by the 4th of March, the navy had not only done its full share of the work of putting down the Rebellion, enabling the army to strike blows where it never could have reached of itself, but it was now on the eve of settling the most momentous point connected with the war, as will be seen farther on.

CHAPTER VI.

CONGRESS IN FIRST REGULAR SESSION UNDER MR. LINCOLN—FIRST ANNUAL MESSAGE—FOLLY OF *HABEAS CORPUS*—MARTIAL LAW—THE CHIEF JUSTICE.

ON the 2d day of December, 1861, Congress again met, and on the next day the President transmitted his

FIRST ANNUAL MESSAGE.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:—

In the midst of unprecedented political troubles, we have cause of great gratitude to God for unusual good health and most abundant harvests.

You will not be surprised to learn that, in the peculiar exigencies of the times, our intercourse with foreign nations has been attended with profound solicitude, chiefly turning upon our own domestic affairs.

A disloyal portion of the American people have, during the whole year, been engaged in an attempt to divide and destroy the Union. A nation which endures factious domestic division is exposed to disrespect abroad, and one party, if not both, is sure, sooner or later, to invoke foreign intervention.

Nations thus tempted to interfere are not always able to resist the counsels of seeming expediency and ungenerous ambition, although measures adopted under such influences seldom fail to be unfortunate and injurious to those adopting them.

The disloyal citizens of the United States who have offered the ruin of our country in return for the aid and comfort which they have invoked abroad, have received less patronage and encouragement than they probably expected. If it were just to suppose, as the insurgents have seemed to assume, that foreign

nations, in this case, discarding all moral, social, and treaty obligations, would act solely and selfishly for the most speedy restoration of commerce, including especially the acquisitions of cotton, those nations appear, as yet, not to have seen their way to their object more directly or clearly through the destruction than through the preservation of the Union. If we could dare to believe that foreign nations are actuated by no higher principle than this, I am quite sure a sound argument could be made to show them that they can reach their aim more readily and easily by aiding to crush this Rebellion than by giving encouragement to it.

The principal lever relied on by the insurgents for exciting foreign nations to hostility against us, as already intimated, is the embarrassment of commerce. Those nations, however, not improbably, saw from the first that it was the Union which made as well our foreign as our domestic commerce. They can scarcely have failed to perceive that the effort for disunion produces the existing difficulty; and that one strong nation promises more durable peace, and a more extensive, valuable, and reliable commerce, than can the same nation broken into hostile fragments.

It is not my purpose to review our discussions with foreign States; because whatever might be their wishes or dispositions, the integrity of our country and the stability of our Government mainly depend, not upon them, but on the loyalty, virtue, patriotism, and intelligence of the American people. The correspondence itself, with the usual reservations, is herewith submitted.

I venture to hope it will appear that we have practiced prudence and liberality toward foreign powers, averting causes of irritation, and with firmness maintaining our own rights and honor.

Since, however, it is apparent that here, as in every other State, foreign dangers necessarily attend domestic difficulties, I recommend that adequate and ample measures be adopted for maintaining the public defenses on every side. While, under this general recommendation, provision for defending our sea-coast line readily occurs to the mind, I also, in the same connection, ask the attention of Congress to our great lakes and

rivers. It is believed that some fortifications and depots of arms and munitions, with harbor and navigation improvements, all at well-selected points upon these, would be of great importance to the national defense and preservation. I ask attention to the views of the Secretary of War, expressed in his report, upon the same general subject.

I deem it of importance that the loyal regions of East Tennessee and Western North Carolina should be connected with Kentucky, and other faithful parts of the Union, by railroad. I therefore recommend, as a military measure, that Congress provide for the construction of such road as speedily as possible. Kentucky, no doubt, will co-operate, and, through her Legislature, make the most judicious selection of a line. The northern terminus must connect with some existing railroad; and whether the route shall be from Lexington or Nicholasville to the Cumberland Gap, or from Lebanon to the Tennessee line, in the direction of Knoxville, or on some still different line, can easily be determined. Kentucky and the General Government co-operating, the work can be completed in a very short time; and when done, it will be not only of vast present usefulness, but also a valuable permanent improvement, worth its cost in all the future.

Some treaties, designed chiefly for the interests of commerce, and having no grave political importance, have been negotiated, and will be submitted to the Senate for their consideration.

Although we have failed to induce some of the commercial powers to adopt a desirable melioration of the rigor of maritime war, we have removed all obstructions from the way of this humane reform, except such as are merely of temporary and accidental occurrence.

I invite your attention to the correspondence between Her Britannic Majesty's Minister, accredited to this Government, and the Secretary of State, relative to the detention of the British ship *Perthshire*, in June last, by the United States steamer *Massachusetts*, for a supposed breach of the blockade. As this detention was occasioned by an obvious misapprehension of the facts, and as justice requires that we should commit no belligerent act not founded in strict right, as sanctioned by

public law, I recommend that an appropriation be made to satisfy the reasonable demand of the owners of the vessel for her detention.

I repeat the recommendation of my predecessor in his annual message to Congress in December last, in regard to the disposition of the surplus which will probably remain after satisfying the claims of the American citizens against China, pursuant to the awards of the commissioners under the act of the 3d of March, 1859. If, however, it should not be deemed advisable to carry that recommendation into effect, I would suggest that authority be given for investing the principal, over the proceeds of the surplus referred to, in good securities, with a view to the satisfaction of such other just claims of our citizens against China as are not unlikely to arise hereafter in the course of our extensive trade with that empire.

By the act of the 5th of August last, Congress authorized the President to instruct the commanders of suitable vessels to defend themselves against and to capture pirates. This authority has been exercised in a single instance only. For the more effectual protection of our extensive and valuable commerce, in the Eastern seas especially, it seems to me that it would also be advisable to authorize the commanders of sailing vessels to recapture any prizes which pirates may make of United States vessels and their cargoes, and the consular courts, now established by law in Eastern countries, to adjudicate the cases, in the event that this should not be objected to by the local authorities.

If any good reason exists why we should persevere longer in withholding our recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Hayti and Liberia, I am unable to discern it. Unwilling, however, to inaugurate a novel policy in regard to them without the approbation of Congress, I submit for your consideration the expediency of an appropriation for maintaining a chargé d'affaires near each of those new States. It does not admit of doubt that important commercial advantages might be secured by favorable treaties with them.

The operations of the Treasury during the period which has elapsed since your adjournment have been conducted with signal success. The patriotism of the people has placed at the disposal

of the Government the large means demanded by the public exigences. Much of the national loan has been taken by citizens of the industrial classes, whose confidence in their country's faith, and zeal for their country's deliverance from present peril, have induced them to contribute to the support of the Government the whole of their limited acquisitions. This fact imposes peculiar obligations to economy in disbursement and energy in action.

The revenue from all sources, including loans, for the financial year ending on the 30th of June, 1861, was eighty-six million eight hundred and thirty-five thousand nine hundred dollars and twenty-seven cents, and the expenditures for the same period, including payments on account of the public debt, were eighty-four million five hundred and seventy-eight thousand eight hundred and thirty-four dollars and forty-seven cents; leaving a balance in the treasury on the 1st of July of two million two hundred and fifty-seven thousand and sixty-five dollars and eighty cents. For the first quarter of the financial year ending on the 30th of September, 1861, the receipts from all sources, including the balance of the 1st of July, were one hundred and two million five hundred and thirty-two thousand five hundred and nine dollars and twenty-seven cents, and the expenses ninety-eight million two hundred and thirty-nine thousand seven hundred and thirty-three dollars and nine cents; leaving a balance on the 1st of October, 1861, of four million two hundred and ninety-two thousand seven hundred and seventy-six dollars and eighteen cents.

Estimates for the remaining three-quarters of the year, and for the financial year 1863, together with his views of ways and means for meeting the demands contemplated by them, will be submitted to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury. It is gratifying to know that the expenditures made necessary by the Rebellion are not beyond the resources of the loyal people, and to believe that the same patriotism which has thus far sustained the Government will continue to sustain it till peace and Union shall again bless the land.

I respectfully refer to the report of the Secretary of War for information respecting the numerical strength of the army, and for recommendations having in view an increase of its

efficiency and the well-being of the various branches of the service intrusted to his care. It is gratifying to know that the patriotism of the people has proved equal to the occasion, and that the number of troops tendered greatly exceeds the force which Congress authorized me to call into the field.

I refer with pleasure to those portions of his report which make allusion to the creditable degree of discipline already attained by our troops, and to the excellent sanitary condition of the entire army.

The recommendation of the Secretary for an organization of the militia upon a uniform basis is a subject of vital importance to the future safety of the country, and is commended to the serious attention of Congress.

The large addition of the regular army, in connection with the defection that has so considerably diminished the number of its officers, gives peculiar importance to his recommendation for increasing the corps of cadets to the greatest capacity of the Military Academy.

By mere omission, I presume, Congress has failed to provide chaplains for hospitals occupied by volunteers. This subject was brought to my notice, and I was induced to draw up the form of a letter, one copy of which, properly addressed, has been delivered to each of the persons, and at the dates respectively named and stated, in a schedule, containing also the form of the letter, marked A, and herewith transmitted.

These gentlemen, I understand, entered upon the duties designated, at the times respectively stated in the schedule, and have labored faithfully therein ever since. I therefore recommend that they be compensated at the same rate as chaplains in the army. I further suggest that general provision be made for chaplains to serve at hospitals, as well as with regiments.

The report of the Secretary of the Navy presents in detail the operations of that branch of the service, the activity and energy which have characterized its administration, and the results of measures to increase its efficiency and power. Such have been the additions, by construction and purchase, that it may almost be said a navy has been created and brought into service since our difficulties commenced.

Besides blockading our extensive coast, squadrons larger than

ever before assembled under our flag have been put afloat, and performed deeds which have increased our naval renown.

I would invite special attention to the recommendation of the Secretary for a more perfect organization of the navy by introducing additional grades in the service.

The present organization is defective and unsatisfactory, and the suggestions submitted by the Department will, it is believed, if adopted, obviate the difficulties alluded to, promote harmony, and increase the efficiency of the navy.

There are three vacancies on the bench of the Supreme Court—two by the decease of Justices Daniel and McLean, and one by the resignation of Justice Campbell. I have so far forbore making nominations to fill these vacancies for reasons which I will now state. Two of the outgoing judges resided within the States now overrun by revolt; so that if successors were appointed in the same localities, they could not now serve upon their circuits; and many of the most competent men there probably would not take the personal hazard of accepting to serve even here, upon the Supreme Bench. I have been unwilling to throw all the appointments northward, thus disabling myself from doing justice to the South on the return of peace; although I may remark that to transfer to the North one which has heretofore been in the South would not, with reference to territory and population be unjust.

During the long and brilliant judicial career of Judge McLean his circuit grew into an empire—altogether too large for any one judge to give the courts therein more than a nominal attendance—rising in population from one million four hundred and seventy thousand and eighteen in 1830, to six million one hundred and fifty-one thousand four hundred and five in 1860.

Besides this, the country generally has outgrown our present judicial system. If uniformity was at all intended, the system requires that all the States shall be accommodated with circuit courts, attended by supreme judges, while, in fact, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Florida, Texas, California, and Oregon have never had any such courts. Nor can this well be remedied without a change in the system; because the adding of judges to the Supreme Court, enough for the accommodation of all parts of the country, with circuit courts, would create a

court altogether too numerous for a judicial body of any sort. And the evil, if it be one, will increase as new States come into the Union. Circuit courts are useful, or they are not useful; if useful, no State should be denied them; if not useful, no State should have them. Let them be provided for all, or abolished as to all.

Three modifications occur to me, either of which, I think, would be an improvement upon our present system. Let the Supreme Court be of convenient number in every event. Then, first, let the whole country be divided into circuits of convenient size, the supreme judges to serve in a number of them corresponding to their own number, and independent circuit judges be provided for all the rest. Or, secondly, let the supreme judges be relieved from circuit duties, and circuit judges provided for all the circuits. Or, thirdly, dispense with circuit courts altogether, leaving the judicial functions wholly to the district courts, and an independent Supreme Court.

I respectfully recommend to the consideration of Congress the present condition of the statute laws, with the hope that Congress will be able to find an easy remedy for many of the inconveniences and evils which constantly embarrass those engaged in the practical administration of them. Since the organization of the Government, Congress has enacted some five thousand acts and joint resolutions, which fill more than six thousand closely printed pages, and are scattered through many volumes. Many of these acts have been drawn in haste and without sufficient caution, so that their provisions are often obscure in themselves, or in conflict with each other, or at least so doubtful as to render it very difficult for even the best informed persons to ascertain precisely what the statute law really is.

It seems to me very important that the statute laws should be made as plain and intelligible as possible, and be reduced to as small a compass as may consist with the fullness and precision of the will of the Legislature and the perspicuity of its language. This, well done, would, I think, greatly facilitate the labors of those whose duty it is to assist in the administration of the laws, and would be a lasting benefit to the people, by placing before them, in a more accessible and intelligible form, the laws which so deeply concern their interests and their duties.

I am informed by some whose opinions I respect, that all the acts of Congress now in force, and of a permanent and general nature, might be revised and rewritten, so as to be embraced in one volume (or, at most, two volumes), of ordinary and convenient size. And I respectfully recommend to Congress to consider of the subject, and, if my suggestion be approved, to devise such plan as to their wisdom shall seem most proper for the attainment of the end proposed.

One of the unavoidable consequences of the present insurrection is the entire suppression, in many places, of all the ordinary means of administering civil justice by the officers and in the forms of existing law. This is the case, in whole or in part, in all the insurgent States; and as our armies advance upon and take possession of parts of those States, the practical evil becomes more apparent. There are no courts nor officers to whom the citizens of other States may apply for the enforcement of their lawful claims against citizens of the insurgent States; and there is a vast amount of debt constituting such claims. Some have estimated it as high as two hundred million dollars, due, in large part, from insurgents, in open rebellion, to loyal citizens, who are, even now, making great sacrifices, in the discharge of their patriotic duty, to support the Government.

Under these circumstances, I have been urgently solicited to establish, by military power, courts to administer summary justice in such cases. I have thus far declined to do it, not because I had any doubt that the end proposed—the collection of the debts—was just and right in itself, but because I have been unwilling to go beyond the pressure of necessity in the unusual exercise of power. But the powers of Congress, I suppose, are equal to the anomalous occasion, and therefore I refer the whole matter to Congress, with the hope that a plan may be devised for the administration of justice in all such parts of the insurgent States and Territories as may be under the control of this Government, whether by a voluntary return to allegiance and order, or by the power of our arms. This, however, not to be a permanent institution, but a temporary substitute, and to cease as soon as the ordinary courts can be re-established in peace.

It is important that some more convenient means should be provided, if possible, for the adjustment of claims against the

Government, especially in view of their increased number by reason of the war. It is as much the duty of government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between private individuals. The investigation and adjudication of claims, in their nature, belong to the judicial department; besides, it is apparent that the attention of Congress will be more than usually engaged for some time to come with great national questions. It was intended, by the organization of the Court of Claims, mainly to remove this branch of business from the halls of Congress; but while the court has proved to be an effective and valuable means of investigation, it in a great degree fails to effect the object of its creation for want of power to make its judgments final.

Fully aware of the delicacy, not to say the danger, of the subject, I commend to your careful consideration whether this power of making judgments final may not properly be given to the court, reserving the right of appeal on questions of law to the Supreme Court, with such other provisions as experience may have shown to be necessary.

I ask attention to the report of the Postmaster-General, the following being a summary statement of the condition of the Department:—

The revenue from all sources during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1861, including the annual permanent appropriation of seven hundred thousand dollars for the transportation of "free mail matter," was nine million forty-nine thousand two hundred and ninety-six dollars and forty cents, being about two per cent less than the revenue for 1860.

The expenditures were thirteen million six hundred and six thousand seven hundred and fifty-nine dollars and eleven cents, showing a decrease of more than eight per cent as compared with those of the previous year, and leaving an excess of expenditure over the revenue for the last fiscal year of four million five hundred and fifty-seven thousand four hundred and sixty-two dollars and seventy-one cents.

The gross revenue for the year ending June 30, 1863, is estimated at an increase of four per cent on that of 1861, making eight million six hundred and eighty-three thousand dollars, to which should be added the earnings of the Department in car-

rying free matter, viz.: seven hundred thousand dollars, making nine million three hundred and eighty-three thousand dollars.

The total expenditures for 1863 are estimated at twelve million five hundred and twenty-eight thousand dollars, leaving an estimated deficiency of three million one hundred and forty-five thousand dollars to be supplied from the Treasury, in addition to the permanent appropriation.

The present insurrection shows, I think, that the extension of this District across the Potomac River, at the time of establishing the Capital here, was eminently wise, and consequently that the relinquishment of that portion of it which lies within the State of Virginia was unwise and dangerous. I submit for your consideration the expediency of regaining that part of the District, and the restoration of the original boundaries thereof, through negotiations with the State of Virginia.

The report of the Secretary of the Interior, with the accompanying documents, exhibits the condition of the several branches of the public business pertaining to that Department. The depressing influences of the insurrection have been specially felt in the operations of the Patent and General Land Offices. The cash receipts from the sales of public lands during the past year have exceeded the expenses of our land system only about two hundred thousand dollars. The sales have been entirely suspended in the Southern States, while the interruptions to the business of the country, and the diversions of large numbers of men from labor to military service, have obstructed settlements in the new States and Territories of the Northwest.

The receipts of the Patent Office have declined in nine months about one hundred thousand dollars, rendering a large reduction of the force employed necessary to make it self-sustaining.

The demands upon the Pension Office will be largely increased by the insurrection. Numerous applications for pensions, based upon the casualties of the existing war, have already been made. There is reason to believe that many who are now upon the pension-rolls, and in receipt of the bounty of the Government, are in the ranks of the insurgent army, or giving them aid and comfort. The Secretary of the Interior has directed a suspension of the payment of the pensions of such per-

sons upon the proof of their disloyalty. I recommend that Congress authorize that officer to cause the names of such persons to be stricken from the pension-rolls.

The relations of the Government with the Indian tribes have been greatly disturbed by the insurrection, especially in the Southern Superintendency and in that of New Mexico. The Indian country south of Kansas is in the possession of insurgents from Texas and Arkansas. The agents of the United States appointed since the 4th of March for this superintendency have been unable to reach their posts, while the most of those who were in office before that time have espoused the insurrectionary cause, and assume to exercise the powers of agents by virtue of commissions from the insurrectionists. It has been stated in the public press that a portion of those Indians have been organized as a military force, and are attached to the army of the insurgents. Although the Government has no official information upon this subject, letters have been written to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs by several prominent chiefs, giving assurance of their loyalty to the United States, and expressing a wish for the presence of Federal troops to protect them. It is believed that upon the repossession of the country by the Federal forces, the Indians will readily cease all hostile demonstrations, and resume their former relations to the Government.

Agriculture, confessedly the largest interest of the Nation, has not a department nor a bureau, but a clerkship only, assigned to it in the Government. While it is fortunate that this great interest is so independent in its nature as not to have demanded and extorted more from the Government, I respectfully ask Congress to consider whether something more can not be given voluntarily with general advantage.

Annual reports exhibiting the condition of our agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, would present a fund of information of great practical value to the country. While I make no suggestion as to details, I venture the opinion that an agricultural and statistical bureau might profitably be organized.

The execution of the laws for the suppression of the African slave-trade has been confided to the Department of the Interior. It is a subject of gratulation that the efforts which have been

made for the suppression of this inhuman traffic have been recently attended with unusual success. Five vessels being fitted out for the slave-trade have been seized and condemned. Two mates of vessels engaged in the trade, and one person in equipping a vessel as a slaver, have been convicted and subjected to the penalty of fine and imprisonment, and one captain, taken with a cargo of Africans on board his vessel, has been convicted of the highest grade of offense under our laws, the punishment of which is death.

The Territories of Colorado, Dakota, and Nevada, created by the last Congress, have been organized, and civil administration has been inaugurated therein under auspices especially gratifying, when it is considered that the leaven of treason was found existing in some of these new countries when the Federal officers arrived there.

The abundant natural resources of these Territories, with the security and protection afforded by organized government, will doubtless invite to them a large immigration when peace shall restore the business of the country to its accustomed channels. I submit the resolutions of the Legislature of Colorado, which evidence the patriotic spirit of the people of the Territory. So far, the authority of the United States has been upheld in all the Territories, as it is hoped it will be in the future. I commend their interests and defense to the enlightened and generous care of Congress.

I recommend to the favorable consideration of Congress the interests of the District of Columbia. The insurrection has been the cause of much suffering and sacrifice to its inhabitants, and as they have no representative in Congress, that body should not overlook their just claims upon the Government.

At your late session a joint resolution was adopted authorizing the President to take measures for facilitating a proper representation of the industrial interests of the United States at the exhibition of the industry of all nations, to be holden at London in the year 1862. I regret to say I have been unable to give personal attention to this subject—a subject at once so interesting in itself, and so extensively and intimately connected with the material prosperity of the world. Through the Secretaries of State and of the Interior, a plan or system

has been devised and partly matured, and which will be laid before you.

Under and by virtue of the Act of Congress, entitled, "An Act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes," approved August 6, 1861, the legal claims of certain persons to the labor and service of certain other persons have become forfeited; and numbers of the latter thus liberated are already dependent on the United States, and must be provided for in some way. Besides this, it is not impossible that some of the States will pass similar enactments for their own benefit respectively, and by operation of which persons of the same class will be thrown upon them for disposal. In such case I recommend that Congress provide for accepting such persons from such States according to some mode of valuation, in lieu, *pro tanto*, of direct taxes, or upon some other plan to be agreed on with such States, respectively; that such persons, on such acceptance by the General Government, be at once deemed free; and that, in any event, steps be taken for colonizing both classes (or the one first mentioned, if the other shall not be brought into existence) at some place or places in a climate congenial to them. It might be well to consider, too, whether the free colored people already in the United States could not, so far as individuals may desire, be included in such colonization.

To carry out the plan of colonization may involve the acquiring of territory, and also the appropriation of money beyond that to be expended in the territorial acquisition. Having practiced the acquisition of territory for nearly sixty years, the question of Constitutional power to do so is no longer an open one with us. The power was questioned at first by Mr. Jefferson, who, however, in the purchase of Louisiana, yielded his scruples on the plea of great expediency. If it be said that the only legitimate object of acquiring territory is to furnish homes for white men, this measure effects that object, for the emigration of colored men leaves additional room for white men remaining or coming here. Mr. Jefferson, however, placed the importance of procuring Louisiana more on political and commercial grounds than on providing room for population.

On this whole proposition, including the appropriation of money with the acquisition of territory, does not the expediency

amount to absolute necessity—that without which the Government itself can not be perpetuated?

The war continues. In considering the policy to be adopted for suppressing the insurrection, I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle. I have therefore, in every case, thought it proper to keep the integrity of the Union prominent as the primary object of the contest on our part, leaving all questions which are not of vital military importance to the more deliberate action of the Legislature.

In the exercise of my best discretion, I have adhered to the blockade of the ports held by the insurgents, instead of putting in force, by proclamation, the law of Congress enacted at the late session for closing those ports.

So, also, obeying the dictates of prudence as well as the obligations of law, instead of transcending, I have adhered to the act of Congress to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes. If a new law upon the same subject shall be proposed, its propriety will be duly considered. The Union must be preserved; and hence all indispensable means must be employed. We should not be in haste to determine that radical and extreme measures, which may reach the loyal as well as the disloyal, are indispensable.

The Inaugural Address at the beginning of the Administration, and the message to Congress at the late special session, were both mainly devoted to the domestic controversy out of which the insurrection and consequent war have sprung. Nothing now occurs to add or subtract to or from the principles or general purposes stated and expressed in those documents.

The last ray of hope for preserving the Union peaceably expired at the assault upon Fort Sumter; and a general review of what has occurred since may not be unprofitable. What was painfully uncertain then is much better defined and more distinct now; and the progress of events is plainly in the right direction. The insurgents confidently claimed a strong support from north of Mason and Dixon's line, and the friends of the Union were not free from apprehension on the point. This, however, was soon settled definitely, and on the right side.

South of the line, noble little Delaware led off right from the first. Maryland was made to *seem* against the Union. Our soldiers were assaulted, bridges were burned, and railroads torn up within her limits, and we were many days, at one time, without the ability to bring a single regiment over her soil to the Capital. Now her bridges and railroads are repaired and open to the Government; she already gives seven regiments to the cause of the Union, and none to the enemy; and her people, at a regular election, have sustained the Union by a larger majority and a larger aggregate vote than they ever before gave to any candidate or any question. Kentucky, too, for some time in doubt, is now decidedly, and, I think, unchangeably, ranged on the side of the Union. Missouri is comparatively quiet, and, I believe, can not again be overrun by the insurrectionists. These three States of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, neither of which would promise a single soldier at first, have now an aggregate of not less than forty thousand in the field for the Union; while of their citizens certainly not more than a third of that number, and they of doubtful whereabouts and doubtful existence, are in arms against it. After a somewhat bloody struggle of months, winter closes on the Union people of Western Virginia, leaving them masters of their own country.

An insurgent force of about fifteen hundred, for months dominating the narrow peninsular region, constituting the counties of Accomack and Northampton, and known as the eastern shore of Virginia, together with some contiguous parts of Maryland, have laid down their arms; and the people there have renewed their allegiance to and accepted the protection of the old flag. This leaves no armed insurrectionist north of the Potomac or east of the Chesapeake.

Also, we have obtained a footing at each of the isolated points, on the southern coast, of Hatteras, Port Royal, Tybee Island near Savannah, and Ship Island; and we likewise have some general accounts of popular movements in behalf of the Union in North Carolina and Tennessee.

These things demonstrate that the cause of the Union is advancing steadily and certainly southward.

Since your last adjournment Lieutenant-General Scott has retired from the head of the army. During his long life the

Nation has not been unmindful of his merit; yet on calling to mind how faithfully, ably, and brilliantly he has served the country, from a time far back in our history, when few of the now living had been born, and thenceforward continually, I can not but think we are still his debtors. I submit, therefore, for your consideration what further mark of recognition is due to him and to ourselves as a grateful people.

With the retirement of General Scott came the Executive duty of appointing in his stead a General-in-Chief of the army. It is a fortunate circumstance that neither in council nor country was there, so far as I know, any difference of opinion as to the proper person to be selected. The retiring chief repeatedly expressed his judgment in favor of General McClellan for the position, and in this the Nation seemed to give a unanimous concurrence. The designation of General McClellan is, therefore, in considerable degree, the selection of the country as well as of the Executive; and, hence, there is better reason to hope there will be given him the confidence and cordial support thus, by fair implication, promised, and without which he can not, with so full efficiency, serve the country.

It has been said that one bad general is better than two good ones; and the saying is true, if taken to mean no more than that an army is better directed by a single mind, though inferior, than by two superior ones at variance and cross-purposes with each other.

And the same is true in all joint operations wherein those engaged *can* have none but a common end in view, and *can* differ only as to the choice of means. In a storm at sea no one on board *can* wish the ship to sink, and yet, not unfrequently, all go down together because too many will direct and no single mind can be allowed to control.

It continues to develop that the insurrection is largely, if not exclusively, a war upon the first principle of popular government—the rights of the people. Conclusive evidence of this is found in the most grave and maturely considered public documents, as well as in the general tone of the insurgents. In those documents we find the abridgment of the existing right of suffrage and the denial to the people of all right to participate in the selection of public officers, except the legislative,

boldly advocated, with labored arguments to prove that large control of the people in government is the source of all political evil. Monarchy itself is sometimes hinted at as a possible refuge from the power of the people.

In my present position I could scarcely be justified were I to omit raising a warning voice against this approach of returning despotism.

It is not needed nor fitting here that a general argument should be made in favor of popular institutions; but there is one point, with its connections, not so hackneyed as most others, to which I ask a brief attention. It is the effort to place *capital* on an equal footing with, if not above *labor*, in the structure of government. It is assumed that labor is available only in connection with capital; that nobody labors unless somebody else, owning capital somehow, by the use of it induces him to labor. This assumed, it is next considered whether it is best that capital shall *hire* laborers, and thus induce them to work by their own consent, or *buy* them, and drive them to it without their consent. Having proceeded so far, it is naturally concluded that all laborers are either *hired* laborers, or what we call slaves. And further, it is assumed that whoever is once a hired laborer is fixed in that condition for life.

Now, there is no such relation between capital and labor as assumed; nor is there any such thing as a free man being fixed for life in the condition of a hired laborer. Both these assumptions are false, and all inferences from them are groundless.

Labor is prior to and independent of capital. Capital is only the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor is the superior of capital, and deserves much the higher consideration. Capital has its rights, which are as worthy of protection as any other rights. Nor is it denied that there is, and probably always will be, a relation between labor and capital producing mutual benefits. The error is in assuming that the whole labor of community exists within that relation. A few men own capital, and that few avoid labor themselves, and with their capital hire or buy another few to labor for them. A large majority belong to neither class—neither work for others nor have others working for them. In most of the Southern States a majority of the

whole people, of all colors, are neither slaves nor masters, while in the Northern States a large majority are neither hirers nor hired. Men, with their families—wives, sons, and daughters—work for themselves, on their farms, in their houses, and in their shops, taking the whole product to themselves, and asking no favors of capital, on the one hand, nor of hired laborers or slaves on the other. It is not forgotten that a considerable number of persons mingle their own labor with capital; that is, they labor with their own hands, and also buy or hire others to labor for them; but this is only a mixed and not a distinct class. No principle stated is disturbed by the existence of this mixed class.

Again, as has already been said, there is not, of necessity, any such thing as the free hired laborer being fixed to that condition for life. Many independent men everywhere in these States, a few years back in their lives, were hired laborers. The prudent, penniless beginner in the world, labors for wages awhile, saves a surplus with which to buy tools or land for himself, then labors on his own account another while, and at length hires another new beginner to help him. This is the just and generous and prosperous system, which opens the way to all, gives hope to all, and consequent energy and progress and improvement of condition to all. No men living are more worthy to be trusted than those who toil up from poverty; none less inclined to take or touch aught which they have not honestly earned. Let them beware of surrendering a political power which they already possess, and which, if surrendered, will surely be used to close the door of advancement against such as they, and to fix new disabilities and burdens upon them, till all of liberty shall be lost.

From the first taking of our national census to the last are seventy years; and we find our population at the end of the period eight times as great as it was at the beginning. The increase of those other things which men deem desirable has been even greater. We thus have at one view what the popular principle, applied to government through the machinery of the States and the Union, has produced in a given time, and also what if firmly maintained, it promises for the future. There are already among us those who, if the Union be pre-

served, will live to see it contain two hundred and fifty millions. The struggle *of* to-day is not altogether *for* to-day; it is for a vast future also. With a reliance on Providence all the more firm and earnest, let us proceed in the great task which events have devolved upon us.

In this message Mr. Lincoln did not deem it necessary to give even a general history of events since the last session of Congress. The war continued, and the main object was the furthering of the means to bring it to a close in a way to preserve the integrity and honor of the Union. He refers to his former message and his inaugural address for the principles of his policy which he yet saw no need of greatly modifying. He calls attention to the act of the 6th of August providing for the confiscation of the property of rebels, and indicates the necessity of some arrangement for taking care of the negroes that were, under that act, falling into the hands of the authorities, and suggests colonization as the proper outlet for these people. Otherwise the slavery question is not mentioned. But after saying that he had conformed to the provision of Congress for confiscating only such property as was used in forwarding the purposes of rebellion, he makes the very significant remark that, "if a new law on the same subject shall be proposed, its propriety will be duly considered. The Union must be preserved; and hence all indispensable means must be employed. We should not be in haste to determine that radical and extreme measures, which may reach the loyal as well as the disloyal, are indispensable." There need be no cavil

about the purport of this brief pointer. One false doctrine of the rebels and their friends, the President stops to assail at some length, that there would be no labor without capital drawing it out in some way, or owning it and thereby acquiring the more sure and absolute right of driving it. Here, as in most other things, Mr. Lincoln was peculiarly fit to represent the great mass of the people. This quality was, perhaps, the one above all others rendering him most suited to the place he occupied. Upon this feeling for the lowly, to some extent, was based Mr. Lincoln's recommendation to Congress of the recognition of the independence of Liberia and Hayti, and the establishment of ministerial relations with them as sovereign States. It may not be worth while here to take note of the wisdom or folly of such a recommendation.

This session of Congress ended on the 17th of July, 1862, and although its main work was in support of the President and the army, some of its acts were of unusual importance, and one of them especially marked the beginning of a new era in the national history. Acts were passed in favor of the Pacific Railroad, for the furthering of settlements on the public lands, for the punishment of polygamy, for the return of letters of value to the writers when sent for any cause to the "dead-letter office," and for the recognition of Hayti and Liberia. At this session provision was also made for the issue of legal-tender notes, the basis of the famous and successful Greenback plan recommended by Mr. Chase.

The Democratic Congressmen now began a constant and persistent opposition to what they styled "arbitrary and unconstitutional" arrests of suspected or actual sympathizers and aiders and abettors in the Rebellion, residing in the Free States, and the border Slave States held under the authority of the Government. These men took the erroneous and pitiable position that whatever the Government did toward crushing the Rebellion in the South, it must do nothing to that end in the loyal North among those who were doing what they could to clog its way to success. During the special session of July, 1861, this session, and every subsequent one, this annoying and pestilential work went on. Some of these misguided men even became so bold as to declare openly in their places in Congress that the "Southern Confederacy" should be acknowledged; and no opportunity was ever lost by them to abuse, slander, or misrepresent the Administration, and criticise and condemn its war and general policy. Some of these men were reprimanded and censured, and a few of them, when endurance had ceased to be a virtue, were expelled, but in the main they went unmolested, and never rested from their evil work and evil influence.

The suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* became a never-ending theme among these men for misrepresenting the tendencies of the Administration, and disturbing the wrong-minded and weak. The cry about this writ in America never has been anything but political quackery and demagogism. Patriots and honest men, men whose deeds were in

harmony with their righteous thoughts never had need to care, and never did care, whether this writ was active or dead. Nothing but the dogma of State sovereignty, which furnished the apology for secession, was ever carried to the height of this *habeas corpus* folly.

In the summer of 1861, a case under this writ was made a test of the course of the Executive. One John Merryman, of Baltimore, guilty, no doubt, of all the charges against him, was confined at Fort McHenry. Merryman applied to the Chief Justice, Roger B. Taney, whose name does not, perhaps, stand clear in the history of the Supreme Court of the United States, on account of his peculiar connection with the Dred Scott case, which no good opinion of his countrymen can ever erase, for a hearing under the writ of *habeas corpus*. The writ was granted, but General George Cadwallader, then in command at Fort McHenry, not only refused to take any note of this act of the Chief Justice, but also declined to appear in his own person to answer for contempt before that official. About his inability to set up his claim to authority over the Executive in the exertion of a power which never would have been employed in times of peace, the Chief Justice said:—

“In relation to the present return, I propose to say that the marshal has legally the power to summon out the *posse comitatus* to seize and bring into court the party named in the attachment; but it is apparent he will be resisted in the discharge of that duty by a force notoriously superior to the *posse comitatus*, and such being the

case, the Court has no power under the law to order the necessary force to compel the appearance of the party. If, however, he was before the Court, it would then impose the only punishment it is empowered to inflict—that by fine and imprisonment.”

The Judge put on file a full exposition of his views on the subject, holding on the main issue the doctrine which gave the backing to the Northern sympathizers, and by many was taken as evidence of his standing with them:—

“1. The President, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, can not suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, nor authorize any military officer to do so.

“2. A military officer has no right to arrest and detain a person, not subject to the rules and articles of war, for an offense against the laws of the United States, except in and of the judicial authority and subject to its control; and if the party is arrested by the military, it is the duty of the officer to deliver him over immediately to the civil authority, to be dealt with according to law.”

The whole tenor of the old Justice's review of the case, if it does not show his sympathy with the Rebellion, or with its friends in the North, and his disposition to set up a troublesome opposition to the administration of affairs greater than could possibly come under his jurisdiction at the most critical period of the national career, certainly shows that he was unable, from age or other causes, to comprehend such a crisis.

Attorney-General Bates, who was at least as well

qualified as the Chief Justice to give an opinion on this matter, asked the questions:—

“1. In the present time of a great and dangerous insurrection, has the President the discretionary power to cause to be arrested and held in custody persons known to have criminal intercourse with the insurgents, or persons against whom there is probable cause for suspicion of such criminal complicity?

“2. In such cases of arrest, is the President justified in refusing to obey a writ of *habeas corpus* issued by a court or a judge, requiring him or his agent to produce the body of the prisoner, and show the cause of his capture and detention, to be adjudged and disposed of by such court or judge?”

And then affirmed them, supporting his position with a frank and careful argument. As an apology for the folly of giving any opinion, the Attorney-General wrote:—

“Whatever I have said about the suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* has been said in deference to the opinions of others, and not because I myself thought it necessary to treat of that subject at all in reference to the present posture of our national affairs. For, not doubting the power of the President to capture and hold by force insurgents in open arms against the Government, and to arrest and imprison their suspected accomplices, I never thought of first suspending the writ of *habeas corpus* any more than I thought of first suspending the writ of replevin before seizing arms and munitions destined for the enemy.”

Horace Binney and the learned Theophilus Parsons, who had no superiors, and few if any equals, in

Constitutional law, expressed views wholly averse to those of the Chief Justice. In his pamphlet on the subject, Mr. Binney says:—

“It is further objected, that this is a most dangerous power. It is, fortunately, confined to most dangerous times. In such times the people generally are willing, and are often compelled to give up, for a season, a portion of their freedom to preserve the rest; and fortunately, again, it is that portion of the people, for the most part, who like to live on the margin of disobedience to the laws, whose freedom is most in danger. The rest are rarely in want of a *habeas corpus*.”

Certainly. Why should an honest, fair, and just man be so occupied about matters only concerning the dishonest, and which are seldom likely to affect or disturb the honest?

Judge Parsons, in his opinion on the *habeas corpus* and martial law, said:—

“The first and most important question is, Who may decide when the exigency occurs, and who may, if it occurs, declare martial law? On this point I have myself no doubt. The clause on this subject is contained in the first article of the Constitution, and this article relates principally to Congress. Nor can there be any doubt that Congress may, when the necessity occurs, suspend the right to the writ of *habeas corpus*, or, which is the same thing, declare or authorize martial law. The question is, Has the President this power? The Constitution does not expressly give this power to any department of Government, nor does it expressly reserve it to Congress, although, in the same article, it does make this express reservation as to some of the provisions contained in the article. This

may be a mere accidental omission, but it seems to me more reasonable and more consonant with the principles of legal interpretation to infer from it an absence of intention to confine it to Congress. And I am confirmed in this opinion by the nature of the case.

“The very instances specified as those in which the right to *habeas corpus* may be suspended (invasion and rebellion) are precisely those in which the reasons for doing so may come suddenly, the necessity of determination be immediate, and a certainty exist that the suspension will be useless, and the whole mischief which the suspension might prevent take place if there be any delay. To guard against the suspension by limiting the cases, as is done, seems to me wise; to obstruct it by requiring the delay necessarily arising from legislative action would seem to be unreasonable. It is true that my construction gives to the President, in the two cases of rebellion and invasion, a vast power; but so is all military power. It is a vast power to send into a rebellious district fifteen thousand soldiers, as Washington did, whose duty it would be to meet the rebels, and, if necessary, kill as many as they could. But it was a power which belonged to him, of necessity, as President; and so, I think, did the power of martial law. If it did not, then, when his troops had captured the armed rebels whom they were sent to subdue, the nearest magistrate who could issue a writ of *habeas corpus* might have summoned the officer having them in charge to bring them before him, and might have liberated them at once to fight again, and this as often as they were captured, until a law could be passed by Congress.

“If the power belongs to the President, he may exercise it at his discretion, when either invasion or rebellion occurs, subject, however, to two qualifications. One, a universal one, applicable to his exercise of every power. If he abuses it, or exercises it wrongfully, he is liable to impeachment. The other is more a matter of discretion

or propriety. I suppose that he would of course report his doings in such a matter to Congress when he could, and be governed by their action.

“My conclusion is, therefore, that in case of invasion from abroad or rebellion at home, the President may declare, or exercise or authorize, martial law at his discretion.”

It may now be briefly said that the President had first authorized General Scott, on the 27th of April, 1861, to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* on the line of communication between Washington and Philadelphia, if he saw that the safety of the country demanded it. Early in July the entire military line to New York was brought under this order. In May the commander on the Florida coast was authorized to suspend this writ. In October, 1861, General McClellan authorized General Banks to suspend the *habeas corpus*, if he saw fit, in carrying out the order to arrest the members of the Legislature. And this form of appointment was given to military governors in the following year:—

“WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., }
“May 19, 1862. } ”

“SIR,—You are hereby appointed Military Governor of the State of North Carolina, with authority to exercise and perform within the limits of that State all and singular the powers, duties, and functions pertaining to the office of Military Governor (including the power to establish all necessary offices and tribunals, and suspend the writ of *habeas corpus*) during the pleasure of the President, or until the loyal inhabitants of that State shall organize a civil government in conformity with the Constitution of the United States.

“EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.”

The two following orders were subsequently promulgated covering this whole subject, mainly, during the war :—

“ WASHINGTON, September 24th.

“ WHEREAS, It has become necessary to call into service, not only volunteers, but also portions of the militia of the State by draft, in order to suppress the insurrection existing in the United States, and disloyal persons are not adequately restrained by the ordinary processes of law from hindering this measure, and from giving aid and comfort in various ways to the insurrection :

“ Now, therefore, be it ordered :

“ *First.* That during the existing insurrection, and as a necessary measure for suppressing the same, all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors, within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting military drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to the rebels against the authority of the United States, shall be subject to martial law, and liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or military commission.

“ *Second.* That the writ of *habeas corpus* is suspended in respect to all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the Rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place of confinement, by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court-martial or military commission.

“ In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

“ Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-fourth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-seventh.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

“ By the President :

“ WM. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.”

“WHEREAS, The Constitution of the United States has ordained that the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it; and

“WHEREAS, a rebellion was existing on the 3d day of March, 1863, which Rebellion is still existing; and

“WHEREAS, by a statute which was approved on that day it was enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, that during the present insurrection the President of the United States, whenever in his judgment the public safety may require, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* in any case throughout the United States, or any part thereof; and

“WHEREAS, in the judgment of the President the public safety does require that the privilege of the said writ shall now be suspended throughout the United States in the cases where, by the authority of the President of the United States, military, naval, and civil officers of the United States, or any of them, hold persons under their command or in their custody, either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of the enemy, or officers, soldiers, or seamen enrolled or drafted or mustered or enlisted in or belonging to the land or naval forces of the United States, or as deserters therefrom, or otherwise amenable to the military law or the Rules and Articles of War, or the rules or regulations prescribed for the military or naval services by authority of the President of the United States, or for resisting a draft, or for any other offense against the military or naval service:

“Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim and make known to all whom it may concern, that the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* is suspended throughout the United States in the several cases before mentioned, and that this suspension will continue throughout the duration of the

said Rebellion, or until this proclamation shall, by a subsequent one to be issued by the President of the United States, be modified or revoked. And I do hereby require all magistrates, attorneys, and other civil officers within the United States, and all officers and others in the military and naval services of the United States, to take distinct notice of this suspension, and to give it full effect, and all citizens of the United States to conduct and govern themselves accordingly and in conformity with the Constitution of the United States, and the laws of Congress in such case made and provided.

“In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed, this 15th day of September, 1863, and the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-eighth. ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

“By the President:

“WM. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.”

On the 5th day of July in the following year, owing to the state of affairs in Kentucky, the President issued a special proclamation suspending the writ of *habeas corpus* in that State. On the 6th of March, 1862, Mr. Lincoln sent this message to Congress:—

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:—

I recommend the adoption of a joint resolution by your honorable bodies, which shall be substantially as follows:

Resolved, That the United States ought to co-operate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system.

If the proposition contained in the resolution does not meet the approval of Congress and the country, there is the end; but if it does command such approval, I deem it of importance that the States and people immediately interested should be at once distinctly notified of the fact, so that they may begin to

consider whether to accept or reject it. The Federal Government would find its highest interest in such a measure as one of the most efficient means of self-preservation. The leaders of the existing insurrection entertain the hope that this Government will ultimately be forced to acknowledge the independence of some part of the disaffected region, and that all the Slave States north of such part will then say: "The Union for which we have struggled being already gone, we now choose to go with the Southern section." To deprive them of this hope substantially ends the Rebellion, and the initiation of emancipation completely deprives them of it as to all the States initiating it. The point is not that *all* the States tolerating slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate emancipation, but that, while the offer is equally made to all, the more Northern shall, by such initiation, make it certain to the more Southern that in no event will the former ever join the latter in their proposed confederacy. I say "initiation," because, in my judgment, gradual, and not sudden emancipation, is better for all. In the mere financial or pecuniary view, any member of Congress, with the census-tables and treasury reports before him, can readily see for himself how very soon the current expenditures of this war would purchase, at fair valuation, all the slaves in any named State. Such a proposition on the part of the General Government sets up no claim of a right by Federal authority to interfere with slavery within State limits, referring, as it does, the absolute control of the subject in each case to the State and its people immediately interested. It is proposed as a matter of perfectly free choice with them.

In the annual message last December I thought fit to say: "The Union must be preserved; and hence all indispensable means must be employed." I said this not hastily but deliberately. War has been made, and continues to be an indispensable means to this end. A practical reacknowledgment of the national authority would render the war unnecessary, and it would at once cease. If, however, resistance continues, the war must also continue, and it is impossible to foresee all the incidents which may attend and all the ruin which may follow it. Such as may seem indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiency toward ending the struggle, must and will come.

The proposition now made, though an offer only, I hope it may be esteemed no offense to ask whether the pecuniary consideration tendered would not be of more value to the States and private persons concerned than are the institutions and property in it, in the present aspect of affairs.

While it is true that the adoption of the proposed resolution would be merely initiatory, and not within itself a practical measure, it is recommended in the hope that it would soon lead to important practical results. In full view of my great responsibility to my God and to my country, I earnestly beg the attention of Congress and the people to the subject.

CHAPTER VII.

1862—WAR OF THE REBELLION—CONGRESS IN THE WINTER OF 1861 AND THE SPRING OF 1862—PROPOSITION TO THE BORDER SLAVE-STATES—THE CONFISCATION ACT—EMANCIPATION IN THE DISTRICT—A GRAND MORAL PICTURE.

THIS startling proposition from the President was variously received throughout the country and in Congress. The border Slave-State “conservatives” were opposed to it; the Democrats, who were mainly pro-slavery, were opposed to it, except those of them who had become thoroughly identified with the war party; and the Abolitionists of the straitest sect were opposed to it. But many Abolitionists, like Horace Greeley, and the great mass of the loyal people looked upon it kindly, and both at home and abroad it was viewed as a magnanimous proposition from the President, who yet held to his original desire to preserve the Union without interfering with slavery in the States, and who in view of the probable necessities of the future, now hoped to induce the States most concerned to institute a policy which would lead to the highest possible advantage to them under the uncertain circumstances, and to which the Free States might be inclined to give their assent. There was the usual false, foolish, and immoral talk in the newspapers and among politicians about the

whole question of slavery being a thing concerning nobody but slaveholders, but the States having slavery, and the only thing for which the President received any praise was the fact of his leaving the matter with them to choose or reject as they saw fit. Still the general opinion in the border Slave States was that the President had made a wrong step, that when the Slave States wanted Congress to aid them in such an enterprise, they could speak for themselves. There was also the sentiment that this gradual emancipation message was a feeler and educator, that it was designed to prepare the country gradually for the inevitable fate of the "institution;" that the message declared substantially: "This is your last chance; I wish to be fair with you, to do the best I can for you; I can not turn aside the current of events; I prefer to hold to my original policy; I still hope the way may be wide, and clear, and satisfactory; but what is not regarded as indispensable to-day may become indispensable to-morrow; uncompensated emancipation, immediate and general emancipation, may become a necessity for the perpetuation of the Union."

A few of the Republicans in Congress, notably John Hickman and Thaddeus Stevens, then both in the House from Pennsylvania, assailed this message with considerable severity, treating it as beneath the dignity and ability of a full-grown man at such an important crisis in the affairs of the Nation.

On the 11th of March, after some discussion, the House passed the President's resolution by a vote of

eighty-nine yeas against thirty-one nays. On the 20th the resolution as passed in the House was taken up in the Senate, and seven days afterwards adopted by thirty-two against ten votes. This joint resolution was then signed by Mr. Lincoln on the 10th of April. Of course, this whole matter fell as a dead letter, as none of the border Slave States took substantially any note of it. None of them desired to give up slavery on any terms.

Mr. Lincoln was deeply in earnest about the matter, however, and did what he could to induce the border States to take some favorable steps in response to the act of Congress. While the resolution was under consideration, about the 10th of March, he invited the border Slave-State Congressmen to meet him at the White House for a frank conversation touching the meaning and design of his compensation message. Some of these men attended the meeting, and the President answered fully the many questions put to him; but nothing came of this well-meant effort. Early in April a committee was appointed in the House to report some plan for bringing about co-operation in the border Slave States in the proposition of the President. And again, by invitation, most of the Congressmen from those States met at the Executive Mansion on the 12th of July when Mr. Lincoln read to them this address:—

“GENTLEMEN,—After the adjournment of Congress, now near, I shall have no opportunity of seeing you for several months. Believing that you of the border States hold more power for good than any other equal number

of members, I feel it a duty which I can not justifiably waive, to make this appeal to you.

“I intend no reproach or complaint when I assure you that, in my opinion, if you all had voted for the resolution in the Gradual Emancipation Message of last March, the war would now be substantially ended. And the plan therein proposed is yet one of the most potent and swift means of ending it. Let the States which are in rebellion see definitely and certainly that in no event will the States you represent ever join their proposed Confederacy, and they can not much longer maintain the contest. But you can not divest them of their hope to ultimately have you with them so long as you show a determination to perpetuate the institution within your own States. Beat them at elections, as you have overwhelmingly done, and, nothing daunted, they still claim you as their own. You and I know what the lever of their power is. Break that lever before their faces, and they can shake you no more forever.

“Most of you have treated me with kindness and consideration, and I trust you will not now think I improperly touch what is exclusively your own, when for the sake of the whole country, I ask, ‘Can you, for your States, do better than to take the course I urge?’ Discarding *punctilio* and maxims adapted to more manageable times, and looking only to the unprecedentedly stern facts of our case, can you do better in any possible event? You prefer that the Constitutional relations of the States to the Nation shall be practically restored without disturbance of the institution; and, if this were done, my whole duty in this respect, under the Constitution and my oath of office, would be performed. But it is not done, and we are trying to accomplish it by war. The incidents of the war can not be avoided. If the war continues long, as it must, if the object be not sooner attained, the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion—by the mere incidents of the war. It

will be gone, and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it. Much of its value is gone already. How much better for you and for your people to take the step which at once shortens the war and secures substantial compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in any other event! How much better to thus save the money which else we sink forever in the war! How much better to do it while we can, lest the war ere long render us pecuniarily unable to do it! How much better for you as seller, and the Nation as buyer, to sell out and buy out that without which the war could never have been, than to sink both the thing to be sold and the price of it in cutting each other's throats!

"I do not speak of emancipation *at once*, but of a *decision* at once to emancipate *gradually*. Room in South America for colonization can be obtained cheaply and in abundance, and when numbers shall be large enough to be company and encouragement for one another, the freed people will not be so reluctant to go.

"I am pressed with a difficulty not yet mentioned, one which threatens division among those who, united, are none too strong. An instance of it is known to you. General Hunter is an honest man. He was, and I hope still is, my friend. I valued him none the less for his agreeing with me in the general wish that all men everywhere could be freed. He proclaimed all men free within certain States, and I repudiated the proclamation. He expected more good and less harm from the measure than I could believe would follow. Yet, in repudiating it, I gave dissatisfaction, if not offense, to many whose support the country can not afford to lose. And this is not the end of it. The pressure in this direction is still upon me, and is increasing. By conceding what I now ask you can relieve me, and, much more, can relieve the country in this important point.

"Upon these considerations I have again begged your

attention to the message of March last. Before leaving the Capitol, consider and discuss it among yourselves. You are patriots and statesmen, and as such I pray you consider this proposition; and at the least commend it to the consideration of your States and people. As you would perpetuate popular government for the best people in the world, I beseech you that you do in nowise omit this. Our common country is in great peril, demanding the loftiest views and boldest action to bring a speedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is saved to the world, its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated, and its happy future fully assured and rendered inconceivably grand. To you, more than to any others, the privilege is given to assure that happiness and swell that grandeur, and to link your own names therewith forever."

To this Address two written replies were made, the minority mainly agreeing with the President, and the majority, while taking quite dissimilar views, suggested that when Congress made certain provisions as to the pecuniary aid proposed, the States concerned might consider the uncalled-for proposition. Horace Maynard, of Tennessee, and J. B. Henderson, of Missouri, made separate reports, fully concurring with the views of Mr. Lincoln.

A sweeping confiscation act was passed at this session, and approved by the President. The act had an emancipation feature, and provided for the organization and employment of the freed slaves of rebels, or other persons of African descent, as the President might deem best for the public good. A clause of the act also authorized the President to issue a proclamation of pardon and amnesty, on such

conditions as he deemed advisable to persons engaged in the rebellion against the National authority.

In furthering the purposes of this important measure, the President issued this proclamation a few days after the adjournment of Congress :—

“In pursuance of the sixth section of the Act of Congress, entitled, ‘An Act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes,’ approved July 17, 1862, and which Act, and the joint resolution explanatory thereof, are herewith published, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim to and warn all persons within the contemplation of said sixth section to cease participating in, aiding, countenancing, or abetting the existing Rebellion, or any rebellion, against the Government of the United States, and to return to their proper allegiance to the United States, on pain of the forfeitures and seizures as within and by said sixth section provided.

“In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

“Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-fifth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-seventh.

“By the President: ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

“WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.”

Of more importance, however, than this act forever freeing the slaves of rebels actually engaged in war upon the United States, was the measure providing for the total abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. Immediately after the assembling of Congress Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced in the Senate a resolution referring to the Committee

on the District of Columbia certain matters pertaining to the slaves, among which was one inquiring into the expediency of abolishing slavery in the District. And a few days afterwards, December 16, 1861, he introduced a bill for the immediate abolition of all the slaves in the District.

This bill, as finally passed March 16, 1862, provided that all slaves in the District be forever free from that date, liable only as other persons to lose their freedom on account of the commission of crime; that a commission be appointed to hear the facts and declare upon the remuneration of loyal masters, a million of dollars being appropriated for that purpose, and three hundred dollars fixed as the average price to be allowed for each slave; that no allowance be made for those brought into the District after the passage of the act; that no witness should be excluded on account of color; that no secret removal of slaves from the District should be allowed; that papers from the Government should be given to each, indicating his manumission; that one hundred thousand dollars should be used for the purpose of colonizing these freed slaves, if they chose to leave the country; and, finally, a supplemental clause providing that all slaves brought into the District at any time, and employed or hired there, should also be free.

After a long and free discussion, such as had never before occurred in the Congress of the United States on the subject of slavery, on the 3d of April, by a vote of twenty-nine to fourteen, the bill passed in the Senate. After a brief and cutting debate in

the House the bill was concurred in on the 11th, by that branch, in a vote of ninety-two to thirty-eight, and approved by the President on the 16th of April, 1862.

The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the exclusive right to legislate for the District, and does not limit its scope or power. And yet, in the discussions on this measure, men, denominated "statesmen," loudly proclaimed that Congress had no power to pass such an act, or legislate at all on the emancipation of the slaves in the District. Although this was not an unheard-of freak in the handling of this maddening theme, the grounds mainly advanced since 1835 by the opponents of emancipation had been unjust interference with an established domestic institution, injustice to the surrounding Slave States, and matters of policy. Although for thirty years Congress had been almost incessantly memorialized by "fanatical" and philanthropic people to remove slavery from the seat of Government, no very decided advance in that direction had been made, and up to the very day on which the chains were broken from these three thousand blacks no political party could have succeeded at the polls, which was not believed to be safe and sound as to non-interference with slavery in the District of Columbia. This was one of the standing tests, both of men and parties. It had always been held by Slave States and the supporters of slavery, that the States, in the manner provided by their constitutions, had sole power, in their boundaries, to legislate for the destruction of

slavery ; and it never could have been held with the least grain of reason that Congress, having sole legislative power in the District, could not do as it pleased with its affairs. And even now, the folly of such a position was too plain to attract much attention. James A. Bayard, one of the leading opponents of the measure, candidly said on the point, in the face of his associates :—

“ I concede, without the slightest reservation, that the authority of the General Government over the District of Columbia is precisely the same as the authority of a State over its territory ; that no Constitutional objection can arise to the action of Congress in abolishing slavery in this District, other than those that could be made within the boundaries of a State under similar provisions of a State constitution.”

The cause of slavery had been greatly strengthened and benefited by the existence of the “ institution ” in the District of Columbia. So far as the District was concerned, slavery was a national institution, all the States supporting it equally, and all tolerating alike the very hard slave code of Maryland which applied to it. While it was well known, the world over, that the North had submitted to the continuance of slavery in the District as a peace-offering, as a political necessity ; nevertheless, the institution acquired thereby an air of respectability it could not have had otherwise. The South was well aware of this fact, and it never entertained any compunctions on account of the disgust, mortification, and suffering of the North. It not only demanded

the continuance and support of slavery in the District, but also imperiously forbade any discussion of the subject, or even the expression of a wish or a sentiment respecting it. It was long the only subject forbidden in the Halls of Congress. The seal of silence and submission, at least, was placed upon every mouth. No party could break this seal, and the individual who was bold enough to do so was accursed forever.

The fiery balls thrown at Fort Sumter had cut the Gordian knot, and the wills and lips of men went loose; the obligations of the past were gone; the crack of the first rebel gun announced the inevitable doom of slavery. Freedom in the District of Columbia was the first substantial fruit of secession; it was the greatest moral achievement of the American Congress, and the names of those who accomplished it will live in the history of human progress when the heroes of many a battle-field shall be forgotten among men.

At no time had slavery been so offensive in the District, and the need for some action to correct it, been so imperative, perhaps, as since the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln. The Republican Administration at the outset seemed to live in constant fear of doing something about slavery which would belie its pretensions and promises. To fight the Rebellion and not touch slavery was its ambition; and for a time these two tasks were equally difficult. While Mr. Lincoln believed slavery to be morally and socially wrong when he entered on the Presidency, there is

no evidence that he had any desire to become a martyr in behalf of negro freedom and elevation. All this was a matter of growth with him. It came with the development of events. Nothing more clearly demonstrates this fact than the ill-treatment and suffering of the negroes in the District for the year preceding their emancipation, and that, in some sense, by his sanction.

Ward H. Lamon, one of Mr. Lincoln's Illinois followers, who had come to Washington to help him, to grow fat under his favors, was made Marshal of the District. Lamon was of pro-slavery origin and predilections, and he made it one of his chief duties to gather up negroes, bond and free, and confine them, as runaway slaves, in the old Washington jail. The iniquity of his business, as well as the revolting condition of the prison, after a time became known, and so loud was the cry against the whole thing that the President took upon himself the responsibility, in advance of the emancipation legislation of Congress, to order the Marshal to empty the jail, and turn his attention to more important things than arresting and holding these doubtful slaves of rebel masters.

Some few things now remained to be done to start these freed people with the least possible degree of fairness in the race of life. Only a week or two after the passage of the Emancipation Bill, James W. Grimes, of Iowa, introduced in the Senate a bill to provide for the education of colored children in Washington. The bill was amended, and passed in both Houses, receiving the President's

approval on the 21st of May, 1862. Later in the same session another bill, supplementary, was passed, and became a law. In the spring of 1863 the educational interests of the freed district negroes were pushed farther on, and finally, in the summer of 1864, provisions were made for their having an equal share of all the privileges afforded by law to the white children of the district.

During this session a bill was introduced, and, after a thorough discussion and very material amendments, was passed in both Houses, and signed by the President on the 19th of June, 1862, forbidding slavery or involuntary servitude in all territory of the United States then existing, or that might in the future be acquired. This bill was virtually reenacting the Ordinance of 1787, and it placed slavery in the Nation where Mr. Lincoln and his political associates desired it to be, and beyond which, it is believed, as has been fully shown in preceding volumes of this work, the authors of the Ordinance of 1787 and the framers of the Constitution never designed it to go, the States where it then was, and where they believed and hoped it would in time die out. Like every other step in this slavery legislation the border State Congressmen and their Democratic friends opposed this bill with great violence and all their ingenuity. But it was a vain struggle. In the passage of this bill the new dogma that Congress had no authority to legislate about slavery in the Territories was set aside forever, and the Administration party laid claim to another step

toward returning to the primitive standards of the Government.

One other important matter relating to slavery came up during this session. This was the capture and return of fugitive slaves by the army. From the outset this had been a disagreeable and difficult matter, and there was exhibited a very decided disposition at Washington, and among soldiers, to avoid any responsibility. The Administration and the Republican party leaders were anxious to live up to their pretensions and promises as to slavery, and it was strongly hoped that the thing which everybody dreaded to touch would some way take care of itself; and so little was the true nature of the case understood that it was generally believed the only thing required was to let slavery alone and it would take care of itself. This great mistake was too soon painfully apparent; and every responsible officer began to deal with a subject that would not be let alone, as suited his own inclination. There was no uniformity, and the authorities at Washington seemed anxious to get on without a policy. General Butler at Fortress Monroe furnished the first example of a fearless disposition to meet the case with a reasonable and just plan. Three slaves came to him who were about to be sent by their rebel master to work in the trenches in South Carolina. He thereupon set them to work in his own camp. With characteristic rebel folly and inconsistency an agent applied for the release of these slaves, saying: "Do you mean to set aside your Constitutional obligations?"

To this stupendous "cheek" the General replied: "Virginia passed an ordinance of secession, and claims to be a foreign country. I am under no Constitutional obligations to a foreign country."

"You say we can not secede, and so you can not consistently retain them," said this fellow.

To this the ever-ready Ben replied: "You contend you have seceded, and you can not consistently claim them. You are using negroes on your batteries. I shall detain them as contraband of war."

But General Butler was not at ease on the subject. Scores of these slaves, whose masters had left their homes to engage in the war against the Government, flocked to his camp. The Administration had no "contraband" policy. His letters to General Scott, and then to Secretary Cameron, furnished the basis of a policy which did for a time apparently satisfy the demands of the case. But the Secretary's plan involved the ultimate necessity of an army of registration clerks, and was never put into general practice.

Buell, Hooker, McClellan, Patterson, Mansfield, Halleck, and others took a course in dealing with the fugitives which best subserved the interests of the rebel masters; while Doubleday, Hunter, Fremont, Wool, Curtis, McDowell, and others pursued a more humane course, and, wisely looking upon the negro as an element of strength on the side of the Rebellion, treated him in that light. But there was a vast amount of ill-feeling about the matter in the army. The sentiment against the negro's carrying

a musket was for a time very decided, and some regiments would not tolerate a negro in their camps, let alone in their ranks. Anything that he could do, but be a slave, seemed to be viewed as making him equal to the white man. And the lower a Northern soldier went in the scale of Christian refinement and moral and intellectual culture, the deeper was his dread and hatred of the negro. This feeling to some extent extended to the whole white race on the continent, and is yet little less active than it was at that or any other period. Those termed "laboring men," and the lowest of them, were, however, the most noisy and despotic about the least sign of favor toward the colored man. To place him in labor competition was the highest crime, and implied a conspiracy against the business or life of the capitalist, manufacturer, or contractor who was bold enough to try the experiment.

With this class of men, moral and intellectual qualities were not taken into account in estimating equality or superiority. The former condition of servitude, and the odor and color of the skin, were the only bases of comparison. Where such principles and such multifarious practices controlled men in and out of the army, it became the authorities of the Government to move with caution.

Congress recognized the difficulties under which the Administration and army labored, and exhibited some disposition, in the special session of the summer of 1861, to provide a remedy. But many of the stoutest-hearted Republicans showed great timidity

in approaching the subject, and nothing was done. By the meeting of the next regular session a different feeling was apparent, and bills were at once before each House providing that "all officers or persons in the military or naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor, who may have escaped from any persons to whom such service or labor is claimed to be due, and any officer who shall be found guilty by a court-martial of violating this article, shall be dismissed from the service."

The border State members and their Democratic friends put forth all their ingenuity to defeat this bill, but to little effect. Still it was shorn of all its original and unnecessarily strong features, and only the main point retained. An effort was made to exclude Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri from the operations of the bill, but even this was not successful. The vote on the bill in the House stood eighty-three to forty-two; and in the Senate twenty-nine to nine. On the 13th of March, 1862, the act became a law by the approval of the President. Thus a very troublesome matter was disposed of, and another mortal stab inflicted upon the old enemy of the Union.

Little more was left for Congress to do on this momentous question. The next blow was to come from the Administration. The progress of events was fast preparing the country for it.

CHAPTER VIII.

1862 — WAR OF THE REBELLION — THE TRENT CASE — FOREIGN AFFAIRS — THE HAND OF OLD ENGLAND — COURSE OF THE “RULING CLASS” — THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE — AMERICA AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE TO BE CRUSHED — MAXIMILIAN — TIME, THE AVENGER.

ON the 8th of November, 1861, Captain Charles Wilkes, commander of the United States war-steamer *San Jacinto*, stopped the British merchant-vessel *Trent*, between Havana and St. Thomas, and forcibly took from her James M. Mason and John Slidell, with their two secretaries. These men, with what signs of authority they could get from Jefferson Davis, were on their way to England and France to represent the “Southern Confederacy,” and this fact was well known to the British consul at Havana, and the captain of the *Trent* and her British passengers, who were all warm in the interest of the Rebellion. A month before, indeed, these men had been carried out of Charleston Harbor by the *Theodora*, a British blockade-runner.

Wilkes proceeded to New York, from whence the prisoners were conveyed to Fort Warren, in Boston Harbor. This affair went into diplomatic history as the “Trent Case,” and for a time created a great deal of excitement and bluster on both sides of the

Atlantic. In England there was a strong desire that it should be made the cause of immediate war with the United States, and no effort was spared to goad the Ministry to assume a hostile attitude. In the South it was regarded as an "especial providence" in favor of the Rebellion, to be followed by foreign recognition, coalition, and the speedy degradation of the United States.

Captain Wilkes had not been instructed to take this step, and hence the Administration was not obliged to support him in it. The policy of the United States had always been unfavorable to searching the vessels of friendly neutral powers, and especially to the old, arrogant British claim to the right of search and impressment. And this very thing had mainly led President Madison to declare war against England in 1812. On these two grounds the Administration could readily rest the defense of the course it determined to take in this unfortunate case.

From the outset Mr. Lincoln regretted the action of Wilkes, not thinking it either just or politic. It was not the time to quarrel with England; and the way to adjust the difficulty carried with it, at least, the appearance of humiliation. The Cabinet was not unanimous on the course to be pursued, and at any rate one member of it, the Secretary of the Navy, never did depart from the strong position he first took, with the majority of the people, in support of the conduct of Captain Wilkes. Mr. Welles, in a letter to Wilkes, on the 30th of November, publicly thanked him for his patriotic act. But this only

showed that, unrestrained by calmer and more politic heads, the Secretary of the Navy would hardly have been a very safe man in times of great emergency. The House of Representatives also passed a vote of thanks, and asked the President to provide a gold medal for Captain Wilkes; but the calmer Senate did not agree to this measure. While the action of the House represented the heat and sentiment of the majority of the people of the country, it also exhibited the value of the Senate and Executive as a check on its temper and extravagance at an important crisis.

This event was not needed to show this country the secret unfriendliness of England, and its imperishable hatred for this Republic and its people; nor was such an incentive necessary here to remind us of our old, ineradicable grudges, and disposition to fire up on the least imaginary or real provocation on the part of England. Great Britain never had a better opportunity to do what her leading politicians and aristocratic classes have doubtlessly always desired, to destroy this Government, or put it in the way to destruction; nor was this country ever in a worse condition to engage in a fierce life-struggle with her old foe. This was all very well known in England, and her failure to take full advantage of her opportunity entitles her to more credit, perhaps, than the American people were ever disposed to give her, whatever may have been her motives.

At the outset England and France had made haste to let this Government, with which they held the most friendly diplomatic relations, know that they

would so far take note of its affairs as to recognize the belligerent rights of the rebels—rights which they did not possess—and thus do what they could to weaken its power. When Captain Wilkes committed his blunder, the ruling “class” in England declared for war, and said the first thing should be independence to the South. The downfall of the Republic would follow.

The Administration took the course that wisdom and prudence dictated, and was quite as selfish in doing so as England was in accepting what was done. Charles Francis Adams, the American Minister at the London Court, was at once notified by Mr. Seward of the course the Administration would take when the time came; and Mr. Adams prepared himself to perform his part of the work to the utmost satisfaction of his chief, whom he deemed not only the model statesman of the age, but also the intellectual and executive force of a Cabinet, where Mr. Lincoln was nothing more than a mere figure-head. England was not long in presenting the occasion for action, which Mr. Seward and the President knew must come. And the demand was what they expected, at least, reparation and apology. Mr. Seward set about the work at once, and, whether it was a duty or a necessity, the task was a difficult one. The whole matter, so far as this Government was concerned, rested upon the fact that it was in no condition to go to war with England, and the way out of this difficulty was in the simple rejection of the act of Captain Wilkes, the release of the four rebels,

and the reassertion of the principle for which the Government had stood out in its first quarter of a century against the British. But Mr. Seward had a double task to perform. To satisfy his impulsive countrymen was of less importance than to appease England's outraged honor, yet it was necessary. Hence, it was incumbent on him to take a much wider scope in his presentation of the case to the British Ministry than was implied in the brief points suggested by the circumstances of the country at the time. Mr. Seward's argument was able and ingenious, and while it taught England that there were two sides to the question, and much in it unfavorable to her, it did something in correcting the hasty judgment of the people at home, and showing them that the act of Captain Wilkes, beyond being not merely impolitic, was also not strictly just toward a neutral power; and, especially, was inconsistent with the former claims of this Government.

England accepted the points in the argument, which she considered particularly satisfactory to her wounded pride, the rebels were released and went on their way, and the two nations continued their former hypocritical friendship.

The United States Government had only done right in the case, and so the world has judged; but the rebels cried that she had been led to the lowest depths of ignominious humiliation to avoid war with England. This was to be expected, as they were the only sufferers by the "Trent Case." With this "special providence" went down their hope in

England. The ways of Providence were as treacherous as the allurements of Great Britain. And even the virulent "London Times" now uttered these sentiments:—

"So we do sincerely hope that our countrymen will not give these fellows anything in the shape of an ovation. The civility that is due to a foe in distress is all that they can claim. We have returned them good for evil, and, sooth to say, we should be exceedingly sorry that they should ever be in a situation to choose what return they will make for the good we have now done them. They are here for their own interest, in order, if possible, to drag us into their own quarrel, and, but for the unpleasant contingencies of a prison, rather disappointed, perhaps, that their detention has not provoked a new war. When they stepped on board the *Trent* they did not trouble themselves with the thought of the mischief they might be doing an unoffending neutral; and if now, by any less perilous device, they could entangle us in the war, no doubt they would be only too happy. We trust there is no chance of their doing this; for, impartial as the British public is in the matter, it certainly has no prejudice in favor of slavery, which, if anything, these gentlemen represent. What they and their secretaries are to do here passes our conjecture. They are, personally, nothing to us. They must not suppose, because we have gone to the very verge of a great war to rescue them, that therefore they are precious in our eyes. We should have done just as much to rescue two of their own negroes; and, had that been the object of the rescue, the swarthy Pompey and Cæsar would have had just the same right to triumphal arches and municipal addresses as Messrs. Mason and Slidell. So, please, British public, let's have none of these things. Let the commissioners come up quietly to town, and have their say with anybody who may have time to listen to them. For our part, we can not see

how anything they have to tell can turn the scale of British duty and deliberation.

“There have been so many cases of peoples and nations establishing an actual independence, and compelling the recognition of the world, that all we have to do is what we have done before, up to the very last year. This is now a simple matter of precedent. Our statesmen and lawyers know quite as much on the subject as Messrs. Mason and Slidell, and are in no need of their information or advice.”

Besides the plain people, there were here and there men of public note and intellectual worth in England who opposed the idea of war with the United States; and especially must it be remembered that the Queen and Prince Consort earnestly desired a peaceful ending of the “Trent Case.” To the influence of this Christian Prince who recognized the kinship of race more than everything else, perhaps, may be traced the repression of the evil tendencies of “Lord” Palmerston’s ministry. The “privileged class,” starting with its old grudge against this country, hoped the Rebellion would end in the downfall of Free America; and to a great extent the “middle class” was readily brought into this view. The great cultivator of this sentiment was a licentious public press, at the head of which stood the utterly vicious and unprincipled “London Times.”

In the last days of Mr. Buchanan’s Administration this paper began its work in the usual way where a mean purpose is in view, by comparisons favorable to the North; and gradually worked out the case in hand, landing the great mass of its

readers with the South, where their free-trade interests were supposed to be. It said :—

“The Southern States have sinned more than the Northern. They have exhibited a passionate effrontery, not content with the sufferance of slavery, but determined on its extension. They refuse to have any man for President unless he regards a black servant and a black portmanteau as chattels of the same category and description. The right, with all its advantages, belongs to the States of the North. The North is for freedom, the South for the tar-brush and pine-fagot. Free and democratic communities have applied themselves to the honorable office of breeding slaves to be consumed on the free and democratic plantations of the South ; thus replacing the African trade by an internal one of equal atrocity. The South has become enamored of her shame.”

Of the declaration of South Carolina it wrote :—

“Nothing can be more frivolous than the grounds of this manifesto ; its statements are utter falsehoods. Without law, without justice, without delay, South Carolina is treading the path that leads to the downfall of nations and to the misery of families. The hollowness of her cause is seen beneath all the pomp of her labored denunciations. Charleston, without trade, is an animal under an exhausted receiver. Trade is her very breath.”

“Time, the Avenger, is doing justice between the American people and ourselves. With what willingness would they not see their sonorous Fourth of July rhetoric covered by the waters of oblivion ! They have fallen to pieces, but we have shown no joy at secession ; we have given no encouragement to the South ; we have turned away from the bait of free trade, and have strengthened them by our sympathy and advice. The secession of South Carolina is to them what the secession of Lancashire

would be to us: it is treason and should be put down. But the North is full of sophists, rhetoricians, logicians, and lawyers; it has not a man of action. . . . The Union seems to be destined to fall without a struggle, without a lament, without an epitaph."

"The force of political cohesion will probably be too strong even for the ambition and sectional hatred of the Charleston demagogues. Though things look so promising for them, it is evident that the secession leaders and their too-willing followers are in the beginning of terrible disasters. Southern credit does not stand high either in the Union or in the world. Capital flies from a land ruled by fanatical demagogues."

"It will not be our fault, if the inopportune legislature of the North, combined with the reciprocity of wants between ourselves and the South, should bring about a considerable modification of our relations with America. The tendencies of trade are inexorable. It may be that the Southern population will now become our best customers. The Free States will long repent an act (Morrill Tariff) which brings needless discredit on the intrinsic merits of their cause."

"The Union is effectually divided into two rival confederacies. The Southern is tainted by slavery, filibustering, and called into existence, it would seem, by a course of deliberate and deep-laid treason on the part of high officials at Washington. In the Northern, the principles avowed are such as to command the sympathies of free and enlightened people. But mankind will not ultimately judge by sympathies and antipathies; they will be greatly swayed by their own interests."

"In the South we find the most convincing proofs of forethought and deliberation. . . . Reunion can never be expected. Men do not descend to such depths of treachery and infamy unless they are about to take a step which they believe to be irrevocable.

“While the North is passing a prohibitory tariff, and speculating on balancing the loss of the cotton regions by annexing Canada, the Confederates are on their good behavior. They are free-traders. The coasting trade from Charleston to Galveston is thrown open to the British flag.”

So it went on in a regular and easy grade until it and the great bulk of the English people among manufacturers, traders, and the aristocracy were ranged on the side of the Rebellion. The rest of Europe was largely guided by the opinions of England, and thus it turned out that the loyal North had to fight alone the great battle of freedom, when it had every reason to feel that England would have given her moral support. Even before Mr. Adams, the representative of the new Administration, arrived in London, the Ministry had acknowledged the belligerent rights of the seceding States, and on the 13th of May, 1861, England issued a neutrality proclamation. France and Spain soon after followed in the same unfriendly and undiplomatic, vicious, and erroneous proceeding. The Government and people of the United States were greatly and justly incensed by this action; and when the representatives of these meddlesome, unfriendly, foreign powers notified Mr. Seward that they had special messages from their governments to read to him, he refused to hear them until he should first have an opportunity to read them privately; and, this privilege granted, he still declined to hear them or hold any communications on the subject with the Ministers.

Along about this time, and later, England also showed further signs of intermeddling, in discussing the propriety of intervention in the affairs of this country between what she termed the "belligerents," and in listening to rebel agents and the misguided and unpatriotic leaders of the Democratic party. Lyons, the British Minister at Washington, recited in detail to his government, the speculations and desires of these evil-minded men, as expressed to him, concerning the interference of England, and gave his own views of the extent to which he thought the Democratic leaders of the North would go, at the proper time, toward the disintegration of the American Republic. "Lord" Lyons was a cool, cautious, and fair man, and possibly wished no ill to this Government; but he committed the mistake of attaching any importance to the opinions and purposes of the Democratic politicians who were, as such, the opponents of every measure of the Administration, or of even listening to their unstatesman-like schemes. The power of these men had vanished, not soon to return. Even then they were without followers. The guns of Fort Sumter had broken the party bands, and the great mass of the Democrats had gone, heart and main, to the support of the Government in the overthrow of the Rebellion. In his letter to the Ministry on the 17th of November, 1861, Lyons expresses his true sentiment, perhaps, in these words:—

"The immediate and obvious interest of Great Britain, as well as of the rest of Europe, is that peace and pros-

perity should be restored to this country as soon as possible. The point chiefly worthy of consideration appears to be whether separation or reunion be the more likely to affect this object."

Four things may be said to have controlled England in reference to the War of the Rebellion in this country: self-interest, old grudges, and hatred of the Yankee, and her devotion to the "divine rights" of kingcraft. Where the just cause was and where her sympathy should be, she freely acknowledged, at the outset. But whatever may be set to the credit of England in many instances, it was not to her purpose now to be controlled by honorable sympathy, the sympathy of honorable principle. She overestimated the strength and endurance of the South, and the extent and force of the allies of the Rebellion at the North, and, as she had ever done, underestimated the almost boundless resources of the Government of the United States; and in her great greed for free trade, for a restoration of her ancient monopoly of Southern trade, she lost sight of her loud pretensions toward and hatred of slavery.

If the United States saw fit to give a little in the settlement of the "Trent Case," gaining thereby more esteem, the world over, than it got censure and ridicule from those who looked at its deeds and purposes only with evil intent, the course of Great Britain in dealing with the American question during the War presented, morally, as false, humiliating, and pitiable a spectacle as ever marred the history of a so-called Christian nation.

After starting out with the voluntary statement and belief that all the right, justice, and good were on the side of the North and the Government, and all the evil and wrong on the side of the rebels, and having declared fully that the sympathy of all enlightened people should be with the former, the "moral" support of the Ministry was given to the Rebellion, and the ruling class in England turned its attention to attempts to break down the cause of the Union, and cheer on its enemies by hopes that never had any foundation in its promises, while the great masses in the mercantile and literary ranks did all they could to falsify the triumphs and purposes of the Government and its loyal supporters.

Hatred for slavery, and all its recent efforts in behalf of American Abolitionism, and its triumphs in freeing its own possessions of the taint of slavery, England now forgot. This record was blotted out by the lust of gain. Her past acts and all her pretensions went for nothing when weighed against cotton, against the free trade of an improvident and lazy, aristocratic people. Good deeds, good words, good principles England now banished, and for them unwisely and unprofitably substituted a series of dark and damning efforts to thwart the Government, for which her friendly pretensions were at no time mitigated. Her manufactories were fired up in the interests of the Rebellion; her ship-yards acquired a new impetus from their Southern patronage, always bankrupt, by her own statement; her avaricious merchants and bankers took new risks in behalf of a people

with poor credit, according to their own statements, in the best of circumstances; and blockade-runners infested the coast she imagined should belong to her from Cape Hatteras to the Rio Grande.

In all this, if there could be one mitigating circumstance, it was in the fact that England did not, perhaps, like the wrong side more than the right; but, in her insatiable avarice she sacrificed all that had been admirable in her history, and all that was manly and true in her treatment of a kindred nation. The inducements she held out to the rebels were delusive, and to these must be charged, to some extent, the duration and persistence of the Rebellion, and hence much of the suffering and evils of the times. Kindredship of race and tongue will undoubtedly do much to eradicate the deep feelings in America against England, for the wrongs meant and the wrongs inflicted during this critical period in the national life, when with no detriment to her she could have strengthened the cause of the Government and shortened the bloody struggle. As the *Ericsson Monitor* and the vast proportions of the American navy greatly weakened the tendencies of Britain during the war, the conquest of the Rebellion, vaster beyond all comparison than any she had ever encountered, gave her a new reason to deal justly and fairly, at least with the United States, in the future. In this wonderful war she saw her claim as "mistress of the seas" crumble away. And should she be unwise enough to raise a warlike issue with this country, the old scores of the slaveholders' Re-

bellion would, with other still unforgotten memories, rise up against her for the day of vengeance. And whatever may be said of the spirit, probably millions of Americans would be willing to undergo the hardships and dangers of another war, if by it the aristocratic government of England could be subverted, and every vestige of her authority utterly destroyed in the Western Hemisphere.

For several years before the breaking out of the Rebellion the South had attempted, by filibustering and negotiation, to open the way for a vast extension of slave territory in Mexico and Central America. A favorable change of government in Mexico would furnish the South an opportunity for a coalition in which she could dominate, and in which she would be able to hold her own against the aggressions of the Free North. The Southern leaders saw in their dreams a vast congenial empire founded on their principle of Christian civilization, African slavery, stretching around the Gulf of Mexico to South America, and eventually embracing all the West India Islands. But as the schemes of secession were developed, and this dream of empire seemed to be more likely to be realized, France, England, and Spain began to consider the subject in the light of their present and ancient claims in the same region. They were, indeed, little behind the Southern adventurers in their schemes to turn the American political dissensions to their own benefit. Two or three years before the close of Mr. Buchanan's Administration Napoleon III. began to lay his own plans for an

establishment under French authority in Mexico. The wounds he had inflicted on the emperor of Austria he wished to palliate or heal while advancing his own interests, by rearing a throne in the West and placing on it Maximilian, the brother of the Austrian king. This he kept to himself, and about the time of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration a kind of joint protectorate for Mexico was arranged upon by France, England, and Spain. This was the key to the immediate recognition by these governments of the belligerent rights of the South. The French emperor had before favored Southern secession, and now he set about giving the Rebellion what encouragement his purposes demanded. Secession accomplished would break the power of the Government of the United States, destroy its Monroe Doctrine, and make it easy of control.

So far as the Federal Union was concerned this European scheme implied and desired its dissolution. Not, however, the complete destruction of the American form of government. It was said, and perhaps believed, that the commercial interests of England, France, and Spain, as also other European governments, would be best subserved by dividing the United States into two republics, and while maintaining them as enemies to each other, render them singly powerless in shaping or dictating the course of foreign interlopers on the continent, and yet preserve all their foreign commercial benefits. While these European monarchies would have been willing to divide the Western World among themselves, it

by no means follows that they would have been pleased to see a great rival monarchy arise here. An enterprising, trading, free republic was more desirable, notwithstanding their senseless and unmanly devotion to titles, aristocracy, and kingly slavery and tyranny.

Spain consented to the Mexican scheme, as she understood it, mainly from the hope that it would some way turn out in the restoration of her ancient authority over that country, her weakness rendering her an object of little concern to the great powers.

There was in this adventure another European interest which should not be overlooked, that of the Pope of Rome; and the whole scheme was pushed forward by Almonte, Miramon, and La Bastida (the Romish Archbishop of Mexico), and, perhaps, other Mexicans who were in Europe looking after their own interests. One of Maximilian's preparatory steps was to negotiate with the Pope for the restoration to the Catholic Church of its old mortmain claims in Mexico. So one way and another, through intrigues at Paris, at London, and in the Vatican, a monarchy was provided for. The part the people of Mexico took in this work, if there could be such a thing as the "people of Mexico," was farcical in the extreme. La Bastida's intrigues reconciled the Church party. The earthly possessions of the Church far outweighed its power and disposition to establish in the hearts and lives of the people an inalienable estate of wisdom, honor, and justice.

Long before the consummation of the final steps

for this outrage on America, England and Spain discovering the purposes of Napoleon, withdrew from the coalition, England having, to some extent, palliated her crime in the matter by stipulating for the support or recognition of the religion of intelligence and virtue, in a country where there never had been one nor the other.

It was now the middle of the summer of 1863 before the French army reached the City of Mexico, and began the preparations for the first act in the wicked drama, with the Archduke of Austria as the leading dupe. The illusory hopes Napoleon had aroused in the breasts of the Southern leaders had long been dead. They had been deceived. All expectations as to Europe had failed, and of this failure Jefferson Davis, in his strangely unsound work says, in speaking of the conduct of foreign powers in refusing to treat the South as an independent power :—

“One immediate and necessary result of their declining the responsibility of a decision, which must have been adverse to the extravagant pretensions of the United States, was the prolongation of hostilities to which our enemies were thereby encouraged, and which resulted in scenes of carnage and devastation on this continent and misery and suffering on the other, such as have scarcely a parallel in history. . . . These neutral nations treated our invasion by our former limited and special agent as though it were the attempt of a sovereign to suppress a rebellion against lawful authority.”

In the winter of 1862 James A. McDougall, of California, introduced in the Senate a series of resolu-

tions, declaring the course of France unfriendly to this country, expressing sympathy with Mexico, and bitterly denouncing any attempts on the part of European monarchies to interfere with republican governments on this continent. But the Republicans laid these resolutions on the table. Again, in the following winter, Mr. McDougall came forward with a resolution calling upon the President to demand the withdrawal of the French troops which had been landed in Mexico, and if this demand was not complied with in a reasonable time war should be declared against France.

In the spring of 1864, Henry Winter Davis was more successful, and obtained the unanimous support of the House to the following spirited reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine :—

“ Resolved, That the Congress of the United States are unwilling, by silence, to leave the nations of the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the Republic of Mexico; and they therefore think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge a monarchical government, erected on the ruins of any republican government in America, under the auspices of any European power.”

This resolution Mr. McDougall attempted to pass in the Senate, but unsuccessfully.

The House called upon the President for the correspondence with France on the occupation of Mexico, and a part of it he saw fit to submit. In a letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. Dayton, Minister

to France, there was revealed this remarkable statement in reference to the House resolution:—

“It is hardly necessary, after what I have heretofore written with perfect candor for the information of France, to say that this resolution truly interprets the unanimous sentiment of the people of the United States in regard to Mexico. It is, however, another and distinct question whether the United States would think it necessary or proper to express themselves in the form adopted by the House of Representatives at this time. This is a practical and purely Executive question, and the decision of its Constitutionality belongs not to the House of Representatives, nor even to Congress, but to the President of the United States. You will, of course, take notice that the declaration made by the House of Representatives is in the form of a joint resolution, which, before it can acquire the character of a legislative act, must receive, first, the concurrence of the Senate, and, secondly, the approval of the President of the United States; or, in case of his dissent, the renewed assent of both houses of Congress, to be expressed by a majority of two-thirds of each body. While the President receives the declaration of the House of Representatives with the profound respect to which it is entitled, as an exposition of its sentiments upon a grave and important subject, he directs that you inform the government of France that he does not at present contemplate any departure from the policy which this Government has hitherto pursued in regard to the war which exists between France and Mexico.”

Mr. Davis's report contains this timely and just reproof:—

“The Committee on Foreign Affairs have examined the correspondence submitted by the President relative to

the joint resolution on Mexican affairs with the profound respect to which it is entitled, because of the gravity of its subject and the distinguished source from which it emanated.

“They regret that the President should have so widely departed from the usage of Constitutional governments as to make a pending resolution of so grave and delicate a character the subject of diplomatic explanations. They regret still more that the President should have thought proper to inform a foreign government of a radical and serious conflict of opinion and jurisdiction between the depositories of the legislative and Executive power of the United States.

“No expression of deference can make the denial of the right of Congress Constitutionally to do what the House did with absolute unanimity, other than derogatory to their dignity.

“They learn with surprise that, in the opinion of the President, the form and term of expressing the judgment of the United States on recognizing a monarchical government imposed on a neighboring republic is a ‘purely Executive question, and the decision of it Constitutionally belongs not to the House of Representatives, nor even to Congress, but to the President of the United States.’

“This assumption is equally novel and inadmissible. No President has ever claimed such an exclusive authority. No Congress can ever permit its expression to pass without dissent.”

If the course of the Administration in dealing with this Mexican affair was liable to criticism at the outset, there need be no question as to its soundness on the Monroe Doctrine. A war with France at such a time would have been unwise, and it would be difficult now to apologize for a policy leading to one. The diplomatic skill which prevented a foreign

war, when the domestic one taxed so heavily the resources and patriotism of the country, is now an occasion of national congratulation and admiration, whatever regret may be felt touching the necessities which sometimes surrounded the situation.

When the Government reached the point in which it could be done with effect, the demand for the removal of the French troops was persistently pressed, until France became as eager to get them away from Mexico as the United States was to have them away. The French were dissatisfied with their mean and unwise adventure, and even plotted for the downfall of the unfortunate man whom they had duped into trying to sit on an imaginary throne in Mexico. And the Pope, having utterly failed in his avaricious scheme, also abandoned Maximilian, and turned a deaf ear to the lamentations of his distracted queen. The American Secretary of State, in oily words, urged the evacuation of Mexico, and as the ultimate success of the Government in conquering the rebels became certain, the French emperor exhibited great anxiety to comply with the demand.

Mr. Seward said: "You will assure the French government that the United States, in wishing to free Mexico, have (has) nothing so much at heart as preserving peace and friendship with France."

However true were these diplomatic words, France had but one thing at heart, and that was to get out of the mad abyss in which all her evil purposes and hopes had been swallowed up. The demands of the United States were complied with; the French troops

left Mexico, and the anarchic democracy murdered the deluded and deserted Austrian prince, and sent his corpse and his broken-minded widow to Europe as Mexico's legacy and warning to monarchic ambition. So ended another of the wonderful political dramas of the nineteenth century, whose bloody skeleton history has dragged itself through the ministry of "Lord" Palmerston to the tomb of Napoleon and the door of the Vatican.

CHAPTER IX.

1862—1863—WAR OF THE REBELLION—FINANCE—THE GREENBACK—MR. CHASE—POLITICS, ELECTIONS, DRAFT-RIOTS—THE GREAT BATTLES OF THE REBELLION FOUGHT AT THE NORTH—THE NEWSPAPERS—MR. LINCOLN AND THE AIDERS AND ABETTORS—“*UNCONSTITUTIONAL*” BECOMES A BY-WORD.

THE war gave rise to extraordinary demands on the financial resources of the Government, which at the outset were met without very great difficulty by the skill of the Secretary of the Treasury and the patriotism of the bankers and the people. Still the demands increased, and the credit of the country was shaken by its reverses on the battle-field, the general uncertainty as to the future course of events, and, to some extent, by the intrigues of misguided and disloyal men of the loyal section. Extraordinary efforts were necessary to furnish means for the prosecution of the war. To this end Mr. Chase recommended in his report in December, 1861, that Government notes or bills, properly secured by the bonds of the Nation and convertible into coin, be provided and placed in the hands of banks and associations; this plan being based upon the idea that the vast loan without interest made by the people to the various banking institutions might, with great propriety, be turned to

the advantage of the Government, and hence to the people themselves, instead of to a few hundred private corporations.

During the winter of 1861 the banks suspended specie payment, generally, throughout the country, and the Government was forced to do the same with its own notes in circulation. Congress had authorized the issue of a considerable quantity of notes to supply the deficiency between the amount obtained from the revenues and the loans provided for, and the amount needed for current expenses, but not for a general circulating currency. In his report in December, 1862, Mr. Chase again renewed his recommendation of the previous year, and both Houses of Congress accepted it. Under this plan the notes of the United States would go into circulation as money to supply the demands of the country and the Government. It was a choice between a currency furnished by hundreds of individual banks without responsibility beyond the resources of each separate institution, and a currency furnished by the Government.

There were other considerations in favor of adopting the plan of Mr. Chase which he ably set forth. He said a uniform national currency would thus be established on the honor and credit of the Government, and also supported by private capital; this would give the currency of the country the highest possible value and security; it would greatly facilitate home and foreign business; it would reconcile the interests of the banks and the people, more

nearly ; it would supply a new bond of union among the States ; and every dollar of it put in circulation in the thousands of channels, would give every man and every child a new and unchangeable interest in the prosperity and permanency of the Government.

Thus the present national or "greenback" system took its origin, and rose rapidly into popular esteem. Congress also authorized the circulation of a small fractional currency for which coin was substituted after the war. The final steps in organizing the national banking system with a national currency were not taken until in the winter of 1862, or shortly before the end of the session of Congress in the spring of 1863 ; and the law was somewhat modified during the subsequent session. But the test of the system had been satisfactory, and the enactment of this law, and putting it into execution, revived the public credit at once, and gave an amazing impulse to public affairs. The loans were taken readily, and all the demands of the Treasury filled without difficulty. Although gold became an article of merchandise and a dollar of it could not be purchased by a dollar in "greenback," the Government and country had no further embarrassment during the war.

At the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1863, Mr. Chase retired from the Cabinet, and was succeeded by William Pitt Fessenden, as Secretary of the Treasury ; but not until he had seen his wise and fortunate financial system established and successful beyond the most sanguine expectation. And now, after a test of twenty years, it is still more firmly

fixed in the affections of the people; having in that time exerted a deeper and more wide-spread influence than its author ever imagined, in the work of "reconstruction," in uniting the country and establishing a common national feeling.

The national greenback banking system is one of the great, immeasurably valuable legacies of Mr. Lincoln's Administration to the country. Its establishment was one of the most happy events in the history of this Republic; and for it, and the wonderful management of the finances of the country under unparalleled demands, Mr. Chase will, perhaps, dispute with Alexander Hamilton the title of first American financier. Of this system Hugh McCulloch, who succeeded Mr. Fessenden in March, 1865, says:—

"Since the commencement of the special session of 1861, the most important subject which has demanded and received the attention of Congress has been that of providing the means for the prosecution of the war, and the success of the Government in raising money is evidence of the wisdom of the measures devised for this purpose, as well as of the loyalty of the people and the resources of the country. No nation within the same period ever borrowed so largely or with so much facility. It is now demonstrated that a Republican Government can not only carry on a war on the most gigantic scale, and create a debt of immense magnitude, but can place this debt on a satisfactory basis, and meet every engagement with fidelity."

The extraordinary success and skill in the management of the national finances were in marked

contrast with the almost childish blundering and utter failure of the rebel efforts in the same direction. From bad at the outset, they went on to worse continually, until they were irrecoverably bankrupt and ruined long before the final crash of arms.

From December, 1862, to the middle of the following year, was the most gloomy period of the great struggle for the preservation of the Nation. While the want of great progress in the army in the West and the reverses in Virginia furnished some foundation for this state of affairs, to the political opponents of the Administration and the friends of peace and secession in the North must be charged mainly the evils of these dark days. In the winter of 1862 the French emperor considered himself called upon to offer his services as a pacificator between the "belligerents." This proposition the Administration and loyal people looked upon as implying the recognition of a Southern government, and an arrangement of the differences between the two parts of the divided Union. It meant the suspension of the war, the only road to peace, and a discussion of the now irreconcilable elements of division. Fair and right-minded Russia had rejected the idea of this foolish and unfriendly proposition, and even England knew it was useless. In his letter of February, 1863, declining the proposition of France, through diplomatic courtesy and in view of the partisan dissensions at home which were greatly crippling the Administration, Mr. Seward made an extended review of the true condition of American affairs as bearing on the case, and

of the certainty of the failure of any such step. In this reply the Secretary says:—

“This Government, if required, does not hesitate in submitting its achievements to the test of comparison; and it maintains that in no part of the world, and in no times, ancient or modern, has a Nation, when rendered all unready for the combat by the enjoyment of eighty years of almost unbroken peace, so quickly awakened at the alarm of sedition, put forth energies so vigorous, and achieved success so signal and effective as those which have marked the progress of this contest on the part of the Union. . . .

“At the same time, it is manifest to the world that our resources are yet abundant, and our credit adequate to the existing emergency. . . .

“The Government has not shut out the knowledge of the present temper, any more than of the past purposes, of the insurgents. There is not the least ground to suppose that the controlling actors would be persuaded at this moment, by any arguments which national commissioners could offer, to forego the ambition that has impelled them to the disloyal position they are occupying. . . .

“On the other hand, as I have already intimated, this Government has not the least thought of relinquishing the trust which has been confided to it by the Nation under the most solemn of all political sanctions; and if it had any such thought, it would still have abundant reason to know that peace proposed at the cost of dissolution would be immediately, unreservedly, and indignantly rejected by the American people. It is a great mistake that European statesmen make, if they suppose this people are demoralized.”

But this evil and unstatesman-like meddling on the part of France was not without its bad influence

on the discontented in the North, or its encouragements to the Rebellion. In the fall of 1862 the elections went against the Administration. In New York Horatio Seymour, a meddlesome "Peace Democrat," was elected Governor by several thousand majority. And in most other States where local and Congressional elections were held there seemed to be a verdict against the Emancipation Proclamation, and in favor of letting the Union go by default. A very considerable element in the Army of the Potomac was opposed to a continuance of the war, mainly basing its opposition on its teachings and sentiments as to the emancipation of the slaves of the rebels. But the emancipation policy of the President was distasteful in other quarters. In the border Slave States, which had been held partly by patriotism and partly by diplomacy and main force, from going into the Rebellion, a strong reaction set in against the Administration, carrying with it nearly the entire population. The abolition test was too much for them. But this was never wonderful in the midst of slavery, when in the free North the negro question was often more than a match for the material of which some patriots were made. In the Northern elections in 1863 the issue was plainly made for or against the continuance of the war. And here, after all, it may be said, the great battles for the perpetuity of the Union were fought. These were the decisive conflicts. The defeat of the Administration of the Government at the polls, in the section from which it drew all its financial and military power,

would have implied defeat in the struggle on the battle-fields of the South.

Who were the allies of the South and the enemies of the National Union in these conflicts at the North? Early in the spring of 1863 general State elections were held in New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut; in the first of which the anti-war Democratic candidate for governor had a plurality of votes over the Republican, but the anti-secession or war wing of the Democracy had a candidate, and the election was thrown into the Legislature, where the Republicans were able to save their governor and State on the side of the Union. In the other two States the contest was close, the Republicans succeeding by reduced majorities. No more bitter and desperately contested elections were, perhaps, ever held in New England. And, although the Administration party was successful, the tide was then evidently against its policy and against the war. The bloody conflict which Franklin Pierce and others predicted would be fought by the friends of the South, of slavery, on the streets of the cities of the North, were merely, mainly, transferred to the polls. The war was declared to be a failure, and all the measures and promises of the Administration were condemned, and every effort possible put forth to weaken its strength and thwart its purposes. And in spite of all the derision and curses of the South for Northern sympathy and pretensions, and the oft-repeated pledges of the Southern leaders to oppose all overtures for reunion, and hold to their determination to

fight on to the death of one or both parties, these preached the possibility of conciliation and thereby restoration of the Union. An idle pretense, as most of the anti-war Democrats very well knew. The two years of war had only deepened the determination of the leaders of the atrocious Rebellion to fight on. They said:—

“The Yankees ought to know by this time what we mean. Democrats or Lincolnites, we hate them all alike. We are not going to submit to a lecherous union with either. We despise equally the Black Republican Abolitionists and the Copperhead political tricksters. We hold at equal value the threats of the one and the fawning humbuggery of the other. Sharp at a trade, let them understand unmistakably that we have nothing to swap, least of all have we any intention of swapping ourselves. They must carry their vile wares to some other market.”

Still the anti-war, the peace party, and the Northern sympathizer went on, losing no opportunity to obstruct the operations of the Government, or to stop the war entirely, whatever the consequences. Congress had provided for the enrollment of all the able-bodied men, not omitting aliens who had declared their intentions to become citizens, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, with the view of filling the deficient quotas under the new calls for troops by drafting. And, notwithstanding the object of the conscription was to fill the army, a strange provision was made for receiving three hundred dollars as a commutation fee, in lieu of the service of the drafted man. This measure now became the special object

of hatred to the opposition party, or anti-war Democrats, and they set about obstructing the necessary arrangements of the President to carry it out. One of the judges of the Supreme Court of New York, and Justice Woodward and the other Democratic judges of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared the whole measure and all the efforts to carry it out "unconstitutional." To prevent the filling up of the old armies, or the formation of a new force at the North, was even a greater defeat to the cause of the Union than a defeat at the hands of the rebels on the battle-field. The adverse moral effect was much greater. It was weakening the Government and strengthening the Rebellion. For whatever purpose all this opposition was designed, it had but one effect, harassing and weakening the Government, decreasing foreign confidence, and increasing the evil inclinations of certain foreign powers, and strengthening and encouraging the Rebellion. This verdict time can never erase. It is not for the historian to attempt a palliatory plea, if he would. History neither forgets nor forgives. The war record of the Democratic party, as an organization, is without apology, and mainly infamous. It is a span which should, in practice, in the reconstructed and regenerated Republic, go into oblivion. The two good ends of the old party, broken, lie on each side of this chasm of madness.

The Fourth of July, in 1863, as far as could be in the loyal States, was made the occasion of giving a new impulse to patriotic energy. But the leaders

of the opposition gave to their oratory a peculiar direction, and divergent to the current of patriotic fervor, which in song, speech, and act rolled in a torrent against the Rebellion. And, to some extent, even this occasion of reunion and national eulogium was turned to the disadvantage of the country, in weakening the faith of the people in the Administration, and strengthening the disposition to resist its measures for preserving the Union.

But Horatio Seymour, and hosts of others, in their speeches and acts, and many of the leading opposition newspapers were preparing the way for the riotous resistance to the Government which immediately followed the enormous pretensions of the "glorious Fourth."

On the 13th of July the draft began in New York. Governor Seymour had said the measure was unconstitutional, and some of the silly newspapers had said the draft act was designed by the miscreants at the head of the Government to lessen the number of Democratic votes at the next election. Forgetful of what the whole man-population of the South was submitting to for the overthrow of the Union, the greatest excitement was raised throughout the North over the draft. State Rights, *habeas corpus*, personal liberty, the Constitution, everything was conjured up, and no effort spared to fire the Northern heart against it by the opposition leaders. And not without effect.

Incendiary hand-bills had been circulated through the parts of New York City most likely to be in-

fluenced by them, and a time fixed for beginning a bloody resistance to the draft, but no very great outbreak occurred until Monday, July 13, 1863. The attention of the rioters was first mainly directed toward the enrolling and draft offices which were sacked and burned, and some of the officers killed. The negro Orphan Asylum on Forty-sixth Street was sacked and burned. The residences and business houses of obnoxious persons were served in the same way, and for the greater part of four days the fiendish mob had the city in its grasp. The hundreds of infernal saloons, recruiting offices of Hell, were its head-quarters, and from these the thousands of whisky-maddened wretches sallied forth to their work of plunder, arson, and murder. Wherever the mob went the firemen followed, and where they were allowed to do so they used some exertion to stop the spread of the fire. But there seemed to be an understanding between the firemen and the rioters. The manufactories and workshops were closed by the mob and the hands ordered into its ranks. A vast army of wretched and wicked women and children followed this brutal mass for carrying to their miserable homes the spoils from the hands of sons and husbands.

On Tuesday the Governor came into the city, and addressed the mob. He said it was made of his friends. He told the rioters that he had sent to Washington to have the draft stopped, and hence they should disperse and be good citizens until his agent came back, and then they could reassemble

when they pleased. However well-meant were the Governor's efforts, his words were badly chosen, and left the impression of an implied conditional sanction of the cause of the rioters. The draft must be stopped. It was charging the draft with the riot. At all events the Governor did not influence the conduct of these his friends.

Now, from Gettysburg came the New York militia and several regiments of regulars, by order of the Government, and Thursday, the 16th, ended the riot, but not until several hundred, a thousand perhaps, of the rioters had been slain. In Boston and several other places at the same time some attempts at resistance were made, but they were of little consequence comparatively. The draft went on, as did the subsequent one in October, and there was no disturbance of much public note. But at all times and wherever resistance was made to this seeming necessity of the Government, it was done by foreign-born citizens, and usually of the more recent importations. And while it is also true that the New York and other rioters were mainly of the lowest Irish Catholics, it will not be forgotten that the teachers in the Church, the bishops and priests, used all their influence on the side of order and obedience to the Government; most of them, perhaps, being zealous patriots.

The New York Democratic organizations were now especially loud in denouncing the Government, in declaring the unconstitutionality of the draft law, and urged the Governor to resist it by the military

power of the State. This again led Mr. Seymour to put himself on unenviable record by a long letter to the President, on the 3d of August, asking the draft to be stopped, and at least until its "Constitutionality" be further tested. The President wrote an answer four days afterwards, and in it are these cutting words:—

"I do not object to abide a decision of the United States Supreme Court, or of the Judges thereof, on the Constitutionality of the draft law. In fact, I should be willing to facilitate the obtaining of it. But I can not consent to lose the time while it is being obtained. We are contending with an enemy who, as I understand, drives every able-bodied man he can reach into his ranks, very much as a butcher drives bullocks into a slaughter-pen. No time is wasted, no argument is used. This produces an army which will soon turn upon our now victorious soldiers already in the field, if they shall not be sustained by recruits as they should be. It produces an army with a rapidity not to be matched on our side, if we first waste time to re-experiment with the volunteer system, already deemed by Congress, and palpably, in fact, so far exhausted as to be inadequate; and then more time to obtain a court decision as to whether a law is Constitutional which requires a part of those not now in the service to go to the aid of those who are already in it; and still more time to determine with absolute certainty that we get those who are to go in the precisely legal proportion to those who are not to go. My purpose is to be in my action just and Constitutional, and yet practical, in performing the important duty with which I am charged, of maintaining the unity and free principles of our common country. Your obedient servant,

"A. LINCOLN."

Several test cases as to the Constitutionality of the Enrollment Act and the draft were subsequently made under Circuit and District Judges, and all of them affirming the act; and Judge Daniel Agnew, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, who reversed the decisions of his Democratic predecessor, whom he also defeated by a large majority in the election of 1863, said :—

“The Constitutional authority to use the national forces creates a corresponding duty to provide a number adequate to the necessity. . . . Power and duty now go hand in hand with the extremity, until every available man in the Nation is called into service, if the emergency requires it.”

The most apocryphal era of American politics is that embracing the transition from slavery to freedom, from the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act to the end of Andrew Johnson's Administration. Political pretensions were then on the most stupendous scale.* And only in the light of results and after events do they appear at their true value. In 1860 there arose the cry of “The Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was.” But this did not reach the key in which the spirit of the times was really pitched. And long ago, every man knows, this specious shibboleth was numbered among the legends of the visionary past. One of the most glaring frauds of this period was the everlasting play on the word “Constitution” on the part of the “Opposition.” All acts that restrained them from doing what they desired, or compelled them to do what they did not

desire, were "unconstitutional." Even to breathe a thought against slavery was "unconstitutional." But to scheme for its extension and against freedom, was ever in harmony with the nature of Magna Charta. Coercion was rankly "unconstitutional." To fight against secession at all was "unconstitutional." If moral suasion could not preserve the Union, nothing else would, for everything else was "unconstitutional." To interfere with the liberties of men, even when they were using them against the welfare of the country, was "unconstitutional." Only universal license and *habeas corpus* were Constitutional. The blackest of all "unconstitutional" things was a thought or act looking toward the immediate or ultimate overthrow of African slavery. So it went on to the smallest and greatest of things, until "unconstitutional" became a by-word. And as such it has gone into the history of the times, as suggestive of the most insincere, immoral, and treacherous period of American politics. That this charge and crime should be allowed to pass in comparative silence and forgetfulness is one of the great political virtues of to-day.

Early in the fall of 1861 the grand jury presented to the United States Circuit Court in New York several newspapers of that city as aiders and abettors of the Rebellion. In this presentation the jury made this unanswerable statement:—

"The grand jury are aware that free governments allow liberty of speech and of the press to their utmost limit, but there is nevertheless a limit. If a person in a

fortress or an army were to preach to the soldiers submission to the enemy he would be treated as an offender. Would he be more culpable than the citizen who, in the midst of the most formidable conspiracy and Rebellion, tells the conspirators and rebels that they are right, encourages them to persevere in resistance, and condemns the effort of loyal citizens to overcome and punish them as an "unholy war?" If the utterance of such language in the streets or through the press is not a crime, then there is a great defect in our laws, or they were not made for such an emergency."

By order of the Postmaster-General some of the papers were soon after taken from the mails or forbidden to be allowed to pass through them. Even the publication of some of them was stopped. At different times, the most offensive and criminal of these Democratic papers were suppressed. In the spring of 1864 two of them in New York City published a forged proclamation of the President calling for four hundred thousand soldiers, which led to their seizure for a time by order of the War Department. About this time, too, one of the Cincinnati papers was wholly or partially suppressed by the order of the general commanding in the department. In Baltimore and other cities the same fate befell evil-doers. But all this brought curses upon the Administration, and set loose another deluge of the "unconstitutional" talk and bluster, and although the "aiding and abetting" were checked in certain channels they broke out more virulently in others where the risks were less or the recklessness greater.

The Governor of New York was up in arms at

once. In a letter to the District Attorney of the County of New York he wrote :—

“I call upon you to look into the facts connected with the seizure of ‘The Journal of Commerce’ and of ‘The New York World.’ If these acts were illegal, the offenders must be punished.”

So the necessary steps were taken, but the grand jury declined to act in the premises against the Government. The Governor was not to be thwarted in that way. He ordered some magistrate to be found who could get the case on, and vindicate the trampled rights of citizens to do what injury to the country their misguided judgments directed. General John A. Dix and several other officers of the Government were accordingly arrested, but being soon after released, the case ended. In the District Attorney’s report or affidavit, he said that he believed that “Hon. A. Lincoln” had actually been a party to the “unconstitutional” acts in directing “John A. Dix” to feloniously order one William Hays to command some other persons to go armed and equipped against these good newspapers in the quiet prosecution of their Constitutional privileges.

In Congress this matter was brought up, and resolutions introduced in both Houses declaring that the seizure of the two New York papers “was an act unwarranted in itself, dangerous to the cause of the Union, in violation of the Constitution, and subversive of the principles of civil liberty, and as such is hereby censured.” But these resolutions were not acted upon, and all loyal people thought them, like

the cause they were designed to defend, dangerous to the interests of the Union. And so these foolish and wicked matters went on to the end. And so, between the "enemies in the rear" and the enemies on the battle-field, the Administration and the loyal people went on in the work before them. Scarcely had the resolutions mentioned here been disposed of forever before the following was submitted to the House :—

"*Resolved*, That the Committee on the Judiciary be instructed to inquire and report what, if any, additional legislation may be necessary to punish the forgery and publication of official documents, and what legislation is necessary to punish those who, through the press or otherwise, give information, aid, or comfort to the rebels."

About this time the President was engaged in a personal combat with the "Opposition" aiders and abettors in Ohio and other States, over *habeas corpus*, and "unconstitutional" arrests, briefly referred to in other chapters.

In reply to some resolutions and a letter from Albany, New York, concerning "arbitrary arrests," which Mr. Lincoln considered it proper for him to make, is the following extract, constituting a considerable part of the remarkable letter, dated June 12, 1863 :—

"Prior to my installation here it had been inculcated that any State had a lawful right to secede from the National Union, and that it would be expedient to exercise the right whenever the devotees of the doctrine should fail to elect a President to their own liking. I was elected contrary to their liking ; and,

accordingly, so far as it was legally possible, they had taken seven States out of the Union, had seized many of the United States forts, and had fired upon the United States flag, all before I was inaugurated, and, of course, before I had done any official act whatever. The Rebellion thus began soon ran into the present civil war; and, in certain respects, it began on very unequal terms between the parties. The insurgents had been preparing for it more than thirty years, while the Government had taken no steps to resist them. The former had carefully considered all the means which could be turned to their account. It undoubtedly was a well-pondered reliance with them that in their own unrestricted efforts to destroy Union, Constitution, and law altogether, the Government would, in great degree, be restrained by the same Constitution and law from arresting their progress. Their sympathizers pervaded all departments of the Government and nearly all communities of the people. From this material, under cover of 'liberty of speech,' 'liberty of the press,' and '*habeas corpus*,' they hoped to keep on foot amongst us a most efficient corps of spies, informers, suppliers, and aiders and abettors of their cause in a thousand ways. They knew that in times such as they were inaugurating, by the Constitution itself the '*habeas corpus*' might be suspended; but they also knew they had friends who would make a question as to who was to suspend it; meanwhile their spies and others might remain at large to help on their cause. Or if, as has happened, the Executive should suspend the writ, without ruinous waste of time, instances of arresting innocent persons might occur, as are always likely to occur in such cases; and then a clamor could be raised in regard to this, which might be, at least, of some service to the insurgent cause. It needed no very keen perception to discover this part of the enemy's program, so soon as by open hostilities their machinery was fairly put in motion. Yet, thoroughly imbued with a reverence for the guaranteed rights of individuals, I was slow to adopt the strong measures which by degrees I have been forced to regard as being within the exceptions of the Constitution, and as indispensable to the public safety. Nothing is better known to history than that courts of justice are utterly incompetent to such cases. Civil courts are organized chiefly for

trials of individuals, or, at most, a few individuals acting in concert; and this in quiet times, and on charges of crimes well defined in the law. Even in times of peace bands of horse-thieves and robbers frequently grow too numerous and powerful for ordinary courts of justice. But what comparison, in numbers, have such bands ever borne to the insurgent sympathizers even in many of the loyal States? Again, a jury too frequently has at least one member more ready to hang the panel than to hang the traitor. And yet, again, he who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills a Union soldier in battle. Yet this dissuasion or inducement may be so conducted as to be no defined crime of which any civil court would take cognizance.

“Ours is a case of rebellion—so called by the resolutions before me—in fact, a clear, flagrant, and gigantic case of rebellion; and the provision of the Constitution that ‘the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it,’ is the provision which specially applies to our present case. This provision plainly attests the understanding of those who made the Constitution, that ordinary courts of justice are inadequate to ‘cases of rebellion’—attests their purpose that, in such cases, men may be held in custody whom the courts, acting on ordinary rules, would discharge. *Habeas corpus* does not discharge men who are proved to be guilty of defined crime; and its suspension is allowed by the Constitution on purpose that men may be arrested and held who can not be proved to be guilty of defined crime, ‘when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.’

“This is precisely our present case; a case of rebellion, wherein the public safety does require the suspension. Indeed, arrests by process of courts, and arrests in cases of rebellion, do not proceed altogether upon the same basis. The former is directed at the small percentage of ordinary and continuous perpetration of crime, while the latter is directed at sudden and extensive uprisings against the Government, which, at most, will succeed or fail in no great length of time. In the latter case, arrests are made, not so much for what has been done, as

for what probably would be done. The latter is more for the preventive and less for the vindictive than the former. In such cases the purposes of men are much more easily understood than in cases of ordinary crime. The man who stands by and says nothing when the peril of his Government is discussed, can not be misunderstood. If not hindered, he is sure to help the enemy; much more, if he talks ambiguously, talks for his country with 'buts' and 'ifs' and 'ands.' Of how little value the Constitutional provisions I have quoted will be rendered if arrests shall never be made until defined crimes shall have been committed, may be illustrated by a few notable examples. General John C. Breckinridge, General Robert E. Lee, General Joseph E. Johnston, General John B. Magruder, General William B. Preston, General Simon B. Buckner, and Commodore Franklin Buchanan, now occupying the very highest places in the rebel war service, were all within the power of the Government since the Rebellion began, and were nearly as well known to be traitors then as now. Unquestionably if we had seized and held them, the insurgent cause would be much weaker. But no one of them had then committed any crime defined in the law. Every one of them, if arrested, would have been discharged on *habeas corpus* were the writ allowed to operate. In view of these and similar cases, I think the time not unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too many."

The Ohio Democracy now took up this contest where it was dropped with the Albany Committee, and a long review of the whole case, dated June 26th, and signed by a prominent Democrat from each Congressional District, among them being George H. Pendleton, was presented to the President. To this the following reply was returned, dated June 29, 1863:—

"GENTLEMEN,—The resolutions of the Ohio Democratic State Convention, which you present me, together with your

introductory and closing remarks, being in position and argument mainly the same as the resolutions of the Democratic meeting at Albany, New York, I refer you to my response to the latter as meeting most of the points in the former.

"This response you evidently used in preparing your remarks, and I desire no more than that it be used with accuracy. In a single reading of your remarks, I only discovered one inaccuracy in matter which I suppose you took from that paper. It is where you say: 'The undersigned are unable to agree with you in the opinion you have expressed that the Constitution is different in time of insurrection or invasion from what it is in time of peace and public security.'

"A recurrence to the paper will show you that I have not expressed the opinion you suppose. I expressed the opinion that the Constitution is different *in its application* in cases of rebellion or invasion, involving the public safety, from what it is in times of profound peace and public security; and this opinion I adhere to, simply because by the Constitution itself things may be done in the one case which may not be done in the other.

"I dislike to waste a word on a merely personal point, but I must respectfully assure you that you will find yourselves at fault should you ever seek for evidence to prove your assumption that I 'opposed in discussions before the people the policy of the Mexican War.'

"You say: 'Expunge from the Constitution this limitation upon the power of Congress to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus*, and yet the other guarantees of personal liberty would remain unchanged.' Doubtless if this clause of the Constitution, improperly called, as I think, a limitation upon the power of Congress, were expunged, the other guarantees would remain the same; but the question is not how those guarantees would stand with that clause *out* of the Constitution, but how they stand with that clause remaining in it, in case of rebellion or invasion, involving the public safety. If the liberty could be indulged in expunging that clause, letter and spirit, I really think the Constitutional argument would be with you.

"My general view on this question was stated in the Albany response, and hence I do not state it now. I only add that, as

seems to me, the benefit of the writ of *habeas corpus* is the great means through which the guarantees of personal liberty are conserved and made available in the last resort; and corroborative of this view is the fact that Mr. Vallandigham, in the very case in question, under the advice of able lawyers, saw not where else to go but to the *habeas corpus*. But by the Constitution the benefit of the writ of *habeas corpus* itself may be suspended, when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.

“You ask, in substance, whether I really claim that I may override all the guaranteed rights of individuals, on the plea of conserving the public safety, when I may choose to say the public safety requires it. This question, divested of the phraseology calculated to represent me as struggling for an arbitrary personal prerogative, is either simply a question *who* shall decide, or an affirmation that *nobody* shall decide, what the public safety does require in cases of rebellion or invasion. The Constitution contemplates the question as likely to occur for decision, but it does not expressly declare who is to decide it. By necessary implication, when rebellion or invasion comes, the decision is to be made from time to time; and I think the man whom for the time the people have, under the Constitution, made the Commander-in-Chief of their army and navy is the man who holds the power and bears the responsibility of making it. If he uses the power justly the same people will probably justify him; if he abuses it he is in their hands, to be dealt with by all the modes they have reserved to themselves in the Constitution.

“The earnestness with which you insist that persons can only, in times of rebellion, be lawfully dealt with in accordance with the rules for criminal trials and punishments in times of peace induces me to add a word to what I said on that point in the Albany response. You claim that men may, if they choose, embarrass those whose duty it is to combat a giant rebellion, and then be dealt with only in turn as if there were no rebellion. The Constitution itself rejects this view. The military arrests and detentions which have been made, including those of Mr. Vallandigham, which are not different in principle from the other, have been for *prevention*, and not for *pun-*

ishment—as injunctions to stay injury, as proceedings to keep the peace—and hence, like proceedings in such cases and for like reasons, they have not been accompanied with indictments or trials by juries, nor in a single case by any punishment whatever, beyond what is purely incidental to the prevention. The original sentence of imprisonment in Mr. Vallandigham's case was to prevent injury to the military service only, and the modification of it was made as a less disagreeable mode to him of securing the same prevention.

“I am unable to perceive an insult to Ohio in the case of Mr. Vallandigham. Quite surely nothing of this sort was or is intended. I was wholly unaware that Mr. Vallandigham was, at the time of his arrest, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for Governor, until so informed by your reading to me the resolutions of the convention. I am grateful to the State of Ohio for many things, especially for the brave soldiers and officers she has given in the present national trial to the armies of the Union.

“You claim, as I understand, that, according to my own position in the Albany response, Mr. Vallandigham should be released; and this because, as you claim, he has not damaged the military service by discouraging enlistments, encouraging desertions, or otherwise; and that, if he had, he should be turned over to the civil authorities under the recent acts of Congress. I certainly do not *know* that Mr. Vallandigham has specifically and by direct language advised against enlistments, and in favor of desertion and resistance to drafting. We all know that combinations, armed in some instances to resist the arrest of deserters, began several months ago; that more recently the like has appeared in resistance to the enrollment preparatory to a draft; and that quite a number of assassinations have occurred from the same animus. These had to be met by military force, and this again has led to bloodshed and death. And now, under a sense of responsibility more weighty and enduring than any which is merely official, I solemnly declare my belief that this hindrance of the military, including maiming and murder, is due to the course in which Mr. Vallandigham has been engaged, in a greater degree than to any other cause; and it is due to him personally in a greater degree than to any other man.

“These things have been notorious, known to all, and, of course, known to Mr. Vallandigham. Perhaps I would not be wrong to say they originated with his especial friends and adherents. With perfect knowledge of them he has frequently, if not constantly, made speeches in Congress and before popular assemblies; and if it can be shown that, with these things staring him in the face, he has ever uttered a word of rebuke or counsel against them, it will be a fact greatly in his favor with me, and one of which, as yet, I am totally ignorant.

“When it is known that the whole burden of his speeches has been to stir up men against the prosecution of the war, and that in the midst of resistance to it he has not been known in any instance to counsel against such resistance, it is next to impossible to repel the inference that he has counseled directly in favor of it.

“With all this before their eyes the convention you represent have nominated Mr. Vallandigham for Governor of Ohio, and both they and you have declared the purpose to sustain the National Union by all Constitutional means. But, of course, they and you in common reserve to yourselves to decide what are Constitutional means, and, unlike the Albany meeting, you omit to state or intimate that, in your opinion, an army is a Constitutional means of saving the Union against a rebellion, or even to intimate that you are conscious of an existing rebellion being in progress with the avowed object of destroying that very Union. At the same time your nominee for Governor, in whose behalf you appeal, is known to you and to the world to declare against the use of an army to suppress the rebellion. Your own attitude, therefore, encourages desertion, resistance to the draft, and the like, because it teaches those who incline to desert and to escape the draft to believe it is your purpose to protect them and to hope that you will become strong enough to do so.

“After a short personal intercourse with you, gentlemen of the committee, I can not say I think you desire this effect to follow your attitude; but I assure you that both friends and enemies of the Union look upon it in this light. It is a substantial hope, and by consequence a real strength to the enemy.

It is a false hope, and one which you would willingly dispel. I will make the way exceedingly easy. I send you duplicates of this letter, in order that you, or a majority, may, if you choose, indorse your names upon one of them, and return it thus indorsed to me, with the understanding that those signing are hereby committed to the following propositions, and to nothing else:—

“1. That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the object and tendency of which is to destroy the National Union; and that, in your opinion, an army and navy are Constitutional means for suppressing that rebellion.

“2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase or favor the decrease or lessen the efficiency of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress that rebellion; and,

“3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid, fed, clad, and otherwise well provided for and supported.

“And with the further understanding that upon receiving the letter and names thus indorsed, I will cause them to be published, which publication shall be, within itself, a revocation of the order in relation to Mr. Vallandigham.

“It will not escape observation that I consent to the release of Mr. Vallandigham upon terms not embracing any pledge from him or from others as to what he will or will not do. I do this because he is not present to speak for himself, or to authorize others to speak for him; and hence I shall expect that on returning he would not put himself practically in antagonism with his friends. But I do it chiefly because I thereby prevail on other influential gentlemen of Ohio to so define their position as to be of immense value to the army, thus more than compensating for the consequences of any mistake in allowing Mr. Vallandigham to return, so that, on the whole, the public safety will not have suffered by it. Still, in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all others, I must hereafter, as heretofore, do so much as the public service may seem to require.

“I have the honor to be, respectfully yours, etc.,

“A. LINCOLN.”

None of the committee signed the President's duplicates, nor were willing to make any pledges for themselves, treating the matter as an insult, and making a long and very personal and acrimonious rejoinder, showing that so far as they were concerned, the discussion had not only not been productive of good, but it served to increase the bitterness of the opposition, the Democratic party, as an organization, becoming more and more anti-war as the end approached. The leaders were unable or unwilling to distinguish between a time of war and a time of peace; and whether they were willingly rebellious and false, or blindly sincere, did not matter in practice. That they were one or the other time and events proved, and, perhaps, few of those who participated in this falsest and maddest of all follies among wise men would care to discuss the matter to-day.

The elections soon came on, and exhibited a great revulsion in public sentiment. The Republican or war party was quite generally successful, reversing all the unfavorable indications of the spring elections, and those of the previous fall. General McClellan wrote a letter indorsing George W. Woodward for Governor of Pennsylvania against Andrew G. Curtin, the war Governor. Woodward was one of the judges of the Supreme Court of the State who had declared the enrollment act and draft "unconstitutional," but General McClellan said: "Having some days ago, had a full conversation with Judge Woodward, I find that our views agree; and I regard his election as Governor of Pennsylvania called for by the interests

of the Nation." But Curtin was re-elected by over fifteen thousand majority. And in Ohio John Brough defeated C. L. Vallandigham by over one hundred thousand votes. In 1862 New York had gone for Seymour by ten thousand, and now the reaction in that State gave the war party a majority of thirty thousand. So in Massachusetts and other Eastern States the majorities were large, as they were also throughout the West. The draft riots had had their effect; the earnest, cutting letters of the President had their effect; Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson had had their effect; and the words and deeds of the malcontent "Opposition" leaders had all conspired to swell the Republican successes in the fall of 1863. This election was a verdict in support of the policy of the Administration, Emancipation Proclamation, and all, and of the continuance of the war until the Rebellion was overthrown. It also pointed unmistakably to the utter defeat of the Democracy in the Presidential contest of 1864.

CHAPTER X.

1862—WAR OF THE REBELLION—THE DEVELOPMENT OF
EMANCIPATION—THE EMANCIPATION PROCLA-
TION—MR. LINCOLN AND HIS DEED.

IN former chapters of these volumes the early course of Mr. Lincoln's Administration in reference to slavery has been given with sufficient fullness, perhaps; and an effort has been made throughout to omit nothing which would seem necessary to convey an accurate idea of Mr. Lincoln's personal views and feelings, when entering upon the Presidency, on this most important subject as related to the crisis then reached in the Nation's history. That he had no design of interfering with slavery in the States where it existed, there can be no doubt. He only hoped during his term of office to see it confined within the bounds it then occupied, and the original idea of its ultimate extinction in the Union established as the sentiment of the country. This was, indeed, the extent of the ambition of the Republican leaders. It was all they really desired or hoped to accomplish. That there would be a long and bloody war, which should make general and immediate emancipation a national necessity, he never believed, did not even think or dream it. And when he entered upon his office, he and his Cabinet, and

the party leaders generally, made extraordinary efforts to exhibit to the slaveholding and already rebellious quarter, their disposition to keep their hands off the "institution." And long after the war had begun the Administration seemed determined to let slavery severely alone, the officers in the army taking courses in dealing with it either in keeping with their own sentiments, or with their views of the probable desires and intentions of the Administration.

The Emancipation Proclamation, and whatever else Mr. Lincoln did for the destruction of slavery, came out of the supposed necessities of the times, and were the results of a gradual development of public affairs. During the special session of Congress in the summer of 1861, there was displayed an evident timidity on the part of the Republican leaders in approaching the subject of slavery, and only the more bold of the old Abolitionists, like Owen Lovejoy, ventured to touch the dangerous theme at all. But by the first of December, when Congress began to assemble in regular session, public sentiment and necessity had prepared the way for action. Having begun the work, Congress moved gradually forward until the great national enemy was dead.

Probably Mr. Lincoln had never had the opportunity to do anything which gave him so much gratification as the approving of the acts abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia and prohibiting slavery in all the Territories of the Nation; and certainly since the signing of the Declaration of Inde-

pendence and the adoption of the Constitution and formation of the Federal Government, no American had had the opportunity to do so great an act. Still he kept pace with Congress with much anxiety as to the effect of his course. Never having been actuated by the sentiments and motives of mere Abolitionism, he was now mainly influenced at every step by the single thought of defeating the rebels and saving the Union. This he made the test of all his acts. He had no ambition to go down in history as the Great Liberator. Events made him do what he did, and yet what he was thus enabled to become to his country and to four millions of the colored race, gave him more satisfaction than it did any other man in America.

General David Hunter issued the following orders at Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head:—

“All persons of color lately held to involuntary service by enemies of the United States, in Fort Pulaski, and on Cockspur Island, Georgia, are hereby confiscated and declared free, in conformity with law, and shall hereafter receive the fruits of their own labor. Such of said persons of color as are able-bodied, and may be required, shall be employed in the Quartermaster’s Department, at the rate heretofore established by Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman.”

“HEAD-QUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, }
“HILTON HEAD, S. C., May 9, 1862. }

“[GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 11.]

“The three States of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, comprising the Military Department of the South, having deliberately declared themselves no longer under

the protection of the United States of America, and having taken up arms against the said United States, it becomes a military necessity to declare them under martial law. This was accordingly done on the 25th day of April, 1862. Slavery and martial law, in a free country, are altogether incompatible. The persons in these three States—Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina—heretofore held as slaves, are therefore declared forever free.

“DAVID HUNTER, Major-General Commanding.

“Official: ED. W. SMITH, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.”

Ten days after the date of this order, the President issued a proclamation, in which he revoked the action of General Hunter in these words:—

“AND WHEREAS, The same is producing some excitement and misunderstanding:

“*Therefore*, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, proclaim and declare that the Government of the United States had no knowledge or belief of an intention, on the part of General Hunter, to issue such a proclamation, nor has it yet any authentic information that the document is genuine; and, further, that neither General Hunter nor any other commander, or person, has been authorized by the Government of the United States to make proclamation declaring the slaves of any State free, and that the supposed proclamation now in question, whether genuine or false, is altogether void, so far as respects such declaration.

“I further make known that, whether it be competent for me, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, to declare the slaves of any State or States free, and whether, at any time, or in any case, it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the Government to exercise such supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I

can not feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field. These are totally different questions from those of police regulations in armies and camps.

"On the sixth day of March last, by a special message, I recommended to Congress the adoption of a joint resolution, to be substantially as follows:—

"*Resolved*, That the United States ought to co-operate with any State which may adopt a gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State in its discretion to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system."

"The resolution, in the language above quoted, was adopted by large majorities in both branches of Congress, and now stands an authentic, definite, and solemn proposal of the Nation to the States and people most immediately interested in the subject-matter. To the people of these States I now earnestly appeal. I do not argue; I beseech you to make the arguments for yourselves. You can not, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partisan politics. This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The change it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not been done by one effort in all past time, as, in the providence of God, it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it!

"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"Done at the City of Washington, this nineteenth day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-sixth.

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

The President could not lose this opportunity to make one more appeal in behalf of his scheme of voluntary, gradual, compensated emancipation. His fond hope was that the border States at least would accept the proposition. "The change it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it?" Vain were such appeals. But they exhibit how little Mr. Lincoln was yet prepared to enter upon the expedient of arbitrary emancipation; but the necessity of which he already began to see, could not long be resisted.

About this time Mr. Lincoln made an earnest attempt to interest the colored people in his plan of starting a colony in New Granada with the means Congress had put at his disposal for that purpose. On the 14th of August, 1862, he called some of the more intelligent colored men to hear him explain the plan and his reasons for it. He told them plainly that the two races should live apart; that they were not on equal terms with the whites, and there was no probability of their being so; that they had no great reason for loving the white race; that they should look to their own interests; that he thought it would be to the interests of both races for them to seek a home to themselves. This he wanted to help them do, and would see to it that they should not be wronged in any way. In this interview the President treated them very kindly, and told them that in his judgment their race was suffering the greatest wrong which had ever been inflicted on any people.

On the 19th of August, Horace Greeley, a man of no very great depth or correctness of judgment on political and many other matters, printed in "The Tribune" a long, and somewhat rude letter to the President, in which Mr. Greeley berates him for acquiescing in the unmilitary and inhuman orders of Halleck and others as to slaves entering the Union lines, and annulling the acts of others looking to the freedom of the slaves; accusing him of being influenced by the opinions of men favorable to the interests of slavery, and who were otherwise unsuitable guides for times in need of measures so extraordinary and vigorous; notifying him that he was not carrying out the laws of Congress, which was as little as any Republican President could do in view of the hopes and promises of his party; and finally notifying him, in the name of twenty millions of people, as he claimed, that the way to crush the Rebellion was to crush slavery. This harangue the President saw fit to answer in one of his most valuable and remarkable letters as follows:—

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
"August 22, 1862."

"HON. HORACE GREELEY:—

"DEAR SIR,—I have just read yours of the 19th instant, addressed to myself through the New York 'Tribune.'

"If there be in it any statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to be erroneous, I do not now and here controvert them.

"If there be any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not now and here argue against them.

"If there be perceptible in it an impatient, dicta-

torial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to be right.

"As to the policy I 'seem to be pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it in the shortest way under the Constitution.

"The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be—the Union as it was.

"If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them.

"If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them.

"My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or destroy slavery."

"If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that.

"What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save this Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union.

"I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views.

"I have here stated my purpose according to my official duty, and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.

Yours,

A. LINCOLN."

On the 17th of July, the President had approved the bill providing for the employment of negroes in

the service of the army and navy, and the everlasting freedom of the slaves of rebel masters so employed. Only a few days after this event the following order was sent out:—

“WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, }
“July 22, 1862. }

“*First.* Ordered that military commanders within the States of Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas, in an orderly manner seize and use any property, real or personal, which may be necessary or convenient for their several commands, for supplies, or for other military purposes; and that while property may be destroyed for proper military objects, none shall be destroyed in wantonness or malice.

“*Second.* That military and naval commanders shall employ as laborers, within and from said States, so many persons of African descent as can be advantageously used for military or naval purposes, giving them reasonable wages for their labor.

“*Third.* That, as to both property and persons of African descent, accounts shall be kept sufficiently accurate and in detail, to show quantities and amounts, and from whom both property and such persons shall have come, on a basis upon which compensation can be made in proper cases; and the several departments of this Government shall attend to and perform their appropriate parts towards the execution of these orders.

“By order of the President.

“EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of WAR.”

The President was evidently making some progress in the work of emancipation; more, indeed, than this order indicated, or than those most acquainted with his affairs knew. He was now plied

on the question from every source. The newspapers discussed the propriety and impropriety of a declaration of universal emancipation; by individuals, and committees, and in every possible way, the subject was brought to Mr. Lincoln's attention. Many men for whose opinions he had respect, disagreed greatly in their recommendations. He heard them all, and sometimes as grave as the subject was, with the appearance of considerable levity. He said to a delegation of religious men from Illinois that no person was more concerned about the issue of such a step than he was, and if there was any expression of the will of Heaven, any Divine revelation about it, he should be the recipient of it. If he knew the will of Providence in the matter, he would readily carry it out. But as the days of miracles seemed to be passed, he would have to study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what was possible, and learn what appeared to be wise and right. In these conversations Mr. Lincoln always managed to draw out the arguments of his visitors against his own doubts. It had always been his way, when he could do no better, to array against himself every possible argument which would seem in any way to throw light or doubt on the course he contemplated or was then taking. This he had already done over and over again in reference to the matter of emancipation. This was about the only bit of philosophy there was in Mr. Lincoln's composition. At all events, whatever may be said about his politics and anything else, his religion was utterly void of philosophical founda-

tion, and never reached the dignity of being worthy of the name even, until he went to Washington and was cut loose from the evil influences under which he lived at Springfield. At Washington he became the subject of the attentions and the prayers of the pious and the good. By these things his natural superstition was aroused to the highest degree of friendliness toward them, and the result was a certain religious development in his own life by which even his best acquaintances were not a little deceived.

As early as the 1st of July, 1862, Mr. Lincoln had begun to think seriously of immediately issuing his Emancipation Proclamation. And it has been claimed that while going to or returning from his visit to General McClellan at Harrison's Landing early in July, he prepared the first draft of that celebrated paper. At any rate he was ahead of Mr. Greeley in his demands for immediate action; and long before most of the earnest personal appeals were made to him in the early autumn, he had decided upon his course. The following is the first or preliminary

PROCLAMATION OF EMANCIPATION.

"I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, and Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the Constitutional relation between the United States and each of the States, and the people thereof, in which States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed.

"That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of

Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all Slave States so-called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the government existing there, will be continued.

“That on the 1st day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.

“That the Executive will, on the 1st day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States or parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States, by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.

“That attention is hereby called to an act of Congress entitled ‘An Act to make an additional Article of War,’

approved March 13, 1862, and which Act is in the words and figures following :

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That hereafter the following shall be promulgated as an additional article of war for the government of the army of the United States, and shall be obeyed and observed as such :

"ARTICLE.—All officers or persons in the military or naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor who may have escaped from any person to whom such service or labor is claimed to be due; and any officer who shall be found guilty by a court-martial of violating this article shall be dismissed from the service.

"SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted,* That this act shall take effect from and after its passage.

"Also, to the ninth and tenth sections of an act entitled 'An Act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other purposes,' approved July 16, 1862, and which sections are in the words and figures following :

"SEC. 9. *And be it further enacted,* That all slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged in rebellion against the Government of the United States, or who shall in any way give aid or comfort thereto, escaping from such persons and taking refuge within the lines of the army; and all slaves captured from such persons, or deserted by them and coming under the control of the Government of the United States; and all slaves of such persons found *on* (or) being within any place occupied by rebel forces and afterward occupied by forces of the United States, shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude, and not again held as slaves.

"SEC. 10. *And be it further enacted,* That no slave

escaping into any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, from any other State, shall be delivered up, or in any way impeded or hindered of his liberty, except for crime, or some offense against the laws, unless the person claiming said fugitive shall first make oath that the person to whom the labor or service of such fugitive is alleged to be due is his lawful owner, and has not borne arms against the United States in the present Rebellion, nor in any way given aid and comfort thereto; and no person engaged in the military or naval service of the United States shall, under any pretense whatever, assume to decide on the validity of the claim of any person to the service or labor of any other person, or surrender up any such person to the claimant, on pain of being dismissed from the service.

“And I do hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in the military and naval service of the United States to observe, obey, and enforce, within their respective spheres of service, the act and sections above recited.

“And the Executive will in due time recommend that all citizens of the United States who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the Rebellion, shall (upon the restoration of the Constitutional relation between the United States and their respective States and people, if that relation shall have been suspended or disturbed) be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves.

“In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

“Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-seventh.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

“By the President:

“WM. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.”

F. B. Carpenter, the artist friend of Mr. Lincoln, has given this account of this proclamation:—

“‘It had got to be,’ said he, ‘midsummer, 1862. Things had gone on from bad to worse, until I felt that we had reached the end of our rope on the plan of operations we had been pursuing; that we had about played our last card, and must change our tactics, or lose the game! I now determined upon the adoption of the emancipation policy; and, without consultation with, or the knowledge of the Cabinet, I prepared the original draft of the proclamation, and, after much anxious thought, called a Cabinet meeting upon the subject. This was the last of July, or the first part of the month of August, 1862.’ (The exact date he did not remember.) ‘This Cabinet meeting took place, I think, upon a Saturday. All were present, excepting Mr. Blair, the Postmaster-General, who was absent at the opening of the discussion, but came in subsequently. I said to the Cabinet that I had resolved upon this step, and had not called them together to ask their advice, but to lay the subject-matter of a proclamation before them; suggestions as to which would be in order, after they had heard it read. Mr. Lovejoy,’ said he, ‘was in error when he informed you that it excited no comment, excepting on the part of Secretary Seward. Various suggestions were offered. Secretary Chase wished the language stronger in reference to the arming of the blacks. Mr. Blair, after he came in, deprecated the policy, on the ground that it would cost the Administration the fall elections. Nothing, however, was offered that I had not already fully anticipated and settled in my own mind, until Secretary Seward spoke. He said in substance: “Mr. President, I approve of the proclamation, but I question the expediency of its issue at this juncture. The depression of the public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so important a step. It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help; the Government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the Government.” His idea,’ said the President, ‘was that it would be considered our last *shriek*, on the retreat.’ (This was his *precise* expression.)

““Now,” continued Mr. Seward, “while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, that you postpone its issue, until you can give it to the country supported by military success, instead of issuing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of the war!”” Mr. Lincoln continued: ‘The wisdom of the view of the Secretary of State struck me with very great force. It was an aspect of the case that, in all my thought upon the subject, I had entirely overlooked. The result was that I put the draft of the Proclamation aside, as you do your sketch for a picture, waiting for a victory. From time to time I added or changed a line, touching it up here and there, anxiously watching the progress of events. Well, the next news we had was of Pope’s disaster, at Bull Run. Things looked darker than ever. Finally, came the week of the battle of Antietam. I determined to wait no longer. The news came, I think, on Wednesday, that the advantage was on our side. I was then staying at the Soldiers’ Home (three miles out of Washington). Here I finished writing the second draft of the preliminary Proclamation; came up on Saturday; called the Cabinet together to hear it, and it was published the following Monday.’

“At the final meeting of September 20th, another interesting incident occurred in connection with Secretary Seward. The President had written the important part of the Proclamation in these words:—

““That, on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever *free*; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will *recognize* the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.’

“When I finished reading this paragraph,’ resumed Mr. Lincoln, ‘Mr. Seward stopped me, and said: “I think, Mr. President, that you should insert after the word ‘*recognize*,’ in that sentence, the words ‘*and maintain*.’” I replied that I had already fully considered the import of that expression in this

connection, but I had not introduced it because it was not my way to promise what I was not entirely *sure* that I could perform, and I was not prepared to say that I thought we were exactly able to "maintain" this.'

"'But,' said he, 'Seward insisted that we ought to take this ground; and the words finally went in!'

"'It is a somewhat remarkable fact,' he subsequently remarked, 'that there were just one hundred days between the dates of the two proclamations issued upon the 22d of September and the 1st of January. I had not made the calculation at the time.'

"'Having concluded this interesting statement, the President then proceeded to show me the various positions occupied by himself and the different members of the Cabinet, on the occasion of the first meeting. 'As nearly as I remember,' said he, 'I sat near the head of the table; the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War were here, at my right hand; the others were grouped at the left,' . . .

"'In February last, a few days after the passage of the 'Constitutional Amendment,' I was in Washington, and was received by Mr. Lincoln with the kindness and familiarity which had characterized our previous intercourse. I said to him one day that I was very proud to have been the artist to have first conceived of the design of painting a picture commemorative of the Act of Emancipation; that subsequent occurrences had only confirmed my own first judgment of that act as the most sublime moral event in our history. 'Yes,' said he, and never do I remember to have noticed in him more earnestness of expression or manner, '*as affairs have turned, it is the central act of my Administration and the great event of the nineteenth century.*'

"'I remember to have asked him, on one occasion, if there was not some opposition manifested on the part of several members of the Cabinet to the emancipation policy. He said, in reply: 'Nothing more than I have stated to you. Mr. Blair thought we should lose the fall elections, and opposed it on that ground only.' Said I: 'I have understood that Secretary Smith was not in favor of your action. Mr. Blair told me that, when the meeting closed, he and the Secretary of the Inte-

rior went away together, and that the latter told him, if the President carried out that policy, he might count on losing *Indiana*, sure! 'He never said anything of the kind to me,' returned the President. 'And how,' said I, 'does Mr. Blair feel about it now?' 'O,' was the prompt reply, 'he proved right in regard to the fall elections, but he is satisfied that we have since gained more than we lost.' 'I have been told,' said I, 'that Judge Bates doubted the Constitutionality of the Proclamation.' 'He never expressed such an opinion in my hearing,' replied Mr. Lincoln. 'No member of the Cabinet ever dissented from the policy, in any conversation with me.'"

At last the final act, known in history as the Emancipation Proclamation, appeared as follows, according to promise, on the first day of the new year:—

EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION.

"WHEREAS, On the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit:

"That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any States or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom:

"That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof respectively

shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States, by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States:

“Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and Government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days, from the day first above mentioned, order and designate as the States and parts of States wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit:

“Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, Ste. Marie, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia; and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomack, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Anne, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are for the present left precisely as if this Proclamation were not issued.

“And by virtue of the power and for the purpose

aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States are, and henceforward shall be, free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons.

“And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free, to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defense; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages.

“And I further declare and make known that such persons, of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.

“And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God.

“In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my name, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

“Done at the City of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-seventh.

“By the President: ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

“WM. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.”

One of Mr. Lincoln's most faithful friends thus describes the signing of the proclamation:—

“The roll containing the Emancipation Proclamation was taken to Mr. Lincoln at noon on the first day of January, 1863, by Secretary Seward and his son, Frederick. As it lay unrolled before him, Mr. Lincoln took a pen, dipped it in ink, moved his hand to the place for the

signature, held it a moment, and then removed his hand and dropped the pen. After a little hesitation he again took up the pen and went through the same movement as before. Mr. Lincoln then turned to Mr. Seward and said: 'I have been shaking hands since nine o'clock this morning, and my right arm is almost paralyzed. If my name ever goes into history, it will be for this act, and my whole soul is in it. If my hand trembles when I sign the Proclamation, all who examine the document hereafter, will say, "He hesitated."' He then turned to the table, took up the pen again, and slowly, firmly wrote that 'Abraham Lincoln' with which the whole world is now familiar. He looked up, smiled, and said: 'That will do.'

The original draft of this paper all in Mr. Lincoln's own handwriting except, perhaps, a few words interlined by Mr. Seward, was bought for the use of the Sanitary Commission at its fair in Chicago in the fall of 1863. Afterwards the President was requested to sign duplicates which he did; and these were sold for the benefit of the Sanitary Fairs in 1864. Some of them were placed in various public institutions, and one, it is said, occupies a conspicuous place in the Library of the British Museum in London.

Mr. Chase presented to the President a paper containing what he viewed as the proper substance of the Proclamation. The last sentence of this Mr. Lincoln adopted, with a slight change, being the closing paragraph of the Proclamation—"And upon this act, believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke

the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God." Otherwise there was little modification of the President's original draft, even this scarcely deserving notice. Long before it was known to his Cabinet and friends, Mr. Lincoln had written the introductory proclamation of September 22, 1862, and to him alone belongs the credit of the entire writing, and the great act. That he had examined the whole subject in all its bearings, in its effects at home and abroad, upon the friends of the Union and the rebels and their aiders and abettors in the North, there can be no doubt.

In a letter to A. G. Hodges, of Frankfort, Kentucky, dated April 4, 1864, Mr. Lincoln gives the best possible exposition of his motives for this act, and the principles which governed him throughout. This is one of his most memorable letters, and is as follows:—

"MY DEAR SIR,—You ask me to put in writing the substance of what I verbally said the other day in your presence to Governor Bramlette and Senator Dixon. It was as follows:—

"I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I can not remember when I did not so think and feel, and yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling. It was in the oath I took that I would, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. I could not take the office without taking the oath. Nor was it my view that I might take an oath to get power, and break the oath in using the power. I

understood, too, that in ordinary civil administration this oath even forbade me to practically indulge my primary abstract judgment on the moral question of slavery. I had publicly declared this many times, and in many ways. And I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in mere deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery.

“I did understand, however, that the very oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that Government, that Nation of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the Nation and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life *and* limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the Nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that, to the best of my ability, I had even tried to preserve the Constitution, if to preserve slavery, or any minor matter, I should permit the wreck of Government, country, and Constitution altogether. When, early in the war, General Fremont attempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not then think it an indispensable necessity. When, a little later, General Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of the blacks, I objected, because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity. When, still later, General Hunter attempted military emancipation, I again forbade it, because I did not yet think the indispensable necessity had come. When, in March, and May, and July, 1862, I made earnest and successive appeals to the border States to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would

come, unless averted by that measure. They declined the proposition, and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or of laying strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter!

"In choosing it, I hoped for greater gain than loss, but of this I was not entirely confident. More than a year's trial now shows no loss by it, in our foreign relations; none in our home popular sentiment; none in our white military force—no loss by it anyhow or anywhere. On the contrary, it shows a gain of quite a hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, seamen, and laborers. These are palpable facts, about which, as facts, there can be no caviling. We have the men, and we could not have had them without the measure.

"And now, let any Union man who complains of the measure, test himself by writing down in one line that he is for subduing the Rebellion by force of arms, and in the next that he is for taking this one hundred and thirty thousand men from the Union side, and placing them where they would be, but for the measure he condemns. If he can not face his cause so stated, it is only because he can not face the truth.

"I add a word, which was not in the verbal conversation. In telling this tale, I attempt no compliment to my own sagacity. I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me. Now, at the end of three years' struggle, the Nation's condition is not what either party or any man devised or expected. God alone can claim it. Where it is tending, seems plain. If God now wills the removal of a great wrong, and wills also that we of the North, as well as you of the South, shall pay fairly for our complicity in that wrong, impartial history will find therein new cause to attest and revere the justice and goodness of God.

"Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN."

So it happened that Mr. Lincoln, who at the outset had said in reference to interfering with slavery in the States, "I believe I have no lawful right, and I have no intention to do so," had gradually come to believe his interference with slavery necessary to preserve the Union, and had come to avow openly and defend the steps by which he had reached this position, and all the consequences of his acts.

The record is far above suspicion. If Mr. Lincoln had departed from his original intentions, he had done so honestly. It was no fault of his. He had vainly tried to control events. They had led him, and in the religious fervor which had, to some extent, displaced his former tendencies, he now held that Deity was at the back of it all, and must have the honor.

The country was, for a time, greatly divided as to the good and evil which might spring from the Emancipation Proclamation. The Democrats said it would fall harmlessly to the dust. But it greatly irritated them at any rate, especially those who believed their political ascendancy could only be recovered and maintained somehow by the South. Many good and wise Union men were uncertain and uneasy about it. Darkness was before them. This was a bold, fearful leap the President had taken.

The rebels pretended to hold the Proclamation in contempt; still it alarmed them, and called out the spirit of the direst vengeance. The effect of the Proclamation in Europe was favorable to the cause of the Government, and long before the Presidential

election in the fall of 1864, the loyal North had come to view it with the President's eyes, to a great extent. Its virtue had already been well attested. The bitter opposition long apparent in the army to the employment of colored soldiers had passed away, and the strong selfish feeling of having the negro bear any possible amount of the brunt and hardship of the war, which never would have been but for him, took the place, even there, of the former drivel about negro "equality" with the white man by placing a musket in his hand. And although various motives, not always creditable, led the loyal people of the North to give a hearty support finally to the emancipation policy and all that followed from it, in the main they were actuated by the one grand, noble sentiment of elevating a downtrodden race, of bettering the condition of a large part of their own, of saving the Government which they believed to be the best ever achieved by enlightened man, and of removing from it, while they had an opportunity and a ground for so doing, the only apparent or probable or possible instrument of its downfall. So the deed was accomplished, and long ago from all civilized nations but one voice has arisen concerning it. Even in America to-day it can hardly be maintained that there is a divided sentiment about the emancipation of the four millions of slaves. It was the great achievement of Mr. Lincoln's Administration. By it, but certainly not wholly so, does he take his place in history, as he believed he should. After the establishment of the Republic it was the greatest event which ever took

place on the continent, if it was not the first in its grandeur and importance; and among the grand achievements of human justice, progress, and government, it must ever be conspicuous.

CHAPTER XI.

1862—WAR OF THE REBELLION—CONGRESS IN THE WINTER
OF 1862—SECOND ANNUAL MESSAGE—WEST VIR-
GINIA—AN ERROR.

ON the first day of December Congress assembled (last session of the “Thirty-seventh Congress”), and on the same day the President sent to that body his

SECOND ANNUAL MESSAGE.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:—

Since your last annual assembling, another year of health and bountiful harvests has passed. And while it has not pleased the Almighty to bless us with a return of peace, we can but press on, guided by the best light he gives us, trusting that in his own good time and wise way, all will yet be well.

The correspondence touching foreign affairs which has taken place during the last year is herewith submitted, in virtual compliance with a request to that effect made by the House of Representatives near the close of the last session of Congress.

If the condition of our relations with other nations is less gratifying than it has usually been at former periods, it is certainly more satisfactory than a Nation so unhappily distracted as we are, might reasonably have apprehended. In the month of June last there were some grounds to expect that the maritime powers which, at the beginning of our domestic difficulties, so unwisely and unnecessarily, as we think, recognized the insurgents as a belligerent, would soon recede from that position, which has proved only less injurious to themselves than to our own country. But the temporary reverses which afterwards befell the national arms, and which were exaggerated by our

own disloyal citizens abroad, have hitherto delayed that act of simple justice.

The Civil War, which has so radically changed, for the moment, the occupations and habits of the American people, has necessarily disturbed the social condition, and affected very deeply the prosperity of the nations with which we have carried on a commerce that has been steadily increasing throughout a period of half a century. It has, at the same time, excited political ambitions and apprehensions which have produced a profound agitation throughout the civilized world. In this unusual agitation we have forbore from taking part in any controversy between foreign states, and between parties or factions in such states. We have attempted no propagandism, and acknowledged no revolution. But we have left to every nation the exclusive conduct and management of its own affairs. Our struggle has been, of course, contemplated by foreign nations with reference less to its own merits than to its supposed and often exaggerated effects and consequences resulting to those nations themselves. Nevertheless, complaint on the part of this Government, even if it were just, would certainly be unwise.

The treaty with Great Britain for the suppression of the slave-trade has been put into operation with a good prospect of complete success. It is an occasion of special pleasure to acknowledge that the execution of it, on the part of her majesty's government, has been marked with a jealous respect for the authority of the United States, and the rights of their moral and loyal citizens.

The convention with Hanover for the abolition of the State dues has been carried into full effect, under the Act of Congress for that purpose.

A blockade of three thousand miles of sea-coast could not be established, and vigorously enforced, in a season of great commercial activity like the present, without committing occasional mistakes and inflicting unintentional injuries upon foreign nations and their subjects.

A civil war occurring in a country where foreigners reside and carry on trade under treaty stipulations, is necessarily fruitful of complaints of the violation of neutral rights. All

such collisions tend to excite misapprehensions, and possibly to produce mutual reclamations between nations which have a common interest in preserving peace and friendship. In clear cases of these kinds I have, so far as possible, heard and redressed complaints which have been presented by friendly powers. There is still, however, a large and an augmenting number of doubtful cases upon which the Government is unable to agree with the governments whose protection is demanded by the claimants. There are, moreover, many cases in which the United States, or their citizens, suffer wrongs from the naval or military authorities of foreign nations, which the governments of those states are not at once prepared to redress. I have proposed to some of the foreign states, thus interested, mutual conventions to examine and adjust such complaints. This proposition has been made especially to Great Britain, to France, to Spain, and to Prussia. In each case it has been kindly received, but has not yet been formally adopted.

I deem it my duty to recommend an appropriation in behalf of the owners of the Norwegian bark, *Admiral P. Tordenskiold*, which vessel was, in May, 1861, prevented by the commander of the blockading force off Charleston from leaving that port with cargo, notwithstanding a similar privilege had shortly before been granted to an English vessel. I have directed the Secretary of State to cause the papers in the case to be communicated to the proper committees.

Applications have been made to me by many free Americans of African descent to favor their emigration, with a view to such colonization as was contemplated in recent acts of Congress. Other parties at home and abroad, some from interested motives, others upon patriotic considerations, and still others influenced by philanthropic sentiments, have suggested similar measures; while, on the other hand, several of the Spanish-American republics have protested against the sending of such colonies to their respective territories. Under these circumstances I have declined to move any such colony to any state without first obtaining the consent of its government, with an agreement on its part to receive and protect such emigrants in all the rights of freemen; and I have at the same time offered to the several states situated within the tropics, or having col-

onies there, to negotiate with them, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, to favor the voluntary emigration of persons of that class to their respective territories, upon conditions which shall be equal, just, and humane. Liberia and Hayti are, as yet, the only countries to which colonists of African descent from here, could go with certainty of being received and adopted as citizens; and I regret to say such persons, contemplating colonization, do not seem so willing to migrate to those countries as to some others, nor so willing as I think their interest demands. I believe, however, opinion among them in this respect, is improving; and that, ere long, there will be an augmented, and considerable migration to both these countries, from the United States.

The new commercial treaty between the United States and the Sultan of Turkey has been carried into execution.

A commercial and consular treaty has been negotiated, subject to the Senate's consent, with Liberia; and a similar negotiation is now pending with the Republic of Hayti. A considerable improvement of the national commerce is expected to result from these measures.

Our relations with Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, Rome, and the other European States, remain undisturbed. Very favorable relations also continue to be maintained with Turkey, Morocco, China, and Japan.

During the last year there has not only been no change of our previous relations with the independent States of our own continent, but more friendly sentiments than have heretofore existed, are believed to be entertained by these neighbors, whose safety and progress are so intimately connected with our own. This statement especially applies to Mexico, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, Peru, and Chili.

The commission under the convention with the Republic of New Granada closed its session without having audited and passed upon all the claims which were submitted to it. A proposition is pending to revive the convention, that it may be able to do more complete justice. The Joint Commission between the United States and the Republic of Costa Rica has completed its labors and submitted its report.

I have favored the project for connecting the United States with Europe by an Atlantic telegraph, and a similar project to extend the telegraph from San Francisco, to connect by a Pacific telegraph with the line which is being extended across the Russian empire.

The Territories of the United States, with unimportant exceptions, have remained undisturbed by the Civil War; and they are exhibiting such evidence of prosperity as justifies an expectation that some of them will soon be in a condition to be organized as States, and be Constitutionally admitted into the Federal Union.

The immense mineral resources of some of those Territories ought to be developed as rapidly as possible. Every step in that direction would have a tendency to improve the revenues of the Government, and diminish the burdens of the people. It is worthy of your serious consideration whether some extraordinary measures to promote that end can not be adopted. The means which suggests itself as most likely to be effective, is a scientific exploration of the mineral regions in those Territories, with a view to the publication of its results at home and in foreign countries; results which can not fail to be auspicious.

The condition of the finances will claim your most diligent consideration. The vast expenditures incident to the military and naval operations required for the suppression of the Rebellion, have hitherto been met with a promptitude and certainty unusual in similar circumstances; and the public credit has been fully maintained. The continuance of the war, however, and the increased disbursements made necessary by the augmented forces now in the field, demand your best reflections as to the best modes of providing the necessary revenue, without injury to business, and with the least possible burdens upon labor.

The suspension of specie payments by the banks, soon after the commencement of your last session, made large issues of United States notes unavoidable. In no other way could the payment of the troops, and the satisfaction of other just demands, be so economically or so well provided for. The judicious legislation of Congress, securing the receivability of these notes for loans and internal duties, and making them a legal

tender for other debts, has made them a universal currency; and has satisfied, partially, at least, and for the time, the long-felt want of a uniform circulating medium, saving thereby to the people immense sums in discounts and exchanges.

A return to specie payments, however, at the earliest period compatible with due regard to all interests concerned, should ever be kept in view. Fluctuations in the value of currency are always injurious, and to reduce these fluctuations to the lowest possible point will always be a leading purpose in wise legislation. Convertibility, prompt and certain convertibility into coin, is generally acknowledged to be the best and surest safeguard against them; and it is extremely doubtful whether a circulation of United States notes, payable in coin, and sufficiently large for the wants of the people, can be permanently, usefully, and safely maintained.

Is there, then, any other mode in which the necessary provision for the public wants can be made, and the great advantages of a safe and uniform currency secured?

I know of none which promises so certain results, and is at the same time so unobjectionable, as the organization of banking associations under a general act of Congress, well guarded in its provisions. To such associations the Government might furnish circulating notes, on the security of United States bonds deposited in the treasury. These notes, prepared under the supervision of proper officers, being uniform in appearance and security, and convertible always into coin, would at once protect labor against the evils of a vicious currency, and facilitate commerce by cheap and safe exchanges.

A moderate reservation from the interest on the bonds would compensate the United States for the preparation and distribution of the notes and a general supervision of the system, and would lighten the burden of that part of the public debt employed as securities. The public credit, moreover, would be greatly improved, and the negotiation of new loans greatly facilitated, by the steady market demand for Government bonds which the adoption of the proposed system would create.

It is an additional recommendation of the measure, of considerable weight, in my judgment, that it would reconcile, as far as possible, all existing interests, by the opportunity offered

to institutions to reorganize under the act, substituting only the secured uniform national circulation for the local and various circulation, secured and unsecured, now issued by them.

The receipts into the treasury from all sources, including loans, and balance from the preceding year, for the fiscal year ending on the 30th June, 1862, were \$583,885,247.06, of which sum \$49,056,397.62 were derived from customs; \$1,795,331.73 from the direct tax; from public lands, \$152,203.77; from miscellaneous sources, \$931,787.64; from loans in all forms, \$529,692,460.50. The remainder, \$2,257,065.80, was the balance from last year.

The disbursements during the same period were for Congressional, Executive, and judicial purposes, \$5,939,009.29; for foreign intercourse, \$1,339,710.35; for miscellaneous expenses, including the mints, loans, post-office deficiencies, collection of revenue, and other like charges, \$14,129,771.50; for expenses under the Interior Department, \$3,102,985.52; under the War Department, \$394,368,407.36; under the Navy Department, \$42,674,569.69; for interest on public debt, \$13,190,324.45; and for payment of public debt, including reimbursement of temporary loan, and redemptions, \$96,096,922.09; making an aggregate of \$570,841,700.25, and leaving a balance in the treasury on the first day of July, 1862, of \$13,043,546.81.

It should be observed that the sum of \$96,096,922.09, expended for reimbursements and redemption of public debt, being included also in the loans made, may be properly deducted, both from receipts and expenditures, leaving the actual receipts for the year, \$487,788,324.97; and the expenditures, \$474,744,778.16.

Other information on the subject of the finances will be found in the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, to whose statements and views I invite your most candid and considerate attention.

The reports of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy are herewith transmitted. These reports, though lengthy, are scarcely more than brief abstracts of the very numerous and extensive transactions and operations conducted through those Departments. Nor could I give a summary of them here, upon any principle, which would admit of its being much shorter

than the reports themselves. I therefore content myself with laying the reports before you, and asking your attention to them.

It gives me pleasure to report a decided improvement in the financial condition of the Post-office Department, as compared with several preceding years. The receipts for the fiscal year 1861 amounted to \$8,349,296.40, which embraced the revenue from all the States of the Union for three quarters of that year. Notwithstanding the cessation of revenue from the so-called seceded States during the last fiscal year, the increase of the correspondence of the loyal States has been sufficient to produce a revenue during the same year of \$8,299,820.90, being only \$50,000 less than was derived from all the States of the Union during the previous year. The expenditures show a still more favorable result. The amount expended in 1861 was \$13,606,759.11. For the last year the amount has been reduced to \$11,125,364.13, showing a decrease of about \$2,481,000 in the expenditures as compared with the preceding year, and about \$3,750,000 as compared with the fiscal year 1860. The deficiency in the Department for the previous year was \$4,551,966.98. For the last fiscal year it was reduced to \$2,112,814.57. These favorable results are in part owing to the cessation of mail service in the insurrectionary States, and in part to a careful review of all expenditures in that Department in the interest of economy. The efficiency of the postal service, it is believed, has also been much improved. The Postmaster-General has also opened a correspondence, through the Department of State, with foreign governments, proposing a convention of postal representatives for the purpose of simplifying the rates of foreign postage, and to expedite the foreign mails. This proposition, equally important to our adopted citizens, and to the commercial interests of this country, has been favorably entertained and agreed to by all the governments from whom replies have been received.

I ask the attention of Congress to the suggestions of the Postmaster-General in his report respecting the further legislation required, in his opinion, for the benefit of the postal service.

The Secretary of the Interior reports as follows in regard to the public lands:

“The public lands have ceased to be a source of revenue.

From the 1st of July, 1861, to the 30th September, 1862, the entire cash receipts from the sale of lands were \$137,476.26—a sum much less than the expenses of our land system during the same period. The homestead law, which will take effect on the 1st of January next, offers such inducements to settlers that sales for cash can not be expected, to an extent sufficient to meet the expenses of the General Land-office, and the cost of surveying and bringing the land into market.”

The discrepancy between the sum here stated as arising from the sales of the public lands, and the sum derived from the same source as reported from the Treasury Department arises, as I understand, from the fact that the periods of time, though apparently, were not really, coincident at the beginning point—the Treasury report including a considerable sum now, which had previously been reported from the interior—sufficiently large to greatly overreach the sum derived from the three months now reported by the Interior, and not by the Treasury.

The Indian tribes upon our frontiers have, during the past year, manifested a spirit of insubordination, and, at several points, have engaged in open hostilities against the white settlements in their vicinity. The tribes occupying the Indian country south of Kansas renounced their allegiance to the United States, and entered into treaties with the insurgents. Those who remained loyal to the United States were driven from the country. The chief of the Cherokees has visited this city for the purpose of restoring the former relations of the tribe with the United States. He alleges that they were constrained, by superior force, to enter into treaties with the insurgents, and that the United States neglected to furnish the protection which their treaty stipulations required.

In the month of August last the Sioux Indians, in Minnesota, attacked the settlements in their vicinity with extreme ferocity, killing, indiscriminately, men, women, and children. This attack was wholly unexpected, and therefore no means of defense had been provided. It is estimated that no less than eight hundred persons were killed by the Indians, and a large amount of property was destroyed. How this outbreak was induced is not definitely known, and suspicions, which may be

unjust, need not be stated. Information was received by the Indian Bureau, from different sources, about the time hostilities were commenced, that a simultaneous attack was about to be made upon the white settlements by all the tribes between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains. The State of Minnesota has suffered great injury from this Indian war. A large portion of her territory has been depopulated, and a severe loss has been sustained by the destruction of property. The people of that State manifest much anxiety for the removal of the tribes beyond the limits of the State as a guarantee against future hostilities. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs will furnish full details. I submit for your special consideration whether our Indian system shall not be remodeled. Many wise and good men have impressed me with the belief that this can be profitably done.

I submit a statement of the proceedings of commissioners, which shows the progress that has been made in the enterprise of constructing the Pacific Railroad. And this suggests the earliest completion of this road, and also the favorable action of Congress upon the projects now pending before them for enlarging the capacities of the great canals in New York and Illinois, as being of vital and rapidly increasing importance to the whole Nation, and especially to the vast interior region hereinafter to be noticed at some greater length. I propose having prepared, and laid before you at an early day, some interesting and valuable statistical information upon this subject. The military and commercial importance of enlarging the Illinois and Michigan Canal, and improving the Illinois River, is presented in the report of Colonel Webster to the Secretary of War, and now transmitted to Congress. I respectfully ask attention to it.

To carry out the provisions of the Act of Congress of the 15th of May last, I have caused the Department of Agriculture of the United States to be organized.

The Commissioner informs me that, within the period of a few months this Department has established an extensive system of correspondence and exchanges, both at home and abroad, which promises to effect highly beneficial results in the development of a correct knowledge of recent improvements in

agriculture, in the introduction of new products, and in the collection of the agricultural statistics of the different States.

Also that it will soon be prepared to distribute largely seeds, cereals, plants, and cuttings, and has already published, and liberally diffused, much valuable information in anticipation of a more elaborate report, which will in due time be furnished, embracing some valuable tests in chemical science now in progress in the laboratory.

The creation of this department was for the more immediate benefit of a large class of our most valuable citizens; and I trust that the liberal basis upon which it has been organized will not only meet your approbation, but that it will realize, at no distant day, all the fondest anticipations of its most sanguine friends, and become the fruitful source of advantage to all our people.

On the 22d day of September last a proclamation was issued by the Executive, a copy of which is herewith submitted.

In accordance with the purpose expressed in the second paragraph of that paper, I now respectfully recall your attention to what may be called "compensated emancipation."

A nation may be said to consist of its territory, its people, and its laws. The territory is the only part which is of certain durability. "One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh, but the earth abideth forever." It is of the first importance to duly consider and estimate this ever-enduring part. That portion of the earth's surface which is owned and inhabited by the people of the United States is well adapted to be the home of one national family, and it is not well adapted for two or more. Its vast extent, and its variety of climate and productions, are of advantage in this age for one people, whatever they might have been in former ages. Steam, telegraphs, and intelligence have brought these to be an advantageous combination for one united people.

In the Inaugural Address I briefly pointed out the total inadequacy of disunion as a remedy for the differences between the people of the two sections. I did so in language which I can not improve, and which, therefore, I beg to repeat:

"One section of our country believes slavery is *right* and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is *wrong* and

ought not to be extended. This is the only substantial dispute. The fugitive-slave clause of the Constitution, and the law for the suppression of the foreign slave-trade, are each as well enforced, perhaps, as any law can ever be in a community where the moral sense of the people imperfectly supports the law itself. The great body of the people abide by the dry legal obligation in both cases, and a few break over in each. This, I think, can not be perfectly cured; and it would be worse in both cases *after* the separation of the sections than before. The foreign slave-trade, now imperfectly suppressed, would be ultimately revived without restriction in one section; while fugitive slaves, now only partially surrendered, would not be surrendered at all by the other.

“Physically speaking, we can not separate. We can not remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and each go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other; but the different parts of our country can not do this. They can not but remain face to face; and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory *after* separation than *before*? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you can not fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you.”

There is no line, straight or crooked, suitable for a national boundary upon which to divide. Trace through, from east to west, upon the line between the free and slave country, and we shall find a little more than one-third of its length are rivers, easy to be crossed, and populated, or soon to be populated, thickly upon both sides; while nearly all its remaining length are merely surveyor's lines, over which people may walk back and forth without any consciousness of their presence. No part of this line can be made any more difficult to pass by writing it down on paper or parchment as a national boundary. The fact of separation, if it comes, gives up on the part of the seceding

section the fugitive-slave clause, along with all other Constitutional obligations upon the section seceded from, while I should expect no treaty stipulation would ever be made to take its place.

But there is another difficulty. The great interior region, bounded east by the Alleghanies, north by the British dominions, west by the Rocky Mountains, and south by the line along which the culture of corn and cotton meets, and which includes part of Virginia, part of Tennessee, all of Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri, Kansas, Iowa, Minnesota, and the Territories of Dakota, Nebraska, and part of Colorado, already has above ten million people, and will have fifty millions within fifty years, if not prevented by any political folly or mistake. It contains more than one-third of the country owned by the United States—certainly more than one million square miles. Once half as populous as Massachusetts already is, it would have more than seventy-five million people. A glance at the map shows that, territorially speaking, it is the great body of the Republic. The other parts are but marginal borders to it, the magnificent region sloping west from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific, being the deepest and also the richest in undeveloped resources. In the production of provisions, grains, grasses, and all which proceed from them, this great interior region is naturally one of the most important in the world. Ascertain from the statistics the small proportion of the region which has, as yet, been brought into cultivation, and also the large and rapidly increasing amount of its products, and we shall be overwhelmed with the magnitude of the prospect presented. And yet this region has no sea-coast, touches no ocean anywhere. As part of one Nation, its people now find, and may forever find, their way to Europe by New York, to South America and Africa by New Orleans, and to Asia by San Francisco. But separate our common country into two nations, as designed by the present Rebellion, and every man of this great interior region is thereby cut off from some one or more of these outlets, not, perhaps, by a physical barrier, but by embarrassing and onerous trade regulations.

And this is true *wherever* a dividing or boundary line may be fixed. Place it between the now free and slave country, or

place it south of Kentucky, or north of Ohio, and still the truth remains, that none south of it can trade to any port or place north of it, and none north of it can trade to any port or place south of it except upon terms dictated by a government foreign to them. These outlets, east, west, and south, are indispensable to the well-being of the people inhabiting, and to inhabit, this vast interior region. *Which* of the three may be the best is no proper question. All are better than either; and all of right belong to that people and to their successors forever. True to themselves, they will not ask *where* a line of separation shall be, but will vow, rather, that there shall be no such line. Nor are the marginal regions less interested in these communications to and through them to the great outside world. They, too, and each of them, must have access to this Egypt of the West without paying toll at the crossing of any national boundary.

Our national strife springs not from our permanent part; not from the land we inhabit; not from our national homestead. There is no possible severing of this but would multiply, and not mitigate, evils among us. In all its adaptations and aptitudes it demands union and abhors separation. In fact, it would ere long force reunion, however much of blood and treasure the separation might have cost.

Our strife pertains to ourselves, to the passing generations of men; and it can, without convulsion, be hushed forever with the passing of one generation.

In this view, I recommend the adoption of the following resolution and articles amendatory to the Constitution of the United States:

“Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of both Houses concurring), That the following articles be proposed to the Legislatures (or conventions) of the several States as amendments to the Constitution of the United States, all or any of which articles, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures (or conventions), to be valid as part or parts of the said Constitution, namely:

“ARTICLE —. Every State, wherein slavery now exists, which shall abolish the same therein, at any time, or times, before the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one

thousand nine hundred, shall receive compensation from the United States, as follows, to wit:—

“The President of the United States shall deliver to every such State bonds of the United States, bearing interest at the rate of — per cent per annum, to an amount equal to the aggregate sum of — for each slave shown to have been therein by the eighth census of the United States, said bonds to be delivered to such States by installments, or in one parcel, at the completion of the abolishment, accordingly as the same shall have been gradual, or at one time, within such State; and interest shall begin to run upon any such bond only from the proper time of its delivery as aforesaid. Any State having received bonds as aforesaid, and afterwards reintroducing or tolerating slavery therein, shall refund to the United States the bonds so received, or the value thereof, and all interest paid thereon.

“ARTICLE —. All slaves who shall have enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of the war at any time before the end of the rebellion, shall be forever free; but all owners of such, who shall not have been disloyal, shall be compensated for them, at the same rates as is provided for States adopting abolishment of slavery, but in such way that no slave shall be twice accounted for.

“ARTICLE —. Congress may appropriate money and otherwise provide for colonizing free colored persons, with their own consent, at any place or places without the United States.”

I beg indulgence to discuss these proposed articles at some length. Without slavery the Rebellion could never have existed; without slavery it could not continue.

Among the friends of the Union there is great diversity of sentiment and of policy in regard to slavery and the African race among us. Some would perpetuate slavery; some would abolish it suddenly, and without compensation; some would abolish it gradually, and with compensation; some would remove the freed people from us, and some would retain them with us; and there are yet other minor diversities. Because of these diversities, we waste much strength in struggles among ourselves. By mutual concession we should harmonize and act together. This would be compromise; but it would be com-

promise among the friends, and not with the enemies, of the Union. These articles are intended to embody a plan of such mutual concessions. If the plan shall be adopted, it is assumed that emancipation will follow, at least, in several of the States.

As to the first article, the main points are: first, the emancipation; secondly, the length of time for consummating it—thirty-seven years; and, thirdly, the compensation.

The emancipation will be unsatisfactory to the advocates of perpetual slavery; but the length of time should greatly mitigate their dissatisfaction. The time spares both races from the evils of sudden derangement—in fact, from the necessity of any derangement—while most of those whose habitual course of thought will be disturbed by the measure will have passed away before its consummation. They will never see it. Another class will hail the prospect of emancipation, but will deprecate the length of time. They will feel that it gives too little to the now living slaves. But it really gives them much. It saves them from the vagrant destitution which must largely attend immediate emancipation in localities where their numbers are very great; and it gives the inspiring assurance that their posterity shall be free forever. The plan leaves to each State, choosing to act under it, to abolish slavery now or at the end of the century or at any intermediate time or by degrees, extending over the whole or any part of the period; and it obliges no two States to proceed alike. It also provides for compensation, and generally, the mode of making it. This, it would seem, must further mitigate the dissatisfaction of those who favor perpetual slavery, and especially of those who are to receive the compensation. Doubtless some of those who are to pay, and not to receive, will object. Yet the measure is both just and economical. In a certain sense, the liberation of slaves is the destruction of property, property acquired by descent or by purchase, the same as any other property. It is no less true for having been often said, that the people of the South are not more responsible for the original introduction of this property than are the people of the North; and when it is remembered how unhesitatingly we all use cotton and sugar, and share the profits of dealing in them, it may not be quite safe to say that the South has been more responsible than the

North for its continuance. If, then, for a common object, this property is to be sacrificed, is it not just that it be done at a common charge?

And if, with less money, or money more easily paid, we can preserve the benefits of the Union by this means than we can by the war alone, is it not also economical to do it? Let us consider it, then. Let us ascertain the sum we have expended in the war since compensated emancipation was proposed last March, and consider whether, if that measure had been promptly accepted, by even some of the Slave States, the same sum would not have done more to close the war than has been otherwise done. If so, the measure would save money, and, in that view, would be a prudent and economical measure. Certainly it is not so easy to pay *something* as it is to pay *nothing*; but it is easier to pay a *large* sum than it is to pay a *larger* one. And it is easier to pay any sum *when* we are able, than it is to pay it *before* we are able. The war requires large sums, and requires them at once. The aggregate sum necessary for compensated emancipation of course would be large. But it would require no ready cash, nor the bonds, even, any faster than the emancipation progresses. This might not, and probably would not, close before the end of the thirty-seven years. At that time we shall probably have a hundred million people to share the burden, instead of thirty-one millions, as now. And not only so, but the increase of our population may be expected to continue for a long time after that period as rapidly as before; because our territory will not have become full. I do not state this inconsiderately.

At the same ratio of increase which we have maintained, on an average, from our first national census in 1790, until that of 1860, we should, in 1900, have a population of one hundred and three million two hundred and eight thousand four hundred and fifteen. And why may we not continue that ratio far beyond that period? Our abundant room—our broad national homestead—is our ample resource. Were our territory as limited as are the British Isles, very certainly our population could not expand as stated. Instead of receiving the foreign born, as now, we should be compelled to send part of the native born away.

But such is not our condition. We have two million nine hundred and sixty-three thousand square miles. Europe has three million and eight hundred thousand, with a population averaging seventy-three and one-third persons to the square mile. Why may not our country, at some time, average as many? Is it less fertile? Has it more waste surface, by mountains, rivers, lakes, deserts, or other causes? Is it inferior to Europe in any natural advantage? If, then, we are at some time to be as populous as Europe, how soon? As to when this *may* be, we can judge by the past and the present; as to when it *will* be, if ever, depends much on whether we maintain the Union.

Several of our States are already above the average of Europe—seventy-three and a third to the square mile. Massachusetts has 157; Rhode Island, 133; Connecticut, 99; New York and New Jersey, each, 80. Also two other great States, Pennsylvania and Ohio, are not far below, the former having 63, and the latter 59. The States already above the European average, except New York, have increased in as rapid a ratio, since passing that point, as ever before; while no one of them is equal to some other parts of our country in natural capacity for sustaining a dense population.

Taking the Nation in the aggregate, and we find its population and ratio of increase, for the several decennial periods, to be as follows:—

1790	3,929,827			
1800	5,305,937	35.02	per cent	ratio of increase.
1810	7,239,814	36.45	"	"
1820	9,638,131	33.13	"	"
1830	12,866,020	33.49	"	"
1840	17,069,453	32.67	"	"
1850	23,191,876	35.87	"	"
1860	31,443,790	35.58	"	"

This shows an average decennial increase of 34.69 per cent in population through the seventy years from our first to our last census yet taken. It is seen that the ratio of increase, at no one of these seven periods, is either two per cent below or two per cent above the average; thus showing how inflexible,

and, consequently, how reliable, the law of increase, in our case, is. Assuming that it will continue, gives the following results:—

1870	42,323,341
1880	56,967,216
1890	76,677,872
1900	103,208,415
1910	138,918,526
1920	186,984,335
1930	251,680,914

These figures show that our country *may* be as populous as Europe now is at some point between 1920 and 1930—say about 1925—our territory, at seventy-three and a third persons to the square mile, being of capacity to contain two hundred and seventeen million one hundred and eighty-six thousand.

And we *will* reach this, too, if we do not ourselves relinquish the chance by the folly and evils of disunion, or by long and exhausting war springing from the only great element of national discord among us. While it can not be foreseen exactly how much one huge example of secession, breeding lesser ones indefinitely, would retard population, civilization, and prosperity, no one can doubt that the extent of it would be very great and injurious.

The proposed emancipation would shorten the war, perpetuate peace, insure this increase of population, and proportionately the wealth of the country. With these, we should pay all the emancipation would cost, together with our other debt, easier than we should pay our other debt without it. If we had allowed our old national debt to run at six per cent per annum, simple interest, from the end of our Revolutionary struggle until to-day, without paying anything on either principal or interest, each man of us would owe less upon that debt now than each man owed upon it then; and this because our increase of men through the whole period has been greater than six per cent; has run faster than the interest upon the debt. Thus, time alone relieves a debtor nation, so long as its population increases faster than unpaid interest accumulates on its debt.

This fact would be no excuse for delaying payment of what is justly due; but it shows the great importance of time in this

connection—the great advantage of a policy by which we shall not have to pay until we number a hundred millions, what, by a different policy, we would have to pay now, when we number but thirty-one millions. In a word, it shows that a dollar will be much harder to pay for the war than will be a dollar for emancipation on the proposed plan. And then the latter will cost no blood, no precious life. It will be a saving of both.

As to the second article, I think it would be impracticable to return to bondage the class of persons therein contemplated. Some of them, doubtless, in the property sense, belong to loyal owners, and hence provision is made in this article for compensating such.

The third article relates to the future of the freed people. It does not oblige, but merely authorizes, Congress to aid in colonizing such as may consent. This ought not to be regarded as objectionable on the one hand or on the other, insomuch as it comes to nothing, unless by the mutual consent of the people to be deported, and the American voters through their Representatives in Congress.

I can not make it better known than it already is, that I strongly favor colonization. And yet I wish to say there is an objection urged against free colored persons remaining in the country which is largely imaginary, if not sometimes malicious.

It is insisted that their presence would injure and displace white labor and white laborers. If there ever could be a proper time for mere catch arguments, that time surely is not now. In times like the present men should utter nothing for which they would not willingly be responsible through time and in eternity. Is it true, then, that colored people can displace any more white labor by being free than by remaining slaves? If they stay in their old places, they jostle no white laborers; if they leave their old places, they leave them open to white laborers. Logically, there is neither more nor less of it. Emancipation, even without deportation, would probably enhance the wages of white labor, and, very surely would not reduce them. Thus, the customary amount of labor would still have to be performed; the freed people would surely not do more than their old proportion of it, and, very probably, for a time would do less, leaving an increased part to white laborers,

bring their labor into greater demand, and consequently enhancing the wages of it. With deportation, even to a limited extent, enhanced wages to white labor is mathematically certain. Labor is like any other commodity in the market—increase the demand for it and you increase the price of it. Reduce the supply of black labor by colonizing the black laborer out of the country, and by precisely so much you increase the demand for and wages of white labor.

But it is dreaded that the freed people will swarm forth, and cover the whole land? Are they not already in the land? Will liberation make them any more numerous? Equally distributed among the whites of the whole country, and there would be but one colored to seven whites. Could the one, in any way, greatly disturb the seven? There are many communities now, having more than one free colored person to seven whites; and this, without any apparent consciousness of evil from it. The District of Columbia and the States of Maryland and Delaware are all in this condition. The District has more than one free colored to six whites; and yet, in its frequent petitions to Congress, I believe it has never presented the presence of free colored persons as one of its grievances. But why should emancipation south send the freed people north? People, of any color, seldom run, unless there be something to run from. *Heretofore* colored people, to some extent, have fled north from bondage, and now, perhaps, from both bondage and destitution. But if gradual emancipation and deportation be adopted, they will have neither to flee from. Their old masters will give them wages, at least until new laborers can be procured; and the freedmen, in turn, will gladly give their labor for the wages, till new homes can be found for them, in congenial climes, and with people of their own blood and race. This proposition can be trusted on the mutual interests involved. And, in any event, can not the North decide for itself, whether to receive them?

Again, as practice proves more than theory in any case, has there been any irruption of colored people northward because of the abolishment of slavery in this District last spring?

What I have said of the proportion of free colored persons to the whites in the District is from the census of 1860, having

no reference to persons called contrabands, nor to those made free by the Act of Congress abolishing slavery here.

The plan consisting of these articles is recommended, not but that a restoration of the national authority would be accepted without its adoption.

Nor will the war, nor proceedings under the Proclamation of September 22, 1862, be stayed because of the *recommendation* of this plan. Its timely *adoption*, I doubt not, would bring restoration, and thereby stay both.

And, notwithstanding this plan, the recommendation that Congress provide by law for compensating any State which may adopt emancipation before this plan shall have been acted upon is hereby earnestly renewed. Such would be only an advance part of the plan, and the same arguments apply to both.

This plan is recommended as a means, not in exclusion of but additional to all others for restoring and preserving the national authority throughout the Union. The subject is presented exclusively in its economical aspect. The plan would, I am confident, secure peace more speedily, and maintain it more permanently, than can be done by force alone; while all it would cost, considering amounts, and manner of payment, and times of payment, would be easier paid than will be the additional cost of the war, if we rely solely upon force. It is much, very much, that it would cost no blood at all.

The plan is proposed as permanent Constitutional law. It can not become such without the concurrence of, first, two-thirds of Congress, and afterwards, three-fourths of the States. The requisite three-fourths of the States will necessarily include seven of the Slave States. Their concurrence, if obtained, will give assurance of their severally adopting emancipation at no very distant day upon the new Constitutional terms. This assurance would end the struggle now, and save the Union forever.

I do not forget the gravity which should characterize a paper addressed to the Congress of the Nation by the Chief Magistrate of the Nation. Nor do I forget that some of you are my seniors, nor that many of you have more experience than I in the conduct of public affairs. Yet I trust that in view of the great responsibility resting upon me, you will

perceive no want of respect to yourselves in any undue earnestness I may seem to display.

Is it doubted, then, that the plan I propose, if adopted, would shorten the war, and thus lessen its expenditure of money and of blood? Is it doubted that it would restore the national authority and national prosperity, and perpetuate both indefinitely? Is it doubted that we here—Congress and Executive—can secure its adoption? Will not the good people respond to a united and earnest appeal from us? Can we, can they, by any other means so certainly or so speedily assure these vital objects? We can succeed only by concert. It is not “can *any* of us *imagine* better?” but “can we *all* do better?” Object whatsoever is possible, still the question recurs “can we do better?” The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.

Fellow-citizens, we can not escape history. We, of this Congress and this Administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation. We *say* we are for the Union. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save the Union. The world knows we do know how to save it. We—even *we here*—hold the power and bear the responsibility. In *giving* freedom to the *slave* we *assure* freedom to the *free*—honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth. Other means may succeed; this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just—a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless.

The reverses in the army and at the polls greatly emboldened the “Opposition,” and Congress had barely assembled until attacks on the Administration and its policy began to be made in this quarter.

The first subject claiming the attention of these men was that of "unconstitutional" arrests. *Habeas corpus* was again the cowardly and mischievous theme. Still nothing was directly accomplished, as the strength of the war and Administration party was unbroken. It was always known beforehand that any scheme of the "Opposition" to thwart the policy of the Government would fail, and could do no more than harass the Administration and disturb the country, while it gave hope to the enemy. Strangely enough, it remained to the end one of the apparent hallucinations of the leaders of this Northern factious party that some acceptable terms could be arranged with the South for the restoration of the Union as it was. Recommendations to suspend hostilities were even made directly to the President, on fictitious and mischievous pretexts, looking to that end. But fortunately a superior wisdom controlled the affairs of the Nation. In a speech made by Jefferson Davis in Mississippi, December 26, 1862, he said:—

"After what has happened during the last two years, my wonder is that we consented to live for so long a time with such miscreants, and have loved so much a Government rotten to the core. Were it ever proposed again to enter into a union with such a people, I could no more consent to do it than to trust myself in a den of thieves."

Yet this folly of the "Opposition" went on, and nothing ever happened to show that it was not a part of the spirit of error and evil which actuated the rebel leaders.

Notwithstanding the numerical strength of the

war and Administration party in Congress nothing came of the President's proposition to end the war in an amendment of the Constitution on the basis of compensated emancipation. A great part of his message is taken up in an earnest presentation of this plan, which, if acted upon at once, would have modified his Emancipation Proclamation, or postponed it, or in some way changed the current of things. But it did not seem to meet the demand of the times. Senator Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts, said it was not the Divine way. And so Mr. Lincoln subsequently thought.

A very strong and almost successful effort was made at this session to pass a bill providing for compensated emancipation in Missouri. A bill for that purpose passed in the House, and somewhat modified was carried in the Senate. But the House failed, on the last day of the session, to agree to the Senate bill, and thus ended forever this scheme for which Mr. Lincoln had hoped so much.

This was the regular, short, biennial session of Congress and ended on the third day of March, 1863. The chief measures passed and approved by the President were the various immense appropriations for the expenses of the Government; a bill for raising a volunteer force in Kentucky to serve in that State, but under the rules of war; a bill incorporating a National Association for the support of colored children and aged colored women; a bill authorizing the President to appoint the head of one Department to fill the place of the head of another

for a vacancy of six months; to organize the Territories of Arizona and Idaho, excluding slavery therefrom; to provide a national currency; to punish correspondence with rebels; the enrolling or draft act; justifying the President in his course as to the writ of *habeas corpus*, and giving him further authority in suspending it; to authorize privateering; to incorporate a society in Washington for the education of colored youth; and on the last day of December, 1862, was approved the bill for the admission of West Virginia as a State of the Union, one of the most needless and unwise measures of Mr. Lincoln's Administration. Looked upon as a Republican party measure, it was an utter failure, as time has sufficiently demonstrated. And viewed from all the points really worthy of respect, the benefits and goods to come out of it to the old State or the new, little, poor, mountain one, the measure can hardly be made to appear wise. The theory on which the State was organized was a new one, and to it the Administration was long unwaveringly opposed. But time and the continuance of the Rebellion cleared the way for the folly, which otherwise never could have been possible. The whole movement was a stupendous piece of foolishness on the part of the people of West Virginia, and at the outset and always it was an error to recognize their error. This anomalous bit of history never should have been made; and at the end of the Rebellion Western Virginia would have been, as was right, a part of the old reconstructed State.

CHAPTER XII.

1862 — WAR OF THE REBELLION — ISLAND No. 10 — GENERAL POPE — NEW ORLEANS — GENERAL BUTLER — FARRAGUT AND HIS MORTAR FLOTILLA — SHILOH — CORINTH — PERRYVILLE — STONE RIVER — WHERE STOOD THE GOD OF BATTLES.

“EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
 “January 27, 1862. }

“*President's General War Order, No. 1.*

“ORDERED, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces.

“That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the army near Mumfordsville, Kentucky, the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready for a movement on that day.

“That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.

“That the heads of Departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for the prompt execution of this order.

“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”

This extraordinary order was founded on two or three important circumstances: the long inactivity

of the army on the Potomac under General McClellan; the wide-spread dissatisfaction on account of its inactivity, and the persistent and constant clamor for its movement; the change in the head of the War Department; and the growing sentiment of distrust in the intentions and ability of General McClellan, in which the President began to share.

On the 13th of January, 1862, Edwin M. Stanton, a Democrat of Ohio, had taken the place of Mr. Cameron as Secretary of War, and it was through his instigation that Mr. Lincoln, worn and out of patience with McClellan's delay, concluded to take the responsibility of ordering a general movement against the rebels. There had been a great outcry against the appointment of Mr. Stanton, there being many able Republicans selected for the place from which Mr. Cameron had been allowed to resign; but the President had followed his unaided inclination in the choice, and who will say to-day that he or any other man could have made a better with the whole world to select from?

A few days subsequently another war order was issued, in which the President directed the Army of the Potomac to be divided into five corps, under Irwin McDowell, E. V. Sumner, S. P. Heintzelman, E. L. Keyes, and N. P. Banks, and at once organized for the field. This was immediately succeeded by an order putting McClellan at the head of the Army of the Potomac in the field, and relieving him of the command of all other departments; Halleck the Commander of the Department of the Mississippi, and

Fremont of the Mountain Department of Virginia, being authorized to report directly to the Secretary of War. The President's order as to the movement of the Army of the Potomac was somewhat modified under General McClellan's representations, and so time passed on in comparative quietness on the Potomac.

While this state of affairs continues in the East, a brief glance may be made at a more active field. At the time of taking position at Columbus, Kentucky, the rebels had also occupied Island No. 10, in the Mississippi, some distance below that place. By their defenses here, at "Fort Pillow," and other strong points above Memphis, they hoped to be able to hold the great river below Columbus. But after the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, it was deemed politic to abandon Columbus. A part of the forces at this place went to Island No. 10, others were scattered along the river at New Madrid and other places, and some of them went to form the army A. S. Johnston was gathering to oppose Buell and Grant. With a view to the capture of Island No. 10, in February, 1862, General Halleck, at St. Louis, directed John Pope, with the army under him at Cairo, considerably outnumbering all the rebel forces from Columbus and Fort Pillow, to move down the river and march across the country to New Madrid. Pope reached this place on the 3d of March, a few days after Polk had abandoned Columbus. Finding the situation stronger and more difficult than he expected, he sent to Cairo for siege-guns. He also set to work, at the sugges-

tion of General Schuyler Hamilton, to open a canal from below Island No. 8, twelve miles across the low marshy country to New Madrid. The river here makes two great, irregular, horseshoe bends, one pointing toward the south, with Island No. 10, and the other lower down, pointing to the north, having New Madrid at its toe on the Missouri side. In nineteen days Pope had this canal ready to give passage to his transports. In the meantime he had planted batteries along the river for several miles below, and had finally succeeded in scaring the rebels out of New Madrid. Some of them took refuge at Island No. 10, and others crossed the river. Large quantities of stores and arms here fell into the hands of Pope. About the middle of the month Commodore Foote had arrived, and begun to bombard the works on the island. On the 6th of April Pope's canal was finished, and by this time one or two of Commodore Foote's gun-boats had, on a dark night, very ingeniously contrived to run by the batteries and join Pope at New Madrid. At day-break on the 7th he began to cross the river with a large portion of his army, the rebels retreating before him and, at the same time, evacuating Island No. 10. The river was high, and at Tiptonville it was backed into the marshes on the Tennessee side, so that the rebels were completely hemmed in. Their case was now without a shadow of hope. The pursuit of the rebels was begun at once, and before daylight on the morning of the 8th of April the bulk of them, six thousand seven hundred, had thrown down their arms

and surrendered. On the same day Commodore Foote had taken possession of Island No. 10.

In his report to Halleck, on the 9th, General Pope said: "We have crossed this great river with a large army, the banks of which were lined with the batteries of the enemy to oppose our passage; have pursued and captured all his forces and material of war, and have not lost a man, nor met with an accident." This was, indeed, a wonderful performance, and General Halleck, who was very profuse in his praise where it was perfectly agreeable to him to apply it, said it was the most brilliant affair of the war up to that period.

This stroke gave new vigor and strength to the Union cause, and opened the Mississippi to Fort Pillow. It had been correspondingly severe to the rebels, who could poorly spare the little army and the large number of guns and vast amount of war supplies, to a great extent sacrificed by incompetency and cowardice. Two or three of their general officers were surrendered to Pope, but in this their cause hardly suffered, as the management, on their part, at Island No. 10 could not have been worse.

But, in the meantime, the question of the mastery of the Mississippi was about to be solved in another quarter. On the 25th of February General Benjamin F. Butler, with a small force, sailed from Fortress Monroe for the capture of New Orleans. Captain D. G. Farragut, who was to co-operate with him, had already sailed with his fleet for the rendezvous at Ship Island, in Mississippi Sound. This expedition

was undertaken by the President and Secretary Stanton, contrary to the judgment of General McClellan, who gave it as his opinion that the attempt would fail with an army of less than fifty thousand men. Butler's whole force when assembled at the mouth of the Mississippi was less than fifteen thousand men. But the fleet under Flag-officer Farragut was large and powerfully armed. Twenty-one of the vessels were mortar-sloops, under Captain David D. Porter, and several of the best-built war-ships of the Navy were in the fleet. This was a wooden fleet, and its operations in the Mississippi were destined to shake a little a decision reached by the iron-clad contest in the Chesapeake, hereafter to be noticed.

On the 17th of April, a few days after Pope appeared before "Fort Pillow," above Memphis, Farragut and Porter began the bombardment of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, twenty-five miles above the mouth of the Mississippi, and seventy-five below New Orleans. It was designed for the mortar flotilla to reduce the forts, if possible; and if this could not be done, Farragut was to run by them, destroy the rebel fleet above, and cut off all support, while Butler was to find his way through the marshes, fall upon St. Philip and carry it by storm. Between the two forts the rebels had planted some formidable obstructions across the channel of the river, and above they had a considerable fleet, consisting of two iron-clad vessels, a large number of river steamboats armed as well as they would bear, some floating batteries, and fire-ships. On the night

of the 24th, Farragut with nine of his vessels succeeded, amidst a terrific cannonade, in running the gauntlet of the forts, and after destroying or capturing the rebel fleet and clearing all obstructions before him, at one o'clock on the 25th appeared before New Orleans and demanded its surrender.

Seeing the success of Farragut, Butler pushed forward to perform his part of the task, the mortar flotilla also resuming the assault on the forts. Although the rebel commanders continued the defense with spirit for a time, it was clear enough the moment that Farragut passed up that the forts and city must be surrendered. By the 28th both forts, with their vast armaments, were in the hands of the Federals; and on the first day of May General Butler took possession of New Orleans, relieving Commodore Farragut from a task he was not very fit or desirous to continue to perform. Farragut proceeded up the river, capturing Baton Rouge, Natchez, and other places, and, passing the fortifications at Vicksburg, actually communicated with Commodore Foote's fleet toward the close of the month. But not being able to capture Vicksburg, and the Government not yet being ready or able to keep pace with his rapid movements, he returned to the Gulf. The rebel fleet on the Mississippi was now destroyed; their great iron-clad, under way at New Orleans, was burned by themselves, and all their efforts toward ship-building on that river broken up. These brilliant achievements were rapidly exhausting the resources of the Rebellion, and narrowing its lease of life.

Soon after the capture of Fort Donelson, General Halleck began to prepare for an advance by the Tennessee River on the second line of the rebel position, the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Early in March, the army sailed up the river from Fort Henry, under the command of General Charles F. Smith, who had distinguished himself at Donelson, and who, Halleck wrote to McClellan, was the only officer who could be trusted with this important movement. Grant had fallen under this great man's displeasure, and had been ordered to turn over the command to Smith, and remain himself at Fort Henry. Halleck reported Grant to McClellan as insubordinate and negligent of duty, and the General-in-Chief thought he ought to be punished. Halleck had very foolishly based his charges against Grant on an anonymous letter, and was, perhaps, predisposed to treat him with disfavor. But when Grant applied to be relieved, and demanded an investigation, he refused to allow anything of the kind, notified the authorities at Washington that Grant was "all right," and ordered him to prepare to resume the command of the force then on the way up the Tennessee River. On the 17th of March Grant reached Savannah; poor C. F. Smith, in the meantime, being disabled, died not long afterwards, without an opportunity to meet the rebels again. He had chosen Pittsburg Landing on the west side of the river as the base of operations, and this Grant accepted.

Here on the evening of the 5th of April Grant had collected an army of about thirty-three thousand

effective men. "Pittsburg Landing" was merely the favorable point at which the Corinth road approached the river, the latter place having some importance as the junction of two lines of railroad, and being about twenty miles from the Landing. The road approaches this point in a deep cut or ravine, furnishing an easy outlet to the country back of it from the river. At some distance from Pittsburg Landing two small streams, Snake Creek and Lick Creek, one below and the other above, not fordable in time of high water as at that season, emptied into the Tennessee. The distance between these creeks is about three miles, and the land a broken table, fifty or a hundred feet above the river, mainly covered with timber without much under-growth, and cut in different directions by irregular ravines. The plat of country between these two streams was somewhat compressed a mile or two out by Owl Creek, a tributary of Snake Creek. Owl and Snake Creeks were both bridged. Two and a half miles out from the landing stood the old log house, without windows, called Shiloh Church. This old cabin, long since gone, had been used as a camp-meeting nucleus in the wonderful, hair-cracking, epileptic stage of some of the Churches.

About this log hut, dignified by the name of Shiloh Church, on Saturday evening, April 5, 1862, with his right resting near the bridge across Owl Creek, lay General W. T. Sherman's division of Grant's army. On the left of this position near Lick Creek lay the left of Sherman's division, and some

distance in advance, cutting his line near the center, was the division of General Benjamin M. Prentiss. In the rear of Sherman was the division of General John A. McClernand, and a mile or so to the rear were the divisions of Generals Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace. Lewis Wallace was with his division, over six thousand strong, at and near Crump's Landing, six miles down the river; and General Grant was, for his part, nine miles away at Savannah, on the opposite side of the river. This position was extremely favorable for the Union army, which was, omitting the division of Lewis Wallace, about seven or eight thousand less than that of the rebels, over forty thousand strong, and ably commanded by Albert Sidney Johnston, and then supposed to be mainly at Corinth, twenty miles away.

When the preparation for this movement began, General Don Carlos Buell was at Nashville at the head of what was called the Army of the Ohio, and not in the department commanded by General Halleck. Halleck notified him of his intended movement and invited him to join him, believing correctly that he would need all the help he could get. The telegraphic correspondence of these two men about this matter is not now an agreeable thing to reflect upon, and would have been far less so at that critical period.

Buell sent to Halleck: "What can I do to aid you?"

Halleck replied: "Why not come to the Tennessee and operate with me?"

After a few evasive passages more between them, Halleck again sent to Buell: "You do not say whether we are to expect any re-enforcements from Nashville."

This contemptible coquetting about personal distinction was fortunately stopped by the President's order on the 11th of March, extending the eastern line of Halleck's department into East Tennessee, and so including Buell. Halleck, who was in great earnest about his grand project, was not slow in availing himself of this fortunate turn, and at once ordered Don Carlos to march with the greater part of his army to his aid. But for a man who was characteristically slow in his movements, except when on the battle-field, this change came a few days too late; too late, at all events, to prevent the national disaster of the 6th of April. Although Buell was urged to move with all possible expedition, it does not appear beyond dispute that he did anything of the kind. He built bridges, and traveled after his own notion; and it is pretty clear that had it not been for the energy and anxiety of his advance division commander, General William Nelson, he would not have been up in time to engage in the battle of Shiloh at all.

The rebel commander was well aware of the movement of Buell, and made every effort to fight Grant before he could join him. On Friday he left Corinth with his whole available force, and hoped to be able to fall upon the Federals early the next morning. But a series of ill circumstances befell the

rebel movements on Friday night and the next morning, and most of Saturday had gone before they were ready to make the strike. It was then thought by John C. Breckinridge, and some other of the general officers, that they had lost their opportunity, and as there would after that be no chance to surprise the Union forces, they should retrace their steps, and not risk a fight at that time. But of their movements up to Saturday night, there was hardly a suspicion in the Union army. Grant had been on the ground that day, and there was, no doubt, the general impression among the Union officers that the rebels were quite active in their front, at a respectful distance, and that they did not contemplate an attack for several days. Thus far their movements were a surprise to the national army; and their coming in mass at dawn on Sunday was also to some extent a surprise, although the whole army was aware of an unusual demonstration in front an hour or two before that time. The rebels were well aware of their general disadvantages in making the assault, of the favorable locality of the Union army, and of the impossibility of their making flank movements; and, perhaps, they were aware that General Grant had spent three weeks in this strong position without felling a tree, rearing any kind of defenses, or even planting a battery. Had Johnston struck the Union army on Saturday morning, there is no certain evidence that his fate would not have been different. Still there was no more of a surprise on the part of the Union forces on Sunday

morning than has often occurred before battles, and about which much less was said.

Grant was down at Savannah, it is true, when he should have been on the field with his army, but as early as three o'clock Sunday morning Prentiss ordered a reconnoissance, and this small force struck the rebel outposts when the battle began at some distance in front of the Union line, the full character of the conflict being barely realized until the rebel shot and shell came crashing through the trees.

Three or four hours afterwards Grant reached the field, and found that the chances were, even then, very decidedly against him. Still characteristically, he went to work as if this were not the case. Lewis Wallace was ordered forward from Crump's, in order to strike the rebels on Sherman's right, but as the army was pressed back, Grant seeing that his position on coming out would be perilous without the ability to resist the odds which could be readily thrown against him, sent to him to return to the river road and come in at the bridge across Snake Creek. This consumed the day, and Wallace did not take his position by the side of Sherman until after dark.

That night the divisions of General Nelson, A. McDowell McCook, and a part of General Thomas L. Crittenden's arrived, crossed the river and took positions on the left of Grant's beaten army. One division of Buell's tardy force did not come up until after the battle was finally ended on Monday.

When darkness closed the conflict on Sunday, the Union army had been beaten back over two miles, at

a great loss of life. But in the last assault the rebels had been repulsed, when they expected to end their day's work by the utter destruction of the Union army. Their commander, their best general, a splendid soldier, Albert Sidney Johnston, had fallen, and it was not certain that their affairs would go so well on the following day. The position of the Union army was now much better, and General Grant believed himself able to whip the rebels still, even had not Buell come up that night. Although ten thousand of his men had been knocked out of the contest, with Wallace's division he could have brought into the battle on Monday twenty-five thousand men at least. He believed the rebel losses had been very great. But Buell's army added greatly to his preponderance, and at daylight he moved forward to victory.

On Sunday night the following dispatch was started on its way to Richmond:—

“BATTLE-FIELD OF SHILOH, }
“VIA CORINTH AND CHATTANOOGA, April 6, 1862.” }

“GENERAL S. COOPER, Adjutant-General:—

“We have this morning attacked the enemy in strong position in front of Pittsburg; and, after a severe battle of ten hours, thanks to Almighty God, gained a complete victory, driving the enemy from every position. The loss on both sides is heavy, including our commander-in-chief, General Albert Sidney Johnston, who fell gallantly leading his troops into the thickest of the fight.

“G. T. BEAUREGARD, General Commanding.”

This announcement seems at first glance, perhaps, to be strictly true, and there is nothing about it

necessarily misleading. But from the last position taken by the Union troops just before night, Beauregard had failed to drive them, and here he had made a desperate attempt, in hope of pushing them into the river, slaughtering them, or capturing them. Strictly speaking he had driven them from every position except the last, where he had met a fearful repulse, and the to-morrow would bring forth—he knew not what. Beauregard's thanking Heaven for the general success of that bloody Sunday was mere etiquettical formality, but it serves here for recording a thought on the general subject.

The Union soldiers were the assailants at the first battle of Bull Run, and that was on Sunday. Some wise men held that this was the cause of the defeat of the national army. "The Sabbath is the Lord's." This fact was utterly neglected, and hence the lesson of defeat. God sees men on the earth only in their purposes. It was in the heart of the rebel generals to be the assailants on the same Sabbath morning. Their supposed necessities outweighed their reverence for Him who instituted this Day, and the rebels inaugurated the battle, and fought from dawn until dark on the Sabbath at Shiloh. And they won. The riotous shouts, which in former times had disturbed the quietness of the sacred Day at "Shiloh Church," were nothing to be compared with this. No Sabbath since the beginning of time on the Tennessee River had been like this one in the horrid crash and suffering of war. But the rule that applied at Manassas, according to the reasoning of some,

could not apply at Pittsburg Landing. Yet the sanguine and so-called Christian rebels said that the God of Battles gave them the victory in both cases. The righteousness of the cause may have mitigated the evil of disobedience at Shiloh. There never was a time when men did not believe that Heaven protects all just causes. And what people at war have not been in the right in their pretensions or belief, and especially in their prayers?

On the third day of May, soon after the disasters to the Rebellion in the valley of the Mississippi, Jefferson Davis issued a fast-day proclamation in which he said that they trusted in the justness of their cause and the protection of their God. And the 16th of May was to be spent in prayer to dispel the gloom of disaster, to drive sorrow from the Southern hearthstone, to beseech the protection of the All-powerful, and to ask that strength and victory be given to the fresh hosts the rebels were sending forth. But this kind of thing was oft repeated, and all over the Sunny South constantly, earnestly, sadly, joyfully, or pretentiously and flippantly, went out the cry: "Victory, O Lord!" So in the North, the sanguine and pious patriot believed that the God of Battles was ranged on the side of those who would preserve the Nation whole, however at times his face might be overshadowed or turned aside. And the President issued his fast and thanksgiving proclamations, and the Great God of Peace was importuned day and night, in public and in private, in prose and in verse, and with all manner of tongues, to direct

the battle against the Rebellion, to crown with success the glorious cause of the Union, and restore the national authority, and renew forever the days of peace and prosperity in all the beloved country. If the people of the South were less in number, and weaker in physical means, they were, perhaps, not behind the North in the quantity and power of their praying. Yet it did not avail much. Or were the God of Battles and the cause of right powerless against the Yankees? Or with the overthrow of the Rebellion was not all pretension to the right cause on the part of the South also overthrown? According to their own religious faith, certainly. The end of the pretension and the argument must appear in the result; and in a religious aspect the Rebellion was a burlesque on man, if not also on his Creator.

I may be pardoned, perhaps, by those who will but take the pains to reflect long enough, in venturing the suggestion here that there never have been in America (or on the earth, for that matter) prayers so loud, or noises so stupendous and awful as to reach the spiritual ear of the Great Jehovah. The sound of the woodman's ax and the awful crash and roar of the battle-field are alike unnoted by the all-perfect faculties of God. The nest in the bush and the temple on the mountain are alike hidden from the spiritual All-seeing Eye.

From the motives, the hearts, and the thoughts, the inward activities, Heaven reads the external acts of men. On the mind side, the real life side, the side of causes, God sees and knows all that suits his

purpose of the outward affairs of men and matter. There it is that he cares for the falling sparrow, and numbers the hairs of the head. There he takes account of what manner of creature man is in the least and the greatest thing. Do not the practices of men and the facts of history belie the often gross and material interpretations of Heaven's relation to earth, of the ways of God and the ways of men? But the general fact, which no man can shirk, remains the same, unaffected by this shifting in the mere interpretation.

When Monday morning broke on the field of Shiloh there was no indication that the victors of the day before were ready and anxious to renew the conflict. Before Lewis Wallace and McClernand the rebels now gave way, and were pressed back over the ground they had gained. Sherman in the center also pressed forward, driving them before him; and thus affairs were turning before Buell got in on to the left, and the rebels were apprised that Grant had been re-enforced. The battle now waged with great fury, the rebels, with skill and stubbornness, contesting every step. But the odds against them was now too great, and soon after noon Beauregard gave orders for the retreat to begin. Still, the fighting went on, and was kept up until the whole army had withdrawn from the field before four o'clock. This retreat from the face of a fresh and powerful army, without pursuit, was highly creditable to General Beauregard, and indicated the respect the Federal Generals yet had for the fighting qualities of his

broken army. On Tuesday Sherman started in pursuit, but finding the rebels were falling back in great distress to what was erroneously believed to be their strongly fortified position at Corinth, he returned to Shiloh.

The victory was with the Union, and, perhaps, was not doubtfully so on Sunday night, even had Buell not come up with his troops, but it had been dearly bought. In the two days' fighting Grant's army lost in killed, wounded, and missing nearly eleven thousand men; and Buell's loss was in the neighborhood of two thousand. The rebel loss was about twelve thousand.

Beauregard now sent to Richmond this dispatch:—

“CORINTH, Tuesday, April 8, 1862.

“TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR, Richmond:

“We have gained a great and glorious victory; eight or ten thousand prisoners and thirty-six pieces of cannon. Buell re-enforced Grant, and we retired to our intrenchments at Corinth, which we can hold. Losses heavy on both sides.

BEAUREGARD.”

While the rebel General's report of Sunday night was mainly true, this one is mainly false, and its whole tendency was to mislead. In the sequel to the events just recorded, it will be especially applicable in showing the spirit of exaggeration which controlled the times, whether for or against the Union.

Four days after the battle of Pittsburg Landing or Shiloh, General Halleck arrived and took command of the army, which was soon increased to one hundred thousand men. But not until the end of the

month did he start toward Corinth. He was an exceedingly cautious soldier, and believing that Grant had committed a great mistake in not fortifying his position at Shiloh, he now fell into the opposite extreme of stopping to intrench at every advance he made toward Corinth.

The Richmond authorities had, in the meantime, made every exertion, by conscription and otherwise, to raise Beauregard's army to the necessary strength to cope with Halleck; and although over a hundred thousand men were collected at Corinth he was able to keep up an effective force of but little over half of the number. At last he was forced to retreat, and surrender all this region to the victorious Federals. And now again, notwithstanding his railroad communications were broken by some of Halleck's active raiders, with great skill he succeeded in conveying off the main part of his stores and all his arms of every kind, and on the 30th of May actually slipped away with his whole army. On the same day the Union troops entered Corinth, and found that the place had only been naturally strong; the rebel fortifications had been fictitious and inconsequential, a piece of information which came too late to benefit the Union army.

The rebel army was greatly demoralized, and it was hoped during the excitement of the retreat the thousands of stragglers would give themselves up to their loyal pursuers. Pope wrote to Halleck, that from what he could gather from various sources this would be the case, whereupon the latter, who had a

wonderful faculty for putting the best end forward on paper, sent this bit of fiction to Washington :—

“General Pope, with forty thousand men, is thirty miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy hard. He already reports ten thousand prisoners and deserters from the enemy, and fifteen thousand stand of arms captured.”

But Pope had not authorized such a statement, and had only expressed it as his belief that ten thousand of the stragglers would come in. It was all a mistake; they did not come in. Beauregard subsequently criticised this dispatch of Halleck's with great severity, as a wicked fabrication; and in so doing forgot his famous dispatch on the 8th of April, when he was twenty miles from the scene of his defeat on the previous day. The rebel authorities had never been well disposed toward Beauregard, and now the feeling was so strong against him that from this time forward his name ceases to be of note in the affairs of the Rebellion. Nothing that he had done justified the light in which he was held by Jefferson Davis. The evidence is wanting to prove that he was not one of the most able of the Southern Generals.

On the 1st of June Fort Pillow was abandoned, and a few days later the rebel fleet was destroyed at Memphis by Commodore Charles H. Davis, and that city surrendered to him. The Mississippi was now open to Vicksburg, and the cause of the Rebellion in the West looked gloomy enough. But in July Halleck was taken to Washington, and the evil effects of dispersion and the lack of a controlling head

were felt in the operations of the Union forces in this quarter.

Buell was again detached and sent toward Chattanooga, and Grant took up his position at Corinth, Grand Junction, and other points on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.

At Corinth, which had been strongly fortified by Halleck and Grant, Rosecrans was in command with about twenty thousand men. Here on the 4th of October he was attacked by a greatly superior force of rebels under Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price; but after a desperate struggle they were repulsed and put to flight, leaving about fifteen hundred of their dead on the field. Twenty-two hundred prisoners and twice as many small arms fell into the hands of the Union forces.

Soon after this the vast stores for Grant's army collected at Holly Springs were destroyed by the rebels, when the Mississippi was made the base of operations and supplies.

In December, General Sherman, under Grant's orders, made an attack on Vicksburg, but was not successful, and withdrew. To compensate him for this failure Sherman got permission to move up the Arkansas River against Arkansas Post, which he easily captured, with its stores, arms, and five thousand prisoners. With this and several minor engagements the year 1862 closed upon General Grant's operations. In the meantime Buell, who can not be relieved of the imputation of being culpably slow in his movements, made a race with Braxton Bragg to

Kentucky. The rebel authorities had revived the original scheme of making a desperate effort to carry the war to the North. Lee, accordingly, had been ordered to march into Maryland and Pennsylvania, and Bragg, who had beaten the laggard Buell to Chattanooga, was directed to strike for Kentucky, threaten Cincinnati, and capture Louisville with the vast army supplies collected there. From East Tennessee Edmund Kirby Smith entered Kentucky by Big Creek Gap, and moving with great celerity under Bragg's order, near Richmond struck the Union forces under the temporary command of General M. D. Manson, General William Nelson being absent during the greater part of the conflict, and in a series of engagements utterly routed them, and captured several thousand prisoners. Smith then rushed on, pushing everything before him, a part of his force actually striking the Ohio River at Augusta, and with his main army throwing Cincinnati into the wildest consternation.

In the meantime Buell had discovered the real intentions of Bragg to strike Louisville, and managed by a mere accident to reach that city in time to save it from falling a prey, with all its rich booty, to the hungry horde from the South. Bragg had now reached Frankfort, where he went through the farce of setting up a new State government, without difficulty finding a tool for the purpose in Richard Hawes, of Bourbon County. But Bragg knew this whole business was destined to be short-lived. Kirby Smith now hurriedly turned his face toward the South, and

sweeping back through the rich Blue-grass region, where the neutrals had thus far fattened on the war, the work of plunder was complete.

Buell, in the meantime, had started from Louisville to intercept Bragg, now with his whole army united, and moving with miles of live-stock and other booty toward Tennessee. Bragg was greatly impeded in his movements in his anxiety to save the much-needed booty for which he had come, a vaster herd of fine beef-cattle, horses, mules, and hogs than had ever before marched out of Kentucky, and that without higgling as to prices or a question in relation to the currency. Bragg was, besides, constitutionally slow.

At Perryville, in Boyle County, near Danville, a part of Buell's forces overtook Bragg, when a desperate battle was fought on the afternoon of the 8th of October, 1862, night closing the conflict, which the rebel general knew would be renewed on the succeeding morning, with the prospect of the utter defeat of his army and all the purposes of his adventure. Leaving a thousand of his wounded on the field he slipped away in the night, passing through Cumberland Gap into East Tennessee, and returning again to Chattanooga. At Cumberland Gap he fully expected to capture the Union force under General George W. Morgan, but in this he was wonderfully mistaken, Morgan having destroyed the Government property and made his way through the mountains to the Ohio.

Rosecrans superseded Buell, whose conduct had

not been satisfactory, and at once began to reorganize the army at Nashville. On the 26th of December, Rosecrans, with about forty-three thousand men, left Nashville with a view of fighting Bragg, who was then at Murfreesboro, with a force numbering nearly twenty thousand more.

Here, on the last day of December, on the banks of the Stone River, a desperate battle was fought, the rebels being finally repulsed, with terrible slaughter, but each army holding substantially the position it occupied at the beginning of the contest. On New-Year's day the two foes lay in full view of each other, without offering to renew the fight. On the 2d, Bragg made another desperate assault, mainly with his division, commanded by John C. Breckinridge, only a short time before Vice-President of the United States, and who had led a part of the rebel force at Shiloh. In a few minutes two thousand of these brave men were cut down, and that night Bragg gave up the contest, and marched back toward Chattanooga. The rebels lost in this fierce conflict nearly fifteen thousand men; and nearly twelve thousand of the Union army were counted as "killed, wounded, and missing or prisoners."

Extensive rebel raids toward the North were now at an end, as were also all hopes of aid from the Northwest, and it was evident that henceforward the Rebellion must be content with making the most of its opportunities for defense, as its sides were pressed closer together.

CHAPTER XIII.

1862—WAR OF THE REBELLION—ON THE POTOMAC—BATTLE OF THE IRON-CLADS—LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN—WILLIAMSBURG—INHARMONIOUS REBELS.

ONE of the most important events of the war occurred on the 8th and 9th of March, 1862, in Hampton Roads, near Fortress Monroe. At the time of the needless, foolish, or criminal destruction of Gosport Navy-yard, the Government authorities were constructing there the *Merrimack*, a powerful steam war-frigate. In a partially wrecked condition, this vessel fell into the hands of the rebels. They constructed on her hull a slanting roof of heavy timbers, and lined the whole with three layers of inch-and-a-half iron. Her ends were built like her sides. The armor extended several feet below the water, and her bow, constructed for cutting the water, had an iron ram or beak. There was considerable doubt and no little uneasiness felt in the North as to the character and utility of this untried vessel. The Administration was at this time with great energy pushing forward an entirely new idea in the form of war-vessels. It was a radical departure from all former methods of ship-building, while it did not embrace all the advantages aimed at in the American system. It furnished, however, the

smallest possible exposed surface, presented the best conditions for the concentration of projectile force, and its form was found to be best adapted to resisting or avoiding such force. But the main idea of the monitor was in its revolving turret. The first monitor, built in great haste as an offset to the *Merrimack*, only subserved her purpose, and illustrated the correctness of the general principle at stake. Her iron armor above the water was five inches thick, with a wood backing two feet and three inches thick. Below the water the iron mail was not so strong. Her turret had an inside diameter of twenty feet, was nine feet high, and was made of eight thicknesses of one-inch iron plate. It carried two eleven-inch guns only, and they were mounted side by side and revolved with the turret. The *Merrimack* carried ten guns, four eleven-inch guns on each side, and a hundred-pound rifled Armstrong gun in each end, and was on the general plan of the European broadside frigates, with the addition of her iron mail and sloping sides. The Government built many other monitors during the war on the general plan of the first one, under the direction of John Ericsson, the inventor. Some of them had two turrets, carrying several fifteen-inch guns; their iron armor was almost doubled; their rapidity and safe sea-going qualities being rendered very satisfactory. Several of them, like the *Puritan*, the *Dictator*, the *Kalamazoo*, and the *Miantonomoh* were then believed to be the most powerful war-vessels in the world; and it may be added here that their construction, the mere experimental trial

of the first one on the 9th of March, went very far toward settling the question of non-intervention in England.

About noon on Saturday, March 8th, the *Merrimack*, accompanied by four armed steamers, came out of Elizabeth River, and shot boldly across Hampton Roads to assail the Federal fleet, consisting of the *Cumberland*, *Congress*, *Minnesota*, *St. Lawrence*, and several other war-vessels. She passed the *Congress* without apparently noticing her, and received her broadside without the slightest effect. She made straight for the *Cumberland*, and struck her with her iron beak, opening a vast hole in her side, at the same time pouring broadside after broadside into the fated vessel. It was the work of a few moments. The *Cumberland* went down, carrying a hundred of her dead and wounded with her, her flag alone standing above the water. She then turned upon the *Congress*, and that vessel was soon blown up. The *Minnesota* was now hard aground in water supposed to be too shallow for the *Merrimack*, and after firing a few shot at her at a distance of a mile, and night coming on, the rebel monster returned, escorted as she had come, towards Norfolk. This had been a sad day to the national cause. With utter amazement the commanders of the powerful wooden vessels saw their fearful broadsides, which would have blown any other ship in the world out of the water, one after one slip harmlessly from the rebel's sloping sides. To all appearances, the whole American navy was at the mercy of this rebel monster. The cities of the northern sea-board

were as chaff before her. If there was no untried, unknown something to cope with the *Merrimack*, the success of the Rebellion was at once removed beyond a doubt. But see what another day brings forth! At nine o'clock that night Ericsson's wonderful little monitor, under the command of Lieutenant John L. Wordon, reached Fortress Monroe, and tarrying there but a few moments, soon after midnight took its position by the side of the *Minnesota*, still aground where the *Merrimack* had left her. Early on Sunday morning, the 9th, under Catesby Jones, a new commander, the rebel craft again made her appearance to finish the work she had begun the day before. She went up the channel in which the *Minnesota* lay, and there discovered her new diminutive and contemptible foe. The little monitor was soon pouring into her solid shots, weighing one hundred and sixty-eight pounds. It was now the turn of the rebel commander to be amazed. The shot from his crashing broadsides slid harmlessly from the small revolving turret, and after repeated attempts he gave up the hope of running the monitor down. The armor of the *Merrimack* now began to give way. She was leaking and disabled. Her commander saw that she was overmatched. The conflict was ended. The *Merrimack* again made her way back to the navy-yard; and with her defeat went down another great hope of the Rebellion. Although she made her appearance again in the Roads, she rendered her builders no further service, and when the rebels abandoned Norfolk in May, she was blown to pieces. As for the little monitor,

although she had stood the trip from New York, she was foundered on her next attempt on the open sea off the coast of Cape Hatteras, on her way to Beaufort.

Except on the Potomac, affairs had progressed with general satisfaction to the national cause. And although it was now settled beyond a doubt that mere localities and ordinary political considerations, so far as the Government was concerned, could have little to do in ending the Rebellion, there arose a constant cry for the advance of McClellan's army for the capture of Richmond. Still, perhaps, at that late date the fall of Richmond was regarded as mainly important because of its being the seat of the rebel military power. Politically it was certainly of no importance, however erroneously many Northern people had fallen into the idea that it was. The Rebellion acquired no political importance, and its military strength was the only thing that could ever give it any. To crush this was now the grand object of the Government, and all available means justified by civilized (and I would almost say Christian) warfare should have been at once employed to that end.

But this lesson was not an easy one for the American people to learn. Even General McClellan, who had been bred a soldier, and had never cast a vote at the polls, seemed to be greatly disturbed by the political circumstances of the war. While General-in-Chief he was continually putting before Butler, Buell, and others the objects for which the war

was waged on the part of the Nation, even dragging in the drivel about Constitutional means, and going so far as to aver that the political considerations in some parts led the military. However true this position may have been in 1861, it was wholly erroneous and misleading at any later date. The work of the Government was now to crush the military power, and hence the life out of the Rebellion, and this thought mainly controlled the actions of military men in the West, and on the Atlantic and Gulf coast, as it had such men as General Butler from the outset.

But General McClellan was not the only one in important position who was infected with this political incubus, and perhaps he caught some of his difficulties in this way from the President, who never was wholly able to free himself from political considerations at any period of the war, going so far as to jeopardize the cause of the country in the appointment of incompetent political generals, to say nothing of other things. With Washington as headquarters any other general might have been demoralized by the same evil influences. Some of them were, and that those who finally came from the West to conquer the Rebellion were not, was owing to several facts, but mainly from their constant employment in the field.

McClellan had become chronically inactive, and there seemed no remedy for it. As his army increased to an enormous size he appeared to become more helpless. And yet he seemed always on the

point of doing something he never did do. A mystic air of this kind hung over his steps. He said that he must crush the enemy at Manassas by the 25th of November, 1861; but when that date was reached the grand army of the Republic was quiet on the Potomac. At the very outset he presented to the Administration, when called upon to do so, a magnificent scheme, and the President thought and hoped he might prove to be the very military genius the crisis demanded; but in practice this scheme was fatal to his reputation; he never carried it out. There can hardly be a doubt that McClellan did at first mean to strike the Rebellion rapidly and hard, but long inactivity furnished grounds for a different construction to be placed upon his words. There were two ways of advancing toward Richmond from the Capital, by Manassas across the country, and by the Potomac and the narrow peninsular routes among the rivers with their vast mouths opening into the Potomac.

There were advocates also of striking Richmond from the west and by way of North Carolina. Although at first General McClellan had no other notion than that entertained by General Scott and the Administration of taking the route of McDowell by Bull Run, yet from this he finally drifted away, and determined to move his vast army down the Potomac with a view of operating from Fortress Monroe, Old Point Comfort, or some other desirable point. The President opposed this plan, and no great good to the national cause ever came out of it.

But McClellan persisted, and Mr. Lincoln gave way. Early in February the President wrote of this serious matter:—

“EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
February 3, 1862. }

“MY DEAR SIR,—You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac; yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas.

If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

“1. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of *time* and *money* than mine?

“2. Wherein is a victory *more certain* by your plan than mine?

“3. Wherein is a victory *more valuable* by your plan than mine?

“4. In fact, would it not be *less* valuable in this: that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

“5. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

“Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

“Major-General McCLELLAN.”

In his letter to the Secretary of War, substantially covering these questions, General McClellan did not meet the difficulty fully. The President was right. He was wrong. The failure of his campaign proved this, and subsequent military criticism was against him. Everything that McClellan had asked was granted, and when he did at last, after a dreary winter of inactivity, set out early in March, appar-

ently with the intention of moving on directly to Richmond, it was only to start anew some delusive hopes. The very intimation that he was moving his vast army hastened the rebel retreat from Manassas Junction to the rear of the Rappahannock, where they could meet him readily, either by the direct route or the Chesapeake.

From Fairfax Court House, on the 13th of March, he wrote to the President that a plan had been concluded upon in a council of his officers, and the Secretary of War telegraphed for him to carry out any plan that had been agreed upon, without an hour's delay, and not wait for the President's confirmation. The plan was the same day brought to the President, and substantially approved at once. Then began the immense work of transferring the army to the peninsular region of Virginia, below the mouth of the Potomac. Nearly four hundred vessels were chartered by the War Department for this purpose, and over a month was consumed in the erroneous task, at an enormous expense to the country, in hope that General McClellan's plan might prove to be right, and the President not be blamed for directing affairs for which he had no qualifications by education.

On the 14th of March, before retracing his steps from Fairfax, McClellan delivered an address to his army, in which he said that he had kept it inactive for a long time, in order to give the death-blow to the Rebellion. He said the patience of the army, and its confidence in him, were worth a dozen

victories. In this singular, antediluvian view of this matter a very large per cent of his anxious and dissatisfied countrymen did not share, however. They were in no mood to listen to such Roman twaddle, and would have taken the victories without the patience or confidence. The General then went on to say that the period of inaction was ended, and he was now going to bring them face to face with the rebels. He then said that he loved the men of his army from the depth of his heart, and that they would do what he desired of them when they came to meet a brave foe, and God would prosper the right. Here, again, were the old promises, which were but poorly fulfilled.

A hundred and twenty thousand men of the grand Army of the Potomac were transported to Fortress Monroe. But General McClellan at once began the work of undesignedly overestimating the rebel strength before him, and complaining of the troops the President had been forced to withhold, of the want of proper support, supplies, and the old tardy policy was naturally resumed. This brought from the President several letters, among which was the following cutting review of the case:—

“WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862.

“MY DEAR SIR,—Your dispatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

“Blenker’s division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it—certainly not without reluctance.

"After you left I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single field-battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My implicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

"I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And allow me to ask: Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond, *via* Manassas Junction to this city, to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

"There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making one hundred and eight thousand then with you and *en route* to you. You now say you will have but eighty-five thousand when all *en route* to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of twenty-three thousand be accounted for?

"As to General Wool's command, I understand it is

doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away.

“I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time. And, if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you; that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and re-enforcements than you can by re-enforcements alone. And, once more, let me tell you, it is indispensable to you to strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. *You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.*

“I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. *But you must act.*

“Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

“Major-General McCLELLAN.”

The President here touches the key-note to the weakness of McClellan's plan, to which he wrongly submitted, and for which, in a degree, he must be held responsible.

A few thousand men, not over ten, under John B. Magruder, were at Yorktown, and guarding the line, thirteen miles long, across the peninsula formed by the York and James Rivers with the Chesapeake. Before these McClellan took his position, and to the utter amazement of the rebel general began to intrench and fortify when he expected him to move up with

his army of over a hundred thousand effective men, and sweep everything before him. In all this peninsular campaign McClellan allowed himself to be deluded into the idea that the whole rebel strength was before him, and that he was not able to cope with it. McClellan sent to Washington for siege-guns. The President, in great alarm, sent back:—

“EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
May 1, 1862. }

“MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN,—Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?

“A. LINCOLN.”

Only two days after this the rebels slunk away, boasting of how five thousand men had kept at bay this splendid army, with which its General had declared he was going to give the Rebellion its death-blow. But about the five thousand men, of course Magruder lied, a thing it was easy for him to do, as it seemed easy for everybody to do in those days. Everything appeared to take the varying standard of the “Confederate” currency.

General Joseph E. Johnston says that Magruder had thirteen thousand men, and of the objects of making the pretension before McClellan at Yorktown, he writes:—

“General Magruder had estimated the importance of at least delaying the invaders until an army capable of coping with them could be formed; and opposed them with about a tenth of their number, on a line of which Yorktown, intrenched, made the left flank. This boldness

imposed upon the Federal General, and made him halt to besiege, instead of assailing the Confederate position. This resolute and judicious course on the part of General Magruder was of incalculable value. It saved Richmond, and gave the Confederate government time to swell that officer's handful to an army."

Of course, there was no need of McClellan's delay at Yorktown. He needed no siege-guns, no intrenchments. Nor was there then anything to prevent his marching directly to Richmond. But General Johnston himself, in his account of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines, fell into the common habit of overestimating the Federal forces and underestimating the number of his own. There were three ways of estimating troops: from the regimental and brigade rolls; from the numbers actually engaged on the field by actual count with the usual per cent off for detached duties of various kinds; and from the exaggerated vision, passion, whim, or disposition of the occasion. The latter of these was most frequently resorted to, and the second seldom or never. This diversity of ways used in making estimates gave rise to the numerous unintentional and designed discrepancies everywhere found in records and writings of the war. The armies were never so large on either side in the field as they were on paper. From sixty-five to eighty per cent was a fair estimate of the number on the pay-roll present for active service on the field. And not unfrequently one-half of an army, even a fresh one, was present to fight the foe. Only on the muster-rolls was there ever such an

army in the field as the people supposed. On the rebel side, perhaps, the cutting on the pay-roll was even greater than on the side of the Government. And where were all of these men, many of whom during the entire war never "saw service" in the field with their regiments?

They were cooks, teamsters, nurses, helpers or servants, choppers and diggers; guarders of prisoners, stations, depots, prisons, vast lines of railroads, rivers, lines of communications; messengers, scouts, spies; in the captured posts on the sea-coast; provost guards, political escorts; general loafers around the country, and wounded and sick. Thus it was that a hundred thousand men on the pay-rolls became fifty thousand on the field of battle.

I can hardly treat with the contempt of silence this announcement of the event and so forth from General McClellan:—

"HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
May 4, 9. A. M. }

"To the Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War:—

"We have the ramparts. Have guns, ammunition, camp equipage, etc. We hold the entire line of his works, which the engineers report as being very strong. I have thrown all my cavalry and horse-artillery in pursuit, supported by infantry. I move Franklin's division, and as much more as I can transport by water, up to West Point to-day. No time shall be lost. The gun-boats have gone up York River. I omitted to state that Gloucester is also in our possession. I shall push the enemy to the wall.

"G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General."

On the same day he again wrote:—

“Our cavalry and horse-artillery came up with the enemy’s rear-guard in their intrenchments about two miles this side of Williamsburg. A brisk fight ensued. Just as my aid left, General Smith’s division of infantry arrived on the ground, and I presume he carried his works, though I have not yet heard.

“The enemy’s rear is strong, but I have force enough up there to answer all purposes.

“We have thus far seventy-one heavy guns, large amounts of tents, ammunition, etc. All along the lines their works prove to have been most formidable, and I am now fully satisfied of the correctness of the course I have pursued.

“The success is brilliant, and you may rest assured its effects will be of the greatest importance. There shall be no delay in following up the enemy. The rebels have been guilty of the most murderous and barbarous conduct in placing torpedoes within the abandoned works, near Mill Springs, near the flag-staffs, magazines, telegraph offices, in carpet-bags, barrels of flour, etc.

“Fortunately we have not lost many men in this manner. Some four or five have been killed and a dozen wounded. I shall make the prisoners remove them at their own peril.”

Then followed this letter to Mr. Stanton:—

“BIVOUAC IN FRONT OF WILLIAMSBURG, }
“May, 5, 1862, 10 o’clock P. M. }

“HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:—

“After arranging for movements up York River, I was urgently sent for here. I find General Joe Johnston in front of me in strong force, probably greater a good deal than my own.

“General Hancock has taken two redoubts and re-

pulsed Early's rebel brigade, by a real charge with the bayonet, taking one colonel and a hundred and fifty other prisoners, and killing at least two colonels and many privates. His conduct was brilliant in the extreme.

"I do not know our exact loss, but fear that General Hooker has lost considerably on our left.

"I learn from the prisoners taken that the rebels intend to dispute every step to Richmond.

"I shall run the risk of at least holding them in check here, while I resume the original plan.

"My entire force is undoubtedly inferior to that of the rebels, who will fight well; but I will do all I can with the force at my disposal.

"G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General Commanding."

J. E. Johnston's army had indeed come up, and of this day's work General Hooker wrote: "History will not be believed when it is told that the noble officers and men of my division were permitted to carry on this unequal struggle from morning until night, unaided, in the presence of more than thirty thousand of their comrades with arms in their hands; nevertheless, it is true." Hooker's loss was over two thousand two hundred, and nearly five hundred of that number were killed.

But General McClellan was mistaken about Hancock's bayonet charge; and, more than this, on the morning of the 6th it was discovered that the rebels had left Williamsburg without waiting to dispute every inch of ground with a force the General had in his usual style represented to the authorities at Washington to be much superior to his own.

The rebel commander, Johnston, makes no men-

tion of Hancock's brilliant "real" bayonet charge, and says:—

"As the Federal army, except Franklin's division, had marched but nine miles to the field the day before, by two roads, one can not understand why four, or even six divisions, if necessary, were not brought into action. The smallness of the force engaged on this occasion greatly strengthened my suspicion that the army itself was moving up York River in transports."

This little soldier squirms around among his words a great deal in attempting to show that he was not defeated at Williamsburg, and the "daisy"-like reports of General McClellan were not justified in view of the great losses under Hooker.

The rebels now abandoned Norfolk, blew up the *Merrimack* (*Merrimac*) or *Virginia*, and drew their forces towards Richmond. On the fifteenth day of May the Federal war-steamers went up James River to Fort Darling, eight miles below Richmond. In the meantime McClellan slowly worked his way to the Chickahominy in a somewhat circuitous route, with a view of keeping up his connection with York River, and by the 25th a part of his army had crossed to the south side of that stream.

Joseph E. Johnston, who had now arrived with his army from Manassas and the Rappahannock, took command of the operations to resist the advance of the Federals. He at once proposed to Jefferson Davis the propriety of gathering in the shortest possible time from every available source a force superior to McClellan's, and with it defeat and destroy his

great army in the swamps of the Chickahominy, and by the one grand stroke establish the cause of the Rebellion.

By this time Mr. Davis had intrusted the general supervision of military matters to Robert E. Lee, and neither of them was ready at that time to fall in with Johnston's proposition, although he put it before them at every opportunity. After the battle of Fair Oaks and the removal of Johnston to the West, they did, however, of necessity, adopt his plan.

Notwithstanding the efforts of some unreliable Southern writers then, and even at this day, to establish the statement as a truth that the greatest harmony and unanimity of sentiment existed among the Southern leaders, nothing could have been more completely at variance with the facts in the case. From the very outset they began to quarrel on points of policy, but more frequently about personal matters, and as time passed their differences became more intense and irreconcilable. Jefferson Davis's two large volumes are, to a great extent, taken up with an effort to set himself right against Governor Brown, of Georgia, Joseph E. Johnston, G. T. Beauregard, and others, besides the general public. There was no harmony among the rebel leaders, and there came to be but one authority in the affairs of the Rebellion. That was the will of Jefferson Davis, and the few to whom he intrusted the execution of his will, and whom he especially favored in so doing.

General Johnston's notion about terminating the war in favor of the Rebellion by the utter ruin

of McClellan's army exhibits how greatly mistaken at that late date even such men were as to the resources and spirit of the North. If McClellan and his grand army had been wholly annihilated in a day, better generals and more powerful armies would have sprung up in a day to take their places. General Johnston had at that period certainly one quality which a good soldier never possesses—a disposition to have his own way and disobey the orders of those who, in the organized Rebellion, were his superiors. This trait he began to show at Harper's Ferry. He could not join Beauregard at Manassas until he knew who would be superior. After the battle of Manassas he set up a constant stream of complaints towards Richmond; accused the Secretary of War, Benjamin, who was an exceedingly officious and incompetent person, of interfering with affairs that disturbed him. He says himself that he was only reconciled somewhat to the necessity of obeying Mr. Davis's order by reflecting that his proposed plan would eventually have to be adopted. Davis on his part mistrusted that Johnston meant to give up Richmond, which he knew could only be defended at a distance, and makes a great parade of what he conceived to be the impossibility of getting anything definite out of Johnston as to his intentions, if he had any, before the battle of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks. Even Stonewall Jackson, the preacher, was insulted about his command by the Secretary of War, and wanted to give up his commission. Henry A. Wise and John B. Floyd quarreled about place. Beauregard and

Davis were always in trouble, from which they were not relieved when the former was allowed by the latter to retire on sick leave. More than everything else the Rebellion lacked the element of harmony. Many, perhaps most, of its leaders, among whom was Joseph E. Johnston, seemed to place their own desires and personal fame above the success of the cause for which they fought.

CHAPTER XIV.

1862—WAR OF THE REBELLION—REBEL SUCCESSES IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY—McCLELLAN ON THE "PENINSULA"—SEVEN PINES—THE CHICKAHOMINY—SEVEN DAYS' BATTLE.

EARLY in March Stonewall Jackson and Richard S. Ewell, by instructions from Richmond, began a series of active operations in the Shenandoah Valley, with a view of diverting McDowell on the Rappahannock from his design of re-enforcing McClellan. After some reverses they were finally successful in gaining a decided advantage over General R. H. Milroy at a place called McDowell, on the 8th of May, and on the 25th of the same month, in defeating General N. P. Banks at Winchester, and forcing him to retreat from the State at Harper's Ferry. These untoward events threw the authorities at Washington into a state of excitement not justified by the ability or intentions of the rebels, who certainly had no hope of reaching the Capital. But the scare at Washington and throughout the North was all the same, and unfortunately resulted in the President's countermanding the order to McDowell to re-enforce McClellan. This, of course, greatly distressed the latter, who never ceased to direct at the President and Secretary of War his battery of com-

plaints. One of the most obvious troubles in the imagination of McClellan was his strong desire to have in his army only officers in perfect agreement with him personally and politically, as well as in a military sense. If he had ever been in favor of organizing the army into corps, he showed great aversion to this arrangement soon after his arrival on the "Peninsula." On the 9th of May, in a very sharp letter to Mr. Stanton, he asserted that a thousand lives were lost at Williamsburg because of this division into corps; that he did not wish to be held responsible for such a state of affairs; that he must have permission to reorganize the corps; and must be allowed to drop incompetent corps commanders at once.

In reply to his dispatch Mr. Lincoln wrote this plain and characteristic letter from Fortress Monroe, where he had gone to see how matters were progressing:—

"HEAD-QUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA, }
"FORT MONROE, VA., May 9, 1862. }

"Major-General McCLELLAN:—

"MY DEAR SIR,—I have just assisted the Secretary of War in framing the part of a dispatch to you relating to army corps, which dispatch, of course, will have reached you long before this will. I wish to say a few words to you privately on this subject. I ordered the army corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom you had selected and assigned as generals of divisions, but also on the unanimous opinion of every *military man* I could get an opinion from, and every modern military book, yourself only excepted. Of course, I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you

to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we can not entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets, and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes—the commanders of these corps are, of course, the three highest officers with you; but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Fitz John Porter, and, perhaps, General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just; but at all events, it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in any thing?

“When you relieved General Hamilton of his command, the other day, you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that Senators and Representatives speak of *me* in their places as they please without question, and that officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with *them*.

“But to return. Are you strong enough—are you strong enough even with my help—to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question to you.

“The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and of course I only desire the good of the cause. Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.”

Nothing could check General McClellan's complaints, or his disposition to overestimate on one side or the other. On the 26th of May he wrote to the President:—

“Have arranged to carry out your last orders. We are quietly closing in upon the enemy, preparatory to the

last struggle. Situated as I am, I feel forced to take every possible precaution against disaster, and to secure my flanks against the probably superior force in front of me. My arrangements for to-morrow are very important, and, if successful, will leave me free to strike on the return of the force detached."

Later on, the same day, in his dispatch concerning the detachment sent out, he gushingly says:—

"Porter's action of yesterday was truly a glorious victory; too much credit can not be given to his magnificent division and its accomplished leader. The rout of the rebels was complete; not a defeat, but a complete rout."

The President had often been misled in this way, and the following from his communication to McClellan, on the 28th of May, shows what stress he was beginning to place upon the General's glowing reports, promises, and pretensions:—

"I am very glad of General F. J. Porter's victory; still, if it was a total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central, from Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think, can not be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry, informs us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's and Ewell's, forced his advance from Charlestown to-day. General King telegraphs us from Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that fifteen thousand left Hanover

Junction Monday morning to re-enforce Jackson. I am painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you, and shall aid you all I can consistently with my view of due regard to all points."

On reaching the Chickahominy General McClellan's first business was to rebuild the bridges, which had been destroyed by the rebels in their retreat. About thirty thousand of his troops were at once passed over to the south side of the stream, the right and left extremes of the army now being several miles apart. This very treacherous river, or creek, with extensive swamps on both sides of it, now cut the Federal army in two, with the weaker part on the side next the rebel troops, and wholly beyond the chance of succor in case of a sudden rise of water.

Johnston now seeing his opportunity, a great rain having fallen on the night of the 30th of May, prepared to fall upon what he seemed to think was only Keyes's Corps of the Federal army on the south side of the Chickahominy. Although his arrangements appeared to be accurate enough for his purpose, they were not successfully carried out, and not until toward the middle of the afternoon was he ready to begin the attack. General Silas Casey, with about five thousand of Keyes's Corps, was in advance at Fair Oaks, and the other division was some distance in the rear, at the point called "Seven Pines," under General Darius M. Couch. Still to the rear of these was the corps of General Heintzelman. Although, to some extent, protected by intrenchments and abatis, Casey's weak division was partially surprised, and

soon gave way, leaving their guns and camp equipage behind them, and rushing in much disorder to the rear of Couch, whose division shared the same fate, but after a stubborn resistance. Longstreet and D. H. Hill had, up to this time, been engaged on the rebel side. Gustavus W. Smith, accompanied by Johnston, came in as night approached, in an attempt to cut the Federals from their river communications. A considerable part of Heintzelman's Corps had come to the aid of Couch. But an event not in the rebel General's calculations now occurred. The river had been rising all day, and the chances were favorable to the complete realization of his hopes, the destruction of the Federal force on the south of the Chickahominy. McClellan, who was sick on the other side of the river, was not ignorant of the dangerous position into which he had allowed his army to fall, and soon after the battle began ordered Sumner to move across with his corps. An hour before night he succeeded in getting across the already partially floating bridge General John Sedgwick's division, and, subsequently, the other division, commanded by General I. B. Richardson, crossed over with great difficulty. Guided by the sound of the battle, Sumner pushed forward with Sedgwick's division through the swamps and woods, and, with great fury, fell upon the flank of the rebel force moving to gain the rear of the discomfited Union troops at Bottom's Bridge. Here the rebels were repulsed and driven back with heavy loss, when night closed upon the contest.

At seven o'clock General Johnston was wounded and carried from the field, Gustavus W. Smith succeeding to the temporary command of the rebel army. Jefferson Davis and General Lee had, during the last hour or two, been on the field, the former directing some of the movements. The next morning the battle was renewed, but not with the former vigor and resolution on the part of the rebels, and by noon they were repulsed and driven from the field. They had failed under very fortunate circumstances.

The battle of Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks, was ended. At this juncture Robert E. Lee took command of the rebel army in Virginia, and began his history with it.

In the three corps, Keyes's, Heintzelman's, and Sumner's, engaged in the two days' fighting, General McClellan reported a total loss of five thousand seven hundred and thirty-nine men, eight hundred and ninety having been killed, and thirty-two hundred and twenty-seven being wounded. The rebel loss, according to the report of General Johnston, was forty-two hundred and thirty-three.

Two or three days after this battle a considerable force of the Union troops advanced to within four miles of Richmond. It was well known some time subsequently that if McClellan had pushed forward his magnificent army, which he foolishly and boyishly "almost believed invincible," even after the "seven days' battles," before Lee had received re-enforcements and reorganized the rebel forces, he could have taken Richmond, and if not simplified the conflict for

the overthrow of the Rebellion, at least ended the everlasting turmoil about Richmond.

While it is, perhaps, no cause of complaint or censure of McClellan that he did not know this rebel military and political center was at his mercy, it is not so clear that it was not in his power to find it out. It was not an omnipotent task. For what had he been permitted to undertake the "peninsular campaign?" What had been his promises? What were they then, day by day, as the army lay there in idleness, and fretting to be led forward to the thing which seemed to be in its grasp?

It was the 24th or 25th of June before he discovered that Stonewall Jackson was coming stealthily from the Shenandoah, and then, in alarm, he began to besiege Washington with his complaints and calls for re-enforcements, averring that two hundred thousand rebels were concentrating to overwhelm him. Only a few days previously he actually telegraphed the President that troops were leaving Richmond to re-enforce Jackson in the valley, so completely was he in the dark as to their true movements. While things seemed to be so favorable for rest and quiet on the Chickahominy, he even proposed to the President that he should be allowed to present to him, in detail, his views on the conduct of the war and the politics of the country. To this unsoldier-like and officious demand the President replied:—

"WASHINGTON, June 21, 1862, 6 P. M.

"Your dispatch of yesterday, 2 P. M., was received this morning. If it would not divert too much of your

time and attention from the army under your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country, as you say you would be glad to give them. I would rather it should be by letter than by telegraph, because of the better chance of secrecy. As to the numbers and positions of the troops not under your command, in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it with accuracy, which I can not, I would rather not transmit either by telegraph or letter, because of the chances of its reaching the enemy. I would be very glad to talk with you, but you can not leave your camp, and I can not well leave here.

A. LINCOLN, President.

"Major-General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN."

For several weeks circumstances, over which the General had not very complete control, prevented his giving to the Administration and the country the benefit of his views on the political conduct of the war. But he did not forget his privilege from his "Excellency," as he called Mr. Lincoln, and when another quiet spell came on the James River he sent the following wonderful letter to the President:—

"HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"CAMP NEAR HARRISON'S LANDING, VA., July 7, 1862. }

"MR. PRESIDENT,—You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in the front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I can not but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your excellency, for your private consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the Rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army, or

strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.

“The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy, covering the whole ground of our national trouble.

“The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the Rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power, even for the present terrible exigency.

“This Rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment.

“In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations; all private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive

demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments, Constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received.

“Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political right. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave-labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus Constitutional, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.

“Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the Government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought

to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

“In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army, one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders, by directing the military forces of the Nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

“I may be on the brink of eternity; and as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love for my country.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General Commanding.

“His Excellency A. LINCOLN, President.”

This is the most remarkable letter written by a soldier, worthy of note, during the war, appealing to official and public respect. On first view the last paragraph of the letter disarms criticism, and startles feelings of mingled pity and contempt. It is the highest appeal, where the common sentiment of mankind demands silence. But when the numerous promises, pretensions, flighty statements, and complaints of General McClellan are taken into account, this putting himself on record with his Maker is not startling, and the mere fact of his doing so should not be allowed to lead judgment captive, as such things often do, and as they are not unfrequently designed to do. Still there is nothing, perhaps, criminal in this letter,

or deserving of systematic apology, if such thing could be made worthy of respect. Nor is there any need of asserting or believing that the last paragraph of General McClellan's letter was not written with an earnest conviction of its truth. The letter is simply a piece of vanity, if no more. It was so in the light of that day; and it did not cease to be so in the light of all subsequent events. It does not now deserve analysis, more than the thousands of similar and worse spirited things, which served to complicate public affairs, and undesignedly or designedly obstruct the rightful progress of events, and injure the cause of the country. Beyond demonstrating the man's character and his unfitness for the position he occupied, and the troubles of the Administration, it is a mere matter of curiosity and ridicule as coming from the General of the "invincible army" of the Potomac, and for these objects has it been reproduced here.

On the second day of June, 1862, General McClellan issued this address to his army:—

"Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac! I have fulfilled at least a part of my promise to you. You are now face to face with the rebels, who are held at bay in front of their capital. The final and decisive battle is at hand. Unless you belie your past history, the result can not be for a moment doubtful. If the troops who labored so faithfully and fought so gallantly at Yorktown, and who so bravely won the hard fights at Williamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court House (Fitz John Porter's raid), and Fair Oaks, now prove themselves worthy of their antecedents, the victory is surely ours.

“The events of every day prove your superiority. Wherever you have met the enemy you have beaten him. Wherever you have used the bayonet he has given way in panic and disorder. I ask of you now one last crowning effort. The enemy has staked his all on the issue of the coming battle. Let us meet him, crush him here, in the very center of the Rebellion.

“Soldiers! I will be with you in this battle, and share its dangers with you. Our confidence in each other is now founded upon the past. Let us strike the blow which is to restore peace and union to this distracted land. Upon your valor, discipline, and mutual confidence, the result depends.”

The inexplicable air of unsoundness about this document is only made more dense by the events that follow. General McClellan's biographer says that for three weeks after this date nothing of importance happened to the Army of the Potomac. Whenever it could do so, it began to repeat its early history.

General McClellan had but recently telegraphed the President that all that could be accomplished by rapid movements he might feel confident would be done. But these things he forgot. He made no rapid movements. Late in May he had said:—

“Delays on my part will be dangerous. I fear sickness and demoralization. This region is unhealthy for Northern men, and unless kept moving, I fear that our soldiers may become discouraged.”

Still his great and preposterous pretensions of love for his soldiers did not prevent his holding them in idleness in the Chickahominy swamps until

the rebel army was ready to meet him, and his case had actually become desperate. It had, perhaps, been a misfortune to the cause of the country that McDowell was unable to bring his vast force to operate with McClellan before Richmond. But the rebel management had been superior, and to some extent their generalship.

That it was always the intention of the Administration to send not only McDowell but all other troops as they could and should be spared to McClellan, no right-minded person, probably, ever doubted. On the 23d of May, the President and the Secretary of War visited the camp of McDowell at Fredericksburg, and then it was arranged that McDowell should move to form the junction with this troublesome officer on Monday, the 26th.

In the meantime the operations of Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley threw the authorities at Washington and the people of the loyal States into an intense excitement. Not only were the governors urged by the Secretary of War to send to Washington all their volunteers and militia, and all the railroads taken possession of by order of the President to be turned on a moment's warning to the exclusive needs of the Government, but all available troops from West Virginia were started for the valley, and McDowell's movement towards Richmond was stopped, and himself with the great part of his army started after Jackson. To this useless task McDowell turned with a heavy heart, but with the obedience and expedition of a true soldier. He

believed that Jackson would be out of his reach long before he could strike him, but in this he was not altogether correct. Although Jackson did whip the Union troops at McDowell and Front Royal, and then drove Banks in great consternation before him out of Virginia, and in his retreat managed with great skill to repulse and whip back his pursuers at Cross Keyes and Port Republic, he had no notion of attempting to capture Washington, nor even to cross into Maryland. The groundless and unwise scare at Washington had effectually diverted McDowell from joining McClellan, although one of his divisions did do so. No one was, perhaps, more disappointed in this result than McDowell. He liked McClellan and believed with him that by the addition of his whole corps, or the greater part of it, to the Army of the Potomac the destiny of Richmond would be sealed.

Although McClellan never ceased to push the President to send McDowell, his words at least show that he was more concerned as to the command he should have over him than he was about the succor to his army, or indeed its success. On the 21st of May he telegraphed to the President:—

“If a junction is effected before we occupy Richmond, it must necessarily be east of the railroad to Fredericksburg and within my department. This fact, my superior rank, and the express language of the sixty-second article of war, will place his command under my orders, unless it is otherwise specially directed by your excellency.”

A day or two later the harassed Lincoln in one of his dispatches to the General, reiterated: “You

will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the 21st."

When McDowell was under orders again for the third time to join McClellan, and the division of General George A. McCall had actually gone forward by water, he wrote to McClellan on the 12th of June: "My Third Division (McCall's) is now on the way. Please do me the favor to so place it that it may be in a position to join the others as they come down from Fredericksburg."

In making this request McDowell was simply going according to the exact language of an order from the War Department to keep the part of his army which should be taken to the aid of McClellan together under his command. But this request fired McClellan at once, and this is the way he wrote to Washington about it:—

"That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that, in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, General McDowell should wish the general interests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command. If I can not fully control all his troops, I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the results.

"The department lines should not be allowed to interfere with me; but General McDowell, and all other troops sent to me, should be placed completely at my disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no other way can they be of assistance to me. I therefore request that I may have entire and full control. The stake at issue is too great to

allow personal considerations to be entertained. You know that I have none."

Calls for re-enforcements, complaints, or somewhat fictitious reports of his army, his intentions, preparations, and so forth, continued to pour from General McClellan toward Washington; and when at last he discovered that Stonewall Jackson had arrived, and began in his alarm to see an enormous army moving upon him, he fell into a strain of tragic taunting, telling the President that while he regretted his inferiority of numbers, he did not consider himself any way responsible. He had talked in deaf ears long enough. He would do all that any general could do, and share the fate of his splendid army. But if a disaster befell him it must rest where it belonged.

On the night of the same day, June 25th, Secretary Stanton replied, as he had repeatedly done before, that he was then doing everything in his power, as he always had done, to aid and give him success; and on the next day the President wrote:—

"WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862.

"MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN,—Your three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying.

"The later one, of 6.15 P. M., suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by two hundred thousand, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted,

and shall omit, no opportunity to send you re-enforcements whenever I possibly can. A. LINCOLN."

On the 20th of June, 1862, General McClellan reported the strength of his army present for duty at 115,102; on special duty, etc., 12,225; and absent on furlough, and so forth, 29,511. And with this grand force, he said as soon as Providence would permit him to do so he would begin to fight the rebels, and take their town and other things.

Providence did not keep him much longer idle. Against the night of the 25th of June he had moved his head-quarters to the south side of the Chickahominy, and the greater part of his army was also over there. With the other side he communicated by the Richmond and York River Railroad, and by several good bridges he had constructed; and on that side he still had the right wing of his army stretching out to Mechanicsville, this place being the outpost, and Fitz John Porter's corps lying along in the rear of this point toward the bridge connecting him with the main army. Although his army was divided in this way by the Chickahominy, his facilities of communication were good; and in view of the turn in his affairs which now followed, this arrangement of his force was fortunate. His concentration on the south side of the river had been made with the avowed purpose of operating against Richmond, and although he had allowed nearly a month to pass since the battle of Fair Oaks, in which time Lee had collected an army nearly equal to his own, it was even yet not too late for him to execute his original design.

At all events, under a less timid and more energetic commander, the case was not hopeless then. After the battle of Fair Oaks Richmond was at his mercy, but now it was well fortified. Yet Lee's main army was north of the Chickahominy, and the three divisions (about twenty-five thousand men) of it on the other side; McClellan could have assailed and overwhelmed it, and have fallen upon the main body from before Richmond, Porter's corps keeping it at bay in the meantime. This would, at any rate, have furnished him a field for the last or final struggle, which he had so long promised his army.

But General McClellan's thoughts were turned in another direction. From his head-quarters to the James River, at Harrison's Landing, it was seventeen miles, and a week before he had ordered preparations to be made for sending supplies from York River to the James, so that if he was driven to cut his connection with his former base and retreat to the latter stream he would there find supplies and the aid of the gun-boats. The change of the depot of supplies from York to James River, however, when it came, was not a voluntary "change of base" merely with General McClellan. It was what he considered a forced necessity. It was a retreat, a timid running by day and night from what he represented as a superior rebel force of two hundred thousand men. It may have been gratifying at the time to talk of McClellan's "change of base," but this piece of insincerity could not become a part of the true history of the war. So soon as he fully decided

to make the James River the source of his supplies he began to retreat, and two things he never spared night or day until he reached Harrison's Landing—Government property and the lives or hardships of his soldiers.

General Lee had made his arrangements to assail the Union army with his main force on the north side of the Chickahominy where it was weak, and after completely cutting all connection with its "base of supplies" on York River, he believed he would be master of the situation, and able to capture or destroy his uncertain foe. But it was long after noon on the 26th before Lee was ready to begin the execution of his purpose, and when night closed the battle of Mechanicsville, the first of the seven days' fighting, the advantage was decidedly with the Union army, the rebels having met a severe repulse. That night the remaining trains and other army supplies were crossed to the south side of the river, and started on their way to the James River, and General George D. Stoneman had been sent to clear the depots along the York River, sending off all the property possible and destroying the rest.

During the morning of the 27th the troops engaged at Mechanicsville on the previous day took a position five miles in the rear with Porter at Gaines's Mills, or Cold Harbor. Here General McClellan deemed it necessary to make a strong resistance in order to gain time to get his trains far on their way to the James River, and effect his other arrangements for the great retreat. It was again after noon

before the rebels came up. A desperate battle ensued. Twice Porter was compelled to send to General McClellan for re-enforcements. The Union forces were everywhere beaten back, and eight or nine thousand men were lost. That night Porter succeeded in crossing the river and destroying the bridges after him.

During this day General Lee found, to his utter disappointment and amazement, that McClellan had actually given up his York River "base," and was making with all his ability for the James. This state of affairs put the rebel General at great disadvantage. Indeed, it was now evident that he had already failed in his purpose, and had done about all he could do in preventing the retreat of an army not greatly outnumbering his own, an army encumbered with a vast train and several thousand head of cattle stretching out one-half of the whole distance to Harrison's Landing. Notwithstanding the bulk of his army was now on the wrong side of the Chickahominy, which he could not cross without repairing the bridges, Lee still believed he would be able to thwart the undertaking of the Union General. He was mistaken and outgeneraled, and he was now not only unable to throw any obstruction in the way of McClellan's retreat, but in the five days of the pursuit met little else than disaster himself, notwithstanding the thousands of blue overcoats and other superabundance of the Union army cast along the way for his benefit.

Saturday, the 28th, McClellan was mainly

unmolested in his retreat. A little artillery practice and skirmishing were all, and otherwise the vast train, and the army of which, a little while ago, McClellan had said, "we are invincible," he almost believed, went quietly on its course. The most considerable obstacle in the way of the retreating army was White-oak Swamp, but this was bridged, and after an engagement of no great importance at Savage's Station, on Sunday evening the rear of the army under Sumner passed over, destroying the bridge after it. Still Jefferson Davis, and most of the rebel leaders thought they had all the time and means they needed for bagging the retreating foe. Every effort was put forth to intercept him, but it did not avail. Stonewall Jackson, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, John Bankhead Magruder, James Longstreet, J. E. B. Stuart, and a host of other fiery rebels were in hot pursuit, all eager to pierce the Union line, but the game glided beyond their reach. McClellan never lost the advantage with which he started.

Toward evening on Monday, at Frazier's Farm, a severe fight took place, but the rebels were kept at bay, and made no advance in disorganizing or breaking the long Federal line. And that night McClellan reached Malvern Hill near the James. Here arrangements were made to check the pursuers. Malvern Hill is an elevated plateau less than a mile in width, but two or three miles long, gradually sloping to the river and to the open country. This naturally strong position, which could not be turned, McClellan hastily fortified, and while he still prepared for a

farther march of six or seven miles to Harrison's Landing, awaited the assault of the rebels without a doubt of the result.

The sixth day had now come, Tuesday, July 1st, since the fighting began. It was late in the day before the rebels arrived and began to face the work they had before them. It was a grim prospect. The guns of the whole Federal army bristled above them ready to sweep the open declivity up which they would be compelled to move, if they moved at all. With the gun-boats in their rear, the Union forces lay in a semicircle on the brow of the hill, eager for the onset. This sight must have shaken the faith of General Lee. The question of McClellan's escape was not now doubtful; and neither good generalship nor respect for the lives of his own men had anything to do with Lee's determination to attempt to drive the Union army from this position. It was not a demoralized army ready to run or throw down its arms.

Lee ordered the attack to be made, but even as late as six o'clock, when it really began with determination, misunderstanding and a lack of zeal characterized the movements of the rebels. Some of their best commands did not participate, and those that did make the assault were slaughtered or driven like chaff before the circle of flame which poured down upon them. A half dozen such assaults, while affecting the Federals but little, would have destroyed the rebel army, and opened the way for McClellan to Richmond. The task was impossible, and it was

well for Lee that night soon put an end to the bloody strife at Malvern Hill.

But this was not the end of the retreat. Early on the morning of the 1st, McClellan went on a boat down to Harrison's Landing, and did not return until long after noon, and then even chose to remain on the boat until an urgent demand was sent for his presence at Malvern Hill, where he remained until night. A great storm set in, but this did not deter McClellan, and before midnight the Union army was groping along the one narrow, muddy road to Harrison's Landing which was reached by noon on Wednesday, July 2d, by the greater part of the force though the whole immense train did not arrive until late on the 3d. The retreat over the seven miles from Malvern to Harrison's Landing was that of an unorganized body of a hundred thousand men, which could have been diverted by the presence of a disciplined foe into an uncontrollable and ruined mass of soldiery.

The march was that of a beaten and leaderless army, instead of the well-controlled and spirited victors of Malvern Hill. Fortunately they were left undisturbed, the rebels having been too badly disorganized and beaten on the 1st to offer even a feeble pursuit on McClellan's "home-stretch." Lee now made little further effort against this army.

W. H. Taylor, in his "Four Years with General Lee," says:—

"Without attempting an account of any one of the seven engagements embraced in the seven days' battles, so fully

described in General Lee's official report, I can not forbear mention of a maladroit performance just before their termination, but for which I have always thought that McClellan's army would have been further driven, even 'to the wall,' and made to surrender—a trifling matter in itself apparently, and yet worthy of thoughtful consideration. General McClellan had retreated to Harrison's Landing; his army, supply, and baggage trains were scattered in much confusion in and about Westover plantation; our army was moving down upon him, its progress much retarded by natural and artificial obstacles; General Stuart was in advance, in command of the cavalry. In rear of and around Westover there is a range of hills or elevated ground, completely commanding the plains below. Stuart, glorious Stuart! always at the front and full of fight, gained these hills. Below him, as a panorama, appeared the camps and trains of the enemy, within easy range of his artillery. The temptation was too strong to be resisted; he commanded some of his guns to open fire. The consternation caused thereby was immediate and positive. It frightened the enemy, but it enlightened him.

"Those heights in our possession, the enemy's position was altogether untenable, and he was at our mercy; unless they could be recaptured his capitulation was inevitable. Half a dozen shells from Stuart's battery quickly demonstrated this. The enemy, not slow in comprehending his danger, soon advanced his infantry in force, to dislodge our cavalry and repossess the heights. This was accomplished; the hills were fortified, and became the Federal line of defense, protected at each flank by a bold creek, which emptied into James River, and by the heavy batteries of the fleet anchored opposite. Had the infantry been up, General Lee would have made sure of this naturally strong line, fortified it well, maintained it against assault, and dictated to General McClellan terms of surrender; and had the attention of the enemy not been so

precipitately directed to his danger by the shots from the little howitzers, it is reasonable to presume that the infantry would have been up in time to secure the plateau."

This is an over-fair picture of the case. The whole army was in truth huddled in a narrow space along the river, and no orders for occupying this ridge commanding the position were given the first day; nor were the troops put in a condition for making any resistance in the plain below. Not until on the third day of July did McClellan begin to take possession of and fortify the hills. General Casey testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War that twenty thousand of the rebels on the ridge surrounding the Landing could have taken the whole army, excepting the small part of it which could have got off in the boats. The opinion of Mr. Taylor given here was general among Federal officers, and the grounds that gave rise to it should, at least, have given the Army of the Potomac a new commander, about the only re-enforcement it needed to enable it to resume successfully its march to Richmond. But, as it was, the celebrated "Peninsular Campaign" was substantially at an end.

CHAPTER XV.

1862—WAR OF THE REBELLION—McCLELLAN AT HARRISON'S LANDING—EVACUATION OF THE PENINSULA—LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN—AN INDEFENSIBLE CAREER—THE GREAT GENERAL NOT YET FOUND.

IN the week's fighting and running from Mechanicsville to Harrison's Landing General McClellan lost, according to his own report, one thousand five hundred and eighty-two killed, seven thousand seven hundred and nine wounded, five thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight missing, in all fifteen thousand two hundred and forty-nine men. This was, in all probability, a low estimate, and probably did not include the sick left behind in the hospitals. There is, perhaps, no indubitable evidence that the rebels did not suffer a loss even greater, although the facts were mainly concealed. On the 3d of July McClellan reported to the Secretary of War that he supposed he had not then left with their colors over fifty thousand soldiers of all the invincible host landed with him on the Peninsula. This was startling, and the strange discrepancies it suggested, as well as other considerations, induced President Lincoln to go all the way to Harrison's Landing to see for himself the condition of the army. And only four days after McClellan had made this frightful

report it was found that there were about eighty-eight thousand soldiers present at the Landing. Thus an enormous gap was filled. But on the 20th of June there were about one hundred and fifteen thousand men present for duty on the Chickahominy. Then, if fifteen or even twenty thousand were lost in the "seven days' battles" and retreat, there would still remain a discrepancy of from seven to fifteen thousand men, and no clew to these can readily be found, unless it is in the amazing supposition that they had been sent off on furlough on the very eve of the battles and retreat. Even after Mr. Lincoln's visit, there was some dispute about McClellan's strength, which gave rise to the following letter:—

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
"July 13, 1862. }

"MY DEAR SIR,—I am told that over one hundred and sixty thousand men have gone with your army on the Peninsula. When I was with you the other day, we made out eighty-six thousand remaining, leaving seventy-three thousand five hundred to be accounted for. I believe three thousand five hundred will cover all the killed, wounded, and missing, in all your battles and skirmishes, leaving fifty thousand who have left otherwise. Not more than five thousand of these have died, leaving forty-five thousand of your army still alive, and not with it. I believe half or two-thirds of them are fit for duty to-day. Have you any more perfect knowledge of this than I have? If I am right, and you had these men with you, you could go into Richmond in the next three days. How can they be got to you, and how can they be prevented from getting away in such numbers in the future?

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

This brought the statement from the General that over thirty-four thousand of his men were absent on furlough by permission, and over three thousand were absent without permission; and of the more than thirty-eight thousand thus absent he thought one-half, at least, was fit for active duty. Lee in his report says very truly that "the siege of Richmond was raised, and the object of a campaign, which had been prosecuted after months of preparation, at an enormous expenditure of men and money, completely frustrated." And in referring to McClellan's losses he says: "His losses in battle exceeded our own, as attested by the thousands of dead and wounded left on every field, while his subsequent inaction shows in what condition the survivors reached the protection to which they fled."

But the latter part of this statement was merely begging the case, and was trifling and unwise on the part of Lee, as he knew then, as everybody else did, that McClellan's inactivity never could have been taken for a sign of the weakness of his army. The sources of his inaction must be sought elsewhere. His activity was most displayed in his letters and dispatches, and in his retreat. If McClellan's army was not strong enough to fight Lee and maintain its position, then it was a military necessity to retreat to the York or the James. On the slightest grounds he always seemed disposed to exaggerate or really fancy the rebel force greater than his own. At Richmond he waited on account of Providence and other things, until he said the rebel army was perhaps

two hundred thousand strong; and under some such impression he started to secure himself down at James River. In overestimating the rebel strength, however, McClellan only displayed a common fault among Northern people. The spirit of exaggeration ruled the time, and where it is not openly seen, it lurks throughout current narrative and record, so that the task of the historian is not only difficult and irksome, but also sometimes doubtful in the end. It is probably a fact that the rebels were never able during the war to gather into one army for single combat a hundred thousand soldiers. And they never did so, even if they were able to spare them from the various salient points in the vast boundary they undertook to defend.

McClellan's retreat to the James River from an army even less numerous than his own was regarded by foreign soldiers, and by most of his countrymen, as a brilliant and wonderful feat. This much has been already intimated here. But this brilliant retreat was no compensation for the utter failure of the "Peninsular Campaign." And even the little credit due him for this successful retreat was greatly modified by the state of his army during the last seven miles, and its defenseless condition for a day or two after the difficult journey was over. He was not allowed to go to the "Peninsula" for the purpose of making glorious retreats. He had selected his own field, and in it he had held out the idea that he would in one grand stroke crush the Rebellion. Nothing had been withheld from him which could be given. But

on the "Peninsula" he resumed the undecided and dilatory habits which had distinguished him on the Potomac. From first to last his cry was for more troops, and yet he kept on furlough nearly one-fourth of his army, and was never able to bring into action half of the men who had muskets in their hands. But once were his troops massed during the campaign, at Malvern Hill, and there they were invincible, indeed. And at Malvern Hill all admiration, even on the part of the panegyrists of fine retreats, must cease. From that point to Harrison's Landing and for a day afterwards he had no army, but only a disorganized mass of men, horses, cattle, wagons, and materials of war.

Why did General McClellan continue his retreat below Malvern Hill? Of course, his "base" was better on the river at Harrison's Landing, but at the former place his communications were complete, and he had the aid of the gun-boats. Malvern Hill was seven miles nearer Richmond if he wanted to go there, and even in his temporary defenses there it was apparent he could whip the rebels whenever they chose to assail him. They could have interfered with his communications more readily at that point on the river, but still this only begs the case. His general officers were unanimously opposed to retreating beyond or giving up Malvern Hill. Even his favorite, Fitz John Porter, was bitterly against it. And when the order came to abandon this position after repulsing the rebels with great slaughter, and demonstrating its superior advantages it is easy to

imagine the indignation and amazement of the brave men who never had any heart in the retrogression from the outset. In the midst of a group of these astonished and disappointed officers General Kearny made the following speech: "I, Philip Kearny, an old soldier, enter my solemn protest against this order to retreat. We ought, instead of retreating, to follow up the enemy and take Richmond. And, in full view of all the responsibility of such a declaration, I say to you all that such an order can only be prompted by cowardice or treason.' And the brave old soldier's sentiment was echoed from many a sore heart.

Now for a brief view of McClellan's course toward the authorities at Washington, and his departure from the Peninsula.

On the very day before the battle of Mechanicsville, McClellan called for re-enforcements; and on the next day the President dispatched, as has been seen:—

"I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have; while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted, I shall omit, no opportunity to send you re-enforcements whenever I can."

On the 28th the General in great heat sent the following communication to Washington:—

"HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
"SAVAGE'S STATION, June 28, 1862, 12.20 A. M. }

"I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several

strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those battalions who fought most bravely, and suffered most, are still in the best order. My regulars were superb; and I count upon what are left to turn another battle, in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I twenty thousand, or even ten thousand, fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and *personnel* of the army.

"If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small.

"I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a General who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes; but to do this the Government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large re-enforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of the Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have.

"In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely intimated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. If, at this instant, I could dispose of ten thousand fresh men, I could gain the victory to-morrow.

"I know that a few thousand more men would have

changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government must not and can not hold me responsible for the result.

"I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not so now, the game is lost.

"If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other persons in Washington.

"You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

"G. B. McCLELLAN.

"Hon. E. M. STANTON."

Telegraphic communications were now broken, and no reply was ever made to this immodest, ill-tempered, untrue, and unsoldier-like letter. Had it been the work of a boy or a woman, a long-suffering and patient Executive might have found less difficulty in forgiving it. Long ago McClellan had taught Mr. Lincoln the virtue of his characteristic traits of forbearance and patience. In the heat of battle and defeat, some may be able to find an apology for this letter; but in view of General McClellan's treatment by the President and the Secretary of War, as well as in view of his being a soldier and a man responsible to his Government and country, the task would be difficult. Without notice of the bad character of this communication the President wrote on the same day, only correcting one erroneous statement, the following reply:—

"WASHINGTON, June 28, 1862.

"Save your army at all events. Will send re-enforcements as fast as we can. Of course they can not reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you

were ungenerous for saying you needed re-enforcements; I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops sent could have got to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that re-enforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the Government is to blame.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

This over-charitable and soothing reply did not correct the evil in McClellan, who substantially repeated his letter of the 28th in his final report.

On the 1st of July Mr. Lincoln again wrote :—

"It is impossible to re-enforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men, we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out.

"A. LINCOLN."

So soon as General McClellan reached the James River he began to pour in his complaints and demands for more troops. Mr. Lincoln now wrote him this remarkable letter (an appeal to a child, or what must I say, a military "crank?") :—

"WASHINGTON, July 2, 1862.

"Your dispatch of yesterday induces me to hope that your army is having some rest. In this hope, allow me

to reason with you for a moment. When you ask for fifty thousand men to be promptly sent you, you surely labor under some gross mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers showing your disposal of forces made last spring for the defense of Washington, and advising a return to that plan. I find it included, in and about Washington, seventy-five thousand men. Now, please be assured that I have not men enough to fill that very plan by fifteen thousand. All of General Fremont's in the valley, all of General Banks's, all of General McDowell's not with you, and all in Washington, taken together, do not exceed, if they reach, sixty thousand. With General Wool and General Dix added to those mentioned, I have not, outside of your army, seventy-five thousand men east of the mountains. Thus, the idea of sending you fifty thousand, or any other considerable forces promptly, is simply absurd. If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg, that in like manner, you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material, and *personnel*, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The Governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept. A. LINCOLN."

On the next day McClellan not only repeated his demand for the troops, but now raised the number to a hundred thousand, and on the 4th reiterated the demand. This thing could not be endured much longer; and yet the President wrote:—

"WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., }
"July 4, 1862. }

"I understand your position as stated in your letter, and by General Marcy. To re-enforce you so as to enable

you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac (about ten thousand men, I suppose), and about ten thousand I hope you will have from Burnside very soon, and about five thousand from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send you another man within a month. Under these circumstances, the defensive, for the present, must be your only care. Save the army, first, where you are, if you *can*, and, secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt, and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion, that with the aid of the gun-boats and the re-enforcements mentioned above, you can hold your present position; provided, and so long as you can keep the James River open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James River open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any apprehension as to the danger of having your communications cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your attention.

“Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

“Major-General McCLELLAN.

“P. S.—If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not restrained from doing so. A. L.”

Here it was, during the General's long days of leisure that he wrote his famous letter of the 7th of July, given in a former chapter, on the political features and conduct of the war. Of this remarkable performance the President took no note, and matters went on in the same way, the General never ceasing his demand for troops, and his expressions of hopes and fancies as to his capture of Richmond, etc.

On the 11th of July, 1862, Halleck had been put

in command of all the land forces of the United States. General Halleck's operations in the West had placed him high in the esteem of the Administration, and it was hoped something would come out of his general direction of military affairs. The day of experiment was not yet passed. The General-in-Chief also visited McClellan at Harrison's Landing, but did not find things to his satisfaction.

Toward the close of July McClellan sent, by Halleck's suggestion, a considerable reconnoitering force to Malvern Hill, and even to White-oak Swamp, driving or capturing the few rebels in the way, showing what was becoming apparent at Washington, by this time, that General Lee was turning his attention in another direction. He knew the character of the Federal commander on the James River, and was not afraid to leave Richmond, his "base of supplies," to go on an expedition toward the north. He believed that if his movement upon Washington did not remove McClellan entirely from the Peninsula, it would at least not draw him from his inactivity on the James.

In the meantime it had been decided at Washington that McClellan's army should be withdrawn from the Peninsula, without consulting him about its propriety. But this was no less difficult a matter than others had been in dealing with General McClellan. When he got the first intimation of this purpose, he began to urge upon the President his original idea of breaking the Rebellion in the way he had taken. He still held that he should be re-enforced, at the

expense of all other parts of the country, and the great struggle made where he was. His way to Richmond, he maintained yet, was the true way to save Washington and the Union. Toward the end of July General Halleck ordered him to remove all his sick; but he was in no hurry even about this, and when, at last, he was notified that this was preparatory to the withdrawal of his entire force, he sent up a long, formal remonstrance. Nor did he stop with this. On the 3d of August the order to evacuate was given, and three days afterward this letter followed from Halleck:—

“HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, }
“August 6, 1862. }

“GENERAL,—Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately telegraphed a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail.

“You, General, certainly could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview. And even after that interview I tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it.

“I assure you, General, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more anxious thoughts than any other of my life. But after full and mature consideration of all the *pros* and *cons*, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued; there was to my mind no alternative.

“Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in the case.

“You and your officers at our interview estimated the

enemy's forces in and around Richmond at two hundred thousand men. Since then you and others report that they have received and are receiving large re-enforcements from the South. General Pope's army, covering Washington, is only about forty thousand. Your effective force is only about ninety thousand. You are thirty miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety, *with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other as he may elect; neither can re-enforce the other in case of such an attack.*

"If General Pope's army be diminished to re-enforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They can not be united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula, is under present circumstances a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, where the two armies can be united.

"Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged: You say that the withdrawal from the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army, 'which is now in excellent discipline and condition.'

"I can not understand why a simple change of position to a new and by no means distant base will demoralize an army in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves assist in that demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not.

"Your change of front, from your extreme right at

Hanover Court House to your present position, was over thirty miles, but I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in effecting it.

"A new base on the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg brings you within about sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a re-enforcement of forty or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined troops.

"The change with such advantages will, I think, if properly represented to your army, encourage rather than demoralize your troops. Moreover, you yourself suggested that a junction might be effected at Yorktown, but that a flank march across the isthmus would be more hazardous than to retire to Fort Monroe.

"You will remember that Yorktown is two or three miles further than Fredericksburg is. Besides, the latter is between Richmond and Washington, and covers Washington from any attack of the enemy.

"The political effect of the withdrawal may at first be unfavorable; but I think the public are beginning to understand its necessity, and that they will have much more confidence in a united army than in its separated fragments.

"But you will reply, why not re-enforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this, you said, at our interview, that you required thirty thousand additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought you would have 'some chance' of success with twenty thousand. But you afterwards telegraphed me that you would require thirty-five thousand, as the enemy was being largely re-enforced.

"If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks.

“To keep your army in its present position until it could be so re-enforced would almost destroy it in that climate.

“The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of the James River; and even after you received the re-enforcement asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on Richmond.

“It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown.

“This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the meantime General Pope’s forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you.

“In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers, indeed, a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula now advise its abandonment.

“I have not inquired, and do not wish to know, by whose advice or for what reasons the Army of the Potomac was separated into two parts, with the enemy between them. I must take things as I find them.

“I find the forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you, or any one else, had presented a better plan, I certainly should have adopted it. But all of your plans require re-enforcements which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to *ask* for re-enforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable troops at your command.

“I have written very plainly as I understand the case, and I hope you will give me credit for having fully con-

sidered the matter, although I may have arrived at very different conclusions from your own.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“W. H. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

“Major-General G. B. McCLELLAN, Commanding, etc., Berkeley, Va.”

Still McClellan delayed, hoping that he might bring about a countermanding of the order. This cutting letter did not move him. On the 9th, General Halleck telegraphed that he must send reinforcements to Pope, and notified him that his conduct was not satisfactory. Then Halleck accused him of willful and determined disobedience, and told him that he would have to explain. And after all of this he resisted, not leaving Fortress Monroe until the 23d of August.

At last, however, the fatal “Peninsular Campaign” had ended. Little substantial had been gained, and much had been lost. Mr. Lincoln’s way to Richmond and the main strength of the rebel war power was the right way, but he had permitted himself to give up to this “Peninsular” scheme of McClellan’s, and was to some extent responsible for it. It was a great error, and no error was ever more poorly executed. Before Yorktown McClellan, who had long ago on the Potomac received the name of “The Great Unready,” tarried until Johnston came, and the small rebel force wholly unable to cope with him began to gather between him and Richmond. At the Chickahominy he waited again until Davis had gathered his new conscripts, and Lee had an army before him which he imagined large enough to

swallow him at a single gulp. He was within four miles of Richmond and might have taken it at any time early in the campaign, and even after the beginning of the "seven days' battles." But he chose to give up what he had gained, and his generals conducted the fighting and retreating as best they could. The campaign had no mitigating circumstances. It was a national calamity. Perhaps no soldier bearing the title of General could have done worse, and certainly no other could have so wearied, fretted, and tried the patience of an all-forgiving and charitable President and people. With the termination of this sad, worthless campaign, should have ended General McClellan's military career. And to say this much is a stretch of historic charity, if there can be such.

Before finally leaving this "Peninsular Campaign" a few words should, perhaps, be written touching the wisdom of withdrawing the Army of the Potomac from the position it occupied on the James River, but without the desire to discuss this point in its various aspects. Especially after reaching the Peninsula, General McClellan always held that Washington could be as well defended from that remote locality as from the position he so long and quietly occupied on the Potomac in its front; and that at or near Richmond was the place to fight and end the Rebellion. Before the army was taken down to the Peninsula, the Administration was right and General McClellan was wrong about the way to Richmond and the force it represented. As Mr. Lincoln

said, if the great battles had to be fought there it was as well certainly to avoid the time and the vast expense of transferring the army by water to the sickly tide-water region of Virginia, and move directly on by Manassas, as it had begun to do where its vast materials were collected, and where there would be no division of its strength for the protection of the Capital. Thus far Mr. Lincoln was the better General, but after he had placed McClellan on the Peninsula, the recall of his army to Washington was of a doubtful propriety, no matter what the emergency should be. With an able and energetic commander the Army of the Potomac then at Harrison's Landing, without re-enforcements, could, on the three last days of July, have taken Richmond, and utterly destroyed every reliable source of supplies for the rebel army. With this force of ninety thousand men in its rear and fifty thousand in its front, there could have been no doubt about the destiny of General Lee's army, by the 1st of September.

The army on the Peninsula only wanted a good general. If it had had a daring and able leader at Malvern Hill, the destruction of the rebel force in Virginia and the capture of Richmond would have been reasonably certain. And General John B. Magruder said that if such an attack as it was capable of had been made on the rebel force south of the Chickahominy on the 26th of June, there was nothing to hinder it taking Richmond and turning, from the works there, upon the rear of an army always weaker than itself. From several other favorable points this

subject might be viewed; and, at all events, while the grounds of unanimity of opinion for the substitution of a new commander may be undisputed, the propriety of removing the army from the Peninsula may well remain a matter of doubt.

CHAPTER XVI.

1862—WAR OF THE REBELLION—GENERAL POPE—CEDAR MOUNTAIN—GAINESVILLE—SECOND BULL RUN—CHANTILLY—McCLELLAN'S HAND—THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND MORE!—LEE IN MARYLAND—HARPER'S FERRY—SOUTH MOUNTAIN—ANTIETAM—LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN—"SEEKS QUIET AND REPOSE" AT LAST.

LATE in June, 1862, General John Pope was brought from the Mississippi Valley, where he had characterized himself as a daring and able officer, and placed in command of the force in the field in front of Washington. This force consisted mainly of the three armies under Irwin McDowell, N. P. Banks, and Franz Sigel, the latter having taken the position recently resigned by General Fremont. From the outset Pope exhibited a degree of activity which was unusual on the Potomac, and in this spirit he never flagged throughout his brief and tragic career in Virginia; although it is, perhaps, true that on assuming the command there was an air of bluster and brag about his proceedings hardly becoming a soldier or a man of discretion. At all events, a general order or address issued by him after assuming the command, on the 14th of July, was quite offensive to some of the Eastern Generals, and especially to George B. McClellan, who had yet

been distinguished for little else than inactivity. This address was not issued by General Pope until he had spent two weeks in studying the condition and character of the Army of Virginia, as the command was designated. As he had passed among officers and men he had been startled by many expressions, such as "lines of retreat," "bases of supplies," "strategic points," "strong positions for defense," etc., to which he had been unused in the West. He took occasion to note these things in the address, and criticising them sharply, requested that they be dropped from the thoughts, as they certainly should be from the operations, of the army in the future. McClellan considered himself mainly affected by this thrust, although it was a long way over the shoulders of Banks and McDowell, and in this supposed hurt of McClellan's began the misfortunes which led to the utter failure of Pope's efforts, of his defeat, and sudden resignation of the command. Pope, at once, favored a policy that would divert a part of the rebel force from McClellan, and wrote to the latter that he was ready and anxious to co-operate with him, but the answer he got was not cheering to Pope; and then, too, McClellan was at that very time retreating to Harrison's Landing, and putting co-operation out of the question. Pope began now to see difficulties which he could not overcome, and believing that the case demanded it, desired to be relieved of the command. But this not being granted he entered with remarkable activity upon the work before him.

At this time it was that the rebel authorities decided upon two great raids toward the North, one under Bragg, already described, and the other under Lee, into Maryland and, perhaps, Pennsylvania. In fact, they were now going under General Lee to Philadelphia to dictate terms of peace in Independence Hall. So they openly declared after entering Maryland. Lee had discovered the character of McClellan, and believed that he could do all this work, including the capture of Washington, while the fault-finding and inactive Federal General remained quiet on the James River, within twenty-five or thirty miles of Richmond. McClellan was not his equal as a soldier, and of this fact he was now going to make good use.

Pope had now pushed far south of the Rappahannock, and on the 10th of August his advance under General Banks was met by Stonewall Jackson at Slaughter's or Cedar Mountain, and after a severe fight, was whipped. Pope now discovered the designs of Lee, and made a Herculean effort to thwart them, but in vain. He fell back rapidly beyond the Rappahannock into the neighborhood of Manassas Junction. He was fortunate to discover in good time Lee's intention to turn his right, and before he could receive aid from the tardy, stubborn, and dissatisfied McClellan, cut him off from Washington and crush him. But his knowledge of Lee's purpose he was unable, by the incompetency or treachery of some of his officers, to turn to good account. Longstreet, he knew, was coming through Thoroughfare Gap, and

although he sent a force sufficient to intercept him and hold him at bay until he could fall upon Jackson and destroy him by main force, his order was not executed. Still on the 29th he assailed Jackson at Gainesville in a desperate battle which closed with the day, and in which he saw the utter hopelessness of depending on the aid from the Army of the Potomac, upon which he had based all his operations, or even for such supplies and assistance as he should have received from Washington. On the following day the battle was renewed. In the meantime Longstreet, who had met no impediment, had come up. The bloody battle fought on this day was called Second Bull Run or Manassas. That night the beaten army of the Union fell back in good order towards Washington.

Lee now sent Jackson to fall on Pope's right flank, but Pope was aware of the design and provided for it the best he could. On the first of September, toward evening, the opposing armies met again at Chantilly, in the rear and to the right of Centerville. In this struggle the rebels were checked, but the losses were very heavy on the Union side. Among the brave men who fell here were General Philip Kearny and General Isaac J. Stevens. Pope now retreated to the fortifications above Alexandria, and at once resigned his command.

Before these battles, McClellan had arrived at Washington, and strangely enough was placed in charge of the whole business of forwarding supplies and troops to Pope, his head-quarters being at Alex-

andria. His paralyzing touch was felt again on both sides of the Potomac, and so utterly evil and demoralizing had been his influence that the President was forced to ask him to appeal to the troops formerly under him to go cheerfully and bravely to the support of Pope, the support of the Nation. And so, he wrote to his favorite Fitz John Porter: "I ask you for my sake, that of the country, and the old Army of the Potomac, that you and all my friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope in all the operations now going on." In all this rebel struggle to ruin the country no such a pitiable and shameful picture is hinted at as is seen in McClellan's letter to Porter. It points certainly to the dangers to the Republic, from the army, which have been so much mooted by the class of politicians to which General McClellan belonged, and of which he himself furnishes the only example in the history of the country. For this letter and the state of affairs which made it possible, patriotism at least can have only words of abhorrence and condemnation. From the day McClellan first began to deal with the Army of the Potomac to the close of his career in the service of the Government his whole influence had been apparently directed to one purpose, that of ingratiating himself, of placing himself before and above the authorities of the Government, and hence of the Government itself. He had early said that the confidence of the army in its general was better than many victories; and his constant contention with and opposition to the Government authorities in plans and principles he

carefully construed to the interest of the army. The long series of dispatches between him and General Halleck, from his post at Alexandria, and that of the General-in-Chief in Washington, it is difficult to study with equanimity at this remote period.

In the midst of an almost unparalleled excitement at Washington, when even the whereabouts of Pope's army was unknown, he stops to present to Halleck the stupendous demand, ever first with him: "Please inform me at once what my position is." "What are my orders and authority?" were the things of first moment. When General Pope urged stores to be sent on, he said: "Tell General Pope when he sends forward a cavalry escort, the trains will be loaded at once." When Pope begged for ammunition, he answered: "I know nothing of the calibers of Pope's artillery." And at last he dispatched to the President that he was quite clear on two points, namely: that they ought to open communication with Pope, or they ought to let Pope get out of the scrape into which he had got the best way he could, and use all their means to secure Washington. "Let Pope get out of his scrape!" This was too much for the sorely tried Lincoln. Pope's cause was his cause, was the cause of the Republic, of all the people. But this supremely selfish and incompetent man had the advantage over him. The Head of the Government appeared powerless before his irreconcilable pretensions, and the moment for casting him off had not yet arrived. At least, so it seemed to the hard-pressed and weary President.

That General Pope committed no mistakes, it would not be easy to prove, perhaps; but his rapid movements, zeal, great energy, bravery, and determination deserved a better fate in Virginia, and that they would have had a different result can hardly be doubted, had King, Porter, and Franklin, and especially McClellan, done what it was their simple duty as patriots and men to do, and which he had every reason to believe they would do.

With the end of this unfortunate campaign the Rebellion rose to its highest state of prosperity and hope. Its outlook was flattering. From the poorly fed and tattered army the illusion spread over the whole South. The "God of Hosts" was leading the right! Vain dream! Like the smoke of the battle, the delusion passed away. The defeat of Pope's army brought no adequate return; and the whole Northern raid was without political results. It inspired the North to do more of what it was so able to do. It gave a new impetus to the martial spirit of the Union. Late in June the governors of seventeen States jointly asked the President to call for more troops to crush the Rebellion, signifying their anxiety to co-operate and the ambition of a prosperous and patriotic people to engage in the work in which they all had an equal interest. In accordance with this appeal, on the first day of July Mr. Lincoln called for three hundred thousand more troops, and soon after a draft was ordered to supply any deficiencies in the quotas of the States. In this joint action of the governors, Tennessee was repre-

sented by Andrew Johnson, and Kentucky, by the president of her Military Board. The resources and power of the Government were not only not broken, but were only put in the way of being called into activity to an adequate extent without embarrassment to a country in which war seemed to feed prosperity.

Still all this could not wholly neutralize the rebel successes in Virginia, or diminish the reputation of brilliant movements and superior generalship. Stonewall Jackson, during this raid and his previous operations in the Shenandoah Valley, placed his name, beyond dispute, among the first generals of his age; and McClellan was not a match for the uncomplaining and energetic Lee. Pope, a brave and dashing soldier of undoubted abilities, was tried under adverse circumstances, and the test was neither just nor satisfactory to the country or himself. Experiment and experience were slowly developing the men for the emergency.

As Pope's army returned broken and leaderless to Washington, there was a systematic effort made to restore McClellan to the command. A political significance began to be attached to McClellan's course, and the President did not then see fit to ignore it. The partisan generals in the Army of the Potomac began to attribute Pope's defeat to his own rashness, "presumption, and incapacity," losing sight of his unaided and solitary struggle almost in view of ample re-enforcements and supplies, and holding out the fancy that all would again be well in the

reinstating of McClellan. Mr. Lincoln was bewildered and oppressed. Something was to be done at once. With a heavy heart, hoping that good would come, he submitted in distrust to what seemed to be a necessity, and on the second day of September, McClellan was again placed at the head of the Army of the Potomac.

Lee, on the day after the last battle with Pope, began his march towards Maryland, crossing the Potomac at Point of Rocks on the 5th of September, and moving rapidly to Frederick. Here, on the 8th, he issued an address to the people of the State. This address was in the common tone of such productions on the part of rebel generals, and in this case especially was almost destitute of truth or honesty. It talked of the violation of the Constitution, of the usurpations of their local governments, of the unlawful dissolution of their Legislature, and expressed the belief that the people of Maryland possessed too lofty a spirit to submit to such a Government. If General Lee was sincere in the language of his proclamation, he was not sane. The privileges which had been taken from the disloyal people of Maryland, had without a scruple and with great severity been denied the loyal, or even those remotely suspected of loyalty, in the South. How could a sane man sincerely talk of infringing the Constitution in dealing with traitors to it, who was the military leader of an organized effort to overthrow utterly the Constitution and the benign Government based upon it?

But the Maryland rebels did not respond to this

appeal. They were willing to give their sympathy without bearing the burdens of a desperate cause which demanded the property and persons of its supporters. Lee was sadly disappointed. He expected the State which had given to the Rebellion the song which most aptly expressed the deep feeling and hatred of the day, would send into his ranks on such an opportunity a great host of those who had been stripped of all their precious rights by a wicked Government which would not deal with its open and secret enemies on strictly Constitutional principles. On this raid into Maryland Lee's army did not, perhaps, receive three hundred recruits, with all the efforts put forth to that end. The whole South was mortified and disappointed. Still the raid was not without some benefits to the rebels. Failing, as he soon saw he was destined to do, in increasing the size of his army, Lee turned his attention, as Bragg had done in Kentucky, to its commissary wants. Not only did he supply its immediate necessities, but thousands of cattle were driven across the Potomac, and everything of present or future benefit to his needy troops was appropriated without ceremony.

On the 7th of September General McClellan left Washington, the advance of his army having started in pursuit of Lee three days previously. He necessarily moved slowly and with caution, not knowing the whereabouts or purposes of the enemy, until he reached Frederick, on the 12th. Here McClellan was fortunate enough to come into possession of a

copy of Lee's order dated only three days before, revealing his designs and the disposition of his forces. This fact Lee never discovered; but that the possession of this exact and valuable information greatly benefited the Union army does not so clearly appear. In speaking of McClellan's good luck in finding this marching order, W. H. Taylor in his "Four Years with General Lee," says:—

"But what an advantage did this fortuitous event give the Federal commander, whose heretofore snail-like movements were wonderfully accelerated when he was made aware of the fact of the division of our army, and of the small portion thereof which confronted him. The God of Battles alone knows what would have occurred but for the singular accident mentioned; it is useless to speculate on this point, but certainly the loss of this battle-order constitutes one of the pivots on which turned the event of the war."

In this order Lee had divided his army, sending Stonewall Jackson to cross the Potomac, destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and then fall upon Harper's Ferry, which was the main object of the entire detachment. The divisions of McLaws, Anderson, and Walker were also sent against Harper's Ferry with especial instructions as to the course to pursue. The whole army was to be reunited at Hagerstown.

Although McClellan's army now had in it a great deal of raw material, new recruits, it was greatly superior in numbers to that of the rebel General, and it was certainly in his power to relieve Harper's

Ferry, and destroy the divisions of Lafayette McLaws and R. H. Anderson. This Lee never could have prevented. However, the opportunity presented was not taken. If General McClellan had a reason for not doing so, it has never been apparent, and it is not now necessary to hunt an apology for his conduct. Instead of moving with the main body of his army through Crampton's Gap in South Mountain, striking the Potomac south of Sharpsburg, he proceeded with commendable rapidity on the track of Lee towards Hagerstown, through Turner's Gap. General W. B. Franklin, who passed through Crampton's Gap, found in his way a part of McLaws's division, but it was not in his instructions to look after Harper's Ferry. On the 14th McClellan's advance overtook Lee at Turner's Gap in South Mountain. The rebel General had discovered McClellan's rapid movement, and now seeing that his stay in Maryland must be brief, was making every possible exertion to delay his pursuer until his plan as to Harper's Ferry should be carried out and his army united. But a battle was inevitable. His position in the Gap was a strong one, yet when night closed the conflict he saw that another day would be fatal to his divided army. When the morning of the 15th dawned and the national army prepared to complete its work, the enemy had disappeared.

At Crampton's Gap, five or six miles south, on the 14th, Franklin had driven the rebels before him; and on that day he heard Jackson's guns at Harper's Ferry, which surrendered on the morning of

the 15th. This place was unfortunately under the command of Colonel D. S. Miles, who had somehow been restored after his disgrace at the first Bull Run. He had with him about fourteen thousand men, mostly new recruits, who had never seen service, two thousand of them being cavalry. These latter got permission, and escaped, and the rest, about twelve thousand, were surrendered, Miles himself receiving a mortal wound after he had put out his white flag.

McClellan now spent two days in hunting Lee and getting ready for battle. This was precious time. Before noon on the 15th he knew that Harper's Ferry had fallen into the hands of the rebels, and well he knew that Stonewall Jackson would not tarry long there to look after the spoils or celebrate the event. Lee had taken a position on the west side of Antietam Creek, several miles from the Potomac, and near the village of Sharpsburg; and during the 15th and 16th his army was still divided, not over one-half of it being with him. All of this McClellan knew. On the afternoon of the 15th, and the following morning, it must have been in his power to accomplish what the finding of Lee's general order at Frederick furnished him the rare opportunity of doing; at least, he could have compensated largely for his failure to move the greater part of his army through the gaps farther south, first intercepting and defeating McLaws, and then falling between Lee and the Potomac. There would have been no escape for the greater part of the rebel

army. McClellan's want of generalship in this case is too apparent to need investigation. On any reasonable grounds his course after reaching Frederick must remain inexplicable.

At the break of day on the morning of the 17th, General Hooker began the bloody battle of Antietam, attacking the rebel extreme left from the position he had skillfully and laboriously taken the evening before. This remained the sanguinary point throughout the day, McClellan resorting to his peculiar tactics of sending in one of his divisions to be whipped, then relieving it by another to share the same fate. Lee knew McClellan's character, and as he had dallied along, squandering the time until his own unsoldierly error of dividing his army in the face of a foe had been corrected, he now relied on the Federal General's repeating his singular Peninsular course of fighting with a single division. Thus he was allowed to mass his main strength on the Federal right through the greater part of the day, and keep well at bay, until darkness closed the conflict, an army very much outnumbering his own. The Union troops slept on their arms in the places they occupied when the day closed, believing that they would rise in the morning to renew the battle and end the war. There was no escape for Lee, they said. But the morning came, and the day wore away, and still the commanding General was silent. Of course the rebels were in no condition to assail; they could only watch their superior antagonist, and hope that his great dilatoriness would enable them to complete

their plans of escape. Old soldiers who, it was said, had been clamorous for the reinstatement of McClellan, now remembered the wonderful inactivity and tardiness of the Peninsula, and again felt their cheeks burn with shame and indignation in recounting the experience of Malvern Hill. An uncertain and weary night passed, and the morning of the 19th broke with the amazing news that, after all, the whole rebel army had been allowed to escape across the Potomac.

On the 20th McClellan sent a small force after Lee, but this was a mistake, as shown by its utter defeat. Lee, well aware of his safety, not only moved leisurely out toward Winchester, but also took occasion to send J. E. B. Stuart with his cavalry to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, and who made a circuit around McClellan as he had done on the Peninsula. McClellan made extensive preparations to catch Stuart, but they amounted to nothing. His preparations always prevented his doing anything in time. In these battles there had been a loss in killed, wounded, and missing of nearly fifteen thousand on each side. The rebels called the battle of Antietam a drawn battle; McClellan said that "not a single gun or color was lost by our army in these battles;" but about all they did was to add something to the solution of the question as to the time yet required to exhaust the resources of the Rebellion. It was now demonstrated beyond a doubt that the rebels were unable to carry the war into the North; the blockade was complete; and the hope of foreign

intervention had died with the test of Ericsson's monitor, and the settlement of the *Trent* case.

McClellan now fell into his usual torpor; and although the country was gratified with the expulsion of the rebel army from Maryland, it was by no means satisfied. Enough had not been done under the circumstances. The President had submitted to the restoration of McClellan, but he was not satisfied, and about the 1st of October he made a visit to the army. The result was that in less than a week afterwards Halleck sent McClellan these peremptory words: "The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good."

But McClellan did not obey the order, and now was renewed the wonderful correspondence between him and Halleck and the President. His remarkable faculty for inventing impossibilities, exaggerating difficulties, overestimating his own achievements, and overestimating the forces opposed to him, was again displayed to its highest perfection. He had persisted in representing the rebel army as more numerous than his own at Antietam, when it was less by twenty or thirty thousand, at least. And that it was not twice as small was owing to his inexcusable delays, when he knew as well as the rebel General himself what was the exact condition of his affairs. He now began to call for re-enforcements, and complain, and in one way or another the President's order to move was set aside.

On the 7th of October, only one day after he had been ordered to cross the Potomac, from his camp near Sharpsburg he considered it his duty to issue a general order to the army, which he had for some time been in the habit of calling "my army," touching the President's Emancipation Proclamation. This order was certainly founded on the supposition of his superior power and influence over the Army of the Potomac. And while it was in the main expressed in unobjectionable terms, the propriety of its appearance is extremely doubtful. The mere thought that the Army of the Potomac could be more devoted to its commander than to the authority of the Government, at such a crisis especially, would deserve to bring its memory into everlasting shame. The order was not flattering to either the intelligence or patriotism of that army. Yet it is hard to believe that General McClellan did not issue this order under the pure conviction that he would serve the country best by doing so. Few, perhaps, at this day, do believe it. And yet, this apparently good and harmless order contains this suggestive and ambiguous sentiment: "The remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is to be found only in the action of the people at the polls."

It is hardly to be doubted that this expression conveyed an idea to the army in harmony with the already well-known opposition of McClellan to what was termed the Republican plan of conducting the war. McClellan was, perhaps, a "War Democrat," but his methods involved less than those of many

other "War Democrats" and other varieties of loyal men, and left more to be reconciled afterwards which had always been irreconcilable and always would remain so. That McClellan at the head of the armies, either with or without the backing of the President and all the loyal people of every grade, with his methods exclusively, or with theirs, or all of them combined, could ever have put down the Rebellion is hardly a matter of question in the light of what he did do while he had such golden opportunities.

At last, about the 1st of November, McClellan crossed the Potomac and moved slowly down toward Fredericksburg. But he had now been tried again and again with a patience and tolerance which may challenge the amazement, as well as the admiration of the world, and the President was worn out with him. Neither his duty nor his forbearance, nor the long-suffering country, could stand further test, and late in the night on the 7th of November an order reached him at Rectortown to turn over the command to General Burnside. This is the brief and decisive order:—

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., }
"November 5, 1862."

"GENERAL,—On the receipt of the order of the President sent herewith, you will immediately turn over your command to Major-General Burnside, and repair to Trenton, N. J., reporting on your arrival at that place by telegraph, for further orders.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"W. H. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

"Major-General McCLELLAN."

"WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, }
"WASHINGTON, November 5, 1862. }

"GENERAL ORDERS NO. 132.

"By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take command of that army.

"By order of the Secretary of War.

"E. D. TOWNSEND, Adjutant-General."

This was one of the few important orders to General McClellan which he did not disobey or stop to argue or quibble over, or seek to delay. Still his method of obeying was peculiar to himself, and was hardly in keeping with the character of a temporary "citizen" army, or that of a plain republican General. At all events, it served to throw him into a more prominent attitude of opposition, sharpen the edge of partisan zeal, and prepare the way for the repetition of the skulking and disobedience which disgraced the series of operations under Pope, on the part of officers and men who were willing to put a personal fancy, or even a genuine grievance, above more manly qualities, or the all-absorbing duty of the hour, undivided devotion to the work of conquering the Rebellion.

McClellan at once issued a brief address to the army under him, closing: "We shall ever be comrades in supporting the Constitution of our country and the nationality of its people." The wisdom and goodness of this whole address were questionable. The General now spent three days in getting ready to leave, passing the last day in showing himself in

the melodramatic capacity of bidding farewell to those to whom he said he bore an inexpressible "love and gratitude."

In his speech at the head-quarters of Fitz John Porter he said: "History will do justice to the deeds of the Army of the Potomac, if the present generation does not."

Ah! no. The kind of justice meant in moments of that sort is the work of the political biographer, or the hero-worshiper. It falls beneath the field of history. The historian would certainly have little difficulty in distinguishing between the army and its commanders.

On his way to Trenton, General McClellan passed through Washington without stopping. He knew what had happened, and why, and it was unnecessary to see the President or General Halleck to find out. At Trenton he said he had come among the people "to seek quiet and repose." How could any earnest, energetic-souled patriot seek quiet and repose at such a time? These things were, indeed, not then to be found in America by either the good or the evil. It was said then and at a later period that no reasons were given either to General McClellan or the country for his unceremonious dismissal. No more apparent hypocrisy was ever talked and written than this charge against the Administration. The mention of it to-day would be an insult to intelligent people. It was Lincoln's boundless charity which withheld the reasons. The least said the better it was for this thoroughly and patiently tried, but

incompetent soldier. The careful reader of these pages need not be told why General McClellan was thus relieved of his command, and took no further active part in the war. His "services" can not be reviewed here. He had furnished him the most magnificently equipped and powerful army ever gathered on the continent, and with it could have moved directly from Washington to Richmond, or by way of the Peninsula even, if he had chosen to do so, instead of lying quietly for many weary months on the Potomac. It matters not now to speculate on the reasons which held him back or prevented him giving the decisive blow he was profuse in promising. Without wrong motives, and with some most admirable qualifications, he yet seemed to be so constituted as to render him totally unfit for the times and the work put before him. He was a slow, but good organizer, without traits enabling him to lead a large army in the field, and especially against an earnest and able domestic enemy; and was, perhaps, as destitute of the true elements of greatness in the man or the soldier as any American who has acquired distinction as the leader of a party or the general of an army. His appointment was the greatest calamity which befell the cause of the Union, and which so greatly deepened, if it did not mainly produce, the dark days of the first years of the war.

Dr. Holland, in his "Life of Lincoln," says, in great charity:—

"That General McClellan loved (liked) power, is evident; and it is just as evident that it was not pleasant to

him to share it with any one ; but, on the whole, there is no evidence that he was not a good, well-meaning, and patriotic man. The difficulty was that he was great mainly in his infirmities. He was not a great man, nor a great general. He was a good organizer of military force, and a good engineer ; he was a good theorizer, and wrote good English ; he had that quality of personal magnetism which drew the hearts of his soldiers to him ; but he was not a man of action, of expedients, of quick judgment, of dash and daring, of great, heroic deeds. He was never ready. There were many evidences that he held a theory of his own as to the mode of conducting the war, and that, independently of the Government, he endeavored to pursue it ; but, even if he did, his failure must always be regarded as mainly due to constitutional peculiarities for which he was not responsible."

One of General McClellan's eulogists makes the following foolish statement in speaking of the General's habit of concealing his designs from the President, and commending him for so doing:—

"General McClellan's communications to the President were generally in reply to inquiries or suggestions from the latter, whose restless and meddlesome spirit was constantly moving him to ask questions, obtrude advice, and make comments upon military matters, which were as much out of his sphere as they were beyond his comprehension."

The exact reverse of this was true in every particular. The great mass of the General's communications to the President were demands on his own part, fictitious promises, and highly colored misleading reports which were a source of ridicule to the rebels,

and which were too often not justified by the facts. That the general of an army had the least right to conceal his designs and movements from the President, is too utterly foolish to deserve ridicule. That Mr. Lincoln was always a good judge of the character of a military project may well be doubted. Where is the soldier or civilian whose judgment has always been above criticism? Where Mr. Lincoln's confidence was fixed he seldom or never obtruded his opinion, never out of place; although many of his letters to McClellan on the Peninsula had in them an air of taunting, which must have been vexatious, and were, it seems, at this distance, entirely uncalled for and reprehensible. That Mr. Lincoln was always right as to his methods and views can not be maintained; and the same may be true as to his dealings with McClellan. As to General Halleck it may hardly be necessary to speak. His magisterial habits were notable; some of his theories and orders were inexplicable; and it could hardly be claimed that while he had many causes of complaint against McClellan, the latter had none against him.

The following little letter will show Mr. Lincoln's general method of dealing:—

“WASHINGTON, August 29, 1862, 4.10 P. M.

“Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit: ‘to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,’ is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels.

A. LINCOLN.

“Major-General McCLELLAN.”

* Nothing can more forcibly and truly display Mr. Lincoln's general way of smoothing difficulties, and his excessive charity towards others and lack of it for himself than the following brief and remarkable speech made at a Union meeting in Washington on the sixth day of August, 1862:—

“FELLOW-CITIZENS,—I believe there is no precedent for my appearing before you on this occasion, but it is also true that there is no precedent for your being here yourselves; and I offer, in justification of myself and of you, that, upon examination, I have found nothing in the Constitution against it. I, however, have an impression that there are younger gentlemen who will entertain you better, and better address your understanding than I will or could, and therefore I propose but to detain you a moment longer.

“I am very little inclined on any occasion to say anything unless I hope to produce some good by it. The only thing I think of just now not likely to be better said by some one else, is a matter in which we have heard some other persons blamed for what I did myself. There has been a very wide-spread attempt to have a quarrel between General McClellan and the Secretary of War. Now, I occupy a position that enables me to observe, that these two gentlemen are not nearly so deep in the quarrel as some pretending to be their friends. General McClellan's attitude is such that, in the very selfishness of his nature, he can not but wish to be successful, and I hope he will—and the Secretary of War is in precisely the same situation. If the military commanders in the field can not be successful, not only the Secretary of War, but myself, for the time being the master of them both, can not but be failures. I know General McClellan wishes to be successful, and I know he does not wish it

any more than the Secretary of War for him, and both of them together no more than I wish it. Sometimes we have a dispute about how many men General McClellan has had, and those who would disparage him say that he has had a very large number, and those who would disparage the Secretary of War insist that General McClellan has had a very small number. The basis for this is, there is always a wide difference, and on this occasion, perhaps, a wider one than usual, between the grand total on McClellan's rolls and the men actually fit for duty; and those who would disparage him talk of the grand total on paper, and those who would disparage the Secretary of War talk of those at present fit for duty. General McClellan has sometimes asked for things that the Secretary of War did not give him. General McClellan is not to blame for asking for what he wanted and needed, and the Secretary of War is not to blame for not giving when he had none to give. And I say here, as far as I know, the Secretary of War has withheld no one thing at any time in my power to give him. I have no accusation against him. I believe he is a brave and able man, and I stand here, as justice requires me to do, to take upon myself what has been charged on the Secretary of War, as withholding from him.

"I have talked longer than I expected to do, and now I avail myself of my privilege of saying no more."

The story of General McClellan, the troubles of the Administration in dealing with him, and the effect in the progress of events, constitute one of the most remarkable chapters of American history. Thus believing, I have given the subject that prominence it appeared to deserve, risking as much as possible under the restraints of brevity. Without the remotest care or preference as to General McClellan's politics, and but the most necessary and

scanty concern about doing him or anybody else either justice or wrong, I have written what I have purely with reference to stating as nearly as may be the truths of history, and making the most available inferences therefrom. And I now confess to leaving the subject with a peculiar sense of relief, freed from another burden and incubus, and landing beyond another difficult passage in the long journey whose end I am every day more and more anxious to reach.

CHAPTER XVII.

1863—WAR OF THE REBELLION—GENERAL BURNSIDE—
FREDERICKSBURG—GENERAL HOOKER TRIED—CHAN-
CELLORSVILLE—STONEWALL JACKSON—WHERE NOW
STOOD THE “GOD OF BATTLES?”—GENERAL MEADE
AT THE HEAD OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—
GETTYSBURG—LEE OUTGENERALED.

ON the 8th of November, 1862, without alacrity or confidence, General Burnside assumed command of the Army of the Potomac. The outlook was discouraging enough. The mode of McClellan's departure had placed the army on the verge of political organization, and none but a bold and foolhardy man could have undertaken to lead it, in full view of Pope's experience, without fear of calamitous consequences. But Burnside was a man of action, and was able to place obedience to orders, and duty, above personal considerations or consequences. He selected Fredericksburg as the best point for operations in the direct route to Richmond, and at once set about moving the army down the Rappahannock. Under all the discouragements of the situation he went to work in an energetic and manly way; in the first place organizing his entire force of over a hundred thousand men into three grand divisions under Hooker, Franklin, and Sumner. The selection of these leaders with the exception of the last was,

perhaps, his first serious mistake. Still it would have been difficult at that moment to escape such an error in that great army of splendid fighters but discontented and angry politicians. Lee was soon aware of the designs of the Union General, and at once moved his whole force for the same point. And when Sumner's advance reached Falmouth above Fredericksburg, on the 17th of November, Lee's was there in force enough to drive it back. Burnside had hoped to reach Fredericksburg, and plant himself on the heights with the Rappahannock behind him, before Lee could come down. Even when he did reach the river, his pontoon train had not arrived, and for a day or two of invaluable time, he was delayed on this account. He supposed General Halleck was engaged to have the pontoons at Fredericksburg by the time his army would appear there to use them, and Halleck seemed to think he was attending to that matter himself. Here was another serious mischance and somebody was responsible for it. The two hostile armies were now facing each other, one lying on the heights on the north and the other on the corresponding ridges on the south side of the Rappahannock. It is sufficient here to say that Fredericksburg stands down by the side of the Rappahannock in the deep cut made for that river through an elevated and beautiful plat of country.

It is now easy to see that after the two armies had taken positions on these opposite heights from which hundreds of great guns were ready in a moment to sweep everything from the intervening

valley, the one which was daring enough to enter it first would be the great sufferer. Some time was now spent in preparations, but at last, on the night of the 10th of December, Burnside began to lay his pontoons, and on the 11th and 12th, having driven the rebel sharp-shooters from the town, his army crossed the river. Franklin was on the left, Sumner on the right, and Hooker in the center. Burnside had learned that the rebel army on its right, stretching far down the river, was divided into two wings by an intervening valley, a road cut for the purpose connecting them. Here he planned for his main assault. This was the left of his army, and unfortunately under the command of General William B. Franklin, one of McClellan's favorites. For several hours on the morning of the 13th, the Union army was concealed by a dense fog which filled the narrow valley. But before noon the sun broke out, and the great army moved forward to slaughter and defeat. It was a dreadful day to these brave soldiers, and the tardy night came not too soon to end a hopeless contest. Over eleven hundred of them had been killed, over nine thousand wounded (nearly half of all of them in Sumner's division where the main assault was not to be made), and many were put down as "missing;" so that nearly fourteen thousand were counted as "lost" on the Union side, while the rebel loss was only about five thousand three hundred.

Hooker was opposed to this battle from the outset, and throughout the day acted, to a great extent,

in accordance with his feelings, several times refusing or neglecting to obey the commands of the responsible General. And on the left, where the main battle was to be, Franklin failed entirely to attack in force or to make any determined effort to do the work assigned to him. General Meade succeeded, however, in gaining a favorable position on the rebel right, with five thousand men, according to Burnside's plan of battle, but for want of support was finally beaten back with great loss. As difficult and unwise, perhaps, as was this fruitless battle, it does not appear that Franklin could not have carried out Burnside's plan to the letter; and had he done so, the rebels would have been forced to abandon their entire position on the ridges. Fredericksburg may be set down as one of those unfortunate events in the history of the Army of the Potomac largely due to General McClellan's peculiar discipline. The propriety of going into battle at all without the hearty approval of the officers on whom success mainly depends may be regarded as doubtful, but the want of perfect acquiescence in the plans of a general never can furnish an apology for failure on the part of his subordinates to use the utmost energy and skill to insure success.

On the 14th, General Burnside would have renewed the contest, but meeting the unanimous opposition of his officers, this unwise intention was abandoned. His opportunity was, indeed, gone, although his available force was yet equal to or greater than that of Lee. On the night of the 15th the

Union army was withdrawn without loss in men or property to its former position on the north side of the river. W. H. Taylor, a rebel writer, says that while "this was the most easily won of all the great battles of the war, the allotted task of the Federal soldiers exceeded human endeavor; and no shame to them that, after such courageous conduct, their efforts lacked success."

Burnside soon after these events began to prepare for making another strike at the rebels; but through the treachery of some of his own officers his plans became generally known, and so this was abandoned. In a visit to Washington made at this time he found that some of his officers were discouraging his plans and making serious exciting misrepresentations in letters to the President. About the middle of January he planned another movement which the character of the weather prevented his putting into execution. This was the end of his operations with the Army of the Potomac. He drew up a general order concerning the evil counsels and machinations in his army, dismissing from the service two brigadiers, John Newton and W. T. H. Brooks, and General Hooker, and relieving from further connection with that army W. B. Franklin, W. F. Smith, John Cochrane, and Edward Ferrero, and J. H. Taylor, the latter being a lieutenant-colonel, and the others ranking as major or brigadier generals. Before issuing this order he submitted it to the President, who taking a somewhat different view of the case, and concluding that General Burnside had, perhaps,

reached his highest point of usefulness in the Army of the Potomac, relieved him of the command. Burnside acted in this matter as any honest and right-minded patriot would have done. He had taken the difficult place with reluctance, but did not desire to leave it at that time. And although he asked to be allowed to resign, he nobly and generously concluded to serve in whatever capacity required, considering it his duty to submit to any course deemed best for the country. The fine old soldier, General Edwin Voss Sumner, resigned at this time, and soon afterwards died; and the order relieving General Burnside also took Franklin from the Army of the Potomac. All these things greatly demoralized this army. Desertions were numerous, and if there ever was a time when the claim of the South to superiority on the battle-field was true it was in Virginia at this moment.

On the 26th of January, 1863, General Joseph Hooker assumed the command, and by the 1st of April had, to a great extent, restored the organization and discipline of the Army of the Potomac. But his appointment was a mistake, and tended only to strengthen the conviction that the case of that brave army was hopeless. Discovering that Lee had detached Longstreet to the south side of the James River, reducing his effective force at Fredericksburg to about sixty thousand men, and finding his own army numbering twice as many, Hooker, who really preferred fighting to inaction, believed the time had come for striking the enemy. His plan was to send

General John Sedgwick with his corps to make a feint on the Rappahannock below the town, while the great body of his army should pass up the river out of sight of the rebels, and crossing that stream and the Rapidan, should clear the rebel outposts, open communications with his supplies by the lower fords, and by way of Chancellorsville fall upon Lee's left and rear in position where Burnside had left him. By the night of the 30th of April, he had with commendable skill succeeded in his preparatory movements, locating his head-quarters at the solitary house called Chancellorsville. Up to this time he had carried out his designs to the letter and had outgeneraled Lee, if there could be any virtue in saying such a thing in view of what followed. He had a large cavalry force of ten or twelve thousand men under the general command of George D. Stoneman. With this he hoped to cut Lee's communications with Richmond, and otherwise greatly advance his own plans for the utter ruin of the enemy. It may as well be said here that Stoneman's magnificent opportunity was turned to poor account. A part of his force did, indeed, enter the rebel fortifications near Richmond; and he gathered some booty and a few prisoners, but this fine cavalry corps, more than three times as great as the rebel cavalry, did in the long run little good for their own cause, and little injury to that of the foe. The only favorable thing which can or need be said of Stoneman's part of Hooker's utter failure, is that it was no worse managed and less beneficial to the country than Hooker's own operations.

By the afternoon of May 1st Hooker, with seventy-five thousand men, had reached the open country beyond the dense, broken wood, called the Wilderness, and seemed to be in a fair way to the realization of his highest hopes. But just here his disaster began. He suddenly took the unmilitary notion that the Wilderness was a bad thing to have in his rear, and amidst the protests of Hancock and several other officers, ordered the army back to Chancellorsville, where he issued a bombastic order or address, made of congratulations for the successful achievements of the three preceding days, and boasts as to the destiny awaiting Lee at his hands. Instead of carrying out his original and correct plan of moving on to find and whip the rebels, he now strangely assumed the defensive, and in a poorly selected position at Chancellorsville, awaited to be attacked. He did not have long to wait; for Lee and Jackson, numerically much weaker, taking advantage of the Wilderness, which he so much feared, were preparing to strike him both in front and rear. Leaving ten thousand of his men under Early in the position at Fredericksburg, Lee had set out to meet the Federal army. Contrary to military principles, and sound sense under ordinary circumstances, Lee divided his force, sending twenty-five thousand men under Stonewall Jackson to gain the rear of Hooker's position. Heartily concurring, and concealed by the "Wilderness" in his movement, Jackson succeeded in making his point, and late in the evening, Saturday, May 2d, surprised and utterly routed Howard's whole corps. But the

nature of the ground and tangled woods, and their extraordinary success somewhat demoralized and confused the rebels, and night coming on, they were attacked and repulsed by Sickles and Pleasonton, meeting just after night the greatest misfortune which had yet befallen them on the field, in the death of Stonewall Jackson. Returning with his staff from viewing the ground before him, in the confusion and darkness, he was fired upon by some of A. P. Hill's men, and fell from his horse mortally wounded. In the assault made by the Union troops at this moment he was ridden over, but was subsequently found and carried from the field. On the 10th of May this brave and able soldier died.

That night Hooker made such disposition of his forces as he thought best, and awaited Lee's attack on Sunday morning. By noon he had driven Hooker from his position at Chancellorsville to another nearer the river, and was the victor, notwithstanding his loss of Jackson and his unequal force. By this time Sedgwick, whose activity had not met Hooker's expectations, had crossed the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg and driving Early before him out of the works where Burnside met defeat, and having brought the greater part of Gibbon's division from the camp at Falmouth, was now pushing on with over twenty-five thousand men to strike Lee's rear. Ascertaining this state of affairs, Lee again committed the unsoldierly act of dividing his force to send a part of it against Sedgwick. But what might a daring, wide-awake commander, with a brave and

eager army not do in the face of such generalship as he had yet encountered in the Army of the Potomac? Keeping Hooker, the greater part of whose army had not been brought into action, at bay, Lee turned his attention for the time mainly to Sedgwick, whom he actually whipped and drove across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford on the night of the 4th.

In the meantime Hooker had remained in his position taken when driven from Chancellorsville on Sunday. Tuesday was spent in unimportant skirmishing, but by Wednesday, 6th, Lee, sufficiently recuperated, moved forward to attack Hooker. But under cover of night, the Union army had been withdrawn to the north side of the river; and the battle of Chancellorsville was ended in complete victory to the rebels and the utter failure of all of Hooker's boasted plans. The Army of the Potomac lost in these unfortunate engagements over seventeen thousand men, of whom five thousand were unwounded prisoners. The rebel loss was, perhaps, no more than three or four thousand less, although the rebel authorities systematically misrepresented their losses, or concealed all clues to the facts throughout the war, thus involving this important matter in perpetual obscurity.

On reaching his old camp at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, General Hooker, on the 6th of May, perpetrated the greatest of his insulting farces in the shape of a congratulatory address to the army. He said they had not done all they had set out to do, and it was unnecessary for him to say why, but one

thing was certain, the Army of the Potomac was a profoundly loyal army, was conscious of its strength, and would stand on its record. Lee also put out a congratulatory order to his army, certainly with some good ground of propriety, and quite gallantly gave the credit to the "Only Giver of victory." It was now once more apparent that the Great Jehovah was a rebel, or at any rate that he was on that side, and was the "God of Battles."

Although there appeared an imperative necessity at this time for the rebels to strengthen their hard-pressed armies in the West, they, that is, Jefferson Davis and the few who sided with him and absolutely controlled the affairs of the Rebellion, thought they had the best of reasons for taking a different course. They believed that those in the North who would, in spite of anything, continue to be their friends, were about to gain the political ascendancy, and then nothing could be surer than their independence. The Army of the Potomac was beaten and dispirited, and its officers were political caballers, who would have restored to the leadership the ever unready McClellan, whom the "Opposition" had already determined to run for the Presidency, and himself

"Cautious in the field, he shunned the sword;
A close caballer, and tongue-valiant lord."

The "Northern Copperheads" were busy and hopeful. They were doing all they could in riotous resistance to the Government. The loyal people

were despondent and uncertain. If the rebels could now strike a stunning blow on Northern soil, the advantage would probably be of inestimable value, if not decisive to their cause. It was the auspicious moment for another Northern sortie. And so all other considerations gave way before this, and by the 3d of June, Lee's advance was on its way by the Shenandoah Valley to Pennsylvania.

On the 14th he reached Winchester, where General R. H. Milroy with seven thousand troops was posted. On the following day he captured about half of Milroy's little army, and most of his stores and guns. By the 26th of June, Lee had crossed the Potomac at Shepardstown and Williamsport, a part of his cavalry having been at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, ten days previously.

A. P. Hill's corps had remained for a time at Fredericksburg to watch the movements of Hooker, but had now joined the main force going to the North. The rebels had put forth all their conscription and other resources for this expedition, and the result was the largest and best equipped army they were ever able to send out, numbering in infantry, cavalry, and artillery nearly one hundred thousand men. After Hooker was fully aware of Lee's departure, he desired to cross the Rappahannock and whip Hill, as he readily could have done without much delay in pursuing Lee, but this wise plan Halleck did not approve. On the 26th of June Hooker crossed the Potomac at Edwards's Ferry, and moved on to Frederick, where he resigned the command of

the army to General George G. Meade, and by order of Halleck was directed to proceed to Baltimore and await further instructions. In a little address or order to the army he said that he was impressed with the belief that his usefulness with it had ended. A few days subsequently he was arrested in Washington by General Halleck for leaving Baltimore without permission. Halleck had opposed his appointment to the command of the Army of the Potomac, and his strange conduct and utter failure at Chancellorsville had further convinced the General-in-Chief that Hooker was wholly unfit for such a trust. And in this he was correct, his judgment being that of his countrymen and of history. Hooker's foolish and unpatriotic political aspirations, or supposed aspirations in that way, were also an additional source of offense to Halleck; while Hooker, on his part, charged to Halleck most of his troubles, if not his failure. If Halleck had been in the employ of Jeff Davis, Hooker said he could not have embarrassed him more than he did from the beginning to the end of his command of the army.

About the time that Hooker took this position he was supposed to be under the influence of the Presidential disease, and was accused of thinking that he possessed qualities especially fitting him to be a temporary military dictator. Concerned only about the national success and honor, Mr. Lincoln wrote to him directly about this matter, telling him that he needed to give himself no concern about his political future, that if he conducted himself so as to defeat Lee and

ruin the hopes of the rebels, the loyal people of the country would take care of his interests. The Presidency would be thrust upon him, and he would be one to join in doing him honor. Long before Hooker set out to pursue Lee into Pennsylvania he felt that he had the same difficulties to contend with that brought Pope and Burnside to ruin. Halleck was not the only man in his way. The President had notified him that he feared he was not meeting the earnest co-operation of some of his officers. It was fortunate for the country that the cool, fair-minded, frank Lincoln was at the head of affairs at this trying period. In his early life he had been noted as the fairest of men, and the best judge in their dissensions and difficulties, and now this faculty was daily put to its utmost test, especially in the management of the self-serving political generals in the Army of the Potomac.

On crossing the Potomac, Hooker found eleven thousand men under General W. H. French at Harper's Ferry, and seeing no use of keeping them there, applied to Halleck to be allowed to attach them to his army, which he considered less than Lee's, but Halleck unwisely answered that French must be left on Maryland Heights. This act Hooker took as the pretext for immediately asking for his relief; which was no more than was expected. Meade had not the slightest premonition of what awaited him. He had been one of the most successful officers connected with the Army of the Potomac, but had been quiet, and was not a Presidential aspirant, and, perhaps,

the best evidence there was that he had been any way connected with the disgraceful cabals was in his supposing that the order for him to take command of the army was an order for his arrest. It was a dangerous experiment to change commanders at such a moment, but perhaps no evil came of it.

Meade issued a modest order, and proceeded at once about the work in hand. French was placed under his command at discretion, also the twenty thousand or more militia under Couch at Harrisburg, both of which he left alone, although Hooker had resigned because he could not use French.

A part of the rebel army penetrated Pennsylvania to within thirteen miles of Harrisburg foraging on the country, and levying heavily in money and supplies at York and Carlisle. Lee halted at Chambersburg, and remained there several days, evidently for news from the North. At the same time Alexander H. Stephens made application to visit Washington as a commissioner from Jefferson Davis, but stopped on being notified that "the customary agents and channels are adequate for all needed communications and conferences between the United States forces and the insurgents." The draft riots in New York and Philadelphia were delayed, and Lee, anxious for his communications, became impatient. He now began to fear that the projected uprising in the North was likely to render him little aid. For the want of his cavalry, which he had unwisely sent away, he was poorly informed as to the movements of Meade. On the 29th he ascertained beyond a doubt, that the

Federals were not, as he seemed to expect, awaiting events on the Potomac, but were then close upon him, pressing forward for the passes of South Mountain. Still, if Meade had any plan it did not appear very clear that it embraced a passage through this mountain ridge, an extension of the Blue Ridge, for he was looking for a strong position on Pipe Creek, fifteen miles south of Gettysburg, as if he would be sought there by Lee. While this was the apparent state of the case, by the first day of July, a part of his cavalry and twenty thousand infantry, under Generals John F. Reynolds and O. O. Howard, reached Gettysburg.

This historic town is about ten miles east of South Mountain, occupying an elevated position in the small valley of Rock Creek among some ridges and high hills, fragmentary outposts of South Mountain. One of these ridges, called Seminary Ridge, stretches for several miles north and south on the west of the town; while another, called Cemetery Ridge, shaped like a fish-hook, and having several high points—Culp's Hill, Round Top, and Little Round Top—on it, lies to the south-east of the town. On Cemetery Ridge is the cemetery, and on Seminary Ridge is a theological school.

It had not been Lee's design to fight unless the advantages were evidently on his side. He seemed to have no plan, indeed. He was waiting for something to turn up. What were the miserable Northern allies going to do? Every moment was fatal to him; and he acted throughout as if the demon of destruction

were guiding him. His conduct was daring, but not that of a wise soldier. He had yet not learned that one man was equal to one man under proper generalship. And when, at last, he heard without the use of his cavalry that Meade was pressing on after him, he ordered all his army to concentrate at Gettysburg, and came down there to fight a battle, which it was really his policy to avoid. Under the pretense of generalship no raid or expedition of the war was so complete a failure as this. But in another chapter a glance will be taken at General Lee as a soldier.

Before noon on the 1st of July the Union cavalry, under General J. Buford, met Hill's advance on the Chambersburg Road, west of Gettysburg. Buford made a stout effort to check the rebels until Reynolds, who had already reached the town, should come to his aid across Seminary Ridge. Howard's corps was also not far in the rear, making this advance force of Meade's army about twenty thousand strong. Reynolds attacked the rebels with vigor, but at the very outset received a shot in the neck which "ended his life." Abner Doubleday, an able officer, immediately succeeded to the command of the 1st corps, and Howard now came up with his corps, taking command of the field. At first the conflict was in favor of the Union forces, but this could not last. From Chambersburg, York, and Carlisle the rebels poured down, and before the middle of the afternoon Howard was whipped and pressed back over Seminary Ridge, and through Gettysburg, taking a position in the cemetery on Cemetery Ridge, in which, strangely enough,

he was not disturbed the rest of the evening or that night. Nearly half of Howard's force had been lost, and at four o'clock Lee had at Gettysburg forty or fifty thousand men. He could have surrounded Howard and captured or killed his whole remaining force before night. Longstreet was tardy, and Lee wanted his whole army; so further operations were put off until the next day. No soldier ever made a more glaring mistake. He said he did not know the strength of the Union army on the heights before him. He certainly knew with what force he had been fighting, and it was an amazing thing if one of the numerous prisoners he had taken could not be found to tell that Meade with four-fifths of his army was fifteen miles away. The absence of his cavalry was not an apology for his not knowing that while he waited for Longstreet, Meade would not be idle.

It was one o'clock before Meade knew of what was going on at Gettysburg. But he must have supposed the rebel General meant to go out of his way to fight him, or he would not have been searching for a "strong position," at the same time exposing one-fifth of his army to be overwhelmed without the possibility of succor. General W. S. Hancock was sent on to take command at Gettysburg, who, thinking well of the position, urged Meade to bring forward the whole army, and continue the battle on Cemetery Ridge. At midnight Meade arrived, and by day-break on the morning of the 2d all the Union army, but Sedgwick's corps, had come up and taken position, and a hundred cannons on

Cemetery Ridge were ready to begin the work of slaughter. The relative situation of the two armies was very much as it had been at Fredericksburg, the attacking force being compelled to pass the intermediate valley swept by hostile guns. The rebel army extended along the broken Seminary Ridge for three or four miles, with a gap of a mile between two of its corps. Longstreet was on the extreme right and really overlapping the Union left. This unfortunate position of the Federal army rendered it liable to be turned at any time; but the rebel General either thought himself too powerful to use the advantage, or did not know that he could do so. He was under the impression that he only had to move forward and complete the task he had so auspiciously begun the day before. He was still without his cavalry, and, with some claim to the respectability of his opinion, held that he could not know that an army equal at least in numbers and bravery to his own was concealed behind the crest of Cemetery Ridge. The day, however, wore away before he could see his opportunity and was ready to strike. Sickles had been ordered with his corps to take a position in the fields between the two ridges on the Union left, with his own right continuing the line at Little Round Top, but in his eagerness to fight had pushed forward some distance, where Meade failed to discover him until the middle of the afternoon. This fatal error it was then too late to correct, although Sickles began the attempt. Lee had also discovered this blunder and at once began a furious

cannonade preparatory to the movement of his assaulting force. The struggle was desperate, but when the day closed slavery was not master. General Sickles had been wounded and in his corps the Union loss was very great. Longstreet had discovered how easily he could command Meade's position from Little Round Top, and sent Hood to occupy it, but he was unsuccessful. The brave General G. K. Warren had made the same discovery, and was there before him. Here there was a desperate conflict, and had the rebels gained this high point in Cemetery Ridge the day would have been theirs. Still they had pressed in this end of the Union line, and held a part of Culp's Hill, at the other. And so the day ended in a way to lure the rebel commander further on in the idea that he yet had the advantage, and would to-morrow reap all its benefits in a final effort.

Culp's Hill, the extreme right of the Union line had been weakened in the struggle for Little Round Top, but in the night the troops withdrawn were returned to that point in the line, and at dawn on the 3d, after a fight of an hour or two, the rebels were driven from the position they had gained the evening before. And so matters stood until after noon.

Sedgwick had arrived before the battle of the 2d, and that night Lee's cavalry had come in, also his last infantry division. From one o'clock to three the rebels kept up an incessant artillery fire, until Lee thought he had silenced most of the Federal

guns, which had been stopped, however, to free the atmosphere of smoke to observe better the movements of the attacking column to come next.

Strangely enough when this grand column of brave men started toward the well-posted Union army their own supporting cannonade was stopped, and not renewed. General Lee had made the fatal discovery when it was too late that his ammunition was nearly exhausted. The main assault was directed against the center of the Federal position, thus giving full play to the Federal guns from the greater part of the line, which Lee now found to his amazement he had not silenced. But onward pressed his veteran troops. Some of them actually gained the heights, driving the Federals momentarily before them, but where in a hand-to-hand conflict they were overcome. Regiment after regiment threw down its arms and rushed forward to surrender. Others were cut down, and, scattered and broken, the remnant sought safety in the woods on Seminary Ridge. The great battle of Gettysburg was ended. The last rebel sortie had failed. Lee and his invincible army had confidently met an equal number of Federal troops under an untried and unpretending officer, and been whipped. And the hope of the Northern "Copperheads" had been crushed forever.

Nearly three thousand of the Union troops were killed, nearly fourteen thousand wounded, and about six thousand missing. And about five thousand rebels were killed, twenty thousand wounded and about ten thousand unwounded taken prisoners, and

the greater part of their wounded fell into the hands of the Federals.

On the night of the 4th Lee withdrew, and although French had destroyed the greater part of his pontoon train, Meade made a weak pursuit, and finally allowed Lee to escape across the Potomac. On the 18th of July the Union army again entered Virginia, passing over oft-trodden grounds to the historic Rappahannock.

Although in the next four or five months several severe fights occurred in this region, and the cavalry was quite active, if not always successful or wisely handled, yet with the battle of Gettysburg the Army of the Potomac ended its decisive work for the year 1863. A part of it was sent to the West, as was also a part of Lee's rebels, and for a time the attention of the country was turned to the stirring events in that direction. A new era in the history of the Army of the Potomac was about to begin. Up to this time it had merely held its own against the Army of Northern Virginia, as the rebel army was called. There had been no brilliant generalship displayed on either side, no successful strategy to touch the eulogist's pen. In vain may the candid reader and student hope to find the elements of pride and admiration in the history of the war in Virginia up to this period. The general picture only startles regret and sorrow.

CHAPTER XVIII.

1863—WAR OF THE REBELLION—THE WEST—VICKSBURG—
PORT HUDSON—THE MISSISSIPPI OPENED—CHICKA-
MAUGA—CHATTANOOGA—LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN—BAT-
TLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS—BURNSIDE AT KNOXVILLE—
MINOR EVENTS—NEGRO SOLDIERS—FORT PILLOW—
GILLMORE AT FORT SUMTER—MISSOURI—THE IN-
DIANS—THE NAVY—ENGLAND HUMILIATED—PROUD
MISTRESS OF THE SEA?

AT the beginning of this year Rosecrans, with the Army of the Cumberland, was at Murfreesboro, facing towards Chattanooga; and the Army of the Tennessee, as Grant's command was at this time called, was on the Mississippi, with Vicksburg as its objective point. Although diverted from his original plan for the capture of Vicksburg and the complete overthrow of the rebel power on the Mississippi, as shown in a former chapter, Grant now set to work to accomplish his purpose by way of the great river itself, without any definite plan. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that all his early plans failed, and dropping one he fell upon another, until he did, at last, gain his purpose in a system of daring and vigorous operations, which met the enthusiastic applause of his countrymen. The position of Vicksburg was naturally strong, and the rebels had exhausted their efforts to make it another of

their Gibraltars of the West. Besides its occupying one of the boldest and most elevated sites on the Lower Mississippi, it was surrounded by a network of marshes, impassable bayous, and swampy and impenetrable forests. The fortifications extended several miles along the Mississippi, quite effectively blockading it, and were held by about twenty-five thousand troops, under John C. Pemberton, a vain soldier, but by no means able to cope with his daring foe, a man who recognized no creed but success. Pemberton was under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, who was watching Rosecrans from Chattanooga and Tullahoma, but unfortunately for his cause, he paid little regard, especially when hard pressed, to the superior wisdom of Johnston.

Early abandoning the idea of operating against Vicksburg by the river, or on the north, Grant began to devise means of getting his army to the south of it. Farragut had twice run the gauntlet of the batteries, but it did not, unfortunately, occur to Grant, until he had had some dear experience, that this could be done again. After spending several months in an attempt to change the channel of the Mississippi, thus neutralizing Vicksburg by rendering it an inland town, and in otherwise trying to open a water communication to the South on the west side, as well as in trying to reach the rebel position by opening a way to the head-waters of the Yazoo, he tried the experiment of running the batteries with his gunboats and transports, and succeeded so well

as to determine at once to transfer his whole army, then about thirty thousand strong, to the south of Vicksburg.

Toward the last of March, 1863, his troops began to move from Milliken's Bend on a circuitous and difficult route through Arkansas, first designing to strike the river and cross it at New Carthage. But by reason of the broken levee and flooded condition of the country, the march was continued down to Hard Times, opposite Grand Gulf, and the crossing was finally effected without opposition at Bruinsburg, a little farther below, on the last day of April. Sherman had been left above to make a diversion with his whole corps on the Yazoo in favor of this daring movement, and having accomplished his object, and completely bewildering Pemberton as to the real designs of his determined foes, he hastened with all possible speed through Arkansas to overtake Grant.

On the 17th of April, General B. H. Grierson, with a thousand cavalymen, set out to ride six hundred miles from La Grange, Tennessee, on the Mississippi, to Baton Rouge, going to the east of all of Pemberton's forces, and destroying his communications, telegraph lines, mills, magazines, manufactories, and so forth. This task Grierson performed to the consternation and amazement of the country, and the satisfaction of his chief. Having gained his hold on the east side of the river, on the 1st of May, Grant set out to execute the remainder of his now definite, daring, and brilliant plan. Eight miles out, near Port Gibson, the rebels were met under General J. S.

Bowen, and defeated with considerable loss. That night they withdrew from Grand Gulf, and at that point Grant at once fixed his temporary base of supplies on the river. He was now forced to await until the 8th before Sherman could overtake him. He now struck for the railroad in the rear of Vicksburg, captured Jackson, the State Capital, turned upon Pemberton, and after severe engagements at Champion's Hill, Big Black River, and other points, by the 19th had driven Pemberton into his fortifications at Vicksburg and pretty thoroughly sealed him up. He had long ago cut loose from Grand Gulf, with a view of opening communications with his depots of supplies above Vicksburg after its capture or investment. This feat he now readily performed. However distasteful such a course was to Grant, he now saw that he must settle down to a regular siege. He called in all the spare forces from his own department, and the authorities at Washington gave every aid possible, so that his total strength reached seventy thousand men, and was great enough to resist any force Johnston might bring upon his rear. At the outset he had made two or three unsuccessful attempts to carry the place by storm, and by the first of July he was ready to try the experiment again. Johnston was then approaching from Canton after weeks of delay, and although Grant had Sherman, with an equal force, watching the rebel movements, he became more and more anxious to finish the work before him. In his own army there had not been perfect harmony. To correct this difficulty

he had been compelled to relieve General John A. McClernand, a really patriotic and able soldier, but pestiferous politician, who never could lose sight of the game of "personal honors." Over the country there had been loud complaint, and Grant's incapacity was a general theme when one failure after another was reported of his attempts to open a new channel for the Mississippi. Donelson and Shiloh had been hair-breadth escapes, and the country neither knew nor had confidence in General Grant. From the beginning he thought little of any scheme for the capture of Vicksburg by the river which was not laid on its southern or eastern side. The advantages of returning to the interior to operate upon its rear, according to his original design after the dispersion of Beauregard's army from Corinth, were not now apparent. And when he had performed the unique and unparalleled feat which placed him in the rear of Vicksburg with his communications established above it on the river, the certainty of his success was not proved, and the country was still clamorous. At all events, admiration for his performance died out in the unexpected delay which followed. While Grant was not, perhaps, unmindful of these things, one thing stood above them all and was supreme with him, the conquest of the rebels and establishment of the power of the Government.

The certain sound of victory had scarcely shot over the Nation from Gettysburg on the 4th of July, when the whole country was electrified by the news which came up with the speed of lightning from

Vicksburg. On that auspicious day the power of the Rebellion had crumbled away on the Mississippi. Grant had made preparations for a final assault on the 5th. Pemberton saw what the result would be, and having abandoned all hope of succor from Johnston, although that General was at that very moment trying to notify him that he was moving as rapidly as he could with a view of so occupying Grant's strength as to enable him to cut his way out of the trouble into which he had got by inability and disobedience, notified Grant that he was ready to arrange the terms for surrender. At three o'clock on the third day of July the two commanders met, and Pemberton proposed the appointment of commissioners to negotiate upon the terms of surrender. This political trick was ever uppermost with rebel generals, and no loyal soldier was ever more averse to listening to it a moment than was General Grant. He declined, and then listened patiently and without a sign of irritation to Pemberton's display of ill-humor and discourtesy until he saw fit to end the meeting by an offer to put his terms in writing. And so at ten o'clock on the morning of the 4th of July Vicksburg surrendered to General Grant.

Besides the munitions of war over twenty-five thousand men, well, wounded, and sick rebel soldiers, were surrendered at Vicksburg. This was, perhaps, the most brilliant campaign of the war, furnishing more of the elements worthy of general admiration and less of the conditions of military criticism. But it had not been without cost. What did General

Grant ever do which was not at great cost? Nearly a thousand lives had been lost, over seven thousand had been wounded, and five hundred were missing. Still, considering the great work done, this was all exceedingly moderate in comparison with the bloody and undecisive conflicts of the Army of the Potomac.

N. P. Banks, who had succeeded to the command of the Department of the Gulf, and who had been moving about with unvarying successes up to this time, with a view of co-operating with Grant, had laid siege to Port Hudson, between Baton Rouge and Vicksburg. When the latter place fell, the rebel commander at Port Hudson seeing the uselessness of further resistance, surrendered that place, with all its property and ten thousand soldiers, to Banks on the 9th of July. The small rebel forces at Helena, Arkansas, and other points on the river were also immediately broken up, and the Mississippi was open from one end to the other as a national highway, and the weak western end of the rebel section severed from the main body. The following characteristic letter from Mr. Lincoln may appropriately stand at this point:—

“EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
“July 13, 1863. }

“Major-General GRANT:—

“MY DEAR GENERAL,—I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable service you have done the country. I write to say a word further. When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you finally did—march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below; and I never had any faith,

except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition, and the like, could succeed. When you got below, and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks; and when you turned northward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment, that you were right and I was wrong.

Yours truly,

“A. LINCOLN.”

The events which have just been briefly mentioned greatly changed the current of feeling in the North. The darkest point had been passed. The riotous spirit was suppressed, and emancipation began to be the accepted policy of the loyal people as well as of the Administration. So pleased was Mr. Lincoln, who was now, to all appearances, fast becoming pious in a really old-fashioned orthodox way, that about the middle of July, thinking the circumstances justified it, he issued a proclamation, setting apart the 6th of August as a day of “thanksgiving, praise, and prayer.” He said: “It is meet and right to recognize and confess the presence of the Almighty Father, and the power of his hand equally in these triumphs and these sorrows.” This proclamation and the similar one, so soon following on its heels early in October, as well as later matters of this kind, will be noticed again in the chapter on Mr. Lincoln’s “religion.”

After the battle of Murfreesboro or Stone River General Rosecrans remained comparatively quiet until the middle of the following summer. The necessity for this long inaction in the Army of the

Cumberland does not more clearly appear at this day than it did then. However the case may have been, it was after the middle of June, 1863, before Rosecrans moved towards Chattanooga. His army was over fifty thousand strong, and the rebel army, under Bragg, at Tullahoma, was, perhaps, equally large. Still General Bragg retired as the Federals advanced, nor did he see fit to halt long at Chattanooga. His disposition to run misled Rosecrans into the belief that he was not willing to fight.

At Lafayette, twenty-five miles south-east of Chattanooga, Bragg began to gather re-enforcements and concentrate, and watch his opportunity to strike the incautious and misled Federal commander, who was wildly dividing his army in the pursuit. At last, however, becoming somewhat doubtful of the purpose of the rebel General, Rosecrans began to concentrate his scattered army in the valley of the Chickamauga, between Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Mountain, two of the many mountain ridges lying west and south of Chattanooga. At this period Longstreet was started with his corps from Virginia to re-enforce Bragg, and every exertion was made at Richmond to gather an army which would be able to annihilate Rosecrans. At last Bragg turned upon his pursuers, and on the 18th of September the hostile armies were facing each other, with Chickamauga Creek between them. On that day Longstreet arrived, and during the night Bragg crossed the creek with at least thirty thousand of his troops. At ten o'clock General George H. Thomas, occupying the left of the Federal line,

discovering what he supposed to be a small, isolated rebel force on the west side of the creek, sent to cut it off, and the battle of Chickamauga began. This day was spent in a fruitless effort on the part of Bragg to turn the left of the Union line with a view of getting in its rear, and night ended the conflict with no very certain indications of what the to-morrow would bring. With unbroken line Rosecrans held his position, which, especially on Thomas's front, was considerably strengthened by breastworks during the night. Late on the morning of the 20th the battle was renewed by a fierce and determined assault on Thomas. About midday, in Rosecrans's efforts to thwart the enemy's design on his left, General Thomas J. Wood mistaking his order to close up, withdrew from his position in the line, leaving a gap into which Longstreet sent his forces with great impetuosity. This was the turning point of the conflict. Rosecrans and the whole left of his army were driven back and dispersed. Rosecrans lost his coolness and presence of mind, and not knowing that his entire army was not broken to pieces, did not himself stop until he reached Chattanooga. But half of the Union army had gathered around Thomas, who fought on and held his position until night, when he crept away, unpursued, to Chattanooga. The Union losses in this great battle were over sixteen thousand, in killed, wounded, and missing—over one-tenth of them being killed. The rebel losses were not less, and, perhaps, a thousand or two more. Rosecrans now fortified himself at Chattanooga, but his com-

munications were soon broken, to a great extent, by his more powerful enemy, and every day made his situation more desperate.

About the middle of October Grant was put in command of the three departments between the Alleghany Mountains and the Mississippi, and sent to Chattanooga, and Rosecrans was directed to turn over the command of the Army of the Cumberland to General Thomas. Through the persuasions of Secretary Stanton, the President submitted to detaching two corps from the Army of the Potomac, and sending these under General Hooker to aid in opening communications to Chattanooga, and raising the army there to fighting strength.

Toward the close of March, 1863, Burnside had been placed in command of what was termed the Department of the Ohio, and in August marched with an army of fifteen thousand men from Kentucky into East Tennessee. General S. B. Buckner, the rebel commander in that region, retreated before him, or rather went, according to his orders, to join Bragg at Chattanooga. Burnside fortified himself strongly at Knoxville, and occupied his army in small detachments, which, in their attempts to clear the country of rebels, were occasionally whipped, instead of going to the aid of Rosecrans, as the authorities at Washington expected him to do.

The ablest military head in the Nation, as it turned out, was now in command of all this western region, and the good results of the arrangement were soon apparent. On the 19th of October, 1863, Grant

telegraphed from Louisville to Thomas to hold out at all hazards. The answer he received was, "I will do so till we starve." That was the ring to inspire an able and determined commander. On the 23d Grant was at Chattanooga, and after a reconnoissance on the following morning, fixed upon his plan of operations. The rebel army occupied the northern declivity and crest of Lookout Mountain and the whole western declivity and crest of Missionary Ridge, as well as the intervening narrow valley of Chattanooga Creek. The north end of Lookout Mountain to the south of Chattanooga points well up to the Moccasin or great bend in the Tennessee River, and Missionary Ridge overlapping this point on its south extends north and south up the river some distance above Chattanooga, to the eastward of that city, all of these historic mountain elevations and the city itself being south or east of the Tennessee. Lookout Mountain commanded the river opposite the Moccasin peninsula or great bend; and from the north end of Missionary Ridge to the river, and some distance up it, extended a strong rebel picket-line. The rebel pickets also extended from Lookout Mountain along the river some distance below Raccoon Mountain. The Union picket-line stretched along several miles above and below Chattanooga, but on the west and north side of the river. In front of Chattanooga, facing Missionary Ridge in a semicircle, with one end on the river above and the other on the river below the town, lay the main body of the Union force, strongly intrenched, when

Grant took command. On the right and left of Thomas, who occupied this semicircle, Grant formed his right and left; Hooker with his twenty-three thousand, or its equivalent, from the Army of the Potomac, was to cross the river at Bridgeport, move up, carry Lookout Mountain, and form the right wing; and Sherman, who was making his way through the country from the Mississippi, was to cross the river above the town, and form the left wing of the army.

In the meantime the rebel authorities, greatly against the better judgment of Bragg, had forced him to detach twelve or fifteen thousand of his men under Longstreet to East Tennessee, who had beaten Burnside's scattered troops and besieged him in his fortifications at Knoxville. Grant became very anxious and impatient about the relief of Burnside, but notified him that he must hold out until Bragg was whipped. Not until the 23d of November did Sherman get up, and the movements for the battle of Chattanooga begin. On that night and the following morning Sherman succeeded in crossing the river on Thomas's left flank, and before dark on the 24th had driven everything before him and firmly secured the whole north end of Missionary Ridge. On this day "Old Hooker" took his grandest stride in the race for military glory. By early morning Hooker had crossed the river, capturing the rebel pickets, or driving them before him, and long before night had cleared the rugged and furrowed north slope of Lookout Mountain, and the plateau above. A light rain

had set in in the morning, and throughout the day mist and cloud concealed the actors in this wonderful exploit from the army in the valley. Only the crash of the arms and the flashes of fire could give any clew to the progress of Hooker. It was, indeed, a battle above the clouds. The night came on, and the sky cleared, and the clouds passed from the valley, and still Hooker struggled around the rugged mountain side. But now the fires kindled by his reserves, and the flashes of his muskets plainly told the anxious watchers below what he was doing. Shout after shout for Jo Hooker swept over the valley; and when the morning of the 25th broke Hooker's left rested on Thomas's right, just as had been designed, and the rebels had not only been driven from Lookout Mountain, but also from the valley of the Chattanooga to Missionary Ridge, and the flag of the Union floated in the breeze on the summit of Lookout Mountain. The rebel army was now pressed in on Missionary Ridge, with Hooker ready to move on its left and Sherman already grasping its right flank. Everything had worked as if the will of the master alone had been consulted, and Grant never had had such good reasons for feeling that he would be master at the end.

In the morning of the 25th Hooker swept on across the valley, being several hours delayed in getting over Chattanooga Creek, and when night came had driven the enemy from the side and summit of the south end of Missionary Ridge, having captured several thousands, and driven others into the embrace

of Thomas, done all that he had been commanded to do, and stopped because the enemy had disappeared.

Early in the morning Sherman had renewed the battle on the left, and soon extending his line around the ridge into Chickamauga Valley threatening the rebel communications, attracted Bragg's attention, who hurled his main strength against him.

From Orchard Knob in the center of his line Grant saw every movement, and when Sherman had accomplished just what he had desired, caused the rebel General to weaken his center for the support of his right and line of communications, he moved forward his center, and Thomas was soon engaged in a desperate struggle up the side of Missionary Ridge. The nature of the ground and the deadly fire against them soon broke up the lines, and in fragments and masses his men climbed the furrowed slope. The summit was gained, and here the battle became a hand-to-hand conflict. On came Thomas's enthusiastic masses. Bragg saw that the day was lost, and with his fleeing army rushed down the east side of the ridge. The wonderful battle of Chattanooga was over, the most brilliant of the war.

The pursuit of Bragg was begun on the morning of the 26th, but this amounted to little, only that Hooker in his impatience fell upon the rebels at Ringgold, Georgia, and was severely repulsed. The entire Union loss in the Chattanooga campaign was nearly six thousand, less than eight hundred being killed. The rebel loss was about ten thousand, over six thousand being prisoners.

Sherman was at once started to Knoxville, which he reached early in December, compelling Longstreet to retreat toward Virginia; and having thus relieved Burnside he marched back to Chattanooga.

A vast number of more or less important minor engagements took place in this year, and up to the end of the war, on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, in West Virginia, in Kentucky, Tennessee, and in Missouri, and other parts of the trans-Mississippi region, of which little need be said in this work. While the result of the war would have been the same without any of these numerous lesser events, they all played some part in the grand total, if no more than to aid in the solution of the general question of endurance and exhaustion. Many of them were quite brilliant on both sides, and deserving of record in a detailed history of the more appalling features of a bloody war, if it may not be morally questionable whether bloody, wicked, or wrong events should ever be perpetuated in the history of mankind, or made a part of the story of a people.

In 1863 General Q. A. Gillmore took possession of Morris Island, captured Fort Wagner in Charleston Harbor, and battered down Fort Sumter in the most wonderful bombardment the world ever heard, perhaps.

In Missouri the Administration had great difficulty in the management of political affairs. Two loyal factions arose, which never could be harmonized. In the spring of 1863 the President removed General Curtis, who sided with one of the factions. From the

following lines it may readily be seen how annoying Missouri difficulties had become to Mr. Lincoln :—

“Your dispatch of to-day is just received. It is very painful to me that you, in Missouri, can not, or will not, settle your factional quarrel among yourselves. I have been tormented with it beyond endurance, for months, by both sides. Neither side pays the least respect to my appeals to your reason. I am now compelled to take hold of the case.

A. LINCOLN.”

The President then sent this letter to General Schofield, which soon got into print:—

“EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
“ May 27, 1863. }

“General J. M. SCHOFIELD:—

“DEAR SIR,—Having removed General Curtis, and assigned you to the command of the Department of the Missouri, I think it may be of some advantage to me to state to you why I did it. I did not remove General Curtis because of my full conviction that he had done wrong by commission or omission. I did it because of a conviction in my mind that the Union men of Missouri, constituting, when united, a vast majority of the people, have entered into a persistent, factious quarrel among themselves, General Curtis, perhaps not of choice, being the head of one faction, and Governor Gamble that of the other. After months of labor to reconcile the difficulty, it seemed to grow worse and worse, until I felt it my duty to break it up somehow, and as I could not remove Governor Gamble, I had to remove General Curtis. Now that you are in the position, I wish you to undo nothing merely because General Curtis or Governor Gamble did it, but to exercise your own judgment, and do right for the public interest. Let your military measures be strong enough to repel the invaders and keep the peace, and not

so strong as to unnecessarily harass and persecute the people. It is a difficult *rôle*, and so much greater will be the honor if you perform it well. If both factions, or neither, shall abuse you, you will probably be about right. Beware of being assailed by one and praised by the other.

“Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.”

But General Schofield failed to give satisfaction, and the trouble went on. The Radicals wanted the President to send Fremont or Ben Butler to take charge of affairs in that State. In August, 1863, Quantrell, who was called a guerrilla, entered Lawrence, Kansas, in the night, with a band of followers, murdered nearly a hundred and fifty of the citizens, and burned nearly two hundred houses. All Germans and negroes, especially, were killed, who could be found by the murderers. The action Schofield took in this affair greatly displeased the Germans, who were disposed to be dissatisfied with everybody who failed to take the course they would have chosen for him.

In the following characteristic, if not wholly dignified, letter, Mr. Lincoln sets out the case with sufficient interest to give it a place here as a picture of many of the difficulties under which he labored:—

“EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
“October, 5, 1863. }

“HON. CHARLES DRAKE and Others, Committee:—

“GENTLEMEN,—Your original address, presented on the 30th ult., and the four supplementary ones presented on the 3d inst., have been carefully considered. I hope you will regard the other duties claiming my attention, together with the great length and importance of these documents, as constituting a sufficient apology for my not having responded sooner.

"These papers, framed for a common object, consist of the things demanded, and the reasons for demanding them.

"The things demanded are:—

"*First.* That General Schofield shall be relieved, and General Butler be appointed as Commander of the Military Department of Missouri.

"*Second.* That the system of enrolled militia in Missouri may be broken up, and national forces be substituted for it; and,

"*Third.* That at elections, persons may not be allowed to vote who are not entitled by law to do so.

"Among the reasons given, enough of suffering and wrong to Union men, is certainly, and I suppose truly, stated. Yet the whole case, as presented, fails to convince me that General Schofield, or the enrolled militia, is responsible for that suffering and wrong. The whole can be explained on a more charitable, and, as I think, a more rational hypothesis.

"We are in civil war. In such cases there always is a main question; but in this case that question is a perplexing compound—Union and slavery. It thus becomes a question not of two sides merely, but of at least four sides, even among those who are for the Union, saying nothing of those who are against it. Thus, those who are for the Union *with*, but not *without slavery*; those for it *without* but not *with*; those for it *with* or *without*, but prefer it *with*; and those for it *with* or *without*, but prefer it *without*.

"Among these, again, is a subdivision of those who are for *gradual*, but not for *immediate*, and those who are for *immediate*, but not for *gradual*, extinction of slavery.

"It is easy to conceive that all these shades of opinion and even more, may be sincerely entertained by honest and truthful men. Yet all being for the Union, by reason of these differences each will prefer a different way of sustaining the Union. At once, sincerity is questioned, and motives are assailed. Actual war coming, blood grows hot, and blood is spilled. Thought is forced from old channels into confusion. Deception breeds and thrives. Confidence dies, and universal suspicion reigns. Each man feels an impulse to kill his neighbor, lest he be killed by him. Revenge and retaliation follow. And all this, as before said, may be among honest men only. But this

is not all. Every foul bird comes abroad, and every dirty reptile rises up. These add crime to confusion. Strong measures deemed indispensable but harsh at best, such men make worse by maladministration. Murders for old grudges, and murders for pelf, proceed under any cloak that will best serve for the occasion.

"These causes amply account for what has occurred in Missouri, without ascribing it to the weakness or wickedness of any general. The newspaper files, those chroniclers of current events, will show that the evils now complained of were quite as prevalent under Fremont, Hunter, Halleck, and Curtis, as under Schofield. If the former had greater force opposed to them, they also had greater force with which to meet it. When the organized rebel army left the State, the main Federal force had to go also, leaving the department commander at home, relatively no stronger than before. Without disparaging any, I affirm with confidence, that no commander of that department has, in proportion to his means, done better than General Schofield.

"The first specific charge against General Schofield is, that the enrolled militia was placed under his command, whereas it had not been placed under the command of General Curtis. The fact is, I believe, true; but you do not point out, nor can I conceive, how that did, or could, injure loyal men or the Union cause.

"You charge that General Curtis being superseded by General Schofield, Franklin A. Dick was superseded by James O. Broadhead as Provost-Marshal-General. No very specific showing is made as to how this did or could injure the Union cause. It recalls, however, the condition of things, as presented to me, which led to a change of commander of that department.

"To restrain contraband intelligence and trade, a system of searches, seizures, permits, and passes, had been introduced, I think, by General Fremont. When General Halleck came, he found and continued the system, and added an order, applicable to some parts of the State, to levy and collect contributions from noted rebels, to compensate losses, and relieve destitution caused by the Rebellion. The action of General Fremont and General Halleck, as stated, constituted a sort of system which

General Curtis found in full operation when he took command of the department. That there was a necessity for something of the sort was clear; but that it could only be justified by stern necessity, and that it was liable to great abuse in administration, was equally clear. Agents to execute it, contrary to the great prayer, were led into temptation. Some might, while others would not, resist that temptation. It was not possible to hold any to a very strict accountability; and those yielding to the temptation, would sell permits and passes to those who would pay most and most readily for them; and would seize property and collect levies in the aptest way to fill their own pockets. Money being the object, the man having money, whether loyal or disloyal, would be a victim. This practice doubtless existed to some extent, and it was a real additional evil that it could be, and was, plausibly charged to exist in greater extent than it did.

“When General Curtis took command of the department. Mr. Dick, against whom I never knew anything to allege, had general charge of this system. A controversy in regard to it rapidly grew into almost unmanageable proportions. One side ignored the *necessity* and magnified the evils of the system, while the other ignored the evils and magnified the necessity; and each bitterly assailed the other. I could not fail to see that the controversy enlarged in the same proportion as the professed Union men there distinctly took sides in two opposing political parties. I exhausted my wits, and very nearly my patience also, in efforts to convince both that the evils they charged on each other were inherent in the case, and could not be cured by giving either party a victory over the other.

“Plainly, the irritating system was not to be perpetual; and it was plausibly urged that it could be modified at once with advantage. The case could scarcely be worse, and whether it could be made better could only be determined by a trial. In this view, and not to ban or brand General Curtis, or to give a victory to any party, I made the change of commander for the department. I now learn that soon after this change Mr. Dick was removed, and that Mr. Broadhead, a gentleman of no less good character, was put in the place. The mere fact of this change is more distinctly complained of than is

any conduct of the new officer, or other consequences of the change.

“I gave the new commander no instructions as to the administration of the system mentioned, beyond what is contained in the private letter afterward surreptitiously published, in which I directed him to act solely for the public good, and independently of both parties. Neither anything you have presented me, nor anything I have otherwise learned, has convinced me that he has been unfaithful to his charge.

“Imbecility is urged as one cause for removing General Schofield, and the late massacre at Lawrence, Kansas, is pressed as evidence of that imbecility. To my mind that fact scarcely tends to prove the proposition. That massacre is only an example of what Grierson, John Morgan, and many others, might have repeatedly done on their respective raids, had they chosen to incur the personal hazard, and possessed the fiendish hearts to do it.

“The charge is made that General Schofield, on purpose to protect the Lawrence murderers, would not allow them to be pursued into Missouri. While no punishment could be too sudden or too severe for those murderers, I am well satisfied that the preventing of the threatened remedial raid into Missouri was the only way to avoid an indiscriminate massacre there, including probably more innocent than guilty. Instead of condemning, I therefore approve what I understand General Schofield did in that respect.

“The charge that General Schofield has purposely withheld protection from loyal people, and purposely facilitated the objects of the disloyal, are altogether beyond my power of belief. I do not arraign the veracity of gentlemen as to the facts complained of; but I do more than question the judgment which would infer that these facts occurred in accordance with the purposes of General Schofield.

“With my present views, I must decline to remove General Schofield. In this I decide nothing against General Butler. I sincerely wish it were convenient to assign him a suitable command.

“In order to meet some existing evils, I have addressed a letter of instruction to General Schofield, a copy of which I

inclose to you. As to the 'enrolled militia,' I shall endeavor to ascertain, better than I now know, what is its exact value. Let me now say, however, that your proposal to substitute national force for the 'enrolled militia,' implies that, in your judgment, the latter is doing something which needs to be done; and if so, the proposition to throw that force away, and to supply its place by bringing other forces from the field where they are urgently needed, seems to me very extraordinary. Whence shall they come? Shall they be withdrawn from Banks, or Grant, or Steele, or Rosecrans?

"Few things have been so grateful to my anxious feelings, as when in June last the local force in Missouri aided General Schofield to so promptly send a large general force to the relief of General Grant, then investing Vicksburg, and menaced from without by General Johnston. Was this all wrong? Should the enrolled militia then have been broken up, and General Herron kept from Grant, to police Missouri? So far from finding cause to object, I confess to a sympathy for whatever relieves our general force in Missouri, and allows it to serve elsewhere.

"I therefore, as at present advised, can not attempt the destruction of the enrolled militia of Missouri. I may add that the force being under the national military control, it is also within the proclamation with regard to the *habeas corpus*.

"I concur in the propriety of your request in regard to elections, and have, as you see, directed General Schofield accordingly. I do not feel justified to enter upon the broad field you present in regard to the political differences between Radicals and Conservatives. From time to time I have done and said what appeared to me proper to do and say. The public knows it well. It obliges nobody to follow me, and I trust it obliges me to follow nobody. The Radicals and Conservatives each agree with me in some things and disagree in others. I could wish both to agree with me in all things; for then they would agree with each other, and would be too strong for any foe from any quarter. They, however, choose to do otherwise, and I do not question their right. I, too, shall do what seems to be my duty. I hold whoever commands in Missouri or elsewhere responsible to me, and not to either Radicals or Conserv-

atives. It is my duty to hear all; but at last I must, within my sphere, judge what to do and what to forbear.

“Your obedient servant, A. LINCOLN.”

And notwithstanding all these efforts, in the summer of 1864, the President had to remove Schofield; and Rosecrans was put in his place. The new commander soon had his hands full of difficulties, the “Sons of Liberty” or “Knights of the Golden Circle” crossing his path, and other evils gathering around him. Sterling Price again appeared in the State in the fall of 1864, but was soon beaten out; not, however, until he had picked up a great many recruits, and done much mischief otherwise.

By this time a large number of negro troops had been organized, and their merit well and favorably tested at Port Hudson, under Gillmore in Charleston Harbor, and under the brave but unskillful General Truman Seymour, in Florida, as well as at different times and places to the end.

In the fall of 1862 the rebel authorities ordered the execution of all slaves found in arms against them; and in his message in January, 1863, Jefferson Davis announced that he should deliver over to the States all captured Federal officers who were found in command of negro soldiers, to be dealt with according to the laws of those States for punishing insurrections of slaves. The rebel “Congress” decreed that such persons should be put to death, and all negroes and mulattoes found in arms should be dealt with by the States according to their laws; that is, they were all to be murdered.

All these things brought from Mr. Lincoln this order :—

“EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
“July 30, 1863. }

“It is the duty of every government to give protection to its citizens, of whatever class, color, or condition, and especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of nations, and the usages and customs of war, as carried on by civilized powers, permit no distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person, on account of his color, and for no offense against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism, and a crime against the civilization of the age.

“The Government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers; and if the enemy shall sell or enslave any one because of his color, the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy’s prisoners in our possession.

“It is therefore ordered that for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war, a rebel soldier shall be executed; and for every one enslaved by the enemy, or sold into slavery, a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on public works, and continued at such labor until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due to a prisoner of war.

“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

“By order of Secretary of War.

“E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.”

While this checked the cruelty practiced toward negro soldiers to some extent, the whole affair led to the suspension of the exchange of prisoners of any kind. And this gave rise to the horrors of Andersonville, Libby, and other rebel prisons. The proposition to renew the exchange of prisoners was

made by the rebels in the summer of 1864, in which they were actuated by two or three motives. They needed all their able-bodied men, and under the old plan of paroling prisoners they returned theirs to the army without waiting for exchange. Then, as their military strength began to crumble in the West, and Sherman began his march toward the Atlantic, they saw that the prisoners in the pens in the South would receive his earliest attention. And, finally, they wanted them to return to their homes to vote for McClellan, offering freedom to all who would agree to vote the Democratic ticket. It may also be claimed that there was a moral compunction involved in the disposition to resume the exchange, as Mr. Chilton, the Inspector-General, submitted it as his opinion to the rebel war department that "the condition of affairs at Andersonville is a reproach to us as a nation."

Still the cruelty towards the negro soldiers was continued at every practicable opportunity, and under every pretext. In the spring of 1863, N. B. Forest, a brutally coarse and uneducated rebel officer, startled the country by getting possession of Fort Pillow by a piece of unsoldiery trickery, and then putting to death the greater part of the soldiers after they had thrown down their arms. The garrison was composed of five hundred and thirty-eight soldiers of whom two hundred and sixty-two were colored. Not even the women and children were spared, but all were murdered, heedless of cries for mercy.

A very extensive Indian war broke out in 1862. and this for some time made a heavy demand on the resources of the Government. At the outset of the Rebellion some of the Indians in the Territory were induced by rebel agents to join in the war for slavery, many of them being negro slave-owners. Through these rebel Indian allies, and, perhaps, by other influences, the Indians of the western border became generally unfriendly or hostile. And finally the Sioux in Minnesota fell to murdering the settlers and burning their houses. They attacked New Ulm, and Yellow Medicine on the Minnesota River, and even Forts Ridgeley and Abercrombie; but by the fall of 1863 they were beaten and brought to terms of peace.

At the close of the war the naval power of the United States had reached magnificent proportions. An earnest, able, and unflinchingly true man was at the head of the Navy arm of the Government. In silent, unwearying, and watchful zeal he pressed forward the great work assigned to him. At the dawn of peace more than seven hundred vessels were under the authority of the Department, and nearly a hundred of them were iron-clads. Seven thousand six hundred men were in the service at the beginning, and nearly fifty-two thousand at the close of the war, with many thousands more, artisans and "laborers," in the navy-yards. The work of this branch of the Government mainly took three natural directions: operations at sea, operations on the rivers, and the coast blockade. The great naval picket-line

extended from Chesapeake Bay to the mouth of the Rio Grande; and to England, especially, the most wonderful feat of the war was the success of this blockade. After the *Monitor* was launched and had fought her first battle in Hampton Roads, the question of supremacy, if there was any, between the Government and the insurgents was settled forever. Still the perseverance of the rebels was great, and many severe conflicts took place before they abandoned as utterly futile their hope of a navy. Even after their pretensions in this way were broken by the destruction of all their vessels on the vast coast, and the numerous rivers, the blockade was a difficult task. France and England and other avaricious nations were constantly looking for opportunities with hundreds of vessels to drop in at unguarded gates with supplies for the rebels. Especially was the far-off coast of Texas beset with blockade-runners. Before the war an occasional foreign vessel had entered the Rio Grande for Matamoras. Now hundreds gathered at this point; but it was well understood that their real object was intercourse with the rebels at Brownsville.

General Butler had scarcely begun his phenomenal rule of a stubborn people at New Orleans when the President declared that port open to the world. So great was the desire of the Government to meet expectations and expectations that this policy was pursued with ports of any consequence captured on the long naval picket-line. While this relieved the apparent rigor of the blockade, it increased the oppor-

tunities of the rebels to reach their foreign aiders and abettors. Hardly a battle on any of the great rivers or on the Atlantic or Gulf coast was fought without the aid of the navy, and many battles never could have been fought without that aid. The sailors were often turned into soldiers, and where the great guns of the vessels could not be otherwise serviceable they were hauled ashore and placed in the siege-lines. Many of the most daring, patriotic, and able men in the country were engaged in this rather inglorious branch of the national power. And nowhere was the Nation's honor more nobly maintained than by the navy and the officers of the Department.

The tendency of Mr. Seward to take to himself the general direction of all departments of the Administration was stubbornly resisted by the less cautious and politic Secretary of the Navy, in whom age had not dimmed the fire of life. Mr. Seward's evil practice was to precede any action of the Administration by a course of conduct on his own part in which he expected the Administration to acquiesce. One of the many instances of this kind was his assurances to Lyons, the British Minister at Washington, that the mail-bags on captured blockade-runners should be sent to their destination without being opened. This Mr. Welles resisted not only as an interference with the affairs of his Department, but also as abandoning to pirates and the abettors of the Rebellion what would often furnish the only clew to their condemnation. But Mr. Lincoln was finally induced, from motives of policy or necessity, to side

with Mr. Seward in this important matter at a time when this Nation was always on the point of an open rupture with England.

When the rebels had exhausted their own efforts and resources to build war-vessels, England came to their aid. With the greatest difficulty Mr. Adams prevailed on the British Ministry to stop the "Laird rams" which were preparing to enter the rebel service, assuring "Lord" Russell that, "at this moment, when one of the iron-clad vessels is on the point of departure from this kingdom on its hostile errand against the United States, it would be superfluous for me to point out to your lordship that this is war."

Still the British Ministry and the "governing class" generally in England were favorable to the cause of the Rebellion, and what aid could be given it in ship-building was given. Indeed, England took up the cause of the Rebellion on the sea, and was beaten.

Although the rebels constructed themselves several more or less formidable war-vessels, as the *Mer-rimac*, the *Tennessee*, the *Albemarle*, the *Louisiana*, the *Manassas*, the *Mississippi*, the *Atlanta*, the *Virginia*, the *Savannah*, the *Sumter*, the *Nashville*, and the *Arkansas*, yet it was reserved for England to furnish them some of the most powerful sea-going vessels of the period. Among these were the *Florida*, the *Tallahassee*, the *Chickamauga*, the *Georgia*, the *Shenandoah*, and the *Alabama*. With these piratical vessels American commerce was driven from the oceans.

Several hundred merchant-vessels were captured by them, and millions of property destroyed. This was a part of England's share in the great Rebellion.

One of the great events of the war was the conquest of the *Merrimack* (Merrimac) by the Ericsson *Monitor*. Although this denoted the beginning of a new era in the construction of war-ships, the great expectations for the monitors were hardly realized in the subsequent history of the war, however the theory of the English broadside was damaged.

Perhaps the most important naval affair of the war, on account of its double signification and bearing, was the destruction of the *Alabama*. This vessel was built at Liverpool by a member of the British Parliament, and against the remonstrance of Mr. Adams, was allowed to go to sea in the fall of 1862. Her armament and her crew were entirely English, and her captain was Raphael Semmes. She cleared the seas wherever she went, and it began to be the boast of England, and the rebels, that the United States had nothing to contend with her, and the fear that this was true was not without supporters at home. At last early in June, 1864, she went into the harbor of Cherbourg, France. On the 19th of that month the United States war-ship, *Kearsarge*, of about equal size and armament, commanded by Captain John A. Winslow, appeared at the entrance of the harbor, and offered battle. However much Semmes wanted to avoid this conflict, he could not do it. The British and French sympathizers expected him to fight. There could be no doubt about the result. Was not

the *Alabama* a British built ship; was not her crew composed of trained English artillerists; had she not an English armament; and had she not mainly sailed under the British flag? The *Kearsarge* moved several miles out, beyond the line of jurisdiction, and then turning upon the *Alabama*, the battle began. In one hour and two minutes the shattered Anglo-rebel ship went down; while the *Kearsarge*, with her crew, received little damage, although the trained British artillerists had fired at her three hundred and seventy shot and shell. The English steam-yacht, the *Deerhound*, having come out of the harbor to see the fight, was invited to aid in picking up the *Alabama's* crew, which she did, and in her share got Semmes, with whom she made off. But this was another illustration of the fact that England had lost her supremacy on the sea. If the South was beaten and mortified, England, her ally, was doubly humiliated.

CHAPTER XIX.

1863—WAR OF THE REBELLION—CONGRESS IN THE WINTER OF 1863—THE MESSAGE—THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW REPEALED—MR. LINCOLN'S PROCLAMATIONS AND MISTAKES.

CONGRESS assembled ("first session of Thirty-eighth") again on the 7th of December, 1863, and sat until July 4, 1864. Although several States, notably Ohio and New York, had increased their opposition or Democratic representation, the political complexion of the two Houses was not much changed at this time, the Republicans and "Unconditional Union Men" having a large majority.

Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, was elected Speaker of the House, receiving one hundred and one votes. Samuel S. Cox, of Ohio, received forty-two of the Democratic votes, and thirty-nine others were scattered, and six members were absent or did not vote. Edward McPherson, of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, was elected clerk. On the following day the President sent in his

THIRD ANNUAL MESSAGE.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:—

Another year of health, and of sufficiently abundant harvests, has passed. For these, and especially for the improved

condition of our national affairs, our renewed and profoundest gratitude to God is due.

We remain in peace and friendship with foreign powers.

The efforts of disloyal citizens of the United States to involve us in foreign wars, to aid an inexcusable insurrection, have been unavailing. Her Britannic Majesty's government, as was justly expected, have exercised their authority to prevent the departure of new hostile expeditions from British ports. The emperor of France has, by a like proceeding, promptly vindicated the neutrality which he proclaimed at the beginning of the contest. Questions of great intricacy and importance have arisen out of the blockade and other belligerent operations, between the Government and several of the maritime powers, but they have been discussed, and, as far as was possible, accommodated in a spirit of frankness, justice, and mutual good-will. It is especially gratifying that our prize courts, by the impartiality of their adjudications, have commanded the respect and confidence of maritime powers.

The supplemental treaty between the United States and Great Britain for the suppression of the African slave-trade, made on the 17th day of February last, has been duly ratified and carried into execution. It is believed that, so far as American ports and American citizens are concerned, that inhuman and odious traffic has been brought to an end.

I shall submit, for the consideration of the Senate, a convention for the adjustment of possessory claims in Washington Territory, arising out of the treaty of the 15th June, 1846, between the United States and Great Britain, and which have been the source of some disquiet among the citizens of that now rapidly improving part of the country.

A novel and important question, involving the extent of the maritime jurisdiction of Spain in the waters which surround the island of Cuba, has been debated without reaching an agreement, and it is proposed, in an amicable spirit, to refer it to the arbitrament of a friendly power. A convention for that purpose will be submitted to the Senate.

I have thought it proper, subject to the approval of the Senate, to concur with the interested commercial powers in an arrangement for the liquidation of the Scheldt dues upon the

principles which have been heretofore adopted in regard to the imposts upon navigation in the waters of Denmark.

The long pending controversy between this Government and that of Chili, touching the seizure at Sitana, in Peru, by Chilian officers, of a large amount in treasure belonging to citizens of the United States, has been brought to a close by the award of his majesty the king of the Belgians, to whose arbitration the question was referred by the parties. The subject was thoroughly and patiently examined by that justly respected magistrate, and although the sum awarded to the claimants may not have been as large as they expected, there is no reason to distrust the wisdom of his majesty's decision. That decision was promptly complied with by Chili, when intelligence in regard to it reached that country.

The joint commission, under the Act of the last session, for carrying into effect the convention with Peru on the subject of claims, has been organized at Lima,* and is engaged in the business intrusted to it.

Difficulties concerning interoceanic transit through Nicaragua are in course of amicable adjustment.

In conformity with principles set forth in my last annual message, I have received a representative from the United States of Colombia, and have accredited a minister to that Republic.

Incidents occurring in the progress of our Civil War have forced upon my attention the uncertain state of international questions touching the rights of foreigners in this country and of United States citizens abroad. In regard to some governments these rights are at least partially defined by treaties. In no instance, however, is it expressly stipulated that, in the event of civil war, a foreigner residing in this country, within the lines of the insurgents, is to be exempted from the rule which classes him as a belligerent, in whose behalf the government of his country can not expect any privileges or immunities distinct from that character. I regret to say, however, that such claims have been put forward, and, in some instances, in behalf of foreigners who have lived in the United States the greater part of their lives.

There is reason to believe that many persons born in foreign

countries, who have declared their intentions to become citizens, or who have been fully naturalized, have evaded the military duty required of them by denying the fact, and thereby throwing upon the Government the burden of proof. It has been found difficult or impracticable to obtain this proof, from the want of guides to the proper sources of information. These might be supplied by requiring clerks of courts, where declarations of intentions may be made or naturalizations effected, to send, periodically, lists of the names of the persons naturalized, or declaring their intention to become citizens, to the Secretary of the Interior, in whose Department those names might be arranged and printed for general information.

There is also reason to believe that foreigners frequently become citizens of the United States for the sole purpose of evading duties imposed by the laws of their native countries, to which, on becoming naturalized here, they at once repair, and, though never returning to the United States, they still claim the interposition of this Government as citizens. Many altercations and great prejudices have heretofore arisen out of this abuse. It is therefore submitted to your serious consideration. It might be advisable to fix a limit beyond which no citizen of the United States residing abroad may claim the interposition of his Government.

The right of suffrage has often been assumed and exercised by aliens, under pretenses of naturalization, which they have disavowed when drafted into the military service. I submit the expediency of such an amendment of the law as will make the fact of voting an estoppel against any plea of exemption from military service, or other civil obligation, on the ground of alienage.

In common with other Western powers, our relations with Japan have been brought into serious jeopardy, through the perverse opposition of the hereditary aristocracy of the empire to the enlightened and liberal policy of the Tycoon, designed to bring the country into the society of nations. It is hoped, although not with entire confidence, that these difficulties may be peacefully overcome. I ask your attention to the claim of the Minister residing there for the damages he sustained in the destruction by fire of the residence of the legation at Yedo.

Satisfactory arrangements have been made with the emperor of Russia, which, it is believed, will result in effecting a continuous line of telegraph through that empire from our Pacific coast.

I recommend to your favorable consideration the subject of an international telegraph across the Atlantic Ocean; and also of a telegraph between this Capital and the national forts along the Atlantic sea-board and the Gulf of Mexico. Such communications, established with any reasonable outlay, would be economical as well as effective aids to the diplomatic, military, and naval service.

The consular system of the United States, under the enactments of the last Congress, begins to be self-sustaining; and there is reason to hope that it may become entirely so, with the increase of trade which will ensue whenever peace is restored. Our Ministers abroad have been faithful in defending American rights. In protecting commercial interests, our consuls have necessarily had to encounter increased labors and responsibilities growing out of the war. These they have, for the most part, met and discharged with zeal and efficiency. This acknowledgment justly includes those consuls who, residing in Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Japan, China, and other Oriental countries, are charged with complex functions and extraordinary powers.

The condition of the several organized Territories is generally satisfactory, although Indian disturbances in New Mexico have not been entirely suppressed. The mineral resources of Colorado, Nevada, Idaho, New Mexico, and Arizona, are proving far richer than has been heretofore understood. I lay before you a communication on this subject from the Governor of New Mexico. I again submit to your consideration the expediency of establishing a system for the encouragement of immigration. Although this source of national wealth and strength is again flowing with greater freedom than for several years before the insurrection occurred, there is still a great deficiency of laborers in every field of industry, especially in agriculture and in our mines, as well of iron and coal as of the precious metals. While the demand for labor is much increased here, tens of thousands of persons, destitute of remunerative

occupation, are thronging our foreign consulates and offering to emigrate to the United States, if essential, but very cheap, assistance can be afforded them. It is easy to see that, under the sharp discipline of civil war, the Nation is beginning a new life. This noble effort demands the aid, and ought to receive the attention and support of the Government.

Injuries, unforeseen by the Government and unintended, may, in some cases, have been inflicted on the subjects or citizens of foreign countries, both at sea and on land, by persons in the service of the United States. As this Government expects redress from other powers when similar injuries are inflicted by persons in their service upon citizens of the United States, we must be prepared to do justice to foreigners. If the existing judicial tribunals are inadequate to this purpose, a special court may be authorized, with power to hear and decide such claims of the character referred to as may have arisen under treaties and the public law. Conventions for adjusting the claims by joint commission have been proposed to some governments, but no definite answer to the proposition has yet been received from any.

In the course of the session I shall probably have occasion to request you to provide indemnification to claimants where decrees of restitution have been rendered, and damages awarded by admiralty courts; and in other cases, where this Government may be acknowledged to be liable in principle, and where the amount of that liability has been ascertained by an informal arbitration.

The proper officers of the Treasury have deemed themselves required by the law of the United States upon the subject, to demand a tax upon the incomes of foreign consuls in this country. While such a demand may not, in strictness, be in derogation of public law, or perhaps of any existing treaty between the United States and a foreign country, the expediency of so far modifying the act as to exempt from tax the income of such consuls as are not citizens of the United States, derived from the emoluments of their office, or from property not situated in the United States, is submitted to your serious consideration.

I make this suggestion upon the ground that a comity,

which ought to be reciprocated, exempts our consuls, in all other countries, from taxation to the extent thus indicated. The United States, I think, ought not to be exceptionally illiberal to international trade and commerce.

The operations of the Treasury during the last year have been successfully conducted. The enactment by Congress of a national banking law has proved a valuable support of the public credit; and the general legislation in relation to loans has fully answered the expectations of its favorers. Some amendments may be required to perfect existing laws, but no change in their principles or general scope is believed to be needed.

Since these measures have been in operation, all demands on the Treasury, including the pay of the Army and Navy, have been promptly met and fully satisfied. No considerable body of troops, it is believed, were ever more amply provided, and more liberally and punctually paid; and it may be added that by no people were the burdens incident to a great war ever more cheerfully borne.

The receipts during the year from all sources, including loans and balance in the Treasury at its commencement, were \$901,125,674.86, and the aggregate disbursements \$895,796,630.65, leaving a balance on the 1st of July, 1863, of \$5,329,044.21. Of the receipts there were derived from customs, \$69,059,642.40; from internal revenue, \$37,640,787.95; from direct tax, \$1,485,103.61; from lands, \$167,617.17; from miscellaneous sources, \$3,046,615.35; and from loans, \$776,682,361.57; making the aggregate, \$901,125,674.86. Of the disbursements there were for the civil service, \$23,253,922.08; for pensions and Indians, \$4,216,520.79; for interest on public debt, \$24,729,846.51; for the War Department, \$599,298,600.83; for the Navy Department, \$63,211,105.27; for payment of funded and temporary debt, \$181,086,635.07; making the aggregate, \$895,796,630.65, and leaving the balance of \$5,329,044.21. But the payment of funded and temporary debt, having been made from moneys borrowed during the year, must be regarded as merely nominal payments, and the moneys borrowed to make them as merely nominal receipts; and their amount, \$181,086,635.07, should therefore be deducted both

from receipts and disbursements. This being done, there remains as actual receipts, \$720,039,039.79, and the actual disbursements \$714,709,995.58, leaving the balance as already stated.

The actual receipts and disbursements for the first quarter, and the estimated receipts and disbursements for the remaining three quarters of the current fiscal year, 1864, will be shown in detail by the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, to which I invite your attention. It is sufficient to say here that it is not believed that actual results will exhibit a state of the finances less favorable to the country than the estimates of that officer heretofore submitted; while it is confidently expected that at the close of the year both disbursements and debt will be found very considerably less than has been anticipated.

The report of the Secretary of War is a document of great interest. It consists of—

1. The military operations of the year, detailed in the report of the General-in-Chief.

2. The organization of colored persons into the war service.

3. The exchange of prisoners, fully set forth in the letter of General Hitchcock.

4. The operations under the act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, detailed in the report of the Provost-Marshal-General.

5. The organization of the invalid corps; and,

6. The operation of the several departments of the Quartermaster-General, Commissary-General, Paymaster-General, Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, and Surgeon-General.

It has appeared impossible to make a valuable summary of this report except such as would be too extended for this place, and hence I content myself by asking your careful attention to the report itself.

The duties devolving on the naval branch of the service during the year, and throughout the whole of this unhappy contest, have been discharged with fidelity and eminent success. The extensive blockade has been constantly increasing in efficiency, as the navy has expanded; yet on so long a line it has so far been impossible to entirely suppress illicit trade. From returns received at the Navy Department, it appears that more than one thousand vessels have been captured since the block-

ade was instituted, and that the value of prizes already sent in for adjudication amounts to over thirteen millions of dollars.

The naval force of the United States consists at this time of five hundred and eighty-eight vessels, completed and in the course of completion, and of these seventy-five are iron-clad or armored steamers. The events of the war give an increased interest and importance to the Navy, which will probably extend beyond the war itself.

The armored vessels in our Navy, completed and in service, or which are under contract and approaching completion, are believed to exceed in number those of any other power. But while these may be relied upon for harbor defense and coast-service, others of greater strength and capacity will be necessary for cruising purposes, and to maintain our rightful position on the ocean.

The change that has taken place in naval vessels and naval warfare since the introduction of steam as a motive power for ships of war demands either a corresponding change in some of our existing navy-yards, or the establishment of new ones, for the construction and necessary repair of modern naval vessels. No inconsiderable embarrassment, delay, and public injury have been experienced from the want of such Governmental establishments. The necessity of such a navy-yard, so furnished, at some suitable place upon the Atlantic sea-board, has, on repeated occasions, been brought to the attention of Congress by the Navy Department, and is again presented in the report of the Secretary, which accompanies this communication. I think it my duty to invite your special attention to this subject, and also to that of establishing a yard and depot for naval purposes upon one of the Western rivers. A naval force has been created on those interior waters, and under many disadvantages, within little more than two years, exceeding in numbers the whole naval force of the country at the commencement of the present Administration. Satisfactory and important as have been the performances of the heroic men of the Navy at this interesting period, they are scarcely more wonderful than the success of our mechanics and artisans in the production of war-vessels which has created a new form of naval power.

Our country has advantages superior to any other nation in

its resources of iron and timber, with inexhaustible quantities of fuel in the immediate vicinity of both, all available and in close proximity to navigable waters. Without the advantage of public works the resources of the Nation have been developed and its power displayed in the construction of a navy of such magnitude which has, at the very period of its creation, rendered signal service to the Union.

The increase of the number of seamen in the public service, from seven thousand five hundred men, in the spring of 1861, to about thirty-four thousand at the present time, has been accomplished without special legislation, or extraordinary bounties to promote that increase. It has been found, however, that the operation of the draft, with the high bounties paid for army recruits, is beginning to affect injuriously the naval service, and will, if not corrected, be likely to impair its efficiency, by detaching seamen from their proper vocation and inducing them to enter the army. I therefore respectfully suggest that Congress might aid both the army and naval service by a definite provision on this subject, which would at the same time be equitable to the communities more especially interested.

I commend to your consideration the suggestions of the Secretary of the Navy in regard to the policy of fostering and training seamen, and also the education of officers and engineers for the naval service. The Naval Academy is rendering signal service in preparing midshipmen for the highly responsible duties which in after life they will be required to perform. In order that the country should not be deprived of the proper quota of educated officers, for which legal provision has been made at the Naval School, the vacancies caused by the neglect or omission to make nominations from the States in insurrection have been filled by the Secretary of the Navy. The school is now more full and complete than at any former period, and, in every respect, entitled to the favorable consideration of Congress.

During the past fiscal year the financial condition of the Post-office Department has been one of increasing prosperity, and I am gratified in being able to state that the actual postal revenue has nearly equaled the entire expenditures; the latter amounting to \$11,314,206.84, and the former to \$11,163,789.59,

leaving a deficiency of but \$160,417.25. In 1860, the year immediately preceding the Rebellion, the deficiency amounted to \$5,656,705.49, the postal receipts of that year being \$2,645,722.19 less than those of 1863. The decrease since 1860 in the annual amount of transportation has been only about twenty-five per cent, but the annual expenditure on account of the same has been reduced thirty-five per cent. It is manifest, therefore, that the Post-office Department may become self-sustaining in a few years, even with the restoration of the whole service.

The international conference of postal delegates from the principal countries of Europe and America, which was called at the suggestion of the Postmaster-General, met at Paris on the 11th of May last, and concluded its deliberations on the 8th of June. The principles established by the conference as best adapted to facilitate postal intercourse between nations, and as the basis of future postal conventions, inaugurate a general system of uniform international charges, at reduced rates of postage, and can not fail to produce beneficial results.

I refer you to the report of the Secretary of the Interior, which is herewith laid before you, for useful and varied information in relation to the public lands, Indian affairs, patents, pensions, and other matters of public concern pertaining to this Department.

The quantity of land disposed of during the last and the first quarter of the present fiscal years was three million eight hundred and forty-one thousand five hundred and forty-nine acres, of which one hundred and sixty-one thousand nine hundred and eleven acres were sold for cash, one million four hundred and fifty-six thousand five hundred and fourteen acres were taken up under the Homestead Law, and the residue disposed of under laws granting lands for military bounties, for railroad and other purposes. It also appears that the sale of the public lands is largely on the increase.

It has long been a cherished opinion of some of our wisest statesmen that the people of the United States had a higher and more enduring interest in the early settlement and substantial cultivation of the public lands than in the amount of direct revenue to be derived from the sale of them. This opinion

has had a controlling influence in shaping legislation upon the subject of our national domain. I may cite, as evidence of this, the liberal measures adopted in reference to actual settlers; the grant to the States of the overflowed lands within their limits in order to their being reclaimed and rendered fit for cultivation; the grants to railway companies of alternate sections of land upon the contemplated lines of their roads which, when completed, will so largely multiply the facilities for reaching our distant possessions. This policy has received its most signal and beneficent illustration in the recent enactment granting homesteads to actual settlers. Since the first day of January last the beforementioned quantity of one million four hundred and fifty-six thousand five hundred and fourteen acres of land have been taken up under its provisions. This fact and the amount of sales, furnish gratifying evidence of increasing settlement upon the public lands, notwithstanding the great struggle in which the energies of the Nation have been engaged, and which has required so large a withdrawal of our citizens from their accustomed pursuits. I cordially concur in the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior, suggesting a modification of the act in favor of those engaged in the military and naval service of the United States. I doubt not that Congress will cheerfully adopt such measures as will, without essentially changing the general features of the system, secure, to the greatest practicable extent, its benefits to those who have left their homes in the defense of the country in this arduous crisis.

I invite your attention to the views of the Secretary as to the propriety of raising, by appropriate legislation, a revenue from the mineral lands of the United States.

The measures provided at your last session for the removal of certain Indian tribes have been carried into effect. Sundry treaties have been negotiated, which will, in due time, be submitted for the Constitutional action of the Senate. They contain stipulations for extinguishing the possessory rights of the Indians to large and valuable tracts of land. It is hoped that the effect of these treaties will result in the establishment of permanent friendly relations with such of these tribes as have been brought into frequent and bloody collision with our out-

lying settlements and emigrants. Sound policy and our imperative duty to these wards of the Government demand our anxious and constant attention to their material well-being, to their progress in the arts of civilization, and, above all, to that moral training which, under the blessing of Divine Providence, will confer upon them the elevated and sanctifying influences, the hopes and consolations of the Christian faith.

I suggested, in my last annual message, the propriety of remodeling our Indian system. Subsequent events have satisfied me of its necessity. The details set forth in the report of the Secretary evince the urgent need for immediate legislative action.

I commend the benevolent institutions established or patronized by the Government in this District to your generous and fostering care.

The attention of Congress, during the last session, was engaged, to some extent, with a proposition for enlarging the water communication between the Mississippi River and the north-eastern sea-board, which proposition, however, failed for the time. Since then, upon a call of the greatest respectability, a convention has been held at Chicago upon the same subject, a summary of whose views is contained in a memorial addressed to the President and Congress, and which I now have the honor to lay before you. That this interest is one which, ere long, will force its own way, I do not entertain a doubt, while it is submitted entirely to your wisdom as to what can be done now. Augmented interest is given to this subject by the actual commencement of the work on the Pacific Railroad, under auspices so favorable to rapid progress and completion. The enlarged navigation becomes a palpable need to the great road.

I transmit the second annual report of the Commissioner of the Department of Agriculture, asking your attention to the developments in that vital interest of the Nation.

When Congress assembled a year ago the war had already lasted nearly twenty months, and there had been many conflicts on both land and sea with varying results. The Rebellion had been pressed back into reduced limits; yet the tone of public feeling and opinion, at home and abroad, was not satisfactory. With other signs, the popular elections, then just past, indicated

uneasiness among ourselves, while amid much that was cold and menacing, the kindest words coming from Europe were uttered in accents of pity, that we were too blind to surrender a hopeless cause. Our commerce was suffering greatly by a few armed vessels built upon and furnished from foreign shores, and we were threatened with such additions from the same quarter as would sweep our trade from the sea and raise our blockade. We had failed to elicit from European governments anything hopeful upon this subject. The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, issued in September, was running its assigned period to the beginning of the new year. A month later the final proclamation came, including the announcement that colored men of suitable condition would be received into the war-service. The policy of emancipation, and of employing black soldiers, gave to the future a new aspect, about which hope, and fear, and doubt contended in uncertain conflict. According to our political system, as a matter of civil administration, the General Government had no lawful power to effect emancipation in any State, and for a long time it had been hoped that the Rebellion could be suppressed without resorting to it as a military measure. It was all the while deemed possible that the necessity for it might come, and that, if it should, the crisis of the contest would then be presented. It came, and, as was anticipated, it was followed by dark and doubtful days. Eleven months having now passed, we are permitted to take another view. The rebel borders are pressed still further back, and, by the complete opening of the Mississippi, the country dominated by the Rebellion is divided into distinct parts, with no practical communication between them. Tennessee and Arkansas have been substantially cleared of insurgent control, and influential citizens in each, owners of slaves and advocates of slavery at the beginning of the Rebellion, now declare openly for emancipation in their respective States. Of those States not included in the Emancipation Proclamation, Maryland and Missouri, neither of which three years ago would tolerate any restraint upon the extension of slavery into new Territories, only dispute now as to the best mode of removing it within their own limits.

Of those who were slaves at the **beginning** of the Rebellion,

full one hundred thousand are now in the United States military service, about one-half of which number actually bear arms in the ranks; thus giving the double advantage of taking so much labor from the insurgent cause, and supplying the places which otherwise must be filled with so many white men. So far as tested, it is difficult to say they are not as good soldiers as any. No servile insurrection, or tendency to violence or cruelty, has marked the measures of emancipation and arming the blacks. These measures have been much discussed in foreign countries, and contemporary with such discussion the tone of public sentiment there is much improved. At home the same measures have been fully discussed, supported, criticised, and denounced, and the annual elections following are highly encouraging to those whose official duty it is to bear the country through this great trial. Thus we have the new reckoning. The crisis which threatened to divide the friends of the Union is past.

Looking now to the present and future, and with reference to a resumption of the national authority within the States wherein that authority has been suspended, I have thought fit to issue a proclamation, a copy of which is herewith transmitted. On examination of this proclamation it will appear, as is believed, that nothing will be attempted beyond what is amply justified by the Constitution. True, the form of an oath is given, but no man is coerced to take it. The man is only promised a pardon in case he voluntarily takes the oath. The Constitution authorizes the Executive to grant or withhold the pardon at his own absolute discretion; and this includes the power to grant on terms, as is fully established by judicial and other authorities.

It is also proffered that if, in any of the States named, a State government shall be, in the mode prescribed, set up, such government shall be recognized and guaranteed by the United States, and that under it the State shall, on Constitutional conditions, be protected against invasion and domestic violence. The Constitutional obligation of the United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and to protect the State, in the cases stated, is explicit and full. But why tender the benefits of this provision only to a State

government set up in this particular way? This section of the Constitution contemplates a case wherein the element within a State, favorable to republican government, in the Union, may be too feeble for an opposite and hostile element external to or even within the State; and such are precisely the cases with which we are now dealing.

An attempt to guarantee and protect a revived State government, constructed in whole, or in preponderating part, from the very element against whose hostility and violence it is to be protected, is simply absurd. There must be a test by which to separate the opposing elements so as to build only from the sound; and that test is a sufficiently liberal one which accepts as sound whoever will make a sworn recantation of his former unsoundness.

But if it be proper to require, as a test of admission to the political body, an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, and to the Union under it, why also to the laws and proclamations in regard to slavery? Those laws and proclamations were enacted and put forth for the purpose of aiding in the suppression of the Rebellion. To give them their fullest effect, there had to be a pledge for their maintenance. In my judgment they have aided, and will further aid, the cause for which they were intended. To now abandon them would be not only to relinquish a lever of power, but would also be a cruel and astounding breach of faith. I may add at this point, that while I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation; nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that Proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress. For these and other reasons it is thought best that support of these measures shall be included in the oath; and it is believed the Executive may lawfully claim it in return for pardon and restoration of forfeited rights, which he has clear Constitutional power to withhold altogether, or grant upon the terms which he shall deem wisest for the public interest. It should be observed, also, that this part of the oath is subject to the modifying and abrogating power of legislation and supreme judicial decision.

The proposed acquiescence of the national Executive in any reasonable temporary State arrangement for the freed people is

made with the view of possibly modifying the confusion and destitution which must, at best, attend all classes by a total revolution of labor throughout whole States. It is hoped that the already deeply afflicted people in those States may be somewhat more ready to give up the cause of their affliction, if, to this extent, this vital matter be left to themselves; while no power of the national Executive to prevent an abuse is abridged by the proposition.

The suggestion in the Proclamation as to maintaining the political frame-work of the States on what is called reconstruction, is made in the hope that it may do good without danger of harm. It will save labor, and avoid great confusion.

But why any proclamation now upon the subject? This question is beset with the conflicting views that the step might be delayed too long or be taken too soon. In some States the elements for resumption seem ready for action, but remain inactive, apparently for want of a rallying point—a plan of action. Why shall A adopt the plan of B, rather than B that of A? And if A and B should agree, how can they know but that the General Government here will reject their plan? By the Proclamation a plan is presented which may be accepted by them as a rallying point, and which they are assured in advance will not be rejected here. This may bring them to act sooner than they otherwise would.

The objection to a premature presentation of a plan by the national Executive consists in the danger of committals on points which could be more safely left to further developments. Care has been taken to so shape the document as to avoid embarrassments from this source. Saying that, on certain terms, certain classes will be pardoned, with rights restored, it is not said that other classes, or other terms, will never be included. Saying that reconstruction will be accepted if presented in a specified way, it is not said it will never be accepted in any other way.

The movements, by State action, for emancipation in several of the States not included in the Emancipation Proclamation, are matters of profound gratulation. And while I do not repeat in detail what I have heretofore so earnestly urged upon this subject, my general views and feelings remain unchanged;

and I trust that Congress will omit no fair opportunity of aiding these important steps to a great consummation.

In the midst of other cares, however important, we must not lose sight of the fact that the war power is still our main reliance. To that power alone we can look, yet for a time, to give confidence to the people in the contested regions, that the insurgent power will not again overrun them. Until that confidence shall be established, little can be done anywhere for what is called reconstruction. Hence our chiefest care must still be directed to the army and navy, who have thus far borne their harder part so nobly and well. And it may be esteemed fortunate that in giving the greatest efficiency to these indispensable arms, we do also honorably recognize the gallant men, from commander to sentinel, who compose them, and to whom, more than to others, the world must stand indebted for the home of freedom disenthralled, regenerated, enlarged, and perpetuated.

On the day this message was sent to Congress the President issued an Amnesty Proclamation, which he found necessary to explain by another four months later. The following are these proclamations, which served to show the continued and determined good disposition of the Administration toward the insurgents, however worthless they were otherwise :—

PROCLAMATION OF AMNESTY.

WHEREAS, In and by the Constitution of the United States, it is provided that the President “shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment;” and

WHEREAS, A rebellion now exists whereby the loyal State governments of several States have for a long time been subverted, and many persons have committed and are now guilty of treason against the United States; and

WHEREAS, With reference to said rebellion and treason, laws have been enacted by Congress declaring forfeitures and confiscation of property and liberation of slaves, all upon terms

and conditions therein stated, and also declaring that the President was thereby authorized at any time thereafter, by proclamation, to extend to persons who may have participated in the existing rebellion, in any State or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions and at such times and on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the public welfare; and

WHEREAS, The Congressional declaration for limited and conditional pardon accords with well established judicial exposition of the pardoning power; and

WHEREAS, With reference to said rebellion, the President of the United States has issued several proclamations, with provisions in regard to the liberation of slaves; and

WHEREAS, It is now desired by some persons heretofore engaged in said rebellion to resume their allegiance to the United States, and to reinaugurate loyal State governments within and for their respective States:

Therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known to all persons who have directly, or by implication, participated in the existing rebellion, except as hereinafter excepted, that a full pardon is hereby granted to them and each of them, with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves, and in property cases where right of third parties shall have intervened, and upon the condition that every such person shall take and subscribe an oath, and thenceforward keep and maintain said oath inviolate; and which oath shall be registered for permanent preservation, and shall be of the tenor and effect following, to wit:

“I, —————, do solemnly swear, in presence of Almighty God, that I will henceforth faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the Union of the States thereunder; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all Acts of Congress passed during the existing rebellion with reference to slaves, so long and so far as not repealed, modified, or held void by Congress, or by decision of the Supreme Court; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all proclamations of the President made during the existing rebellion having reference to slaves, so long and so far as not modified or declared void by decision of the Supreme Court. So help me God.”

The persons excepted from the benefits of the foregoing provisions are all who are, or shall have been, civil or diplomatic officers or agents of the so-called Confederate Government; all who have left judicial stations under the United States to aid the rebellion; all who are, or shall have been, military or naval officers of said so-called Confederate Government above the rank of colonel in the army, or of lieutenant in the navy; all who left seats in the United States Congress to aid the rebellion; all who resigned commissions in the army or navy of the United States, and afterwards aided the rebellion; and all who have engaged in any way in treating colored persons, or white persons in charge of such, otherwise than lawfully as prisoners of war, and which persons may have been found in the United States service as soldiers, seamen, or in any other capacity.

And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known that whenever in any of the States of Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, Virginia, Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina, a number of persons, not less than one-tenth in number of the votes cast in such State at the Presidential election of the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty, each having taken the oath aforesaid and not having since violated it, and being a qualified voter by the election law of the State existing immediately before the so-called Act of Secession, and excluding all others, shall re-establish a State government which shall be republican, and in nowise contravening said oath, such shall be recognized as the true government of the State, and the State shall receive thereunder the benefits of the Constitutional provision which declares that "the United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and, on application of the Legislature, or the Executive (when the Legislature can not be convened), against domestic violence."

And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known that any provision which may be adopted by such State government in relation to the freed people of such State, which shall recognize and declare their permanent freedom, provide for their education, and which may yet be consistent, as a temporary

arrangement, with their present condition as a laboring, landless, and homeless class, will not be objected to by the national Executive. And it is suggested as not improper, that, in constructing a loyal State government in any State, the name of the State, the boundary, the subdivisions, the constitution, and the general code of laws, as before the rebellion, be maintained, subject only to the modifications made necessary by the conditions hereinbefore stated, and such others, if any, not contravening said conditions, and which may be deemed expedient by those framing the new State government.

To avoid misunderstanding, it may be proper to say that this proclamation, so far as it relates to State governments, has no reference to States wherein loyal State governments have all the while been maintained. And for the same reason, it may be proper to further say, that whether members sent to Congress from any State shall be admitted to seats Constitutionally, rests exclusively with the respective Houses, and not to any extent with the Executive. And still further, that this Proclamation is intended to present the people of the States wherein the national authority has been suspended, and loyal State governments have been subverted, a mode in and by which the national and loyal State governments may be re-established within said States, or in any of them; and while the mode presented is the best the Executive can suggest, with his present impressions, it must not be understood that no other possible mode would be acceptable.

Given under my hand, at the City of Washington, the eighth day of December, A. D. one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-eighth.

By the President: ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

AMNESTY DEFINED.

WHEREAS, It has become necessary to define the cases in which insurgent enemies are entitled to the benefits of the Proclamation of the President of the United States, which was made on the 8th day of December, 1863, and the manner in which they shall proceed to avail themselves of those benefits; and

WHEREAS, The objects of that Proclamation were to suppress the insurrection, and to restore the authority of the United States; and

WHEREAS, The amnesty therein provided by the President was offered with reference to these objects alone:

Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim and declare that the said proclamation does not apply to the cases of persons who, at the time when they seek to obtain the benefits thereof by taking the oath thereby prescribed, are in military, naval, or civil confinement or custody, or under bonds or on parole of the civil, military, or naval authorities, or agents of the United States as prisoners of war, or persons detained for offenses of any kind, either before or after conviction; and that, on the contrary, it does apply only to persons who, being yet at large and free from any arrest, confinement, or duress, shall voluntarily come forward and take the said oath with the purpose of restoring peace and establishing the national authority.

Prisoners excluded from the amnesty offered in the said proclamation may apply to the President for clemency, like all other offenders, and their application will receive due consideration.

I do further declare and proclaim that the oath prescribed in the aforesaid Proclamation of the 8th of December, 1863, may be taken and subscribed to before any commissioned officer, civil, military, or naval, in the service of the United States, or any civil or military officer of a State or Territory, not in insurrection, who by the law thereof may be qualified for administering oaths.

All officers who receive such oaths are hereby authorized to give certificates thereon to the persons respectively by whom they are made. And such officers are hereby required to transmit the original records of such oaths at as early a day as may be convenient to the Department of State, where they will be deposited and remain in the archives of the Government.

The Secretary of State will keep a register thereof, and will, on application in proper cases, issue certificates of such records in the customary form of such certificates.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, the 26th day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-eighth. ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President :

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

In the great mass of acts passed during this session, the most noticeable were those amending and perfecting the Enrollment and Draft Act further authorizing the President to call out troops and enlarge the army and navy; to revive the office of Lieutenant-General, which the President bestowed upon General U. S. Grant; to enable Nevada, Colorado, and Nebraska to form State governments, and organizing a temporary government for Montana; to establish the present postal money order system, which went into effect in the fall of 1864; to repeal the "Fugitive Slave Law;" and a vast number of resolutions of thanks to generals, naval officers, and soldiers who had distinguished themselves, armies that had rendered noble service, and a gold medal was voted to General Grant.

A "reconstruction" act was passed looking to the organization of the rebel States, but this was not signed by the President. The bill provided,

1. For the appointment of a provisional governor of each rebel State.

2. That the provisional governor, as soon as military resistance to the Government should cease, should cause the people to be enrolled, and if those

taking the oath of loyalty should be in the majority, a convention should be held for re-establishing the State government.

3. The number of delegates to the convention was fixed, and the provisional governor authorized to designate the voters, rejecting all who had fought against the country whether taking the oath or not.

4. That the delegates elected should assemble in convention with the provisional governor as chairman, and take the oath of submission to the Government, and then provide for incorporating in the State constitution, that no man who had held any high office under the rebel authorities should be eligible to the Legislature or office of governor, that there should be no more slavery forever, and that all debts made under the Rebellion should be repudiated.

5. That the convention should, with these provisions, reconstruct the constitution, and when submitted to the people, if the result was favorable, the President should declare the government of the State re-established.

6. That if the convention failed to conform to this plan, the provisional governor should disperse it, and some time when the indications were more favorable, cause another election, and try it again.

7. That until such reorganization should be effected, the provisional governor should assess and collect the taxes.

8. That there should be no more slavery, and if any should be claimed as slaves they should be discharged by *habeas corpus*.

9. That any person who should withhold liberty from one of these declared free should be fined and imprisoned:

10. That any person who should after the passage of the bill hold a civil office, or any military office above the rank of a colonel, under the Rebellion, should not be a citizen of the United States.

The President had already committed himself to support a plan not substantially different in Arkansas and Louisiana, and had in his Proclamation of Amnesty indicated the course he favored. Still he approved most of this bill, and that it might not fail to accomplish any good for which it was designed, he issued this proclamation and to it appended the entire bill:—

“WHEREAS, At the late session, Congress passed a bill ‘to guarantee to certain States, whose governments have been usurped or overthrown, a republican form of government,’ a copy of which is hereunto annexed; and

“WHEREAS, The said bill was presented to the President of the United States for his approval less than one hour before the *sine die* adjournment of said session, and was not signed by him; and

“WHEREAS, The said bill contains, among other things, a plan for restoring the States in rebellion to their proper practical relation in the Union, which plan expresses the sense of Congress upon that subject, and which plan it is now thought fit to lay before the people for their consideration:

“Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States; do proclaim, declare, and make known, that, while I am (as I was in December last, when by proclamation I propounded a plan for restoration) unprepared, by a formal approval of this bill, to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration; and, while I am also unprepared to declare that the Free State constitutions and governments already

adopted and installed in Arkansas and Louisiana shall be set aside and held for nought, thereby repelling and discouraging the loyal citizens who have set up the same as to further effort, or to declare a Constitutional competency in Congress to abolish slavery in States, but am at the same time sincerely hoping and expecting that a Constitutional amendment abolishing slavery throughout the nation may be adopted, nevertheless I am fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one very proper plan for the loyal people of any State choosing to adopt it, and I am, and at all times shall be, prepared to give the Executive aid and assistance to any such people, so soon as the military resistance to the United States shall have been suppressed in any such State, and the people thereof shall have sufficiently returned to their obedience to the Constitution and laws of the United States, in which cases military governors will be appointed, with directions to proceed according to the bill.

“In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

“Done at the City of Washington, this eighth day of July, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-ninth.

“By the President: ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

“WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.”

This Proclamation, and Mr. Lincoln's course as to the Reconstruction Bill, passed by a large majority in both Houses, were mistakes in the light of subsequent events. They were also mistakes, perhaps, in reference to his own powers in the face of a Congress loyal by an overwhelming majority. Yet, under the circumstances, these mistakes were not an adequate apology for the appearance of a paper in very harsh, intemperate, and exaggerated terms signed by B. F. Wade and Henry Winter Davis condemning and

criticising the President's course in the whole matter. These men were chairmen of the respective committees in the two Houses having in hand the parts of the President's Message relating to reconstruction, and Mr. Davis presented the bill which the President neglected to sign. The motive which seemed to move their attack on Mr. Lincoln was based upon the part they had taken in the construction of the bill. At all events, the harm that Mr. Lincoln had done to his own cause, was greatly augmented by their appeal to the people. The "Opposition" made all they could of this affair, but when November came, the result at the polls told plainly enough in whom the people placed confidence.

Towards the close of December, 1861, Mr. Howe, of Wisconsin, introduced in the Senate a bill for the repeal of the "Fugitive Slave Act" of 1850. This bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee and there lay until the spring of 1863. David Wilmot and Henry Wilson also made efforts in 1862 to bring about some legislation for the destruction of this obnoxious Act; and a number of petitions kept the matter before Congress, but nothing was done. Soon after the session opened in 1863, Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, offered a bill for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 and the Amendatory Act of 1850. Mr. Ashley, of Ohio, and George W. Julian, of Indiana, also presented bills for the same purpose. In January, 1864, Charles Sumner in the Senate moved the appointment of a committee of seven to consider all matters pertaining to slavery

and the treatment of slaves. Of the committee, five were strong anti-slavery men. From this committee, late in February, Mr. Sumner introduced a bill for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Act, and with it an exhaustive report. Carlile, of West Virginia, and the Democrat, Buckalew, of Pennsylvania, as the minority of the committee of seven, also made a report against the majority bill. After a long, and to some extent, foolish wrangle, Mr. Sumner's bill was laid on the table and not taken up. Early in June Daniel Morris, of New York, in the House introduced "A bill to repeal the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, and all acts, and parts of acts, for the rendition of fugitive slaves." On the 13th of the same month this bill was passed by a vote of eighty-two to fifty-seven. A week later through Mr. Sumner this bill was brought to the consideration of the Senate, and on the 23d was passed by twenty-seven yeas against twelve nays. And thus passed away this troublesome law, which had been virtually dead since the fall of Sumter, like everything else belonging to slavery; and all this turmoil about it now did no more than to aid in the irrevocable establishment of the decree which had gone forth in the Emancipation Proclamation.

CHAPTER XX.

WAR OF THE REBELLION — MR. LINCOLN'S BURDENS —
HIS SPEECH AT GETTYSBURG—MEDDLESOME HORACE
GREELEY'S DOUBTFUL CONDUCT—PSEUDO ATTEMPTS
AT NEGOTIATION.

BEYOND what may be termed his legitimate official duties the demands made upon the President were onerous and trying. Few who sought him were ever turned away. Without a vast degree of sympathy for sufferings liable to befall all, and which should be borne without publicity, and little or no respect for the needless, officious, or impertinent efforts of men to be seen and heard, he felt it his duty to care for all, however laborious the task. It was his way of being President. What he considered it his duty to do, he did not intrust to another. It was expected of him, and he did it.

Mr. Lincoln was largely imbued with the feeling that he could do better than others what he had to do. He had carried this feeling with him from the times of his first physical conquests at Gentryville and New Salem. And when it came to an argument or a defense he never forgot his battles with Judge Douglas. While deferring so little, and yet so much, to the opinions and wants of others, he re-examined his

motives and acts at every apparent adverse decision of the people.

When Horace Greeley, who gave Mr. Lincoln no little trouble, wrote his impertinent letter, under date of August 19, 1862, he was greatly surprised to receive an answer. While he went on the common error that it was proper and to be expected that every man who wanted to do so should attack, advise, or abuse a President, he did not think Mr. Lincoln would depart from the standard of silent dignity prescribed for Presidents. Thus it was that Mr. Lincoln was found writing carefully worded and thoughtful letters to the Governor of New York about his draft riots, and to Fernando Wood about his injurious fabrications, schemes, or something, concerning peace; long, carefully prepared, and caustic letters to the Copperheads of New York and Ohio; voluminous and meaty letters to the factionists in Missouri; letters to Churches and officious, consequential, and gushing preachers; letters to political quacks and schemers; letters to military adventurers and self-promoters; to scores of fault-finders, and hundreds of earnest and sham eulogists and flatterers; to the reconstructionists in Louisiana and Arkansas; to weak-kneed Union men in Kentucky; letters to the "working-men" of Manchester and London, England; a long letter to the "working-men" of New York, pleasing and pampering them by accepting a foolishly proffered membership in their society; and so on to almost endless extent; speeches to soldiers who must see Father Abraham; little speeches at sanitary fairs,

in Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia; and speeches and letters in place and out of place. There was no rest for Lincoln. The burdens of the Nation he bore, and when the picture of the slain rose before him, and the thousands of appeals for the maimed, the suffering, and the needy were daily presented to him, it was no wonder that he should exclaim: "I shall never be glad again."

One of the most interesting of all these letters written by Mr. Lincoln is the following, which sufficiently explains itself:—

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
"December 23, 1863. }

"I have just looked over a petition signed by some three dozen citizens of St. Louis, and their accompanying letters, one by yourself, one by a Mr. Nathan Ranney, and one by a Mr. John D. Coalter, the whole relating to the Rev. Dr. McPheeters. The petition prays, in the name of justice and mercy, that I will restore Dr. McPheeters to all his ecclesiastical rights.

"This gives no intimation as to what ecclesiastical rights are withdrawn. Your letter states that Provost Marshal Dick, about a year ago, ordered the arrest of Dr. McPheeters, pastor of the Vine Street Church, prohibited him from officiating, and placed the management of affairs of the Church out of the control of the chosen trustees; and, near the close, you state that a certain course 'would insure his release.' Mr. Ranney's letter says: 'Dr. Samuel McPheeters is enjoying all the rights of a civilian, but can not preach the gospel!' Mr. Coalter, in his letter, asks: 'Is it not a strange illustration of the condition of things, that the question who shall be allowed to preach in a church in St. Louis shall be decided by the President of the United States?'

"Now, all this sounds very strangely; and, withal, a little as if you gentlemen making the application do not understand the case alike—one affirming that this Doctor is enjoying all the rights of a civilian, and another pointing out to me what will secure his *release*! On the 2d of January last I wrote to General Curtis in relation to Mr. Dick's order upon Dr. McPheeters; and, as I suppose the Doctor is enjoying all the rights of a civilian, I only quote that part of my letter which relates to the Church. It was as follows: 'But I must add that the United States Government must not, as by this order, undertake to run the Churches. When an individual, in a Church or out of it, becomes dangerous to the public interest, he must be checked; but the Churches, as such, must take care of themselves. It will not do for the United States to appoint trustees, supervisors, or other agents for the Churches.'

"This letter going to General Curtis, then in command, I supposed, of course, it was obeyed, especially as I heard no further complaint from Dr. Mc. or his friends for nearly an entire year. I have never interfered, nor thought of interfering, as to who shall or shall not preach in any Church; nor have I knowingly or believingly tolerated any one else to interfere by my authority. If any one is so interfering by color of my authority, I would like to have it specially made known to me.

"If, after all, what is now sought is to have me put Dr. Mc. back over the heads of a majority of his own congregation, that, too, will be declined. I will not have control of any Church or any side. A. LINCOLN."

On the 19th of November, 1863, a great concourse of loyal people assembled at Gettysburg to engage in the ceremony of setting aside, as a sacred spot on the bosom of "mother earth," the ground containing the mortal remains of the loyal soldiers who had

fallen in the great battle there. Among them were the President and his Cabinet. Edward Everett was the orator of the occasion, but his polished speech did not satisfy the demand of the moment. The eyes of the vast assembly were upon the weary President. After leaving Washington he had written a little speech, and this he now stood forward, with bowed form, and pronounced impressively:—

“Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new Nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that Nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We are met to dedicate a portion of it as the final resting-place of those who here gave their lives that that Nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

“But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate, we can not consecrate, we can not hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work that they have thus far so nobly carried on. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us; that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to the cause for which they here gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that the dead shall not have died in vain; that the Nation shall, under God, have a new birth of freedom, and that the Government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

This simple and beautiful speech touched the sympathetic chord, and partly from its own merit and partly from the sad end of the strange and interesting man who uttered it, it will live in the literary history of this country when the lofty periods of the Massachusetts scholar and orator shall be lost.

Two events may now be described, which, although coming under the head of political trickery, form a link in the story of the times. Horace Greeley, one of the poorest judges of men and things in the world, and yet who had an insatiable itching to put his nose or finger in everything going on, a fact which everybody knew, early in July, 1864, received a letter from a rebel in Canada, leading him to the belief that authorized agents from Jefferson Davis were awaiting to proceed to Washington to negotiate for peace. Mr. Greeley had taken up the utterly baseless notion that this was the way to reach peace, and that the war should be stopped, and for some months he had been blundering about in "The Tribune," and otherwise, in vain to find a clew.

On the 7th of July he wrote the President a long letter, inclosing the one he had received from Canada. In this letter he not only begged the President to harbor these unauthorized frauds from Canada, but told him that he did not understand the demand of the people for peace; that something must be done to prevent a Northern insurrection; and then laid down a plan of settlement, finally telling the President that if he did not deem it advisable to make an offer of terms to the rebels, he should listen to what

they had to say. A few days later, owing to another letter received from Canada, Mr. Greeley wrote the President, on the 13th, that he had reliable information that authorized agents were awaiting near Niagara Falls to confer with him, or any commissioners of his appointment. Two days afterwards Mr. Lincoln, in replying to this letter, said:—

“I am disappointed that you have not already reached here with those commissioners. If they would consent to come on being shown my letter to you on the 9th instant, show that and this to them; and, if they will consent to come on the terms stated in the former, bring them. I not only intend a sincere effort for peace, but I intend that you shall be a personal witness that it is made.”

Mr. Hay, the private secretary of the President, carried this message to New York, and having the authority to make out a passport, at the suggestion of Mr. Greeley included in it the names of four persons, Clement C. Clay, Jacob Thompson (Secretary of the Navy under Buchanan), James P. Holcombe, and the wild, unreliable, revolutionary George N. Sanders. On the 17th Mr. Greeley arrived at Niagara Falls, and at once notified these men that he was ready to furnish them a safe conduct to Washington as the authorized agents of the rebel authorities. This brought him a letter from Clay and Holcombe, Thompson never at any time appearing in the intrigue, informing him that there was a mistake about their being authorized peace negotiators from Jefferson Davis, but stating that they were in his confidence, and any satisfactory steps on their part

toward peace would be received well at Richmond. This showed Mr. Greeley that he had been going too fast. These men had not authorized the representations he had made to the President, and on which with terms affixed the safe conduct had been granted. Mr. Greeley now substantially acknowledged this fact to them, and sent to Washington for further orders. Mr. John Hay was now hastened off to Niagara with this communication :—

“EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C., }
 “July 18, 1864. }

“TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN :—

“Any propositions which embrace the restoration of peace, *the integrity of the whole Union*, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”

The matter had now gone as far as it could go, and as far as it was designed to go from the first. Mr. Greeley went home, and Clay and Holcombe wrote him a long letter dated on the 21st. This letter may or may not have been dictated by Northern Copperheads who were in communication with these men, but it was ingeniously constructed to favor their purposes in the coming elections, as well as to aid the rebel cause abroad. The foundation for the semblance of strength which their letter acquired Mr. Greeley had supplied, and though he did this

through his anxiety for the accomplishment of something always impossible, he not only refused to undo the wrong he had done, but gave himself, to some extent, to the work of confirming and aggravating it. This letter accused the President of opening the door unconditionally for untrammelled, liberal negotiations, and then closing it by an utter change of his purposes and pretenses in the communication of the 18th addressed "To whom it may concern." This, they said, presented the case in an entirely different aspect from the first impressions they had of the President's disposition. It was a rude withdrawal, they said, of a courteous overture for negotiations. And although the letter is purposely couched in evasive terms as to any conditions which would have been acceptable to the rebels, and purposely and absolutely falsely conveys the idea that an opportunity honorable to the Union was now rudely thrown away, still they were not able to get through it, without revealing themselves and revealing what the President had long known and what Horace Greeley and everybody else had just as good grounds for knowing. They said:—

"Whilst an ardent desire for peace pervades the people of the Confederate States, we rejoice to believe that there are few, if any, among them, who would purchase it at the expense of liberty, honor, and self-respect. If it can be secured only by submission to terms of conquest, the generation is yet unborn which will witness its restitution. If there be any military autocrat in the North, who is entitled to proffer the conditions of this manifesto, there is none in the South authorized to entertain them."

These irresponsible men well knew before they set out on this affair what would be the result of it, and never designed it for anything but political effect, and everything had worked to their hand. They knew they could offer but one proposition, unconditional independence for the South, and that could never be listened to by the Government. The utter falsity of their position and their letter was plain enough. But the point where Mr. Lincoln was affected was in the charge of his change from his original hope he had held out at first to "no truce to rebels, except to bury their dead, until every man shall have laid down his arms, submitted to the Government, and sued for mercy."

Mr. Lincoln's first letter to Greeley about this affair was as follows :—

"WASHINGTON, D. C., July 9, 1864.

"HON. HORACE GREELEY :—

"DEAR SIR,—Your letter of the 7th, with inclosures received. If you can find any person anywhere professing to have any proposition of Jefferson Davis, in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union and abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him he may come to me with you, and that if he really brings such proposition, he shall, at the least, have safe conduct with the paper (and without publicity if he chooses) to the point where you shall have met him. The same if there be two or more persons. Yours truly,

"A. LINCOLN.

This was the only letter written by the President on the subject, except that on the 15th, given substantially already. So at the outset he had told Mr.

Greeley, in substance, what he said in the communication "To whom it may concern," and he had never intimated anything else. He had not changed. Mr. Greeley, however had failed to show the Canada rebels Mr. Lincoln's letters of the 9th and 15th, as he had been directed to do, and had told them nothing about the conditions of their safe conduct, and when this letter, which was a wholly false political fabrication, was published, he gave it strength by holding out the untruth that the President had changed from good to bad between the 9th and the 18th of July. The "Opposition" or "Copperheads," as they were called, now burst out in a furious assault on the President, taking this letter of the two rebels and this pseudo attempt at negotiation as their text. Every evil to the country and its cause, that was possible, was made out of it.

Mr. Lincoln felt deeply the injury Mr. Greeley had done to him and the country, and with a view of correcting it, applied to him for the publication of their full correspondence, omitting such parts of Mr. Greeley's letters as he thought would be mischievous, relating to his predicted insurrections in the North, and similar foolishness. But Mr. Greeley refused to have any part of his letters, utterly inadmissible, really, throughout, printed, without the extremely bad parts as well. So Mr. Lincoln, concluding that he should suffer the injustice to himself, dropped the matter, hoping the people would take that view of the case which the good of the Nation required.

The following letter from him to the editor of "The New York Times" must end the matter here:—

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, }
"August 15, 1864. }

"HON. HENRY J. RAYMOND:—

"MY DEAR SIR,—I have proposed to Mr. Greeley that the Niagara correspondence be published, suppressing only the parts of his letters over which the red pencil is drawn in the copy which I herewith send. He declines giving his consent to the publication of his letters, unless these parts be published with the rest. I have concluded that it is better for *me* to submit, for the time, to the consequences of the false position in which I consider he has placed me, than to subject the *country* to the consequences of publishing these discouraging and injurious parts. I send you this, and the accompanying copy, not for publication, but merely to explain to you, and that you preserve them until their proper time shall come.

"Yours truly, ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

About the same time another effort, no doubt designed for a similar purpose, political effect, was made in a different direction. Colonel James F Jaques and J. R. Gillmore (Edmund Kirk) without authority from Mr. Lincoln got permission to pass through the lines to go to Richmond, where they had a long interview with Jefferson Davis, and in which they drew from him this statement:—

"I desire peace as much as you do; I deplore bloodshed as much as you do; but I feel that not one drop of the blood shed in this war is on my hands. I can look up to my God and say this. I tried all in my power to avert this war. I saw it coming, and for twelve years I worked night and day to prevent it; but I could not.

The North was mad and blind; it would not let us govern ourselves; and so the war came; and now it must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks, and his children seize his musket and fight our battle, unless you acknowledge our right to self-government. We are not fighting for slavery. We are fighting for independence, and that or extermination we will have. . . .

“Say to Mr. Lincoln, from me, that I shall at any time be pleased to receive proposals for peace on the basis of our independence. It will be useless to approach me with any other.”

This statement drawn from Mr. Davis was worth a great deal to the national cause, politically and otherwise, at home and abroad. It settled the matter indisputably that the war must go on until the Rebellion was overthrown. This fact was well known before. The rebels had never lost an opportunity to express themselves. They wanted no compromise with the Yankees. In the face of all these things, could it be believed that the men who talked of compromise, conciliation, amicable settlement, and restoration of the Union were sincere? Would changing the Administration of public affairs at such a crisis into the hands of the Democratic party, as then organized, restore the Union? Was not all this “Opposition” madness and folly a part of the war for the establishment of slavery and the overthrow of the Union?

The following rebel opinions must serve to close this chapter:—

“The time for compromise has now passed, and the South is determined to maintain her position, and make all who oppose

her smell Southern powder and feel Southern steel if coercion is persisted in. He had no doubts as to the result. He said we will maintain our rights and government at all hazards. We ask nothing, we want nothing; we will have no complications. If the other States join our confederation they can freely come in on our terms. Our separation from the old Union is now complete. No compromise, no reconstruction is now to be entertained." (Jefferson Davis, at Montgomery, February 16, 1861.)

"I am against it now and forever. What have we worked for? Simply a new constitution? No! we sought to be relieved of the North because they were fleecing us; giving fishing bounties and otherwise squandering the public treasure, and filling their pockets from our labors. I would not unite with them if they were to bind themselves in amounts more than they were worth, and give me a distress warrant to sell them out. I wish the people of Georgia to say: This shall be a slaveholding confederacy, and nothing else." (T. R. R. Cobb, of Georgia at Atlanta, in 1861, on reconstruction.)

"It can not be that the people of the Confederate States can again entertain a feeling of affection and respect for the Government of the United States. We have, therefore, separated from them; and now let it be understood that the separation is and ought to be final and irrevocable; that Virginia 'will under no circumstances entertain any proposition from any quarter which may have for its object a restoration or reconstruction of the late Union, on any terms or conditions whatever.'" (Governor Letcher, of Virginia, in December, 1862.)

"It is a favorite idea with a great many, that possibly the old order of things could be restored; that our rights under that Constitution could be guaranteed to us, and everything move on peacefully as before the war. My friends, there are a great many desirable things; but the question, not what may be wished, but what may be obtained, is the one reasonable men may consider. It is desirable to have a lovely wife and plenty of pretty children; but every man can't have them. I tell you now, candidly, there is no more possibility of reconstructing the old Union and reinstating things as they were four years

ago than exists for you to gather up the scattered bones of your sons who have fallen in this struggle from one end of the country to the other, re-clothe them with flesh, fill their veins with the blood they have so generously shed, and their lungs with the same breath with which they breathed out their last prayer for their country's triumph and independence." (Governor Vance, of North Carolina, in a speech at Wilkesboro, in 1864.)

'No one, however, knows better than Abraham Lincoln that any terms he might offer the Southern people which contemplate their restoration to his bloody and brutal Government, would be rejected with scorn and execration. If, instead of devoting to death our President and military and civil officers, he had proposed to make Jefferson Davis his successor, Lee Commander-in-Chief of the Yankee armies, and our domestic institutions not only recognized at home, but readopted in the Free States, provided the South would once more enter the Yankee Union, there is not a man, woman, or child in the Confederacy who would not spit upon the proposition. We desire no companionship upon any terms with a Nation of robbers and murderers. The miscreants, whose atrocities in this war have caused the whole civilized world to shudder, must keep, henceforth, their distance. They shall not be our masters, and we would not have them for our slaves." ("The Dispatch," in discussing Mr. Lincoln's Amnesty Proclamation.)

CHAPTER XXI.

1864—WAR OF THE REBELLION—NOMINATIONS—CANDIDATES—PLATFORMS—PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION—
NO SWAPPING HORSES WHILE CROSSING
A STREAM—THE CABINET.

THE friends of the prosecution of the war, the undoubted Union men of the country, were greatly divided at the beginning of this year. Indeed, a bitter and wicked faction was organized among those who had been supporters of the Administration, and classed under the head of Republican. For a time the influence of this faction was exceedingly injurious to the national cause; more so, perhaps, than that of the "Copperheads," in effect at all times the allies of the Rebellion. This faction vehemently opposed the renomination of Mr. Lincoln for the Presidency; attacked his official acts, the policy and conduct of public affairs under him; attacked his character; and in its general course greatly disturbed the country, as well as weakened foreign confidence. "The New York Tribune" and many other Republican newspapers systematically opposed the renomination of Mr. Lincoln, although their opposition was tempered, to some extent, by a sense of the injury they were likely to render the country. But few of these men could or would ever

see that they were then placing themselves side by side with the enemies of the country, of the Union, and would be so fixed and adjudged in future times. With a view of quieting or dispersing this faction, the friends of the Administration, and as it proved, the true friends of the Union, took steps to hold the nominating convention at an unusually early day. This movement met the energetic protest of the Republican malcontents who wanted more time to infect and distract public sentiment. Of course, the leaders of the anti-Lincoln or anti-Administration Republicans were mainly men who had failed in their schemes of self-advancement, or failed to have things their own way. They were disappointed aspirants for military glory; disappointed office-seekers; disappointed schemers for this and that; Abolitionists who wanted slavery crushed out at once whether it could be done or not; men of wild and unreasonable theories; men who had asked and not received; they were of the men who always rise up in every time of calamity to disturb the common harmony, to demand what can not or should not be done, and who themselves could not do what they seemed to desire, if all possible power were given them.

On the 1st of May these Republican factionists issued a call for a convention to meet in Cleveland on the last day of that month. In this call it was said: "The time has come for all independent men, jealous of their liberties and of the national greatness, to confer together and unite to resist the swelling invasion of an open, shameless, and unrestrained

patronage which threatens to engulf under its destructive wave the rights of the people, the liberty and dignity of the Nation." Several other calls for the same convention were made, and all of them were expressed in similarly foolish and untrue language, and signed by men then and ever afterwards equally undistinguished. The convention met at Cleveland, Ohio, according to the call, with fifteen States and the District of Columbia represented by self-appointed delegates. Most of them were the friends of Fremont, and a very large per cent of them were Germans. General John Cochrane, of New York, was permanent president, and on taking the chair made a very extravagant speech.

John C. Fremont was nominated by acclamation as the candidate for President, and with few dissenting votes John Cochrane was chosen for the Vice-Presidency. A platform in keeping with the character of the convention was adopted, and both candidates accepted the "distinguished honor." General Fremont's letter of acceptance dated June 4, 1864, was marked by especial severity towards the Administration, and was a source of deep regret to many who had formerly held him, perhaps, undeservedly high. Of this letter Governor Morton, of Indiana, said :—

"I carried the standard of General Fremont to the best of my poor ability through the canvass of 1856, and I have since endeavored to sustain him, not only as a politician, but as a military chieftain, and never until I read this letter did I have occasion to regret what I have done.

It has been read with joy by his enemies and with pain by his friends, and omitting one or two sentences, there is nothing in it that might not have been written or subscribed without inconsistency by Mr. Vallandigham."

This was the general verdict. Fremont finally declined to make the race, not, as he said for the benefit of Mr. Lincoln, whom, in his greatness, he considered at that time an utter failure, but for the sake of defeating McClellan of whom he thought much worse. This was, appropriately, the end of the political and military careers of General Fremont; and it may well be doubted whether he had the necessary qualities for success either as a politician or a general; a statesman, in any high sense of the word, he was not. Not always in a practicable and safe sense was he even a "Pathfinder."

At noon on Tuesday, June 7th, the Republican or Union National Convention assembled in Baltimore. Robert J. Breckinridge, the distinguished Kentucky Presbyterian clergyman, was chosen temporary president, and on taking the chair, made a long, stirring speech, in which he clearly indicated that before the convention began its work it was well known who the chief on the ticket would be; the loyal people whom the convention represented, had but one candidate, and it had assembled to execute their will. In the afternoon a permanent organization was effected, with ex-Governor William Dennison, of Ohio, as chairman.

On the following morning the matter of credentials was disposed of by admitting the Radical Union dele-

gation of the two delegations presenting themselves from Missouri, and admitting delegates from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Tennessee with equal voting privileges of those from other States, although this course was not in harmony with the Act of Congress excluding the people of rebel States from participation in national affairs. A delegation from South Carolina appeared, but this State was not admitted. Delegates from Florida and Virginia were admitted without the right to vote. The most noted character, perhaps, in this convention was Parson W. G. Brownlow, of Tennessee.

It was now moved to nominate Mr. Lincoln by acclamation, but this meeting some opposition, a ballot was taken giving him all the votes of the convention except those from Missouri, which, under instructions, were cast for General Grant. Mr. Lincoln's renomination was then made unanimous.

The candidates for the Vice-Presidency were Hannibal Hamlin, the incumbent; Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee; and Daniel S. Dickinson, of New York. On the first ballot Mr. Johnson received two hundred, Vice-President Hamlin one hundred and forty-five, Mr. Dickinson one hundred and thirteen, General B. F. Butler twenty-eight, Lovell H. Rousseau, of Kentucky, twenty-one, and twelve were scattered among others. Votes were now changed in favor of Andrew Johnson, and his nomination made unanimous. After the appointment of an "Executive Committee" the convention adjourned.

On the following day, Thursday 9th, Mr. Lincoln was waited upon at the White House and duly notified of his renomination, on which occasion he made a brief speech, and gave unmistakable evidence of his gratification with the action of the convention

The following is Mr. Lincoln's formal letter of acceptance :—

“ EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, {
“ June 27, 1864. } ”

“ HON. WILLIAM DENNISON and others, a Committee of the National Union Convention :

“ GENTLEMEN,—Your letter of the 14th instant formally notifying me that I have been nominated by the convention you represent for the Presidency of the United States for four years from the 4th of March next, has been received. The nomination is gratefully accepted, as the resolutions of the convention, called the platform, are heartily approved.

“ While the resolution in regard to the supplanting of republican government upon the Western Continent is fully concurred in, there might be misunderstanding were I not to say that the position of the Government in relation to the action of France in Mexico as assumed through the State Department and indorsed by the convention, among the measures and acts of the Executive, will be faithfully maintained so long as the state of facts shall leave that position pertinent and applicable.

“ I am especially gratified that the soldier and the seaman were not forgotten by the convention, as they forever must and will be remembered by the grateful country for whose salvation they devote their lives.

“ Thanking you for the kind and complimentary terms in which you have communicated the nomination and other proceedings of the convention, I subscribe myself,

“ Your obedient servant, ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”

On the 29th of August the Democrats met in convention in Chicago and nominated General George Brinton McClellan for the Presidency and George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, an anti-war Democrat, for the Vice-Presidency. Some account of this convention is to be found in the last volume of this work.

The Republican malcontents still made some effort to organize an opposition to Mr. Lincoln, but this finally gave way under the strong unanimity with which the patriotic and the friends of the prosecution of the war joined in his support, and by the first Tuesday in November the followers of General McClellan and the Chicago platform were about the only visible opponents of the President or his policy.

The strong peace wing of the Democracy, or the Copperheads, made every possible attack on Mr. Lincoln, on what they supposed to be his private conduct as well as his administration of public affairs, and the false was not distinguished from the true. The newspapers gave a wide circulation to every slander. Never were charges so vengeful and heartless made against any Presidential candidate, perhaps, as those against Mr. Lincoln at this time. That they were in the main or wholly foundationless fabrications, no one would now question. The common history of political campaigns was, however, but repeating itself, only in its most bitter and venomous form. Nor were the Republicans far behind their misguided opponents in the use of those instruments which render political contests disgraceful and disgusting to the refined and the true. As the contest

deepened, the war or loyal party dropped its own dissensions, and the anti-war Democrats became reconciled to their candidate, who was not willing to acknowledge that the war had been a failure. Military events strengthened the side of the Administration, and long before the day of the election the loyal people had decided who should be President, had decided that it was unwise and unsafe to swap horses while crossing a stream.

During all this time Mr. Lincoln was as usual unswerving in well-doing. He neglected no just and reasonable method of producing harmony in his own party, or among the temporary supporters of the Administration and the war. On the 23d of September, 1864, he invited Mr. Blair to withdraw from his Cabinet, and in his place he put Ex-Governor William Dennison, of Ohio. Mr. Chase also withdrew from the Cabinet, and in July, 1864, William Pitt Fessenden, of Maine, took his position, giving place in March, 1865, to Hugh McCulloch. In January of the previous year Caleb B. Smith had been displaced in the Interior Department by John P. Usher, of Indiana.

These changes, to a great extent, were made in accordance with the demands of the party, and not from any want of harmony with the President. Mr. Blair had been an able and practical Postmaster-General, and under his management and suggestion were brought about some valuable reforms in the mail service of the country. Although some of these reforms were expensive they have greatly contributed

towards the perfection of the system, and, several causes operating in his favor, he was enabled to overcome to a great extent the long standing deficits in the revenue of his Department. Under him the free delivery system in cities, and the railway service were greatly and beneficially modified or entirely changed; the postal money-order system was introduced, which, after the first year, has continually brought a net income to the Department; foreign postal conventions were effected, and other progressive and beneficial acts serve to leave the mark of this Cabinet officer upon the history of public administrations. Under Mr. Blair's energetic successor the management of this useful Department of the Government was efficient and admirable.

Of the Treasury Department little need be said here. The "greenbacks'" author will not readily be forgotten, in the face of the financial ruins of the past, by a race of money-lovers and money-getters. The personal relations between the President and Mr. Chase were not, probably, the best, but there had been no time after the occasion arose, in the death of Chief Justice Taney, when Mr. Lincoln did not design offering this successful financier and aspirant for the Presidency the place he took on the Supreme Bench.

On the 18th of July, 1864, the President issued a proclamation calling for five hundred thousand soldiers, and providing for a draft to supply deficiencies. On the 20th of December another call was issued for three hundred thousand more. Two other calls, in February and March, had also been made in

this year, amounting to seven hundred thousand, so that on this election year one million and a half of troops had been called for by the President in spite of the "Opposition" cry of "no more men and not a dollar of money for this cruel war." Besides these enormous demands on the people, a hundred thousand hundred days' men were gratuitously furnished by the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin.

Besides working, the President wrote several important letters during this political canvass, nor did he hesitate to speak when called upon to do so. On the occasion of a serenade on the 19th of October, Mr. Lincoln appeared in front of the White House and said :—

"FRIENDS AND FELLOW-CITIZENS,—I am notified that this is a compliment paid me by the loyal Marylanders resident in this District. I infer that the adoption of the new Constitution for that State furnishes the occasion, and that in your view the extirpation of slavery constitutes the chief merit of the new Constitution. Most heartily do I congratulate you and Maryland, and the Nation and the world, upon the event. I regret that it did not occur two years sooner, which I am sure would have saved to the Nation more money than would have met all the private loss incident to the measure. But it has come at last, and I sincerely hope its friends may fully realize all their anticipations of good from it, and that its opponents may by its effect be agreeably and profitably disappointed.

"A word upon another subject. Something was said by the Secretary of State, in his recent speech at Auburn, which has been construed by some into a threat that if I

should be beaten at the election, I will, between then and the end of my Constitutional term, do what I may be able to ruin the Government. Others regard the fact that the Chicago Convention adjourned, not *sine die*, but to meet again if called to do so by a particular individual, as the intimation of a purpose that if their nominee shall be elected he will at once seize control of the Government.

"I hope the good people will permit themselves to suffer no uneasiness on either point. I am struggling to maintain the Government; not to overthrow it. I am struggling especially to prevent others from overthrowing it, and I therefore say, that if I shall live, I shall remain President until the 4th of next March, and that whoever shall be constitutionally elected thereto in November, shall be duly installed as President on the 4th of March, and that in the meantime I shall do my utmost, that whoever is to hold the helm for the next voyage shall start with the best possible chance to save the ship. This is due to the people, both on principle and under the Constitution. Their will, Constitutionally expressed, is the ultimate law for all.

"If they should deliberately resolve to have immediate peace, even at the loss of their country and their liberties, I know not the power or the right to resist them. It is their own business, and they must do as they please with their own. I believe, however, they are still resolved to preserve their country and their liberty, and in this, in office or out of it, I am resolved to stand by them.

"I may add that in this purpose, to save the country and its liberties, no classes of people seem so nearly unanimous as the soldiers in the field and the seamen afloat. Do they not have the hardest of it? Who should quail while they do not?

"God bless the soldiers and seamen, with all their brave commanders!"

Mr. Lincoln was again successful by an overwhelming majority. Some further account of this election is to be found in the last volume of this work. How the President himself viewed the result may be seen in the following speech, delivered at the White House on the night of the election :—

“FRIENDS AND FELLOW-CITIZENS,—Even before I had been informed by you that this compliment was paid me by loyal citizens of Pennsylvania friendly to me, I had inferred that you were of that portion of my countrymen who think that the best interests of the Nation are to be subserved by the support of the present Administration. I do not pretend to say that you, who think so, embrace all the patriotism and loyalty of the country; but I do believe, and I trust without personal interest, that the welfare of the country does require that such support and indorsement be given. I earnestly believe that the consequences of this day’s work, if it be as you assume, and as now seems probable, will be to the lasting advantage if not to the very salvation of the country. I can not, at this hour, say what has been the result of the election, but whatever it may be, I have no desire to modify this opinion; that all who have labored to-day in behalf of the Union organization, have wrought for the best interest of their country and the world, not only for the present but for all future ages. I am thankful to God for this approval of the people; but while deeply grateful for this mark of their confidence in me, if I know my heart, my gratitude is free from any taint of personal triumph. I do not impugn the motives of any one opposed to me. It is no pleasure to me to triumph over any one, but I give thanks to the Almighty for this evidence of the people’s resolution to stand by free government and the rights of humanity.”

On the 10th of November, General Grant, who was almost equally concerned with Mr. Lincoln in the result of the election, wrote:—

“CITY POINT, November 10, 1864—10.30 P. M.

“HON. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War:—

“Enough now seems to be known to say who is to hold the reins of Government for the next four years.

“Congratulate the President for me for this double victory.

“The election having passed off quietly, no bloodshed or riot throughout the land, is a victory worth more to the country than a battle won.

“Rebeldom and Europe will construe it so.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.”

On the same night the President had just made this remarkable speech to a large procession gathered around the Executive Mansion:—

“FRIENDS AND FELLOW-CITIZENS,—It has long been a grave question whether any government not *too* strong for the liberties of its people can be strong *enough* to maintain its own existence in great emergencies. On this point the present Rebellion brought our Republic to a severe test; and a Presidential election, occurring in regular course during the Rebellion, added not a little to the strain.

“If the loyal people *united* were put to the utmost of their strength by the Rebellion, must they not fall when *divided* and partially paralyzed by a political war among themselves?

“But the election was a necessity. We can not have free government without elections; and if the Rebellion could force us to forego or postpone a national election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered and

ruined us. The strife of the election is but human nature practically applied to the facts of the case. What has occurred in this case must ever recur in similar cases. Human nature will not change. In any future great national trial, compared with the men of this, we shall have as weak and as strong, as silly and as wise, as bad and as good.

“Let us, therefore, study the incidents of this, as philosophy to learn wisdom from, and none of them as wrongs to be revenged.

“But the election, along with its incidental and undesirable strife, has done good, too. It has demonstrated that a people’s government can sustain a national election in the midst of a great civil war. Until now, it has not been known to the world that this was a possibility. It shows, also, how sound and how strong we still are. It shows that, even among candidates of the same party, he who is most devoted to the Union, and most opposed to treason, can receive most of the people’s votes. It shows, also, to the extent yet known, that we have more men now than we had when the war began. Gold is good in its place, but living, brave, patriotic men, are better than gold.

“But the Rebellion continues; and now that the election is over, may not all, having a common interest, reunite in a common effort to save our common country? For my own part, I have striven, and will strive, to avoid placing any obstacle in the way. So long as I have been here, I have not willingly planted a thorn in any man’s bosom.

“While I am deeply sensible to the high compliment of a re-election, and duly grateful, as I trust, to Almighty God, for having directed my countrymen to a right conclusion, as I think, for their own good, it adds nothing to my satisfaction that any other man may be disappointed or pained by the result.

“ May I ask those who have not differed with me to join with me in the same spirit towards those who have ”

“ And now, let me close by asking three hearty cheers for our brave soldiers and seamen, and their gallant and skillful commanders.”

CHAPTER XXII.

1864—WAR OF THE REBELLION—CONGRESS IN THE WINTER
OF 1864—LAST SESSION UNDER MR. LINCOLN—
FOURTH ANNUAL MESSAGE—END
OF SLAVERY.

ON Monday, December 5, 1864, Congress again assembled (last session of the "Thirty-eighth Congress"), and on the following day the President sent to both Houses his

FOURTH ANNUAL MESSAGE.

FELLOW—CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:—

Again the blessings of health and abundant harvests claim our profoundest gratitude to Almighty God.

The condition of our foreign affairs is reasonably satisfactory.

Mexico continues to be a theater of civil war. While our political relations with that country have undergone no change, we have, at the same time, strictly maintained neutrality between the belligerents.

At the request of the States of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, a competent engineer has been authorized to make a survey of the river San Juan and the port of San Juan. It is a source of much satisfaction that the difficulties which for a moment excited some political apprehensions, and caused a closing of the interoceanic transit route, have been amicably adjusted, and that there is a good prospect that the route will soon be re-opened with an increase of capacity and adaptation. We could not exaggerate either the commercial or the political importance of that great improvement.

It would be doing injustice to an important South American State not to acknowledge the directness, frankness, and cor-

diality with which the United States of Colombia have entered into intimate relations with this Government. A claims convention has been constituted to complete the unfinished work of the one which closed its session in 1861.

The new liberal constitution of Venezuela having gone into effect with the universal acquiescence of the people, the government under it has been recognized, and diplomatic intercourse with it has opened in a cordial and friendly spirit. The long deferred Aves Island claim has been satisfactorily paid and discharged.

Mutual payments have been made of the claims awarded by the late joint commission for the settlement of claims between the United States and Peru. An earnest and cordial friendship continues to exist between the two countries, and such efforts as were in my power have been used to remove misunderstanding and avert a threatened war between Peru and Spain.

Our relations are of the most friendly nature with Chili, the Argentine Republic, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Paraguay, San Salvador, and Hayti.

During the past year no differences of any kind have arisen with any of those republics, and, on the other hand, their sympathies with the United States are constantly expressed with cordiality and earnestness.

The claim arising from the seizure of the cargo of the brig *Macedonian* in 1821 has been paid in full by the government of Chili.

Civil war continues in the Spanish part of San Domingo, apparently without prospect of an early close.

Official correspondence has been freely opened with Liberia, and it gives us a pleasing view of social and political progress in that Republic. It may be expected to derive new vigor from American influence, improved by the rapid disappearance of slavery in the United States.

I solicit your authority to furnish to the Republic a gun-boat at moderate cost, to be reimbursed to the United States by installments. Such a vessel is needed for the safety of that State against the native African races; and in Liberian hands it would be more effective in arresting the African slave-trade than a squadron in our own hands. The possession of the least

organized naval force would stimulate a generous ambition in the Republic, and the confidence which we should manifest by furnishing it would win forbearance and favor towards the colony from all civilized nations.

The proposed overland telegraph between America and Europe, by the way of Behring's Straits and Asiatic Russia, which was sanctioned by Congress at the last session, has been undertaken, under very favorable circumstances, by an association of American citizens, with the cordial good-will and support as well of this Government as of those of Great Britain and Russia. Assurances have been received from most of the South American States of their high appreciation of the enterprise, and their readiness to co-operate in constructing lines tributary to that world-encircling communication. I learn, with much satisfaction, that the noble design of a telegraphic communication between the eastern coast of America and Great Britain has been renewed with full expectation of its early accomplishment.

Thus it is hoped, that with the return of domestic peace the country will be able to resume with energy and advantage its former high career of commerce and civilization.

Our very popular and estimable representative in Egypt died in April last. An unpleasant altercation which arose between the temporary incumbent of the office and the government of the pasha resulted in a suspension of intercourse. The evil was promptly corrected on the arrival of the successor in the consulate, and our relations with Egypt, as well as our relations with the Barbary powers, are entirely satisfactory.

The rebellion which has so long been flagrant in China has at last been suppressed, with the co-operating good offices of this Government, and of the other Western commercial states. The judicial consular establishment there has become very difficult and onerous, and it will need legislative revision to adapt it to the extension of our commerce, and to the more intimate intercourse which has been instituted with the government and people of that vast empire. China seems to be accepting with hearty good-will the conventional laws which regulate commercial and social intercourse among the Western nations.

Owing to the peculiar situation of Japan, and the anoma-

lous form of its government, the action of that empire in performing treaty stipulations is inconstant and capricious. Nevertheless, good progress has been effected by the Western powers, moving with enlightened concert. Our own pecuniary claims have been allowed, or put in course of settlement, and the inland sea has been reopened to commerce. There is reason also to believe that these proceedings have increased rather than diminished the friendship of Japan towards the United States.

The ports of Norfolk, Fernandina, and Pensacola have been opened by proclamation. It is hoped that foreign merchants will now consider whether it is not safe and more profitable to themselves, as well as just to the United States, to resort to these and other open ports, than it is to pursue, through many hazards, and at vast cost, a contraband trade with other ports which are closed, if not by actual military operations, at least by a lawful and effective blockade.

For myself, I have no doubt of the power and duty of the Executive, under the law of nations, to exclude enemies of the human race from an asylum in the United States. If Congress should think that proceedings in such cases lack the authority of law, or ought to be further regulated by it, I recommend that provision be made for effectually preventing foreign slave-traders from acquiring domicile and facilities for their criminal occupation in our country.

It is possible that if this were a new and open question, the maritime powers, with the light they now enjoy, would not concede the privileges of a naval belligerent to the insurgents of the United States, destitute as they are and always have been, equally of ships and of ports and harbors. Disloyal emissaries have been neither less assiduous nor more successful during the last year than they were before that time, in their efforts, under favor of that privilege, to embroil our country in foreign wars. The desire and determination of the maritime States to defeat that design are believed to be as sincere as, and can not be more earnest than, our own.

Nevertheless, unforeseen difficulties have arisen, especially in Brazilian and British ports, and on the northern boundary of the United States, which have required, and are likely to continue to require, the practice of constant vigilance, and a just and

conciliatory spirit on the part of the United States, as well as of the nations concerned and their governments. Commissioners have been appointed under the treaty with Great Britain, on the adjustment of the claims of the Hudson Bay and Puget's Sound Agricultural Companies in Oregon, and are now proceeding to the execution of the trust assigned them.

In view of the insecurity of life in the region adjacent to the Canadian border by recent assaults and depredations committed by inimical and desperate persons who are harbored there, it has been thought proper to give notice that after the expiration of six months, the period conditionally stipulated in the existing arrangements with Great Britain, the United States must hold themselves at liberty to increase their naval armament upon the lakes, if they shall find that proceeding necessary. The condition of the border will necessarily come into consideration in connection with the question of continuing or modifying the rights of transit from Canada through the United States, as well as the regulation of imposts, which were temporarily established by the Reciprocity Treaty of the 5th of June, 1864. I desire, however, to be understood while making this statement, that the colonial authorities are not deemed to be intentionally unjust or unfriendly towards the United States, but, on the contrary, there is every reason to expect that with the approval of the imperial government, they will take the necessary measures to prevent new incursions across the border.

The Act passed at the last session for the encouragement of emigration has, as far as was possible, been put into operation. It seems to need an amendment which will enable the officers of the Government to prevent the practice of frauds against the immigrants while on their way and on their arrival in the ports, so as to secure them here a free choice of avocations and places of settlement. A liberal disposition towards this great national policy is manifested by most of the European states, and ought to be reciprocated on our part by giving the immigrants effective national protection. I regard our immigrants as one of the principal replenishing streams which are appointed by Providence to repair the ravages of internal war, and its wastes of national strength and health. All that is necessary is to secure the flow of that stream in its present fullness, and to that

end the Government must, in every way, make it manifest that it neither needs nor designs to impose involuntary military service upon those who come from other lands to cast their lot in our country.

The financial affairs of the Government have been successfully administered during the last year. The legislation of the last session of Congress has beneficially affected the revenues, although sufficient time has not yet elapsed to experience the full effect of several of the provisions of the acts of Congress imposing increased taxation.

The receipts during the year, from all sources, upon the basis of warrants signed by the Secretary of the Treasury, including loans and the balance in the Treasury on the first day of July, 1863, were one billion three hundred and ninety-four million seven hundred and ninety-six thousand and seven dollars and sixty-two cents; and the aggregate disbursements, upon the same basis, were one billion two hundred and ninety-eight million fifty-six thousand one hundred and one dollars and eighty-nine cents, leaving a balance in the Treasury, as shown by warrants, of ninety-six million seven hundred and thirty-nine thousand nine hundred and five dollars and seventy-three cents.

Deduct from these amounts the amount of the principal of the public debt redeemed, and the amount of issues in substitution therefor, and the actual cash operations of the Treasury were: receipts, eight hundred and eighty-four million seventy-six thousand six hundred and forty-six dollars and fifty-seven cents; disbursements, eight hundred and sixty-five million two hundred and thirty-four thousand and eighty-seven dollars and eighty-six cents; which leaves a cash balance in the Treasury of eighteen million eight hundred and forty-two thousand five hundred and fifty-eight dollars and seventy-one cents.

Of the receipts, there were derived from customs one hundred and two million three hundred and sixteen thousand one hundred and fifty-two dollars and ninety-nine cents; from lands, five hundred and eighty-eight thousand three hundred and thirty-three dollars and twenty-nine cents; from direct taxes, four hundred and seventy-five thousand six hundred and forty-eight dollars and ninety-six cents; from internal revenue, one

hundred and nine million seven hundred and forty-one thousand one hundred and thirty-four dollars and ten cents; from miscellaneous sources, forty-seven million five hundred and eleven thousand four hundred and forty-eight dollars and ten cents; and from loans applied to actual expenditures, including former balance, six hundred and twenty-three million four hundred and forty-three thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine dollars and thirteen cents.

There were disbursed, for the civil service, twenty-seven million five hundred and five thousand five hundred and ninety-nine dollars and forty-six cents; for pensions and Indians, seven million five hundred and seventeen thousand nine hundred and thirty dollars and ninety-seven cents; for the War Department, six hundred and ninety million seven hundred and ninety-one thousand eight hundred and forty two dollars and ninety-seven cents; for the Navy Department, eighty-five million seven hundred and thirty-three thousand two hundred and ninety-two dollars and seventy-seven cents; for interest of the public debt, fifty-three million six hundred and eighty-five thousand four hundred and twenty-one dollars and sixty-nine cents—making an aggregate of eight hundred and sixty-five million two hundred and thirty-four thousand and eighty-seven dollars and eighty-six cents, and leaving a balance in the Treasury of eighteen million eight hundred and forty-two thousand five hundred and fifty-eight dollars and seventy-one cents, as before stated.

For the actual receipts and disbursements for the first quarter, and the estimated receipts and disbursements for the three remaining quarters of the current fiscal year, and the general operations of the Treasury in detail, I refer you to the report of the Secretary of the Treasury. I concur with him in the opinion that the proportion of moneys required to meet the expenses consequent upon the war derived from taxation should be still further increased; and I earnestly invite your attention to this subject, to the end that there may be such additional legislation as shall be required to meet the just expectations of the Secretary.

The public debt on the first day of July last, as appears by the books of the Treasury, amounted to one billion seven hun-

dred and forty million six hundred and ninety thousand four hundred and eight-nine dollars and forty-nine cents. Probably, should the war continue for another year, that amount may be increased by not far from five hundred millions. Held as it is for the most part by our own people, it has become a substantial branch of national though private property.

For obvious reasons, the more nearly this property can be distributed among all the people, the better. To favor such a general distribution, greater inducements to become owners might, perhaps, with good effect and without injury, be presented to persons of limited means. With this view, I suggest whether it might not be both expedient and competent for Congress to provide that a limited amount of some future issue of public securities might be held by any *bona fide* purchaser exempt from taxation and from seizure for debt, under such restrictions and limitation as might be necessary to guard against abuse of so important a privilege. This would enable prudent persons to set aside a small amount against a possible day of want.

Privileges like these would render the possession of such securities to the amount limited most desirable to every person of small means, who might be able to save enough for the purpose. The great advantage of citizens being creditors as well as debtors, with relation to the public debt, is obvious. Men readily perceive that they can not be much oppressed by a debt which they owe to themselves.

The public debt on the first day of July last, although somewhat exceeding the estimate of the Secretary of the Treasury made to Congress at the commencement of last session, falls short of the estimate of that officer made in the succeeding December as to its probable amount at the beginning of this year, by the sum of three million nine hundred and ninety-five thousand and seventy-nine dollars and thirty-three cents. This fact exhibits a satisfactory condition and conduct of the operations of the Treasury.

The national banking system is proving to be acceptable to capitalists and to the people. On the 25th day of November five hundred and eighty-four national banks had been organized, a considerable number of which were conversions from State banks. Changes from the State system to the national system

are rapidly taking place, and it is hoped that very soon there will be in the United States no banks of issue not authorized by Congress, and no bank-note circulation not secured by the Government. That the Government and the people will derive general benefit from this change in the banking systems of the country can hardly be questioned. The national system will create a reliable and permanent influence in support of the national credit and protect the people against losses in the use of paper money. Whether or not any further legislation is advisable for the suppression of State bank issues, it will be for Congress to determine. It seems quite clear that the Treasury can not be satisfactorily conducted unless the Government can exercise a restraining power over the bank-note circulation of the country.

The report of the Secretary of War and the accompanying documents will detail the campaigns of the armies in the field since the date of the last annual message, and also the operations of the several Administrative bureaus of the War Department during the last year. It will also specify the measures deemed essential for the national defense, and to keep up and supply the requisite military force.

The report of the Secretary of the Navy presents a comprehensive and satisfactory exhibit of the affairs of that Department, and of the naval service. It is a subject of congratulation and laudable pride to our countrymen, that a navy of such vast proportions has been organized in so brief a period, and conducted with so much efficiency and success.

The general exhibit of the navy, including vessels under construction on the first of December, 1864, shows a total of six hundred and seventy-one vessels, carrying four thousand six hundred and ten guns and five hundred and ten thousand three hundred and ninety-six tons, being an actual increase during the year over and above all losses by shipwreck or in battle, of eighty-three vessels, one hundred and sixty-seven guns, and forty-two thousand four hundred and twenty-seven tons. The total number of men at this time in the naval service, including officers, is about fifty-one thousand. There have been captured by the navy during the year, three hundred and twenty-four vessels, and the whole number of naval captures since hostili-

ties commenced is one thousand three hundred and seventy-nine, of which two hundred and sixty-seven are steamers. The gross proceeds arising from the sale of condemned prize property thus far reported, amount to fourteen million three hundred and ninety-six thousand two hundred and fifty dollars and fifty-one cents. A large amount of such proceeds is still under adjudication, and yet to be reported. The total expenditures of the Navy Department, of every description, including the cost of the immense squadrons that have been called into existence from the 4th of March, 1861, to the first of November, 1864, are two hundred and thirty-eight million six hundred and forty-seven thousand two hundred and sixty-two dollars and thirty-five cents.

Your favorable consideration is invited to the various recommendations of the Secretary of the Navy, especially in regard to a navy-yard and suitable establishment for the construction and repair of iron vessels, and the machinery and armature for our ships, to which reference was made in my last annual message. Your attention is also invited to the views expressed in the report in relation to the legislation of Congress at its last session in respect to prize on our inland waters.

I cordially concur in the recommendation of the Secretary as to the propriety of creating the new rank of vice-admiral in our naval service.

Your attention is invited to the report of the Postmaster-General for a detailed account of the operations and financial condition of the Post-office Department.

The postal revenues for the year ending June 30, 1864, amounted to twelve million four hundred and thirty-eight thousand two hundred and fifty-three dollars and seventy-eight cents, and the expenditures to twelve million six hundred and forty-four thousand seven hundred and eighty-six dollars and twenty cents; the excess of expenditures over receipts being two hundred and six thousand six hundred and fifty-two dollars and forty-two cents.

The views presented by the Postmaster-General on the subject of special grants by the Government in aid of the establishment of new lines of ocean mail steam-ships, and the policy he recommends for the development of increased commercial

intercourse with adjacent and neighboring countries, should receive the careful consideration of Congress.

It is of noteworthy interest that the steady expansion of population, improvement, and Governmental institutions over the new and unoccupied portions of our country have scarcely been checked, much less impeded or destroyed by our great Civil War, which, at first glance, would seem to have absorbed almost the entire energies of the Nation.

The organization and admission of the State of Nevada has been completed, in conformity with law, and thus our excellent system is firmly established in the mountains which once seemed a barren and uninhabitable waste between the Atlantic States and those which have grown up on the coast of the Pacific Ocean.

The Territories of the Union are generally in a condition of prosperity and growth. Idaho and Montana, by reason of their great distance and the interruption of communication with them by Indian hostilities, have been only partially organized; but it is understood that these difficulties are about to disappear, which will permit their governments, like those of the others, to go into speedy and full operation.

As intimately connected with, and promotive of this material growth of the Nation I ask the attention of Congress to the valuable information and important recommendations relating to the public lands, Indian affairs, the Pacific Railroad, and mineral discoveries contained in the report of the Secretary of the Interior, which is herewith transmitted, and which report also embraces the subjects of patents, pensions, and other topics of public interest pertaining to his Department.

The quantity of public land disposed of during the five quarters, ending on the 30th of September last, was four million two hundred and twenty-one thousand three hundred and forty-two acres, of which one million five hundred and thirty-eight thousand six hundred and fourteen acres were entered under the Homestead Law. The remainder was located with military land-warrants agricultural scrip certified to States for railroads, and sold for cash. The cash received from sales and location fees was one million nineteen thousand four hundred and forty-six dollars.

The income from sales during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1864, was six hundred and seventy-eight thousand and seven dollars and twenty-one cents, against one hundred and thirty-six thousand and seventy-seven dollars and ninety-five cents received during the preceding year. The aggregate number of acres surveyed during the year has been equal to the quantity disposed of; and there is open to settlement about one hundred and thirty-three million acres of surveyed land.

The great enterprise of connecting the Atlantic with the Pacific States by railways and telegraph lines has been entered upon with a vigor that gives assurance of success, notwithstanding the embarrassments arising from the prevailing high prices of materials and labor. The route of the main line of the road has been definitely located for one hundred miles westward from the initial point at Omaha City, Nebraska, and a preliminary location of the Pacific Railroad of California has been made from Sacramento eastward to the great bend of the Truckee River, in Nevada.

Numerous discoveries of gold, silver, and cinnabar mines have been added to the many heretofore known, and the country occupied by the Sierra Nevada and Rocky Mountains, and the subordinate ranges, now teems with enterprising labor, which is richly remunerative. It is believed that the product of the mines of precious metals in that region has, during the year, reached, if not exceeded, one hundred millions in value.

It was recommended in my last annual message that our Indian system be remodeled. Congress, at its last session, acting upon the recommendation, did provide for reorganizing the system in California, and it is believed that under the present organization the management of the Indians there will be attended with reasonable success. Much yet remains to be done to provide for the proper government of the Indians in other parts of the country to render it secure for the advancing settler, and to provide for the welfare of the Indian. The Secretary reiterates his recommendations, and to them the attention of Congress is invited.

The liberal provisions made by Congress for paying pensions to invalid soldiers and sailors of the Republic, and to the widows, orphans, and dependent mothers of those who have

fallen in battle or died of disease contracted, or of wounds received in the service of their country, have been diligently administered. There have been added to the pension rolls during the year ending the 30th day of June last, the names of sixteen thousand seven hundred and seventy invalid soldiers, and of two hundred and seventy-one disabled seamen, making the present number of army invalid pensioners, twenty-two thousand seven hundred and sixty-seven, and of navy invalid pensioners, seven hundred and twelve. Of widows, orphans, and mothers, twenty-two thousand one hundred and ninety-eight have been placed on the army pension rolls, and two hundred and forty-eight on the navy rolls. The present number of army pensioners of this class is twenty-five thousand four hundred and thirty-three, and of navy pensioners, seven hundred and ninety-three. At the beginning of the year the number of Revolutionary pensioners was one thousand four hundred and thirty. Only twelve of them were soldiers, of whom seven have since died. The remainder are those who, under the law, receive pensions because of relationship to Revolutionary soldiers. During the year ending the 30th of June, 1864, four million five hundred and four thousand six hundred and sixteen dollars and ninety-two cents have been paid to pensioners of all classes.

I cheerfully commend to your continued patronage the benevolent institutions of the District of Columbia, which have hitherto been established or fostered by Congress, and respectfully refer for information concerning them, and in relation to the Washington Aqueduct, the Capitol, and other matters of local interest, to the report of the Secretary.

The Agricultural Department, under the supervision of its present energetic and faithful head, is rapidly commending itself to the great and vital interest it was created to advance. It is peculiarly the people's Department, in which they feel more directly concerned than in any other. I commend it to the continued attention and fostering care of Congress.

The war continues. Since the last annual message all the important lines and positions then occupied by our forces have been maintained, and our armies have steadily advanced, thus liberating the regions left in the rear, so that Missouri, Ken-

tucky, Tennessee, and parts of other States have again produced reasonably fair crops.

The most remarkable feature in the military operations of the year is General Sherman's attempted march of three hundred miles directly through the insurgent region. It tends to show a great increase of our relative strength, that our General-in-Chief should feel able to confront and hold in check every active force of the enemy, and yet to detach a well-appointed, large army to move on such an expedition. The result not yet being known, conjecture in regard to it is not here indulged.

Important movements have also occurred during the year to the effect of molding society for durability in the Union; although short of complete success, it is so much in the right direction, that twelve thousand citizens in each of the States of Arkansas and Louisiana have organized loyal State governments with free constitutions, and are earnestly struggling to maintain and administer them. The movement in the same direction, more extensive though less definite, in Missouri, Kentucky and Tennessee, should not be overlooked. But Maryland presents the example of complete success. Maryland is secure to liberty and union for all the future. The genius of rebellion will no more claim Maryland. Like another foul spirit, being driven out, it may seek to tear her, but it will rule her no more.

At the last session of Congress, a proposed amendment of the Constitution abolishing slavery throughout the United States, passed the Senate, but failed for lack of the requisite two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives. Although the present is the same Congress, and without questioning the wisdom or patriotism of those who stood in opposition, I venture to recommend the consideration and passage of the measure at the present session.

Of course the abstract question is not changed, but an intervening election shows almost certainly that the next Congress will pass the measure if this does not. Hence there is only a question of time as to when the proposed amendment will go to the States for their action, and as it is to go at all events, may we not agree that the sooner the better. It is not claimed that

the election has imposed a duty on members to change their views or their votes any further than as an additional element to be considered. Their judgment may be affected by it. It is the voice of the people now for the first time heard upon the question. In a great national crisis like ours, unanimity of action among those seeking a common end is very desirable, almost indispensable, and yet no approach to such unanimity is attainable unless some deference shall be paid to the will of the majority, simply because it is the will of the majority. In this case the common end is the maintenance of the Union, and among the means to secure that end, such will, through the election, is most clearly declared in favor of such Constitutional amendment.

The most reliable indication of public purpose in this country is derived through our popular elections. Judging by the recent canvass and its result, the purpose of the people, within the loyal States, to maintain the integrity of the Union, was never more firm nor more nearly unanimous than now.

The extraordinary calmness and good order with which the millions of voters met and mingled at the polls, give strong assurance of this. Not only those who supported the "Union ticket" (so-called), but a great majority of the opposing party also may be fairly claimed to entertain and to be actuated by the same purpose. It is an unanswerable argument to this effect that no candidate for any office whatever, high or low, has ventured to seek votes on the avowal that he was for giving up the Union.

There has been much heated controversy as to the proper means and best mode of advancing the Union cause, but in the distinct issue of Union or no Union, the politicians have shown their instinctive knowledge that there is no diversity among the people. In affording the people a fair opportunity of showing one to another, and to the world, this firmness and unanimity of purpose, the election has been of vast value to the national cause.

The election has exhibited another fact not less valuable to be known; the fact that we do not approach exhaustion in the most important branch of the national resources, that of living men. While it is melancholy to reflect that the war has filled

so many graves and carried mourning to so many hearts, it is some relief to know that, compared with the surviving, the fallen have been so few. While corps and divisions, and brigades and regiments, have formed and fought, and dwindled and gone out of existence, a great majority of the men who composed them are still living. The same is true of the naval service. The election returns prove this. So many voters could not else be found. The States regularly holding elections, both now and four years ago—to wit, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin—cast three million nine hundred and eighty-two thousand and eleven votes now against three million eight hundred and seventy thousand two hundred and twenty-two cast then, showing an aggregate now of thirty-three million nine hundred and eighty-two thousand and eleven, to which is to be added, thirty-three thousand seven hundred and sixty-two cast now in the new States of Kansas and Nevada, which did not vote in 1860. Thus swelling the aggregate to four million fifteen thousand seven hundred and seventy-three, and the net increase during the three years and a half of war, to one hundred and forty-five thousand seven hundred and fifty-one.

To this, again, should be added the number of all soldiers in the field from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Indiana, Illinois, and California, who, by the laws of those States, could not vote away from their homes, and which number can not be less than ninety thousand. Nor yet is this all. The number in organized Territories is triple now what it was four years ago, while thousands, white and black, join us as the national arms press back the insurgent lines. So much is shown affirmatively and negatively by the election.

It is not material to inquire how the increase has been produced, or to show that it would have been greater but for the war, which is probably true; the important fact remains demonstrated that we have more men now than we had when the war began; that we are not exhausted, nor in process of exhaustion; that we are gaining strength, and may, if need be, main-

tain the contest indefinitely. This as to men. Natural resources are now more complete and abundant than ever. The national resources, then, are unexhausted, and, we believe, inexhaustible. The public purpose to re-establish and maintain the national authority is unchanged, and, as we believe, unchangeable. The manner of continuing the effort remains to choose.

On careful consideration of all the evidence accessible, it seems to me that no attempt at negotiation with the insurgent leader could result in any good. He would accept of nothing short of the severance of the Union. His declarations to this effect are explicit and oft-repeated. He does not attempt to deceive us. He affords us no excuse to deceive ourselves. We can not voluntarily yield it. Between him and us the issue is distinct, simple, and inflexible. It is an issue which can only be tried by war, and decided by victory. If we yield we are beaten; if the Southern people fail him, he is beaten; either way it would be the victory and defeat following war. What is true, however, of him who heads the insurgent cause, is not necessarily true of those who follow. Although he can not reaccept the Union, they can. Some of them, we know, already desire peace and reunion. The number of such may increase. They can at any moment have peace simply by laying down their arms, and submitting to the national authority under the Constitution. After so much, the Government could not, if it would, maintain war against them. The loyal people would not sustain or allow it. If questions should remain, we would adjust them by the peaceful means of legislation, courts, and votes.

Operating only in Constitutional and lawful channels, some certain and other possible questions are and would be beyond the Executive power to adjust; for instance, the admission of members into Congress, and whatever might require the appropriation of money. The Executive power itself would be really diminished by the cessation of actual war. Pardons and remissions of forfeiture, however, would still be within Executive control. In what spirit and temper this control would be exercised, can be fairly judged of by the past. A year ago general pardon and amnesty upon specified terms were offered

to all except certain designated classes, and it was at the same time made known that the excepted classes were still within contemplation of special clemency. During the year many availed themselves of the general provision, and many more would, only that the signs of bad faith in some led to such precautionary measures as rendered the practical process less easy and certain. During the same time, also, special pardons have been granted to individuals of excepted classes, and no voluntary application has been denied. Thus, practically, the door has been for a full year open to all, except such as were not in condition to make free choice; that is, such as were in custody or under constraint. It is still so open to all, but the time may come, probably will come, when public duty shall demand that it be closed, and that in lieu more rigorous measures than heretofore shall be adopted.

In presenting the abandonment of armed resistance to the national authority, on the part of the insurgents, as the only indispensable condition to ending the war on the part of the Government, I retract nothing heretofore said as to slavery. I repeat the declaration made a year ago, that, while I remain in my present position, I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation. Nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that Proclamation, or by the acts of Congress.

If the people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an Executive duty to re-enslave such persons, another, and not I, must be their instrument to perform it. In stating a single condition of peace, I mean simply to say, that the war will cease on the part of the Government whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it.

During this short session, closing on the 3d of March, 1865, the following more important acts were passed and became laws: To establish the office of Vice-Admiral in the Navy, ranking with Lieutenant-General in the Army; to require lawyers admitted to practice in the Supreme Court, and the circuit and district courts of the United States to take the

oath of allegiance, approved in 1862; an act to prevent military and naval officers interfering in elections except to preserve the peace; and to establish the "Freedmen's Bureau." But the only really important act of this session was that providing for an amendment to the Constitution forbidding slavery in the United States.

At an early date in the previous session this matter had been brought before Congress, and fully discussed in all its bearings with the usual rancor, extravagance, and folly which had been the inseparable accompaniment of all attempts in Congress to handle the subject of slavery. There was the usual amount of talk about God and Canaan, and slavery being the Heaven-decreed and normal position of the colored race; and Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana, reannounced the wonderful doctrine that the Government of the United States had nothing to do with the moral question of human slavery. However, the act providing for the amendment had but six dissenting votes in the Senate. In the House it failed of getting the necessary two-thirds vote.

Early in the present session, according to the recommendation of the President's Message, a motion was made to reconsider the action of the House in the previous summer, and again the discussion of the almost dead "institution" began. Nor was it much less virulent than it had been before secession, so-called, took away the hot-headed defenders of slavery from the far South. The advocates of the institution were not wanting in Congress, the North fur-

nishing the greater part of them. Of one of these Thaddeus Stevens said: "When we all molder in the dust; he may have his epitaph written, if it be truly written, Here rests the ablest and most pertinacious defender of slavery, and opponent of liberty."

Finally on the last day of January, 1865, the question on reconsidering the former action of the House was carried by a vote of one hundred and twelve yeas against fifty-seven nays. And then the joint resolution of the former session, providing for an amendment of the Constitution doing away with slavery, was passed by one hundred and nineteen yeas against fifty-six nays, D. W. Voorhees, of Indiana, and seven others not voting. A majority of the border State Representatives voted for the measure, as did a number of Democrats from various parts of the Union, but all the nays and the eight not voting were Democrats.

Amidst the wildest demonstrations of joy on the part of the friends of the measure, Ebon C. Ingersoll, of Illinois, said: "In honor of this immortal and sublime event, I move that the House adjourn." And the House did adjourn, ringing with the triumphant shouts of the friends of liberty. Thus Congress had finished its share in the overthrow of human slavery, the grand achievement of the age. And in good time more than two-thirds of the States sanctioned the emancipation acts of the Administration, and this crowning act of Congress, the amendment forever prohibiting slavery in the United States becoming a part of the Constitution.

CHAPTER XXIII.

WAR OF THE REBELLION—OVERTURES FOR PEACE—
MR. BLAIR AND JEFFERSON DAVIS—MR. LIN-
COLN'S SECOND INAUGURAL.

LATE in 1864 Mr. Lincoln gave F. P. Blair, Sen., a permit to pass through the army to go to Richmond. This old political busybody was impressed with the notion that he was the possessor of a plan for the restoration of the Union without further bloodshed. Mr. Lincoln had full confidence in Mr. Blair's patriotism, but would not even listen to his views touching his visit to Jefferson Davis. The President had announced in his last annual message the only terms on which he would ever consent to a suspension of the war—that the rebels should lay down their arms and return to their allegiance to the Government. This had always been Mr. Lincoln's position, and few persons knew it better than Francis P. Blair, Sen. Early in January Mr. Blair succeeded in reaching Richmond, and holding a long conversation with the rebel executive. In his account of the interview Mr. Davis treats the whole matter in the light of a very grave condescension on his part toward this old political associate. But Mr. Blair made amends, to some extent, by his good conduct, his earnestness as to some preliminary

steps for peace, and his kind and flattering expressions touching his own Southern blood, and so on. His proposition was that military hostilities should be suspended on the simple understanding, and nothing more, that the attention of the armies and the whole people should be turned to the maintenance of "The Monroe Doctrine" against France in Mexico. This being done, in the meantime, Mr. Blair seemed to believe the wounds of the domestic war would somehow be healed, and the Union restored. Although his judgment was at fault in this whole business, there can be no question about Mr. Blair's good intentions and patriotism. He was quite particular in assuring Mr. Davis that he was acting entirely on his own responsibility, while he took equal pains to urge the belief that the President would treat his plan with favor.

Davis dismissed him with this letter to himself:—

"RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, January 12, 1865.

"F. P. BLAIR, Esq.:—

"SIR,—I have deemed it proper, and probably desirable to you, to give you in this form the substance of remarks made by me, to be repeated by you to President Lincoln, etc.

"I have no disposition to find obstacles in forms, and am willing now, as heretofore, to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace; am ready to send a commission whenever I have reason to suppose it will be received, or to receive a commission, if the United States Government shall choose to send one.

"That, notwithstanding the rejection of our former offers, I would, if you could promise that a commissioner, minister, or agent would be received, appoint one imme-

diately, and renew the effort to enter into conference with a view to secure peace to the two countries.

“Yours, etc., JEFFERSON DAVIS.”

The true character of this artful letter is revealed in the two last words, *two countries*. Two countries the Administration and the loyal North could never acknowledge, and that was well known.

With almost inexhaustible resources, and the enthusiasm of the people rising as it now became more apparent daily that the Rebellion was speedily falling to pieces, a mere fantasy could have led any sane man to suppose any terms but unconditional surrender would be accepted from the rebels. And so Mr. Lincoln wrote in answer to this letter designed for the eye of the rebel chief:—

“WASHINGTON, January 18, 1865.

“F. P. BLAIR, Esq.:—

SIR,—You having shown me Mr. Davis’s letter to you of the 12th inst., you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now, and shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he, or any other influential person now resisting the national authority, may informally send to me with a view of securing peace to the people of our one common country. Yours, etc., A. LINCOLN.”

With this Mr. Blair again visited Richmond, and in his interview with Jefferson Davis, took occasion to call his attention to the expression *our one common country* in the President’s letter, and the object of its use. Mr. Davis was then frank enough to say that he recognized its purpose of counteracting the words *two countries* in his letter. Mr. Blair got among his

old friends while on this visit to Richmond, and lost no opportunity to assure them of the hopelessness of their cause. In his strange book on the "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Mr. Davis says :—

"Mr. Blair had many acquaintances among the members of the Confederate Congress ; and all those of the class, who, of old, fled to the cave of Adullam, 'gathered themselves unto him.'"

Davis now consulted with Alexander H. Stephens and others, and concluded to send commissioners to treat with President Lincoln, in the vain hope that he might be induced to take up with Mr. Blair's proposition as to the enforcement of "The Monroe Doctrine," which in some way would in the end turn to the great advantage of the Southern cause.

In a letter to Charles Francis Adams Mr. Seward gave this account of the meeting and its result :—

"DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON CITY, }
"February 7, 1865. }

"SIR,—It is a truism that in times of peace there are always instigators of war. So soon as war begins there are citizens who impatiently demand negotiations for peace. The advocates of war, after an agitation, longer or shorter, generally gain their fearful end, though the war declared is not unfrequently unnecessary and unwise. So peace agitators in time of war ultimately bring about an abandonment of the conflict, sometimes without securing the advantages which were originally expected from the conflict.

"The agitators for war in time of peace, and for peace in time of war, are not necessarily, or perhaps ordinarily, unpatriotic in their purposes or motives. Results alone determine whether they are wise or unwise. The treaty of peace concluded at Guadalupe-Hidalgo, was secured by an irregular negotiator

under the ban of the Government. Some of the efforts which have been made to bring about negotiations, with a view to end our Civil War, are known to the whole world, because they have employed foreign as well as domestic agents. Others, with whom you have had to deal confidentially, are known to yourself, although they have not publicly transpired. Other efforts have occurred here which are known only to the persons actually moving in them and to this Government. I am now to give, for your information, an account of an affair of the same general character, which recently received much attention here, and which, doubtless, will excite inquiry abroad.

“A few days ago Francis P. Blair, Esq., of Maryland, obtained from the President a simple leave to pass through our military lines without definite views known to the Government. Mr. Blair visited Richmond, and on his return he showed to the President a letter which Jefferson Davis had written to Mr. Blair, in which Davis wrote that Mr. Blair was at liberty to say to President Lincoln that Davis was now, as he always had been, willing to send commissioners if assured they would be received, or to receive any that should be sent; that he was not disposed to find obstacles in forms. He would send commissioners to confer with the President with a view to a restoration of peace between the two countries if he could be assured they would be received. The President thereupon, on the 18th of January, addressed a note to Mr. Blair, in which the President, after acknowledging that he had read the note of Mr. Davis, said that he was, is, and always should be, willing to receive any agents that Mr. Davis or any other influential person, now actually resisting the authority of the Government, might send to confer informally with the President, with a view to the restoration of peace to the people of our one common country. Mr. Blair visited Richmond with this letter, and then again came back to Washington.

“On the 29th ultimo we were advised from the camp of Lieutenant-General Grant that Alexander H. Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and John A. Campbell were applying for leave to pass through the lines to Washington, as peace commissioners, to confer with the President. They were permitted by the Lieutenant-General to come to his head-quarters, to await there

the decision of the President. Major Eckert was sent down to meet the party from Richmond at General Grant's headquarters. The Major was directed to deliver to them a copy of the President's letter to Mr. Blair, with a note to be addressed to them and signed by the Major, in which they were directly informed that if they should be allowed to pass our lines they would be understood as coming for an informal conference upon the basis of the aforementioned letter of the 18th of January to Mr. Blair. If they should express their assent to this condition in writing, then Major Eckert was directed to give them safe conduct to Fortress Monroe, where a person coming from the President would meet them. It being thought probable, from a report of their conversation with Lieutenant-General Grant, that the Richmond party would, in the manner prescribed, accept the condition mentioned, the Secretary of State was charged by the President with the duty of representing this Government in the expected informal conference. The Secretary arrived at Fortress Monroe in the night of the 1st day of February. Major Eckert met him in the morning of the 2d of February, with the information that the persons who had come from Richmond had not accepted in writing the condition upon which he was allowed to give them conduct to Fortress Monroe. The Major had given the same information by telegraph to the President at Washington. On receiving this information the President prepared a telegram directing the Secretary to return to Washington. The Secretary was preparing at the same moment to so return, without waiting for instructions from the President. But at this juncture Lieutenant-General Grant telegraphed to the Secretary of War, as well as to the Secretary of State, that the party from Richmond had reconsidered and accepted the conditions tendered them through Major Eckert; and General Grant urgently advised the President to confer in person with the Richmond party. Under these circumstances, the Secretary, by the President's direction, remained at Fortress Monroe, and the President joined him there on the night of the 2d of February. The Richmond party was brought down the James River in a United States steam transport during the day, and the transport was anchored in Hampton Roads.

"On the morning of the 3d, the President, attended by the Secretary, received Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell on board the United States steam transport *River Queen*, in Hampton Roads. The conference was altogether informal. There was no attendance of secretaries, clerks, or other witnesses. Nothing was written or read. The conversation, although earnest and free, was calm, and courteous, and kind on both sides. The Richmond party approached the discussion rather indirectly, and at no time did they either make categorical demands, or tender formal stipulations or absolute refusals. Nevertheless, during the conference, which lasted four hours, the several points at issue between the Government and the insurgents were distinctly raised, and discussed fully, intelligently, and in an amicable spirit. What the insurgent party seemed chiefly to favor was a postponement of the question of separation, upon which the war is waged, and a mutual direction of efforts of the Government, as well as those of the insurgents, to some extrinsic policy or scheme for a season, during which passions might be expected to subside, and the armies be reduced, and trade and intercourse between the people of both sections resumed. It was suggested by them that through such postponement we might now have immediate peace, with some not very certain prospect of an ultimate satisfactory adjustment of political relations between this Government and the States, section, and people now engaged in conflict with it.

"The suggestion, though deliberately considered, was nevertheless regarded by the President as one of armistice or truce, and he announced that we can agree to no cessation or suspension of hostilities except on the basis of the disbandment of the insurgent forces and the restoration of the national authority throughout all the States in the Union. Collaterally, and in subordination to the proposition which was thus announced, the anti-slavery policy of the United States was reviewed in all its bearings, and the President announced that he must not be expected to depart from the positions he had heretofore assumed in his Proclamation of Emancipation and other documents, as these positions were reiterated in his last annual message. It was further declared by the President that the complete restoration of the national authority everywhere was

an indispensable condition of any assent on our part to whatever form of peace might be proposed. The President assured the other party that while he must adhere to these positions, he would be prepared, so far as power is lodged with the Executive, to exercise liberality. Its power, however, is limited by the Constitution; and when peace shall be made, Congress must necessarily act in regard to appropriations of money and to the admission of representatives from the insurrectionary States. The Richmond party were then informed that Congress had, on the 31st ultimo, adopted, by a Constitutional majority, a joint resolution submitting to the several States the proposition to abolish slavery throughout the Union; and that there is every reason to expect that it will be soon accepted by three-fourths of the States, so as to become a part of the national organic law.

“The conference came to an end, by mutual acquiescence, without producing any agreement of views upon the several matters discussed, or any of them. Nevertheless, it is perhaps of some importance that we have been able to submit our opinions and views directly to prominent insurgents, and to hear them in answer, in a courteous and not unfriendly manner.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

“WILLIAM H. SEWARD.”

This conference lasted for several hours, the President and Mr. Stephens doing most of the talking. Mr. Stephens at the outset brought up the common interest on which the attention of the country might be directed for a time, “The Monroe Doctrine,” when the President very positively informed them that he had given no word of countenance or sanction to Mr. Blair’s scheme about sending an army to Mexico, and assured them that no hope must be entertained as to his assenting to the semblance, even of an armistice, without the condition that it should be on the ground of the restoration of the Union.

On this point the rebel agents had no authority to negotiate; and only hoped in an artful scheme to take advantage of the Government in a way that might lead to their final independence. Mr. Stephens says in his wonderful book, "Constitutional View of the War between the States," that neither the commissioners nor the rebel authorities had the remotest idea of sending any of the rebel army to aid in expelling the French from Mexico. It could not be spared. Before this "peace conference" ended, Mr. Stephens suggested to the President that their meeting might not be wholly fruitless, if they could arrange some satisfactory terms for a general exchange. And this was very soon afterwards done under the direction of General Grant, to the great gratification of the whole country.

Two other good results were the immediate outcome of this conference. It convinced those at the North, who would be convinced, that the rebel leaders would submit to no terms which did not imply their independence as a nation, and hence that the Union could only be restored and maintained by destroying the military power of the Rebellion. It also served to divide further the already utterly hopeless and divided rebels. A few days after his return to Richmond, Alexander H. Stephens gave up the cause as lost, and sought his home in Georgia. But not so with Jefferson Davis. He foolishly persisted in appearing to believe that Mr. Lincoln had committed himself to Mr. Blair's scheme for peace, and had treacherously changed his disposition on hearing

of the fall of Fort Fisher, the last possible gateway of the Rebellion to British supplies. Public meetings were called in Richmond, and every means taken to inflame and prolong the spirit of opposition and war. In one of these Jefferson Davis said in a fiery speech: "I would be willing to yield up everything I have on earth, and if it were possible, would sacrifice my life a thousand times, before I would succumb." But all this bluster amounted to nothing. At that very moment the Rebellion was crumbling, and in less than two months he was a solitary fugitive.

The morning of the 4th of March, 1865, was dark, rainy, and cold, but the President, tired and gloomy, was at the Capitol signing bills, and doing all he could to give effect to the last work of Congress. The procession to escort him, according to custom, from the White House, moved without him. In the Senate Chamber Andrew Johnson had taken the oath of office as Vice-President, and delivered an address. The clouds had broken away, and as the tall, weary President stepped upon the eastern portico of the Capitol the sun burst upon his uncovered head amidst the shouts of the great concourse of eager and sympathetic spectators around him.

In a clear, but sad tone, he then delivered this brief and remarkable

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN,—At this second appearing to take the oath of the Presidential office, there is less occasion for an extended address than there was at first. Then a statement of a course to be pursued seemed very fitting and proper.

Now, at the expiration of four years, during which public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still absorbs the attention and engrosses the energies of the Nation, little that is new could be presented.

The progress of our arms upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself, and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. With high hopes for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured.

On the occasion corresponding to this, four years ago, all thoughts were anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it; all sought to avoid it.

While the inaugural address was being delivered from this place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agents were in the city seeking to destroy it without war; seeking to dissolve the Union and divide the effects by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war, but one of them would make war rather than let the Nation survive, and the other would accept war rather than let it perish; and the war came.

One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the southern part of it.

These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was somehow the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union by war, while the Government claimed no right to more than restrict the territorial enlargement of it.

Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding.

Both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes his aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces; but let us judge not, that we may not be judged. The prayer of

both could not be answered. That of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has his own purposes. "Woe unto the world because of offenses, for it must needs be that offenses come: but woe unto the man by whom the offense cometh." If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of these offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through his appointed time, he now wills to remove, and that he gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to him?

Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.

With malice toward no one, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up the Nation's wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphans, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.

The religious tone of this address doubtlessly startled some of Mr. Lincoln's Western friends; and the air of sadness that pervaded it was not forgotten six weeks later when he had fallen beneath the assassin's hand. Coming events had cast their mystic shadow before. The circumstances had never existed previously in the history of this country to bring forth an inaugural address like this, nor would it have been possible for any of Mr. Lincoln's predecessors to produce such an address

even had the circumstances favored it. Mr. Lincoln's political and official speeches and papers have in them a directness, simplicity, and originality which render them entirely unique in the political literature of his age and country. They lacked some of the polish and glitter, to say nothing of the verbosity, displayed by many of the occupants of the Executive Chair, but if they lost anything in these respects they made up for it in more enduring and admirable qualities.

CHAPTER XXIV.

1864—WAR OF THE REBELLION—GRANT AND SHERMAN—
END OF MISTAKES—ATLANTA CAMPAIGN—RESACA—
KENESAW MOUNTAIN — DALTON — ATLANTA — STONE-
MAN—FROM THE RAPIDAN TO PETERSBURG—THE
WILDERNESS—COLD HARBOR—HOOD IN TENNESSEE—
FRANKLIN—NASHVILLE—SHERMAN BEGINS HIS WON-
DERFUL MARCH TO THE SEA.

HERETOFORE it has been convenient and somewhat necessary to treat of military affairs separately on each side of the Alleghany Mountains; but early in the spring of 1864 an event took place rendering the continuance of this plan unimportant in the brief view which the comparative size these volumes has already reached compels me to take. This was the appointment of General Grant to command the entire army of the United States. The failure of the Army of the Potomac to make any great headway against the rebel force which opposed it, and the common lack of confidence in General Halleck, the General-in-Chief, gave rise to a strong demand for placing the direction of military concerns in other hands. In order to relieve the case of any difficulties and uncertainties, Congress revived the rank of Lieutenant-General which had been borne by General Washington only, and by General Scott by

brevet; and that the President should make no mistake in the man, Congress passed a resolution recommending the appointment of Grant. But this caution was unnecessary. Mr. Lincoln joined in the general sentiment, and on the 2d of March, the day after the act creating the office was finally passed and signed, he sent to the Senate the name of General Grant.

On the 9th of March, 1864, in Washington, the President delivered to Grant his commission as Lieutenant-General, and without delay he set about the task before him. Some of his acts had been severely criticised, and there were not wanting those who believed that McClellan, Buell, or somebody else, should have been selected instead of this stubborn, silent soldier. But he had been more successful than any other general, and it was well known that he was without political bias. He took a soldier's view of the war, believing there was but one thing for him to do, crush the military strength of the Rebellion. This was his faith and the principle which controlled his conduct. "From the first I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both North and South, until the military power of the Rebellion was entirely broken." This it was, after he had started on his march to Richmond and fought the great battle of the Wilderness, that took form in his memorable expression: "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."

The President and the people made no mistake this time. The right man had been selected; per-

haps the only man known in the Nation fit to direct the military affairs of the war to a successful conclusion. Under him one general plan was at once adopted for putting into active and constant operations the whole war force at the command of the Government, and directing it to one final point. Having no time or inclination to remain under the mischievous political influences of Washington, General Grant at once visited the head-quarters of the Army of the Potomac, and then went to Nashville to consult with and lay his plans before Sherman, whom he considered the most able of all his aids.

General Halleck was now made chief of the army staff, the Army of the Potomac was reorganized and relieved of some of its inefficient and supernumerary officers, and thoroughly equipped for the great campaign before it.

The main interests of the war from this time on centered around the operations of Grant and Sherman, although the capture of Mobile and its forts, and the capture of Fort Fisher and the port of Wilmington, North Carolina, the last gate-way of freebooters and foreign blockade-runners, were events of incalculable advantage to the cause of the country. A vast number of minor operations and engagements would also deserve mention in a more detailed history of the battle and bloody side of the war.

The two important rebel forces were collected under Lee in Virginia, and Joseph E. Johnston in the mountains south of Chattanooga. These it was Grant's purpose to strike simultaneously, and orders

were issued for a general movement of the armies on the 4th of May, 1864.

At this time Sherman, with his advance at Ringgold, Georgia, had an effective force of between ninety and a hundred thousand men of all arms; and opposed to him was Johnston's army at Dalton then not half so large, but which before the campaign was far advanced reached, perhaps, sixty thousand, and by the statement of the not very reliable General Hood, seventy thousand. In the defenses of Atlanta the rebel force was also greatly augmented by Governor Brown's Georgia militia, not numbered in the regular army conscripts.

As the Army of the Potomac began to cross the Rapidan on the 5th of May, Sherman set forward to destroy Johnston or drive him from the mountains of Georgia, and the two remarkable final campaigns of the war were commenced. The march of Sherman to Atlanta was conducted on the same general plan as that of Grant to Richmond, and was, while being laid in a country presenting more natural obstacles to success, identical in many respects. From Chattanooga to the Chattahoochee River within eight miles of Atlanta, a series of mountain ridges and spurs cut by rivers and poor narrow valleys rendered this one of the most easily defended regions on the continent, and consequently the hazardous task imposed upon and so successfully executed by Sherman will ever meet the admiration of the world, and stand among the greatest of military achievements. The result of the campaign of Atlanta was

not creditable to General Johnston, although his regular force was much inferior in numbers to that of his antagonist. His appointment to the command over Bragg had been submitted to by Mr. Davis against his will, and Davis's unfriendly disposition toward him remained unbroken to the end, and, indeed, continues to this day. Bragg, who was also unfriendly to Johnston, was put in a superior position at Richmond. The correspondence between Johnston, Davis, Bragg, and the rebel war department throughout the campaign was more in the spirit of personal enmity than of men engaged in a common struggle which stood much in need of harmony from the beginning. Bragg distinctly stated that the effort to re-enforce and strengthen Johnston would depend upon his assent to enter at once upon an offensive policy for the recovery of Tennessee and Kentucky; and while not directly dissenting, Johnston saw the necessity of first fighting Sherman who was in his way. The following extract from General Johnston's "Narrative" will plainly show that he was not unmindful in his own operations of the advantage which might accrue to the Northern allies:—

"The Northern Democrats had pronounced the management of the war a failure, and declared against its continuance; and the Presidential election, soon to occur, was to turn upon the question of immediate peace or continued war. In all the earlier part of the year 1864, the press had been publishing to the Northern people most exaggerated ideas of the military value of Atlanta, and that it was to be taken, and that its capture would termi-

nate the war. If Sherman had been foiled, these teachings would have caused great exaggeration of the consequences of his failure, which would have strengthened the peace party greatly; so much, perhaps, as to have enabled it to carry the Presidential election, which would have brought the war to an immediate close."

And how could such an event as the success of the Democrats at that election have brought the war to an immediate close? Evidently in no other way than by the Mexicanization of the Government, by the successful candidate and his party at once seizing the Presidential office and driving out the still legal Administration, and then acknowledging the independence of the South. General Johnston was well informed as to the character and purposes of the Northern Democratic leaders. But he utterly failed to carry out his part of the scheme by whipping Sherman. In the series of battles from Dalton to Atlanta, over an almost impassable country, covered with natural positions for defense against any superior force, it would be difficult to find any great amount of generalship on the part of General Johnston, however much the conduct of the rebel soldiers may have been worthy of admiration. Had he conducted the campaign with even Lee's skill and stubbornness in Virginia, Sherman's march to Atlanta might have been greatly delayed, at least.

Sherman finding that Rocky-Face Ridge, and the gap in which the railroad passed through it strongly barricaded and defended by Johnston's troops, presented an impracticable obstacle to his reaching the

rebel army at Dalton, began his first skillful movement. On the 8th of May McPherson passed through Snake Creek Gap, the greater part of the army soon following, thus turning the rebel position and compelling Johnston to retreat to Resaca, where on the 14th and 15th a severe battle was fought, with heavy losses on both sides, but especially in the Union army. Johnston now fell back to the Etowah, but this strong position he also abandoned, retreating to Altoona Pass. After another battle at New Hope Church, Sherman also turned this position. At Kennesaw Mountain Johnston made his next stand, where on the 27th of June Sherman attacked him at two points and was severely repulsed. This event, which was no more than Sherman expected, again drove him to his former plan of turning the rebel position, from which he had only departed for policy's sake. This movement forced Johnston back to the Chattahoochee River, which he soon abandoned, and fell back to the fortifications around Atlanta, where he was relieved from the command, and General J. B. Hood placed at the head of the rebel army. Hood was a more impulsive and in every way less able officer than Johnston, although he did not at the outset depart from the plans of his former superior.

Hood sallied from his fortifications and fought several battles around Atlanta, but was repulsed with great loss, finally abandoning all hope of preventing Sherman's turning his position. The Federal cavalry had broken the lines of communication on the south, and Stoneman, who was never a very successful officer,

in an attempt to reach the prison pens at Macon, allowed himself to be surrounded, and was forced to surrender with a considerable part of his command. The rebel general unwisely lost the use of his cavalry, one fifth of his entire force, in an attempt to destroy Sherman's line of communications with Chattanooga. And although the damage done to Sherman was not inconsiderable, it did not alter or check his plans for a moment. The rebel cavalry had scarcely left a burning bridge until a construction train with a thousand skillful workmen was on the spot to rebuild it.

Early in August Sherman began his movements to turn Atlanta, and force its abandonment by the rebels. By the first of September he had reached Jonesborough, twenty miles south of Atlanta, drawing a considerable portion of the rebel army after him, making that part of it left in the fortifications, with all the Georgia militia, too weak to attack Schofield, and the part in front of him too weak to resist the advance of the army with him.

In this condition of affairs nothing was left to Hood but to give up Atlanta, which he did on the night of September 1st. On the next day the Federal troops took possession of it. Sherman soon afterwards sent about four hundred and fifty families from the town into Hood's army, and then burned most of the place, sparing only churches and dwelling-houses, a performance which, however justifiable under any war code, was not so clearly politic and wise in view of events that speedily followed.

In the campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta the entire loss in the national army amounted to thirty thousand men, and among the brave men who fell was James Birdseye McPherson, of whose military skill Grant thought more, perhaps, than that of any other officer in the army besides Sherman. The rebel losses were probably greater, and among the most distinguished, if not soldierly, of their officers who fell was the Episcopal Bishop, General Leonidas Polk.

This campaign ending in the fall of Atlanta had been extremely disastrous to the rebel cause. It spread consternation and dismay throughout the "Confederacy." Jefferson Davis came down to see Hood, and distinguished himself by several very undignified and foolish speeches at different points on his route. He was determined on another sortie toward the North, and Hood with his inadequate force was willing to undertake it. Partly for this purpose this rash officer had displaced a more cautious and able general. Accordingly, toward the close of September, Hood left Sherman in possession of Georgia, crossed the Chattahoochee, and set out on his fatal expedition to Tennessee.

The result of this campaign was received with great exultation throughout the North. On the 3d of September, the President issued a proclamation calling upon the people to give thanks for "the signal success that Divine Providence has recently vouchsafed to the operations of the United States fleet and army."

The following order was also issued :

“EXECUTIVE MANSION, September 3, 1864.

“The national thanks are tendered by the President to Major-General William T. Sherman and the gallant officers and soldiers of his command before Atlanta, for the distinguished ability, courage, and perseverance displayed in the campaign in Georgia, which under Divine Providence resulted in the capture of the city of Atlanta. The marches, battles, sieges, and other military operations that have signalized this campaign, must render it famous in the annals of war, and have entitled those who have participated therein to the applause and thanks of the Nation.

“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”

While it is, perhaps, true that Grant took personal command of the Army of the Potomac with some reluctance, this feeling was, no doubt, counterbalanced to a great extent by his disposition to do what was expected of him, and his desire to encounter Lee. His course, from the outset, was such as to conciliate and inspire confidence. Meade was placed second in command, a step which made in his favor with the army. Still for a time there was a considerable faction against him, and not a few of the officers and men adhered to the old folly concerning McClellan.

By the time appointed for a general movement of all the forces, Grant had visited Butler, in command at Fortress Monroe, and consulted with him concerning the part he was to take in the coming campaign, and no effort had been spared anywhere to insure confidence and success.

Before daylight on the morning of the 4th of May, the Army of the Potomac, over a hundred thousand strong, under its new leader, began to cross the Rapidan.

The rebel army, under General Lee, numbering nearly seventy thousand made little or no resistance to this movement, and it is a singular fact that throughout the series of battles on the march to Richmond, Lee did not undertake to dispute the passage of any of the numerous rivers, with his strong antagonist. With his superior strength General Grant believed that the rebels would not offer him battle, but would retreat before him. This mistake, for which there was, probably, no ground of justification in Lee's former conduct, led to another, which came very near being disastrous to the national cause. This was in crossing the army into "The Wilderness" rather prepared for a march than a battle. "The Wilderness" was not the spot that Grant would have chosen for a battle, even with a preponderant force. Here the Army of the Potomac had once been unfortunate. The Wilderness was a dense growth of pine and other trees, tangled in an almost impenetrable mass, cut by deep ravines, and penetrated by a few narrow roads, rendering an army invisible at a hundred yards. A spot where artillery and cavalry were comparatively useless. Lee knew this ground well and determined to profit by the advantage it presented for striking a foe outnumbering him nearly two to one, or at least very greatly. Accordingly, instead of retreating, as Grant expected

him to do, Lee fell upon the Federal army, and the great battles of "The Wilderness" were fought on the 5th and 6th of May, with a loss on the Union side double that of the rebels. But the battles taught Lee the stubborn and determined character of his antagonist, and put him strictly on the defensive, a position he was never able to change materially. They also taught the Army of the Potomac that it had a leader who was not to be rendered inactive by repulse or deterred by difficulties. On the 7th, Grant again moved forward in an effort to turn the rebel right and fall between him and Richmond. But in this he was not successful. Lee soon detecting his purpose, and being on the inside line retired with his own force, and at Spottsylvania Court House behind his intrenchments was ready to dispute the Federal advance. And here again great battles were fought on the 10th and 12th, in which the Union losses were much greater than the rebel.

In a few days, with the army raised to nearly its original numbers by re-enforcements, Grant again set forward in his vain effort to get between Lee and his seat of supplies. His cavalry, skillfully managed by Sheridan, was kept in constant employment, still not able to accomplish all he had expected of it.

By the last of May the Union army had reached the neighborhood of Cold Harbor and the Chickahominy, with its base of supplies at McClellan's old depot, White House on the Pamunkey River. Here, at Cold Harbor, on the first of June, one of the most desperate battles of the war was fought,

Grant attacking the rebels in their fortifications, and losing two men to their one.

In the mean time General Butler, who had moved up the James River, and fortified himself at Bermuda Hundred, made some demonstrations toward Petersburg and Richmond, but had failed to take the former place as Grant expected him to do.

Franz Sigel, who was in the Shenandoah Valley, had also failed to carry out his part of the programme, and had been superseded by General Hunter, who was forced to abandon the Valley and make a pitiable retreat through West Virginia to the Ohio River.

After the battle of Cold Harbor, Lee went into his fortifications at Richmond and Petersburg, and without molestation Grant crossed the Chickahominy, and on the 15th of June reached the James River with his army, now larger than when he crossed the Rapidan on the 4th of May. His losses had been fifty thousand, of which more than eight thousand were killed and more than thirty-five thousand wounded. Among the many valuable officers who had fallen was General John Sedgwick.

On reaching the fortifications at Richmond, including all his re-enforcements under Beauregard, Breckinridge, and others, Lee's army numbered about ninety thousand, his losses in the series of battles from the Rapidan being about thirty thousand.

Grant was now before Richmond, and had settled down to a siege of that place. His object from the outset was to destroy Lee's army, and not the capture

of Richmond, and of this purpose he never lost sight. He had failed to meet Lee in open battle as he hoped to do, and that officer was too wary to allow himself to be cut off from his base of supplies, and crushed by an overwhelming force. Lee having the inside line, and an almost unbroken chain of fortifications from the Rapidan to the James, had been able with pluck and watchfulness to thwart the intentions of his skillful and powerful foe. This he had done without the exhibition of great generalship. And while there was no very marked display of military genius on either side, the failure of General Grant to accomplish fully his original purpose was no good ground for an argument in support of the want of great generalship in him. While the country cried out loudly against the enormous losses, the unalterable conviction was reached that Lee had met more than his match, and that the end was not far distant.

Again, returning for a time to the West, Sherman is found still at Atlanta, nearly three hundred miles from Nashville, and four hundred and seventy-five from Louisville, with all his supplies to be drawn over one railroad through a hostile country. It would have been reasonable, even in a man of ordinary military wisdom, to suppose that when the whole rebel army had turned upon his communications, Sherman would be forced to follow, and thus abandon the ground he had gained. This was General Hood's conclusion when he determined to march towards Nashville. And even General Grant thought that Sherman should follow and whip Hood. And this he did for a time undertake

to do. He sent Thomas to Nashville to organize and command a force to operate against Hood, and sent nearly thirty thousand of his own men to his aid, and after seeing that Thomas was able to contend with his foe, he turned his attention to the daring scheme to be briefly described further on.

Much against his will, Jefferson Davis had submitted to placing General Beauregard nominally in command of all the troops in this region, and although Beauregard joined the army and went with it into Tennessee, he did not interfere with Hood's disposition of affairs, and finally declined to go on to Nashville. He seemed to have lost most of his interest in a cause which he already believed to be lost under the bad management of Mr. Davis.

Hood divided his army, increased against he reached Nashville to nearly sixty thousand men, into three corps, under Stephen D. Lee, B. F. Cheatham, and A. P. Stewart; and James Wheeler and N. B. Forrest commanded his cavalry force. But he was unfortunate from the outset, and soon began to display his temper in quarrels with his officers, against whom he had the best grounds of complaint. It was no fault of his that Johnston had been removed from the command, whom they considered much his superior, if not the first soldier of the "Confederacy." To their failure to execute his orders, Hood attributed the great part of his disaster on this expedition. But his campaign showed plainly enough that the military spirit of the Rebellion was broken. Schofield, who had been sent from Nashville with

about seventeen thousand men, to oppose his march, retreated before him to Columbia, where he suffered a very narrow escape and greatly shook Grant's confidence in his ability. But, through the inaction of Hood's officers, Schofield was allowed to correct his error to some extent, and effect his escape, when it was in their power to prevent it. Partly through necessity Schofield stopped at Franklin, eighteen miles from Nashville, where the rebels, following close on his heels, attacked him and in a great battle met a bloody repulse, losing six thousand of their men, while his own loss was not one-third as many. In the night he slipped away to Nashville. Notwithstanding this disaster, in which many of his bravest officers had fallen, Hood moved on to Nashville, where Thomas, finally ready with a force somewhat greater than his own, moved out of his intrenchments on the 15th of December and assaulted him, the battle continuing the greater part of that and the next day, and resulting in the complete overthrow of the rebel army. Between fifteen and twenty thousand prisoners were taken, and, unlike all other cases, the pursuit was pushed with great vigor for two hundred miles, until the rebel army was mainly disorganized in Alabama and Mississippi, and Hood relieved of the command.

In the meantime Sherman had not been idle. At first with a view of making Atlanta a military post, when his weak foe was before him, he had found it necessary to remove the remaining population beyond his lines. After Hood had marched northward, and he had arranged for Thomas to take care of him,

Sherman sought permission of Grant to cut loose from his old line of supplies and seek an outlet on the Atlantic. About the 1st of November Grant gave his consent and blessing, and the preparation began in earnest. The wonderful thing which Jefferson Davis or no other person ever expected to occur Sherman now did : cut his own communications.

The railroad from Atlanta to Chattanooga was destroyed, many of the bridges which he had himself rebuilt were burned, and now it became a necessity to destroy all that part of Atlanta which could be of military advantage to the enemy after his departure. With his army of sixty-five thousand men, including five thousand five hundred cavalry organized into two corps or wings under O. O. Howard and H. W. Slocum, and the cavalry under Judson C. Kilpatrick, on the 16th of November, Sherman began his memorable march to the sea. The distance from Atlanta to Savannah is about three hundred miles. On the 21st of December he took possession of the latter place, Hardee, with a considerable force, having escaped from it towards Charleston during the preceding night. This wonderful march had been made with a loss of two or three hundred men, and a desolate track thirty or forty miles wide, including the two great railroads connecting Atlanta with Savannah and Charleston, marked where the "Confederacy" had again been cut in two.

CHAPTER XXV.

BEGINNING OF THE END—SHERMAN IN NORTH CAROLINA—FALL OF CHARLESTON—MR. LINCOLN'S COUNCIL WITH HIS GREAT CAPTAINS—FIVE FORKS—FALL OF RICHMOND—SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON—END OF THE WAR—CLOSING SCENES IN THE LIFE OF MR. LINCOLN—DEATH—THE NATION IN SORROW.

GRANT had driven the rebel army from the Rapidan to Richmond. His loss had been great, but he could afford to lose two men to Lee's one. And even this would not represent the relative strength and resources of the two contending forces, by a great deal. The boastful and arrogant rebel leaders now began to feel how puny was their power in comparison with the skillfully handled and almost inexhaustible resources of the Government. The strong man was fixing a death grasp on the Rebellion. Its vital center had been torn asunder, and another onset would crush the reptile's head.

Petersburg, about twenty miles from Richmond, was considered the key to that place. It was a railroad center, was the direct way of connection with Wilmington and Charleston, and when it fell Richmond would be no longer tenable. Against this point Grant directed the greater part of his attention during the fall and winter of 1864. But his great

army made slow progress. Lee not only held with great skill his long defensive works, but also occasionally sallied forth, striking his foe with telling effect. As the winter wore on, however, courage and hope died in the rebels. The army under Lee was rapidly melting away. Its numerical strength was always greatly exaggerated, and especially towards the end, when a handful of brave men in their strong intrenchments kept at bay Grant's vast army. Lee not only held his position at Petersburg and Richmond, but also in the fall of 1864 actually withdrew a part of his force for quite 'a pretentious sortie towards Washington and into Pennsylvania. This was, however, of little consequence, and Grant sent Sheridan, who finally cleared the Shenandoah Valley, and after becoming master of all the country north of Richmond, early in the spring joined Grant to take part in the final scenes of the Rebellion.

Sherman had in the mean time been instructed to move north to co-operate with the army around Richmond, and Thomas was ordered to operate in the same direction with his cavalry from East Tennessee. It had, perhaps, been a part of Grant's and Sherman's original plan, as discussed together soon after Grant was placed in command of all the armies, to push Sherman's force from Atlanta to the Gulf, but circumstances after the fall of Atlanta caused the General-in-Chief, as well as Sherman, to turn his thoughts towards the Atlantic Ocean. He at first thought that Sherman should follow up and defeat Hood before starting on this expedition, but when

he saw that he could give Thomas the necessary strength, he fell into Sherman's view that the favorable moment had arrived for the march through the country to the coast. This reached, he seemed to think the proper way for Sherman to join him was by the sea. Looking to this end he set to work to capture Wilmington, and this being done the Atlantic coast was clear of rebel control at all points in his way. But Sherman did not think it best to break the discipline of his army by a sea voyage, correctly believing that he could better serve the cause by marching overland. To this view Grant finally assented, too; and after conducting affairs in a lively and thorough manner in Savannah for a month, Sherman set out, towards the close of January, for Goldsboro, North Carolina.

In the meantime, pressed by necessity, Jefferson Davis had again called Joseph E. Johnston to the front, and put him in command of all the forces south of Virginia to operate against Sherman. But the most he could do was to keep out of Sherman's way. The Union army made a considerable bend to the interior, far enough to take in and destroy Columbia. Hardee also evacuated Charleston, and on the 18th of February, 1865, General Gillmore entered that city.

At Bentonville a considerable battle was fought, and throughout the march there was almost constant skirmishing. Still Sherman pursued his way, leaving desolation behind him, as he had done in Georgia. On the 21st of March he reached Goldsboro, where he found Schofield, whom Grant had sent, with over

twenty thousand men, from Wilmington. Leaving the army in the command of Schofield, Sherman went on to General Grant's head-quarters at City Point on the James River, nine miles from Petersburg, where on the 27th he met President Lincoln, General Grant, and Admiral David D. Porter, in council.

The 10th of April was fixed upon as the day for a general movement for the last struggle. Lee's line of defense was now thirty miles long, a length he had been compelled to take by Grant's repeated attempts to turn his right. The whole number of muskets actually guarding this line on the last day of March did not exceed a thousand to the mile. The most wonderful thing in all this bloody contest between Grant and Lee was the holding of this long line, even if it was well fortified, against the vast army before it. Grant knew the character of the heroic men on the inside, and preferred to wait until the moment came, which he knew would come, when he could take it without great loss of life among his own men. Lee did not share Mr. Davis's opinion that Richmond was absolutely essential to the life of the Rebellion, and would have abandoned it before it was too late to unite all their forces to overwhelm Sherman in his march through South Carolina. He saw the time was not far distant when Richmond would have to be abandoned. On the 2d of March, 1865, he sent a letter to Grant asking an interview for the purpose of determining if the controversy, as he termed it, could not be settled by a convention.

Grant sent this letter to Washington, at the same time showing that he was not averse to meeting Lee. The following reply, written by Mr. Lincoln himself, was returned :—

“WASHINGTON, March 3, 1865, 12 P. M.

“LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT,—The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of General Lee’s army, or on some minor and purely military matter. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political question. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions. Meanwhile you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.

“EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.”

Grant now becoming uneasy about Lee’s getting away from him to prolong the contest somewhere else, renewed his vigilance, and desiring his army without the assistance of Sherman’s to finish the task it had begun on the Rapidan, on the 29th of March left City Point to begin the final movement. On account of the heavy rains that now set in his progress was slow, his determination being to turn the rebel right, and while drawing attention to this point begin the assault on the main defensive works. On the 31st Lee, mistaking Grant’s movement on his right as an attempt to cut the South side railroad, simply withdrew from the lines a large part of his small army, and with it fell with desperation upon Sheridan, who commanded this advance. On Saturday, April 1st, Sheridan completely routed this force

in a great battle at Five Forks, and before daylight on Sunday morning, Grant carried the rebel works, and before noon the remnant of Lee's army was put to flight. That night Jefferson Davis and his followers left Richmond, and Ewell burned a great part of the city with the rebel archives. The criminals in the penitentiary were set at liberty, the city plundered by its own people, and a night of horror closed the Rebellion in its proud, desolate capital.

On the 3d of April the Federal troops took possession of the city, and were soon able to arrest the fire and restore order. And on the next day Abraham Lincoln walked into Richmond amidst the shouts and prayers of the helpless race that regarded him as a savior.

Lee hoped to effect his escape and join Johnston, with some vague notions of still being able to continue the struggle. But as to the conduct of his retreat he gave no orders, and hundreds of his men deserted. Their officers even encouraged them to do so. And notwithstanding the general feeling that all was lost, most of those remaining with him fought with great bravery when called upon to do so. When Lee reached the Danville Railroad he found that the almost ubiquitous Sheridan had preceded him. He then continued west towards Lynchburg, only to find, at Appomattox Court-house, that Sheridan was before him across his track, not only with his cavalry, but also a large body of infantry he was not able to resist. Some of his officers had already advised him to surrender the hopeless cause. And on the 7th of

April, in a letter to him, General Grant had invited him to do the same. At last, on the morning of the 9th, after a vain attempt to gain some political advantages from Grant by letter, the two commanders met and arranged the simple, easy terms of surrender, as dictated by Grant.

Of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee had left, of all branches and kinds, only about twenty-eight thousand men to be surrendered. From the Rapidan to Appomattox Court House it had made a gallant record which, in a better cause, would have been worthy of undying fame.

On the 14th of April, Johnston invited Sherman to an armistice until terms for the surrender of the army under him could be agreed upon. On the 18th in the presence of General John C. Breckinridge, then the rebel secretary of war, Sherman and Johnston drew up a plan for the surrender of the latter, involving political principles which were distasteful at Washington, and especially so under the shadow of the great misfortune which had just befallen the country in the moment of triumph. And General Grant was ordered forward to take command of Sherman's army and direct matters to a suitable and honorable result.

But Johnston wisely accepted the terms given to Lee, and on the 26th of April the surrender was effected, Sherman still conducting the negotiations, and Grant approving. This was virtually the end of the war of the Rebellion. By the end of the following month the authority of the Government

was again restored to the Rio Grande. The closing events and scenes of the war, and the conduct of General Sherman for which he was so entirely misunderstood and unjustly censured, must be treated of in the history of the next Administration, which had its existence on account of the assassination of President Lincoln.

In September, 1862, the rebel authorities at Richmond ordered all white men between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five into the army, and directions were given to catch them up wherever they could be found, without question or ceremony. In February, 1864, all white men from seventeen to fifty were conscripted for the war. At this time, too, all male free negroes were ordered into the service of the rebel army, and twenty thousand male slaves. In the fall of the same year, as it became evident that all other resources were exhausted, Mr. Davis recommended the employment of negroes as soldiers, and the appropriation of the entire male slave population to the purposes of the army, promising emancipation as a reward for faithful services. Virginia stubbornly opposed this measure, and at first the rebel congress declined to pass a bill authorizing negro soldiers. Finally, however, the measure was adopted, and Mr. Davis authorized to put into the army one-fourth of all the male negroes between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. But the time had passed for the rebels to derive either good or evil from this source, or, indeed, from any other.

As Grant and Sherman were preparing for the

final movement, Mr. Lincoln relaxed nothing in his own efforts to give the crushing blow to the Rebellion. On the 19th of March he issued an order for the arrest of all citizens or domiciled aliens engaged in trade or intercourse with the rebels; directing that all non-resident foreigners found violating the blockade should leave the United States in twelve days; and marshals were directed to arrest and imprison all foreigners found disregarding the order.

In the wild rejoicing over the fall of Richmond Mr. Lincoln joined, and if he had ever entertained fear for his own safety he lost it at this time. On the 3d of April, unattended, except by Admiral Porter, his little son Tad, and the few sailors who had rowed him from the war-vessel in the James River, he landed and walked through the streets to General Weitzel's head-quarters in the former residence of Jefferson Davis in Richmond. Here he met several citizens, and afterwards in the same reckless way rode through several of the principal streets. On the following day he again appeared in Richmond, this time accompanied by Mrs. Lincoln, Vice-President Johnson, and many others.

Owing to his conversations at this time with repentant rebels he sent this letter to General Weitzel:—

“HEAD-QUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, }
“CITY POINT, April 6, 1865. {

“Major-General WEITZEL, Richmond, Va.:—

“It has been intimated to me that the gentlemen who have acted as the Legislature of Virginia, in support of the Rebellion, may now desire to assemble at Richmond

and take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government. If they attempt it, give them permission and protection, until, if at all, they attempt some action hostile to the United States, in which case you will notify them, give them reasonable time to leave, and at the end of which time arrest any who remain.

“Allow Judge Campbell to see this, but do not make it public. Yours, etc., A. LINCOLN.”

Not only Mr. Lincoln's disposition to treat the rebels with extreme leniency is here foreshadowed, but also his plan of reconstruction. Both his disposition and plan are more fully seen in the following speech, the last Mr. Lincoln ever made, delivered to a vast assemblage of light-hearted and happy people in front of the Executive Mansion in Washington on the 11th of April:—

MR. LINCOLN'S LAST SPEECH.

“We meet this evening not in sorrow, but in gladness of heart. The evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond, and the surrender of the principal insurgent army, give hope of a righteous and speedy peace, whose joyous expression can not be restrained. In the midst of this, however, He from whom all blessings flow must not be forgotten. A call for a national thanksgiving is being prepared, and will be duly promulgated. Nor must those whose harder part gives us the cause of rejoicing be overlooked. Their honors must not be parceled out with others. I myself was near the front, and had the high pleasure of transmitting much of the good news to you; but no part of the honor, for plan or execution, is mine. To General Grant, his skillful officers and brave men all belongs. The gallant navy stood ready, but was not in reach to take active part.

“By these recent successes, the reinauguration of the national authority, reconstruction, which has had a large share of

thought from the first, is pressed much more closely upon our attention. It is fraught with great difficulty. Unlike the case of a war between independent nations, there is no authorized organ for us to treat with. No man has authority to give up the Rebellion for any other man. We simply must begin with and mold from disorganized and discordant elements. Nor is it a small additional embarrassment that we, the loyal people, differ among ourselves as to the mode, manner, and means of reconstruction.

“As a general rule, I abstain from reading the reports of attacks upon myself, wishing not to be provoked by that to which I can not properly offer an answer. In spite of this precaution, however, it comes to my knowledge that I am much censured from some supposed agency in setting up and seeking to sustain the new State Government of Louisiana. In this I have done just so much as, and no more, than the public knows. In the annual message of December, 1863, and accompanying proclamation, I presented a plan of reconstruction (as the phrase goes), which I promised, if adopted by any State, should be acceptable to, and sustained by, the Executive Government of the Nation. I distinctly stated that this was not the only plan which might possibly be acceptable; and I also distinctly protested that the Executive claimed no right to say when or whether members should be admitted to seats in Congress from such States. This plan was, in advance, submitted to the then Cabinet, and distinctly approved by every member of it. One of them suggested that I should then, and in that connection, apply the Emancipation Proclamation to the theretofore excepted parts of Virginia and Louisiana; that I should drop the suggestion about apprenticeship for freed people, and that I should omit the protest against my own power, in regard to the admission of members of Congress, but even he approved every part and parcel of the plan which has since been employed or touched by the action of Louisiana.

“The new constitution of Louisiana, declaring emancipation for the whole State, practically applies the Proclamation to the part previously excepted. It does not adopt apprenticeship for freed people, and it is silent, as it could not well be otherwise, about the admission of members to Congress. So that, as it

applies to Louisiana, every member of the Cabinet fully approved the plan. The message went to Congress, and I received many commendations of the plan, written and verbal; and not a single objection to it, from any professed emancipationist, came to my knowledge, until after the news reached Washington that the people of Louisiana had begun to move in accordance with it. From about July, 1862, I had corresponded with different persons, supposed to be interested, seeking a reconstruction of the State government for Louisiana. When the message of 1863, with the plan before mentioned, reached New Orleans, General Banks wrote me he was confident that the people, with his military co-operation, would reconstruct substantially on that plan. I wrote him, and some of them, to try it. They tried it, and the result is known. Such only has been my agency in getting up the Louisiana government. As to sustaining it, my promise is out, as before stated. But as bad promises are better broken than kept, I shall treat this as a bad promise, and break it whenever I shall be convinced that keeping it is adverse to the public interest. But I have not yet been so convinced.

“I have been shown a letter on this subject, supposed to be an able one, in which the writer expresses regret that my mind has not seemed to be definitely fixed on the question whether the seceded States, so-called, are in the Union or out of it. It would, perhaps, add astonishment to his regret were he to learn that, since I have found professed Union men endeavoring to make that question, I have *purposefully* forborne any public expression upon it. As appears to me, that question has not been, nor yet is, a practically material one, and that any discussion of it, while it thus remains practically immaterial, could have no effect other than the mischievous one of dividing our friends. As yet, whatever it may hereafter become, that question is bad as the basis of a controversy, and good for nothing at all—a merely pernicious abstraction. We all agree that the seceded States, so-called, are out of their proper practical relation with the Union, and that the sole object of the Government, civil and military, in regard to those States, is to again get them into that proper practical relation. I believe it is not only possible, but in fact easier to do this without deciding, or even considering, whether

these States have ever been out of the Union, than with it. Finding themselves safely at home, it would be utterly immaterial whether they had ever been abroad. Let us all join in doing the acts necessary to restoring the proper practical relations between these States and the Union, and each forever after innocently indulge his own opinion whether, in doing the acts, he brought the States from without into the Union, or only gave them proper assistance, they never having been out of it.

“The amount of constituency, so to speak, on which the new Louisiana government rests, would be more satisfactory to all if it contained fifty, thirty, or even twenty thousand, instead of only about twelve thousand, as it really does. It is also unsatisfactory to some that the elective franchise is not given to the colored man. I would myself prefer that it were now conferred on the very intelligent, and those who serve our cause as soldiers. Still the question is not whether the Louisiana government, as it stands, is quite all that is desirable. The question is, ‘Will it be wiser, to take it as it is, and help to improve it, or to reject and disperse it?’ ‘Can Louisiana be brought into proper practical relation with the Union *sooner* by *sustaining* or by *discarding* her new State government?’

“Some twelve thousand voters, in the heretofore Slave State of Louisiana, have sworn allegiance to the Union, assumed to be the rightful political power of the State, held elections, organized a State government, adopted a Free State constitution, giving the benefit of public schools equally to black and white, and empowering the Legislature to confer the elective franchise upon the colored man. Their Legislature has already voted to ratify the Constitutional amendment recently passed by Congress, abolishing slavery throughout the Nation. These twelve thousand persons are thus fully committed to the Union, and to perpetual freedom in the States—committed to the very things and nearly all the things the Nation wants; and they ask the Nation’s recognition and its assistance to make good that committal. Now, if we reject and spurn them, we do our utmost to disorganize and disperse them. We, in effect, say to the white men: ‘You are worthless, or worse; we will neither help you, nor be helped by you.’ To the blacks we say: ‘This cup of Liberty which these, your old masters, hold to your lips, we

will dash from you, and leave you to the chances of gathering the spilled and scattered contents in some vague and undefined when, where, and how.' If this course, discouraging and paralyzing both black and white, has any tendency to bring Louisiana into proper practical relations with the Union, I have, so far, been unable to perceive it. If, on the contrary, we recognize and sustain the new government of Louisiana, the converse of all this is made true.

"We encourage the hearts and nerve the arms of the twelve thousand to adhere to their work, and argue for it, and proselyte for it, and fight for it, and feed it, and grow it, and ripen it to a complete success. The colored man, too, seeing all united for him, is inspired with vigilance, and energy, and daring to the same end. Grant that he desires the elective franchise, will he not attain it sooner by saving the already advanced steps towards it, than by running backward over them? Concede that the new government of Louisiana is only to what it should be as the egg is to the fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching the egg than by smashing it. (Laughter.) Again, if we reject Louisiana, we also reject one vote in favor of the proposed amendment to the National Constitution. To meet this proposition, it has been argued that no more than three-fourths of those States, which have not attempted secession, are necessary to validly ratify the amendment. I do not commit myself against this, further than to say that such a ratification would be questionable, and sure to be persistently questioned, while a ratification by three-fourths of all the States would be unquestioned and unquestionable.

"I repeat the question: 'Can Louisiana be brought into proper practical relation with the Union *sooner* by *sustaining* or by *discarding* her new State government?' What has been said of Louisiana will apply generally to other States. And yet so great peculiarities pertain to each State, and such important and sudden changes occur in the same State, and, withal, so new and unprecedented is the whole case, that no exclusive and inflexible plan can safely be prescribed as to details and collaterals. Such exclusive and inflexible plan would surely become a new entanglement. Important principles may, and must, be inflexible.

“In the present situation, as the phrase goes, it may be my duty to make some new announcement to the people of the South. I am considering, and shall not fail to act, when satisfied that action will be proper.”

On the same day the President issued a proclamation opening the ports of the South to general commerce, and on the 13th, an order from the War Department put a stop to all drafting and recruiting, to remove restrictions on trade, and generally compress the plans for continuing the war.

The Cabinet was now in complete accord with the President in lenient feeling toward the South, and in general views of reconstruction, and was thus composed: Wm. H. Seward, Edwin M. Stanton, Gideon Welles, Wm. Dennison, J. P. Usher (who was to give place to James Harlan in May), and James Speed, who had in November, 1864, taken the place of Judge Bates, as Attorney-General. On the 14th, the President called a Cabinet meeting which was very harmonious, in view of the immediate ending of the war, there being no diversity of opinion on the subject of reconstruction, now for the first time appearing as a matter of great consequence. Mr. Seward was not at this meeting, owing to severe wounds received from a fall from his buggy. Mr. Carpenter, in his “Six Months in the White House,” says of this last Cabinet meeting:—

“General Grant was present, and during a lull in the discussion the President turned to him and asked if he had heard from General Sherman. General Grant replied that he had not, but was in hourly expectation of receiv-

ing dispatches from him announcing the surrender of Johnston.

“‘Well,’ said the President, ‘you will hear very soon now, and the news will be important.’

“‘Why do you think so?’ said the General.

“‘Because,’ said Mr. Lincoln, ‘I had a dream last night; and ever since the war began, I have invariably had the same dream before any important military event occurred.’ He then instanced Bull Run, Antietam, Gettysburg, etc., and said that before each of these events, he had had the same dream; and turning to Secretary Welles, said: ‘It is in your line, too, Mr. Welles. The dream is, that I saw a ship sailing very rapidly; and I am sure that it portends some important national event.’”

In the ordinary way of viewing such things, this dreaming of Mr. Lincoln’s would go under the head of superstition. It would be difficult to associate such superstition with the irreligion, which some, at all stages of his life, have attributed to Mr. Lincoln. But all persons will agree that in giving his dreams in any manner, let alone with the air of such confidence, to his Cabinet, Mr. Lincoln presents a new and singular spectacle in the conduct of Presidents. That his dream now pointed to himself, if to anything, Mr. Lincoln did not seem to have any suspicion, and since he had entered upon his office he had not felt so free and light-hearted as on that 14th of April.

To his wife he had said: “And well I may feel so, Mary, for I consider this day the war has come to a close. We must be more cheerful in the future; between the war and the loss of our darling Willie, we have been very miserable.”

Among the other ways Mr. Lincoln took of exhibiting his lightness of spirit at this time, was his arrangement to be present at a performance at Ford's Theater. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to stop to consider the propriety or impropriety of a President ever visiting such a place, let alone in times of such national distress. And it would be folly to intimate that the result might not have been the same, if the President had been at the White House, the Soldiers' Home, or any place else, as unprotected as he chose to go, when threats of assassination were reaching him daily. Still there remains a point connected with the tragedy of the night of the 14th of April which may not be passed in silence, and which will ever attract the notice of the careful reader of history, if it does not give rise to a sense of regret or a feeling of shame in the American people and the friends of Abraham Lincoln, even viewing them from no more than a moral elevation.

The place to die is of no less importance than that in which we are born. The place of either of these events may seriously affect any man's posthumous reputation. The matter at issue is character, and offices, deeds, degrees of civilization, forms of government can avail little. Simply trace the case where the imagination would lead! From mere man nothing can drive the taint of place or circumstance. Only a God could be born in a manger or could die on a cross.

The unwelcome specter of Ford's Theater must ever haunt this dreadful tragedy, mocking the ten-

derest and strongest memories that cling around the life and the tomb of the martyr. Even John Quincy Adams, with his passion for theater-going, would not have chosen to bid adieu to the world in a theater. What pride and pleasure there is in the eulogium, "He died at his post!"

In the pressure upon Mr. Lincoln's life, the popular demands, in the very composition of his character, those may seek apologies who will; I hold that no truly great mind is so limited, so circumscribed in its demands for outlet or recreation, that it must hunt it at doubtful times in questionable places. To such there could never possibly be a moment or an occasion when something of beauty would not rise up a joy forever.

Early in the day it was known that Mr. Lincoln would attend the theater that night, and some time after eight o'clock, unaccompanied except by Mrs. Lincoln, Major H. R. Rathbone, and Miss Clara W. Harris, he made his way amidst the welcome greetings of the densely packed audience, to the box engaged for the Presidential party on the second floor.

General Grant was now much sought after in Washington, but the calm and unceremonious soldier was little disposed to gratify public curiosity. Many expected to see him by the President's side that night, and it was Mr. Lincoln's desire that they should not be disappointed. But General Grant had business elsewhere; and other persons whom the President pressed to accompany him were also too

much occupied with more essential, desirable, or better things.

At a quarter past ten o'clock, the incarnate fiend, John Wilkes Booth, a member of a family of "actors," gained access to the President's box unnoticed by its occupants, barred the door after him, and, drawing a pistol, shot the President, the ball entering the back of his head. Major Rathbone, unarmed, at once grappled the murderer who stabbed him in the arm near the shoulder, and breaking away, leaped ten or twelve feet to the stage, crying, "*Sic semper tyrannis!*" and waving his dagger to the yet confounded audience, shouted, "The South is avenged," or something to that effect, made his way to his horse in the street, and escaped to sympathizing friends in Maryland.

After he was shot, Mr. Lincoln never spoke again. He was soon afterwards removed to a house across the street, where at twenty-two minutes past seven o'clock on the next morning, Saturday, April 15, 1865, he "died." Not long after the city was startled by the murder at the theater, the report went out that another of the avengers of the South had made, perhaps, a fatal assault on the Secretary of State, then confined to his bed by the injuries received in the fall from his carriage. The air was rife with stories of assassination, all feeling of security was lost, and no citizen then living had ever seen so dark a night as that was in the National Capital.

The tidings of the murder of the President soon spread this darkness over the whole country; and,

indeed, the civilized world stopped aghast at the horrid deed. The memories of that Saturday can never pass away. Who can not now reproduce the sad picture? All business was suspended. Men wandered from their stores and shops; farmers mounted their horses and rode in silence to town; hands were grasped without a word; the tongue cleaved to the roof of the mouth; strong hearts gave way in floods of bitter tears. O! it was the gloomiest day America had ever seen! "I saw in that day more of the human heart than in all the rest of my life." So said Charles Godfrey Leland, and so may every man say who then lived.

Soon after his death the body of the President was removed to the White House, embalmed, and placed in the "Green Room."

On Wednesday, 19th, the "funeral services" were performed in the grand "East Room" of the President's Mansion, after which the body was carried to the Capitol, where additional thousands filed through the great rotunda to gain a last look at the pale, poor face so recently lit up by Lincoln, the gentle, generous spirit, then and ever since more loved than any other President of the United States.

Finally, on the morning of the 21st, the coffin was closed, conveyed to the railroad depot, and on a grand funeral train started on its long journey to Springfield, Illinois. At Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and, indeed, in all the cities, and throughout the country, in the entire journey, the people came in mass to the line of the road to do honor to the

martyred President. From the 19th of April till the 3d of May, when the body was laid in "Oak Ridge Cemetery" at Springfield, this funeral had continued. Nothing like it had ever been seen in America; perhaps, not in the world.

CHAPTER XXVI.

CHARACTER AND WORK OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN—
A WONDERFUL STUDY—THE GREAT, THE
WISE, AND THE GOOD.

THE end had come, such an end as Mr. Lincoln and his wife had dreamed of, if not expected, for him. The public had passed through the stages of silent and demonstrative grief, of anger and revenge, of reasonable, second thought, and become calm. Time, the healer, has made this no exception to the rule, and long ago men were able, perhaps, to hear what was of good report, and what of ill, concerning this singular and interesting character. Notwithstanding his simplicity and plainness, on two great points, at least, men were deceived in Abraham Lincoln. These were his real force as a man and President, and his religious character during his Presidency, and at the end. In this chapter it is designed to look briefly at his official capacity and his general traits.

In April, 1873, Charles Francis Adams delivered at Albany, a "Memorial Address on the Life, Character, and Services of W. H. Seward." In this address Mr. Adams committed the great error of placing Mr. Seward virtually at the head of the Government in Mr. Lincoln's Administration. There may be an

apology for Mr. Adams, in the fact that his error was a common one at the outset, especially with New York and New England politicians. At the beginning of the Administration Mr. Adams was sent as Minister to England, where he remained until after Mr. Lincoln's death, and had less opportunity than other men, perhaps, to correct the error into which he had fallen. All his correspondence as the representative of the Government was with Mr. Seward, and he seemed to see only the Secretary of State in all the important steps of the Administration. Still Mr. Adams was able to know better than his address indicates, and his opinions of Mr. Lincoln were defamatory. His opinion of Mr. Seward was colored beyond proportion, and also erroneous. He was mistaken in the character of both men. At the outset Mr. Lincoln shrank from comparing his inexperience in public affairs with the long service of some of the men he had chosen to associate with him in the conduct of the affairs of the Government, and it is undoubtedly true that this association rendered him more deferential towards the views of others. He found the machinery of the Government too complicated to be managed by one man, and having confidence in the members of his Cabinet he was glad to rely upon them for the performance of the work of the Departments over which they presided. And here he made it a rule not to interfere, unless, as the responsible head of all, it became necessary for him to do so. He who has followed with any care the course of this story can have little difficulty in

deciding who was the master. If Mr. Seward's friends deceived themselves about this matter, it was more than Mr. Seward did after the mismanagement and difficulties surrounding the attempts to relieve Fort Sumter. Mr. Seward was fond of keeping up the delusion in which he and his friends had started out, but he was ere long mistaken himself about his place in the Administration. And Mr. Adams did him a great injury in indicating that he felt another was nominally enjoying the honors for which his wisdom had laid the foundation. He had no such feeling toward Mr. Lincoln, although he was a politician, perhaps in all that term ordinarily implied.

Mr. Seward's standing with the President was very high, and not unfrequently his judgment, and not Mr. Lincoln's inclination, controlled a point of conduct. But this was so with all the heads of Departments, where the President thought the circumstances justified his confidence and deference, and was only more apparent with Mr. Seward owing to the more general nature of his position as an adviser.

While Mr. Lincoln seldom differed openly with any of the members of his Cabinet, he often treated their most serious recommendations with a story, and never quite got rid of his disposition to look upon their opinions lightly. While he seldom failed to consult them on important matters, some of his most marked steps were taken before they were aware of what was coming, or without being able to assent or protest. No very small part of his countrymen believed Mr. Lincoln deficient in will-power, and it is,

perhaps, astonishing that in his Cabinet this opinion had a place. Mr. Carpenter tells this story of a conversation he had with Attorney-General Bates on this point:—

“Referring to Mr. Lincoln’s never-failing fund of anecdote, he (Bates) remarked: ‘The character of the President’s mind is such that his thought habitually takes on this form of illustration, by which the point he wishes to enforce is invariably brought home with a strength and clearness impossible in hours of abstract argument. Mr. Lincoln,’ he added, ‘comes very near being a perfect man, according to my ideal of manhood. He lacks but one thing.’ Looking up from my palette, I asked, musingly, if this was official dignity as President. ‘No,’ replied Judge Bates, ‘that is of little consequence. His deficiency is in the element of will. I have sometimes told him, for instance, that he was unfit to be intrusted with the pardoning power. Why, if a man comes to him with a touching story, his judgment is almost certain to be affected by it. Should the applicant be a woman, a wife, a mother, or a sister, in nine cases out of ten, her tears, if nothing else, are sure to prevail.’”

But, Mr. Lincoln could and did say no in many of these cases where he considered there was some principle at stake, or something beyond the mere relief of pain or trouble. The diversity of sentiment on this point in Mr. Lincoln’s character arose less from a defect in him than from the defective way of viewing the case. Is there any man now so foolhardy as to maintain that Mr. Lincoln could be led, knowingly, to do a wrong, in his mature and best days? Where principles of justice and right were concerned, no man was firmer. When substance was at stake,

Mr. Lincoln was unalterable. What he deemed right, or true, or good, or best, he supported with all his might. For ways, shadows, manners, non-essentials, he did not care. He yielded. Where sentiment or heart was the actor he leaned with the power that ruled the moment. Trifles had little attraction for him. To questions of substance, of moment, of truth, of right, to genuine principle, he hung with changless tenacity.

On his way to Washington in 1861 he said in Independence Hall, in Philadelphia: "I have said nothing but what I am willing to live by, and, if it be the pleasure of Almighty God, die by." And the principles here announced, and those which the progress of events caused him subsequently to adopt, did actually lead to his death. For his principles he died. What American, either in his life or death, exhibited a more potent will, a more unalterable devotion to principle? To view him among principles and essentials, he was unbending and as firm as a rock. To view him among trifles, customs, sufferings, and forms, he was yielding and forgiving. In the realm of mercy Abraham Lincoln was among the greatest of men.

Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War, had desired to withdraw from the difficult place he held in the Cabinet, and meant to do so when he could see the time had come; accordingly a few days after the surrender of Lee, he presented the matter to the President. It was a written form of resignation, in which the stern War Secretary took occasion to speak in

the warmest terms of the President's kindness to him, and of his own appreciation of the generous man with whom he had been associated. Greatly affected by the contents of the paper, Mr. Lincoln tore it to pieces, and threw his arms around the Secretary, saying as he did so: "Stanton, you have been a good friend and a faithful public servant, and it is not for you to say when you will no longer be needed here." Mr. Carpenter, who relates this story, says that the friends present shed tears over the President's demonstration. This severe-mannered, proud, unyielding man, who had been taken into his Cabinet, had learned to revere his power and admire his character, felt his loss as deeply as any other man, and was, perhaps, as much disposed to avenge his death. When the generous Chief had fallen, he knelt at his side soliloquizing: "Am I, indeed, left alone? None may now ever know or tell what we have suffered together in the Nation's darkest hours." When the Surgeon-General said to him that there was no hope, he could not believe. "No, no, General, no, no!" was the passionate response of this greatest of American War Secretaries.

But dismissing the unanimous Cabinet, it may be well to glance for a moment at the opinions of two or three other men, among the hundreds who wrote and talked. George Bancroft, the historian, thus spoke in New York:—

"Those who come after us will decide how much of the wonderful results of his public career is due to his own good common sense, his shrewd sagacity, readiness of wit,

quick interpretation of the public mind, his rare combination of fixedness and pliancy, his steady tendency of purpose; how much to the American people, who, as he walked with them side by side, inspired him with their own wisdom and energy; and how much to the overruling laws of the moral world, by which the selfishness of evil is made to defeat itself. But after every allowance, it will remain that members of the Government which preceded his Administration opened the gates of treason, and he closed them; that when he went to Washington the ground on which he trod shook under his feet, and he left the Republic on a solid foundation; that traitors had seized public forts and arsenals, and he recovered them for the United States, to whom they belonged; that the Capitol, which he found the abode of slaves, is now the home only of the free; that the boundless public domain which was grasped at, and, in a great measure, held for the diffusion of slavery, is now irrevocably devoted to freedom; that then men talked a jargon of a balance of power in a Republic between Slave States and Free States, and now the foolish words are blown away forever by the breath of Maryland, Missouri, and Tennessee; that a terrible cloud of political heresy rose from the abyss, threatening to hide the light of the sun, and under its darkness a rebellion was rising into indefinable proportions; now the atmosphere is purer than ever before, and the insurrection is vanishing away; the country is cast into another mold, and the gigantic system of wrong, which had been the work of more than two centuries, is dashed down, we hope forever. And as to himself personally, he was then scoffed at by the proud as unfit for his station, and now, against the usage of later years, and in spite of numerous competitors, he was the unbiased and the undoubted choice of the American people for a second term of service. Through all the mad business of treason he retained the sweetness of a most placable disposition; and the slaughter of myr-

iads of the best on the battle-field, and the more terrible destruction of our men in captivity by the slow torture of exposure and starvation, had never been able to provoke him into harboring one vengeful feeling or one purpose of cruelty."

In an address delivered in Boston, Ralph Waldo Emerson said:—

"A plain man of the people, extraordinary fortune attended him. Lord Bacon says: 'Manifest virtues procure reputation; occult ones, fortune.' He offered no shining qualities at the first encounter; he did not offend by superiority. He had a face and manner which disarmed suspicion, which inspired confidence, which confirmed good will. He was a man without vices. He had a strong sense of duty, which it was very easy for him to obey. Then he had what farmers call a long head; was excellent in working out the sum for himself; in arguing his case, and convincing you fairly and firmly.

"Then it turned out that he was a great worker; had prodigious faculty of performance; worked easily. A good worker is so rare; everybody has some disabling quality. In a host of young men that start together, and promise so many brilliant leaders for the next age, each fails on trial; one by bad health, one by conceit or by love of pleasure, or by lethargy, or by a hasty temper—each has some disqualifying fault that throws him out of the career. But this man was sound to the core, cheerful, persistent, all right for labor, and liked nothing so well.

"Then he had a vast good-nature, which made him tolerant and accessible to all; fair-minded, leaning to the claim of the petitioner; affable, and not sensible to the affliction which the innumerable visits paid to him, when President, would have brought to any one else. And how this good-nature became a noble humanity, in many a tragic case which the events of the war brought to him,

every one will remember, and with what increasing tenderness he dealt, when a whole race was thrown on his compassion. The poor negro said of him, on an impressive occasion, 'Massa Linkum am everywhere.'

"Then his broad good-humor, running easily into jocular talk, in which he delighted, and in which he excelled, was a rich gift to this wise man. It enabled him to keep his secret, to meet every kind of man and every rank in society, to take off the edge of the severest decisions to mask his own purpose and sound his companion, and to catch with true instinct the temper of every company he addressed. And, more than all, it is to a man of severe labor, in anxious and exhausting crises, the natural restorative, good as sleep, and is the protection of the over-driven brain against rancor and insanity.

"He is the author of a multitude of good sayings, so disguised as pleasantries that it is certain they had no reputation at first but as jests; and only later, by the very acceptance and adoption they find in the mouths of millions, turn out to be the wisdom of the hour. I am sure if this man had ruled in a period of less facility of printing, he would have become mythological in a very few years, like Æsop, or Pilpay, or one of the Seven Wise Masters, by his fables and proverbs.

"But the weight and penetration of many passages in his letters, messages, and speeches, hidden now by the very closeness of their application to the moment, are destined hereafter to a wide fame. What pregnant definitions; what unerring common sense; what foresight, and on great occasions, what lofty, and more than national, what humane tone! His brief speech at Gettysburg will not easily be surpassed by words on any recorded occasion. . . .

"It can not be said there is any exaggeration of his worth. If ever a man was fairly tested, he was. There was no lack of resistance, nor of slander, nor of ridicule. The times have allowed no State secrets; the Nation has

been in such a ferment, such multitudes had to be trusted, that no secret could be kept. Every door was ajar, and we knew all that befell.

“Then what an occasion was the whirlwind of the war! Here was place for no holiday magistrate, no fair-weather sailor; the new pilot was hurried to the helm in a tornado. In four years—the four years of battle days—his endurance, his fertility of resources, his magnanimity, were sorely tried and never found wanting.

“There, by his courage, his justice, his even temper, his fertile counsel, his humanity, he stood an heroic figure in the center of an heroic epoch. He is the true history of the American people in his time. Step by step he walked before them; slow with their slowness; quickening his march by theirs; the true representative of this continent; an entirely public man; father of his country; the pulse of twenty millions throbbing in his heart, the thought of their minds articulated by his tongue.”

Charles Godfrey Leland says: “Whatever the defects of Lincoln’s character were, it may be doubted whether there was ever so great a man who was, on the whole, so good.” The same writer also says of Mr. Lincoln: “Born to extreme poverty, and with fewer opportunities for culture than are open to any British peasant, he succeeded, by sheer perseverance and determination, in making himself a land-surveyor, a lawyer, a politician, and a President.”

Thus men plant standards of judgment, and the world follows where inclination directs. Neither greatness nor goodness did Mr. Lincoln ever claim, and, perhaps, few men who have arisen to distinction were more thoroughly and constantly pushed and borne forward by their friends at every step

than was he. In common parlance, in the uncritical, loose, every-day ways of speaking, Mr. Lincoln was, perhaps, both great and good. But really how few and far between are the tests under which any man may appear great and good! How few men, in all our history, in the history of the world, have been able to stand these tests!

. It is not the design here to bring in review, especially, those acts of Mr. Lincoln's life which may or may not accurately be deemed great or good; the patient reader of these volumes will not find wanting many details in the career of this interesting character, nor will he be able to complain, perhaps, of a lack of disposition in the author to throw the best deeds into the best possible light. One of Mr. Lincoln's distinguishing traits was story-telling, and in that it will not, probably, be claimed there were any traces of greatness. He would travel long distances to hear or tell stories, and he thought this faculty of great service to him. In this he was, perhaps, not mistaken. He told stories, in season and out of season, and sometimes they were offensive to men who felt that their own moods were not so trifling, or that he did not understand the demands of his office and the times.

In his earlier days, before he reached the Presidency, many of his stories were lacking in some of the elements of purity, but there is not a shadow of evidence that he ever liked them for their vulgarity. It was because they so pertinently met the case in hand. It was the unanswerable keenness in

them, and not the vulgarity, which pleased him. The point is not a difficult one, and even men without wit can appreciate it. Between Mr. Lincoln's coarser stories and his personal habits there was no connection. One did not point to the other. It would be difficult to find a man whose social and private life was more absolutely clean and pure, in every conceivable sense of the term, than that of Abraham Lincoln at all stages of his career. In him personal and social cleanness was not inconsistent with questionable story-telling. It would not be safe to say, perhaps, that the majority of men could be secure in imitating him in this practice, and here may be caught a glimpse of his superiority. He made various uses of his stories, and, in some particulars, they seemed to serve him well even as President. When he would avoid a difficult question, or a direct answer, or one for which he was not prepared, or which he should not make from the nature of the case or times, he was sure to be reminded of a story, and this served to relieve him at the moment. His story-telling often, too, relieved him of the weight of anxiety which rested upon him, and this, those who knew him best, finally came to understand and appreciate. He was not an original story-teller. That is, his stories were mainly second-handed; he did not invent them. It is a mistake to say that he drew on his imagination for many of his stories. Even this species of falsity would not have been tolerable to him. He was a truth-teller before he was a story-teller. He adapted many of his stories

to the occasion and circumstances, but if he manufactured any of them, it was from facts and incidents suited to the case. Several different collections of his stories have been published, and many have been attributed to him which he never told.

In 1854, or thereabouts, Mr. Lincoln joined a temperance society, but he did not attend its meetings, and although he hated whisky he was never inclined to make a fuss about it. He did not uphold temperance or sumptuary legislation, and was not in this respect consistent with his own practices. He did not use tobacco in any form, or have any other unclean habits, nor indulge in any sensual extremes.

Mr. Lincoln's thirst was for fame. This was the all-absorbing passion of his life. In his unattractive boyhood he had dreamed of it, and all through the after struggles which carried him to the pinnacle, it was the source of his inspiration. He yearned for position, and liked to be honored. He thought everything, and everybody wrong that came across his way to distinction. Everything he did, no matter how trifling, pointed to his own advancement in public favor. His day and night dream was of himself and his glory. This was Mr. Lincoln's great fault, although it was not without mitigating conditions. He fully believed the road to fame lay through a life of certain supreme uses, and in devotion to truth and justice. The fame he desired was to be founded among these things. Mr. Lincoln never could have separated fame from a life of right deeds, such as his moral sense led him to believe men should admire;

nor could he have associated it with acts not beneficial to his race. When he had gained the Presidency, he had reached the beginning of the end of his dream, and a change came over the nature of his struggle for fame. After a time he found what he had never before possessed, and this corrected his strong vein of selfishness, as may be seen in the chapter on his religion. If his earlier public life had been spent largely in his own interests, his last years were devoted to the good of the human family and his country.

"Mr. President" now grated harshly on his ear. To his friends he said, sometimes: "Call me Lincoln, and I'll never tell that the rules of etiquette were broken." The President's Mansion he spoke of as "Here" or "This place," his business or official room he called the "Shop," and the President's room at the Capitol, he was accustomed to speak of as "The room they call the President's." No man was now considered in his way. He threw the responsibility of the various departments on his Cabinet Ministers, and all the honor there was in the positions they held he desired them to have. He interfered only where he felt that he should do so, being responsible for the whole, and often he assumed the public censure when it should have rested on other shoulders. To the man who was said to have spurned him as a lawyer, he became warmly attached, more than to any member of his council, and no greater display of will power could have been possible than the devotion with which he hung to all of these

men amidst the public cry of distrust, and in favor of removal. No wonder Mr. Seward would say that President Lincoln was the best man he ever knew. He gave him every opportunity to gain in the estimation of the people. When he did not want to make a speech, as was usually the case, he would say: "Seward, go out and give them some of your poetry." He would have stood out of the road to the Presidency for any of them. To the aspiring generals he only said, Do something, fight great battles, whip the rebels, save the country, and the people will take care of you; you shall be President, shall deserve to be; and he was ready to throw up his hat and push them. For the last two years the whole burden of his life was, "What I do or forbear, I do or forbear because I believe it best for the country." He stood in no man's way. He had reached the goal, and although at times, as he saw the power of the Rebellion giving away, he had gleams of a sunshiny end to his long Administration, in which he would be happier than he had been, yet he was ever recurring to his old dream of fate. "He never could be glad again," was a feeling he could not always shake off, and this aided in bending his form, silvering his hair, and deepening the furrows in his wrinkled face.

In Mr. Lincoln's dream of power, success, honor, there had always been a final scene of misfortune or death to him. The gory specter always stood at the side of the angel of glory. At first this had been manifest destiny, at last it was the finger of Provi-

dence. He was, in a measure, reconciled. He wanted no protection, no guards. Such things were not democratic; and then, he would certainly end the work he had to do. Whatever change for the better came over his religious faith, his imagination was still sick and distorted. In the picture there were two ends, a good one and a bad one.

But had he any grounds for such a scheme of life and death for himself more than most other men, even the most ordinary of them? From the day he set his foot in the settlement at New Salem to the night of his assassination, he had no cause to "drip sorrow from his steps," as Mr. Herndon says of him. He had no cause for anything but joy and blessing. Everything that occurred to him should have given him elasticity and vigor in his walk before the world. His face should have shone like the sun. His successes were wonderful. They were wonderful to himself. Friends stood thick on all sides of him. Their hands were always extended to help him. They were fascinated with him, while he mainly appeared to think of and labor for himself. He thought of going up himself, and seemed to care little to see others going. He seldom gave a helping hand, and those who had and those who had not he treated alike. The good that others did for him he forgot in thinking of the good they ought to do him. If he once thanked them he never thought of it again. Good deeds deserved nothing at his hands; bad ones he absolutely despised. Even Dennis Hanks suspected him of hypocrisy, but was gener-

ous enough to say that he might be mistaken about it. And Dennis was mistaken.

Many things to Lincoln were without substance, and he could not like them. He found no delight in what suited narrow, little minds. So, after 1850, or even before, he took little or no interest in local politics. He cared little who was elected. The small things of the community barely deserved his notice. There was no great principle in any of these things. At home in Illinois he was not a charitable man, barely mentally so. He gave nothing systematically, even when he could. Hardly did he give his moral support to the building of the community. Science, education, arts, general progress, were not themes to him. He seldom talked of them. His world was politics, and he was the center of that world. But he was no demagogue. He went straight forward. When he was once a Whig he was always a Whig. In his "House-divided-against-itself Speech" he took his grand stand, and from this he never swerved. In his political scheme justice and right were absolute, and honesty was his religion.

He could never take what did not belong to him, and was ever slow to receive the homage and praise he had appeared to prize above everything else. In the matter of honesty, however, Mr. Lincoln was, perhaps, not perfect. While he took nothing from men which they claimed as their own, he neglected to give them what they had a right to expect, a hearty return of love, sympathy, help, cheerfulness, and contentment. His sadness was, to some extent,

inherited, but it was not incurable. The world has a right to expect cheerful countenances, and manly words and steps. What right has any man to burden and sadden the world with his little sorrows? The ills of one man are not to be held against those of the world. Mr. Lincoln's sorrows were baseless, and had they been real, he had no right to make them the property of other people. A brave, wise, good, and unselfish man, strictly speaking, would never do such a thing. One of Mr. Lincoln's friends took this story from his mouth:—

“It was just after my election in 1860, when the news had been coming in thick and fast all day, and there had been a great ‘Hurrah, boys!’ so that I was well tired out, and went home to rest, throwing myself down on a lounge in my chamber. Opposite where I lay was a bureau, with a swinging-glass upon it, and looking in that glass, I saw myself reflected, nearly at full length; but my face I noticed had *two* separate and distinct images, the tip of the nose of one being about three inches from the tip of the other. I was a little bothered, perhaps startled, and got up and looked in the glass, but the illusion vanished. On lying down again I saw it a second time—plainer, if possible, than before; and then I noticed that one of the faces was a little paler, say five shades, than the other. I got up and the thing melted away, and I went off, and, in the excitement of the hour, forgot all about it—nearly, but not quite; for the thing would once in a while come up, and give me a little pang, as though something uncomfortable had happened. When I went home I told my wife about it, and a few days after I tried the experiment again, when, sure enough, the thing came again; but I never succeeded in bringing the ghost back after that, though I once tried very industriously to show it to my

wife, who was worried about it somewhat. She thought it was a sign that I was to be elected to a second term of office, and that the paleness of one of the faces was an omen that I should not see life through the last term.' ”

His poor wife joined him in his fatalistic dreams. She was seer enough to say that this vision meant his re-election and his tragic death. And did he not believe it? When he entered the White House he lacked “the one thing needful” to correct the dark ways of his life, and make him a model to his race. He had erected his own standards, and if he did not rely implicitly upon them, he did not take to those of other men. Men were only his instruments; among them he had no models. But he was not a man without a heart, and so prominent did his heart acts become during his best days (the period in which his irreligion and selfishness largely melted away), that it has been a question among men whether his heart or his cold intellect shaped his conduct as President.

The matter of gratitude is a thing about which the many-sided world has given itself much trouble, and many men have held to the notion that Mr. Lincoln was without this somewhat exaggerated virtue. He liked or loved mankind as a whole, or in the abstract much more than in the individual. He was tender and gentle without talking of love. He expressed his own general trait most truly when he said he did what he did “with malice toward none, and with charity for all;” and in the following words he gave all of his beautiful philosophy of gratitude:—

“My friends you owe me no gratitude for what I have done; and I, I may say, owe you no gratitude for what you have done; just as, in a sense, we owe no gratitude to the men who have fought our battles for us. I trust that this has all been for us all a work of duty.”

Gratitude he now held was due to the Great Giver of all gifts. To do what was just and right and best and fit was reasonably to be exacted and expected of man, and in the doing should he find his delight and reward.

What was true and good he came to venerate intensely, if he did not always do so, and this was one of his distinguishing traits. And akin to it was his strong sense of right and justice. Mere friendship and all ordinary considerations gave way before these. The title of “Honest Abe” he deserved, and, perhaps, he esteemed it more than all else. To have earned this title must go far in the estimation of the world, and on the pages of history, in fixing his name among the few who may justly be called “the great, the wise, and the good.

CHAPTER XXVII.

MR. LINCOLN'S RELIGION—LOOK AT THIS MAN OF SORROW—WHAT VERDICT?

IT is not difficult for an ordinarily well-balanced man to be good to others when he has more than he wants for himself. A full man, like a full horse, may readily be generous. A starving man is not greatly different from other animals under like circumstances. The laws of mental and spiritual life are upon the same general footing as the physical, and are explained by them. Genuine goodness is not so circumscribed, nor is selfishness so much diffused, as many suppose. In the first successful stages of Mr. Lincoln's life he seemed to doubt, at times, whether any of his acts were unselfish. When he put himself to great trouble to relieve a suffering animal or man, it was to relieve a pang or distress in himself caused by the pain of the other. This he thought was selfishness. So have thought other misguided men. This is one of the most foolish sophisms of the sophists. One man looks at another in pain or misfortune, and he is himself disturbed, pained, or his sympathies are aroused. Were he purely selfish this result could not follow. He would say, This is not my business; I am proof against

things of this kind. When he has felt at all, and knows that he has, he has put the seal of falsehood on the theory of selfishness. If he puts forth his hand to give aid, he relieves an unbidden pang in himself, one to which selfishness could not have given birth. To the other a benefit follows, and the delight is mutual. Would not a purely selfish creature have power to relieve himself of pain, or the uneasiness of sympathy, by taking some other course, one giving him no trouble, work, or self-denial? Should he not say, Let the plant lie; if it droops and dies there are more flowers to brighten the path which I am traveling; the lame brute or the unfortunate man, what are their sorrows to me? The pang disappears, does it not? Is it not lost in the forgetfulness and easy philosophy of selfishness? Is an act done for a purpose a selfish one? Is a motive the necessary sign of selfishness? What folly! The character of the motive is only a matter of question. The pain in one arising from sight of pain in another is genuine sympathy; otherwise it would not be pain. Selfishness does not torture itself. It courts no sorrow, admits none. The hand extended in relief is impelled by the motive to do good, to serve another. Selfishness may have no hand in the act. Selfishness is not bound to act in that way. If it had a pang it could and would choose another course for its relief, one in harmony with its nature. If it merely assumed a pang without its real existence, in the hope or desire of ultimate sole self-benefits, then there would be no question about the motive or the

character of the deed, and we would enter the realm of undisputed, unmitigated selfishness.

There are no overburdened or oppressed individuals in the providence of God.

There are no favored individuals in the providence of God.

On these two great axiomatic propositions Mr. Lincoln stumbled all his life. The reverse of these he took to be true, some way, notwithstanding his single devotion to what he deemed principles of justice and right. He considered himself a man of sorrow. The weight of his father's hand was always on his back. The ignorance and poverty of his parents seemed to be a burden to him in after life. His love affairs drew him into fits of insanity, from which he recovered with additional burdens on his shoulders. And finally he felt that the fates had driven him into a marriage which he could not and must not avoid, and in this he deemed himself doomed to walk in a cloud of sadness.

These unmanly whims diseased his mind; and when he viewed himself in a political aspect he only got back double reflections from his mirror of sorrows. Fate had here, too, fixed upon him a burden which he could not and would not shake off, and which must land him ultimately in the darkness of despair. He was the servant of the people, and in a great struggle, a decree and principle of fate, he was to die for them. In him, bodily, the great and "irrepressible conflict" was first waged. The people were his instruments. He was the central figure in

all his calculations. God or fate, much the same to him, so indicated; and when the burden fell from his back the drama would end, in evil to him and good to mankind. Hour after hour he spent in confirming himself in these gloomy and evil fancies. His moments of gloom, his dark, black, "terrible," "terrible" moments, were those in which he sat dreaming of himself, dreaming of his sorrows, of responsibilities, of evils, of crosses, suffering, honors, glories, death, uncertainty, and night, irretrievable, godless night. When he worked, worked hard incessantly, told stories, and was merry, he was a man, and only then. Even then it was hard to keep the dark shadows from creeping over him. His hours of sadness were the most precious. There he built dark castles, in which he groped as a Giant Despair. Here was a perpetual fantasy. And the man who had taken a pride in being called the "Sangamon Chief," who could throw or whip any man in the county or State, a towering king among men, as animals, was lost with himself as a spiritual or intellectual being.

I hold that any sane, intelligent man may sit down and build a castle in the air; it may, indeed, be to surround himself with untold wealth, with which he rears beautiful edifices dedicated to religion, art, science, music, charity; clothes the naked, feeds the hungry, makes friends and foes alike happy, and, against his will, causes all men to rise up and call him blessed; may repeat this dream, day after day, until the "baseless fabric" will not fly away at his

bidding, and insanity claim a new subject from the ever beautiful and healthful domain of god-like reason.

Here was Mr. Lincoln at fault more than any other President of the United States, or indeed, any other man who has risen to distinction in this country. All the things which are here enumerated before his political burdens, so conceived, came upon him, and which were the introduction to all other gloomy errors in his life, were things that are common to the lots of men.

Who has not been thwarted in his early loves? How many have not fought with poverty? Where have been the dwellings of the wise? Where has not ignorance stalked at noonday? How many have escaped the misfortunes of imperfect parentage? What youth has not considered his own evils and hardships very considerable and onerous? What per cent of all marriages is wisely made and perfectly harmonious and blissful? Why, if all men were as unwise as Abraham Lincoln then was, the world would be a vast lunatic asylum. Most brave men, even ordinary ones, have fought these common little battles, and gone on stronger for it, and have been able to help the world on a little, by having themselves made some progress in learning "to be, and to do, and to suffer."

The worst and the best of it all about this dreamer's dreams of glory and misfortune was, that they came true. Every step served to convince him that the next was certain and unavoidable. Without long years of preparation he entered the White House.

This humble rail-splitter from the West! He had dreamed of this day. And now could the rest fail to follow?

In what may be called Mr. Lincoln's religious life there were, however, two distinct epochs. One of these counterbalanced or neutralized the other. They may be designated as the evil and the good epochs, the first extending from his boyhood to his election as President, and the other embracing the years he spent in the White House. However, much stress has been placed upon the teachings and good influence of his "sainted mother," it does not appear that Lincoln was saved or even greatly benefited by them. Sallie Bush, his step-mother, may have given a new direction to his manly instincts and his aspirations, about gaining distinction in the world, but that she succeeded in fixing him in the principles of Christianity, or that she either had the ability, or a very lively inclination, to do so, is not shown by evidence in her life or his. His first step in oratory was in the ridicule of poor preaching, vulgar and unrefined preaching, and poor preachers, coarse and illiterate preachers, that then abounded, and with whom the world is yet, perhaps, sufficiently afflicted. His purpose in hearing a sermon seemed to be to gratify his faculty of imitation and ridicule. To this end, to some extent, he read the Bible. Much of it he had in his mind, and what he had he handled as he did the coarse things with which he labored. It was the only book that was always easy of access. The divinity of the Scriptures he did not

see, but his passion for reading was gratified. When he wandered from Indiana, if he had principles in this way they were not positive, if they were not anti-Christian. At New Salem he "fell among robbers," he entered a "den of thieves," and these he took up, dropping what he had. In a race of infidels, he soon outran all teachers.

In 1834, or 1835, he wrote, it is strongly claimed, a long paper or pamphlet constituting what he termed an argument against the Bible and Christianity. This performance he exhibited to Samuel Hill and his son, New Salem merchants. The son thought it beyond the bounds of ordinary execration, and Hill threw the manuscript into the fire, and burned it before the author's face. Hill believed that Lincoln was susceptible of rising to a great future, and this thing, if it came to light, would kill him utterly, as it deserved to do. Thus ended this matter, and the world never knew much about it, not enough to be absolutely certain of its truth, and Lincoln took alarm himself, and became too politic to make another venture, although he talked about his pamphlet to several of his "friends."

In Springfield his associations were irreligiously similar to those of New Salem, and all through his early political career his position, or supposed position, was a cause of weakness, which gave him no little annoyance, rendering him still more reticent and politic. In 1840 even, he had courted the good opinion of the clergy, and, perhaps, deceived them, to some extent, as to his real views. He ceased to

make himself known in this matter to his friends, even to his infidel friends, even to Herndon, who has written so much about him, and whose great ambition appeared to be to prove that Mr. Lincoln was an infidel, and opposed to technical Christianity. But however reliable the testimony Mr. Herndon was able to give, up to 1840, perhaps 1856, he ceased to be reliable after that time. Then, he knew that Lincoln's religion was as bad as his own, if not worse. He admits that Lincoln not only ceased to confide in this thing, but most of the real workings of his life to him; then, how could he have known what they were? His inference that Lincoln held out in his former ways to the end, is not established either by his assertion or the supposed proofs he has given. That Lincoln believed in God and immortality Herndon never doubted, and he believed the letter to John D. Johnston, as to his father's preparation for death, proves this fact beyond a doubt. And so it did, if Mr. Lincoln was not a hypocrite. But Mr. Herndon's falling back upon this kind of evidence shows plainly enough how little he really knew about what Mr. Lincoln was feeling and thinking.

Mr. Lamon, who was much with Mr. Lincoln and knew as little about him, in this respect, as anybody, and who took Herndon for his guide, put much stress on the opinion of John G. Nicolay, to the effect that Mr. Lincoln did not change his religious views after entering the White House. But Mr. Nicolay had no opportunity to know what Mr. Lincoln's opinions were then, and he knew very little,

subsequently, about what Mr. Lincoln was doing in this respect.

Jesse W. Fell, one of the most reliable writers on this subject, was of the opinion that Mr. Lincoln's views on most points were directly opposite to the precepts of what is termed orthodoxy, and hence would have been classed as entirely out of the pale of Christianity. But said Mr. Fell: "To my mind, such was not the true position, since his principles and practices and the spirit of his whole life were of the very kind we universally agree to call Christian; and I think this conclusion is in no wise affected by the circumstance that he never attached himself to any religious society whatever."

About the time of Mr. Lincoln's election to the Presidency, Mr. Newton Bateman, State Superintendent of Education, thinking that the moment had come to give a new direction to Mr. Lincoln's religion in the estimation of the world, took the task upon himself. Dr. Holland gives this statement of the matter substantially from Mr. Bateman:—

"Mr. Newton Bateman, Superintendent of Public Instruction for the State of Illinois, occupied a room adjoining and opening into the Executive Chamber. Frequently this door was open during Mr. Lincoln's receptions; and throughout the seven months or more of his occupation, Mr. Bateman saw him nearly every day. Often, when Mr. Lincoln was tired, he closed his door against all intrusion, and called Mr. Bateman into his room for a quiet talk. On one of these occasions Mr. Lincoln took up a book containing a careful canvass of the city of Springfield in which he lived, showing the candidate for whom each citizen had declared it his intention to vote in the approaching election. Mr. Lincoln's friends had, doubtless at his own

request, placed the result of the canvass in his hands. This was toward the close of October, and only a few days before the election. Calling Mr. Bateman to a seat at his side, having previously locked all the doors, he said: 'Let us look over this book. I wish particularly to see how the ministers of Springfield are going to vote.' The leaves were turned, one by one, and as the names were examined Mr. Lincoln frequently asked if this one and that were not a minister, or an elder, or the member of such or such a Church, and sadly expressed his surprise on receiving an affirmative answer. In that manner they went through the book, and then he closed it and sat silently, and for some minutes regarding a memorandum in pencil which lay before him. At length he turned to Mr. Bateman with a face full of sadness, and said: 'Here are twenty-three ministers, of different denominations, and all of them are against me but three; and here are a great many prominent members of the Churches, a very large majority of whom are against me. Mr. Bateman, I am not a Christian—God knows I would be one—but I have carefully read the Bible, and I do not so understand this book;' and he drew from his bosom a pocket New Testament. 'These men well know,' he continued, 'that I am for freedom in the territories, freedom everywhere as far as the Constitution and laws will permit, and that my opponents are for slavery. They know this, and yet, with this book in their hands, in the light of which human bondage can not live a moment, they are going to vote against me. I do not understand it at all.'

"Here Mr. Lincoln paused—paused for long minutes, his features surcharged with emotion. Then he rose and walked up and down the room in the effort to retain or regain his self-possession. Stopping at last, he said, with a trembling voice, and his cheeks wet with tears: 'I know there is a God, and that he hates injustice, and slavery. I see the storm coming, and I know that His hand is in it. If he has a place and work for me—and I think he has—I believe I am ready. I am nothing, but truth is every thing. I know I am right, because I know that liberty is right; for Christ teaches it, and Christ is God. I have told them that a house divided against itself can not stand, and Christ and reason say the same; and they will

find it so. Douglas do n't care whether slavery is voted up or voted down, but God cares, and humanity cares, and I care ; and with God's help I shall not fail. I may not see the end ; but it will come, and I shall be vindicated ; and these men will find that they have not read their Bibles aright.'

"Much of this was uttered as if he were speaking to himself, and with a sad and earnest solemnity of manner impossible to be described. After a pause, he resumed : ' Does n't it appear strange that men can ignore the moral aspects of this contest ? A revelation could not make it plainer to me that slavery or the government must be destroyed. The future would be something awful, as I look at it, but for this rock on which I stand ' (alluding to the Testament which he still held in his hand), ' especially with the knowledge of how these ministers are going to vote. It seems as if God had borne with this thing (slavery) until the very teachers of religion have come to defend it from the Bible, and to claim for it a divine character and sanction ; and now the cup of iniquity is full, and the vials of wrath will be poured out.'

"His last reference was to certain prominent clergymen in the South, Drs. Ross and Palmer among the number ; and he went on to comment on the atrociousness and essential blasphemy of their attempts to defend American slavery from the Bible. After this the conversation was continued for a long time. Every thing he said was of a peculiarly deep, tender, and religious tone, and all was tinged with a touching melancholy. He repeatedly referred to his conviction that the day of wrath was at hand, and that he was to be an actor in the terrible struggle which would issue in the overthrow of slavery, though he might not live to see the end. He repeated many passages of the Bible, and seemed specially impressed with the solemn grandeur of portions of Revelation, describing the wrath of Almighty God. In the course of the conversation, he dwelt much upon the necessity of faith in the Christian's God, as an element of successful statesmanship, especially in times like those which were upon him, and said that it gave that calmness and tranquillity of mind, that assurance of ultimate success, which made a man firm and immovable amid the wildest excitements. After further reference to a belief in Divine Provi-

dence, and the fact of God in history, the conversation turned upon prayer. He freely stated his belief in the duty, privilege, and efficacy of prayer, and intimated, in no unmistakable terms, that he had sought in that way the Divine guidance and favor.

"The effect of this conversation upon the mind of Mr. Bateman, a Christian gentleman whom Mr. Lincoln profoundly respected, was to convince him that Mr. Lincoln had, in his quiet way, found a path to the Christian stand-point—that he had found God, and rested on the eternal truth of God. As the two men were about two separate, Mr. Bateman remarked: 'I have not supposed that you were accustomed to think so much upon this class of subjects. Certainly your friends generally are ignorant of the sentiments you have expressed to me.'"

And, of course, Dr. Holland and most other Christian people adopted this view of the case. It was best and most agreeable. It was best for Mr. Lincoln's welfare as President, and most agreeable to the great body of those who were to uphold him. Mr. Lamon flatly contradicts this whole story, and treats it as a bad piece of fiction. And while it does seem that Mr. Bateman had drawn on his imagination, and was willing to risk his own reputation for the sake of removing an eternal blemish from that of Lincoln, it may still be held, with some propriety, that the question of veracity has never been absolutely settled against Mr. Bateman. After a thorough and exhaustive consideration of the subject, however, I am forced to the conclusion that Mr. Bateman's story was to a great extent fictitious, and that at the time of Mr. Lincoln's election to the Presidency, he stood about where Mr. Herndon and that class of his friends placed him technically; at least, he was certainly not a Christian, however much like one

should be, he might have been in many of his practices. But if Mr. Bateman willfully committed an error that good might come, Mr. Lamon and his school, in the face of evidence which they were not wise or just in overlooking, have gone to the opposite extremes. It is by them asserted that Mr. Lincoln not only never uttered a word which implied the slightest faith on his part in Christ as the Savior of men, as God, but that he never even uttered any of the names of God, the Savior. How true all of this is may appear hereafter.

Most of Mr. Lincoln's friends, both early and late, believed him to be very superstitious. And so he was, but that there can always be, or is generally, any thing very profound or serious in this charge may well be doubted. Mr. Lincoln believed in "signs and omens," and dreamed himself into a helpless fatalism, but a belief in "signs and omens" is not necessarily superstition; and whether it makes any part of superstition depends on the nature of the "signs and omens." The man who plants or sows at certain times in the month is said to be superstitious in a mean sense, but that charge should be made with caution. Hundreds of things once placed under the easy designation of superstition, have become scientific facts. The mental and spiritual planes have been approached with distrust, in ignorance and caution. There, it has been held, fair science does not go, and the foundations of those planes are treated as uncertain and mystical. If Mr. Lincoln was never able to get beyond the things of natural sense, he

had at all events, a deep, unalterable belief in the supernatural.

But why lay all this stress upon what he believed in these matters? Why should all these discussions, and this strife have arisen about his religious opinions? Was it because the friends of Christianity needed such a supporter? Was it because the enemies of Christianity felt that their bad cause would be greatly benefited by the influence of such a character? What were his theological opinions worth? In theology Mr. Lincoln was an unwise man, extremely so. Strictly speaking, he was learned on few subjects, and less on this than any other. He really read very few books. During the last four or five years of his life he read no great modern work. Two or three humorous works he read thoroughly, he thought, to relieve him from the weight of his labor and troubles. A course of theological reading he never imposed upon himself. What little he did read at New Salem and Springfield was in a skeptical line. His theological opinions were utterly worthless, and his position as a religious or irreligious man could not have weighed as a straw for or against any cause. Opinions are valuable for the weight of evidence they carry with them, for the manner in which they appeal to intelligent judgment. The weight of evidence may be sufficiently apparent in the known character of the individual who expresses the opinion. Among the intelligent, that man may look most for the reasonable and fair consideration of his views who has read the most and to the best advantage, who

has thought the most and the most cautiously, critically, and correctly. To be worthy of respect, an opinion, on any subject, must appeal to intelligent and refined judgment. In theology men wander most, and yet here they set themselves up most. However dense ignorance may be on other subjects, here it is likely to be far more dense. The man who never reads the Bible, which he often can not understand, or a plain work on religion or theology, which he might stand some little chance of understanding, is often the first and loudest in setting himself up as "knowing just as much about that as he does, he's never been there." If men know little of the things immediately before their eyes, and all around their natural senses, how much less may they be expected to know of things seen by eyes and surrounded by senses they do not believe they possess, spiritual things with which theology and religion chiefly deal!

It is a matter of utter indifference, so far as establishing the right or the wrong, what ignorant and uninformed men believe. So Mr. Lincoln's reading, culture, opportunities, preparation did not fit him for a theological critic, and hence it was ridiculous at the outset to place any stress upon what he was religiously, from what he had studied, thought, reasoned, learned, loved.

Many of those, who, in an earlier day, from 1845 to 1860, talked about and assailed Mr. Lincoln's religion, did it from what they termed the orthodox point of view. And after all, with them, Mr. Lin-

coln's offense seemed mainly to be want of orthodoxy. It was not so much that he lacked in the elements, or at least many of the practical elements, of Christian life and character, but that he failed in answering to the creed. This was one of the barely possible things with Mr. Lincoln. Nothing could be more difficult with him than to say, "I believe." What would satisfy minds of ordinary mold was often wholly unsatisfactory and out of the question with Mr. Lincoln. Here, as in most other things, it was natural for him not to be a minnow, but to wander uncaught, like a big fish, in the blue deep.

In the previous pages the first epoch of Mr. Lincoln's religious character and life, so-called, has been presented with some degree of fullness. This course has appeared necessary from the importance which has been attached to him in this matter, and the efforts put forth by a class of good men, who, in their zeal for his general and unbroken fame, perhaps, overstepped the boundary of fact to establish for him a reputation which can hardly be sustained; and by another class, who, being his friends and admirers, and claiming the weight of evidence on their side, have made similar efforts to prove that Mr. Lincoln remained to the end, what he had formerly been, or what they had believed he had been, and such as they were themselves.

In his brief farewell words to the people of Springfield, February 11. 1861, Mr. Lincoln said: "A duty devolves upon me which is, perhaps, greater than that which has devolved upon any other man since

the days of Washington. He never would have succeeded except for the aid of Divine Providence, upon which he at all times relied. I feel that I can not succeed without the same Divine aid which sustained him, and on the same Almighty Being I place my reliance for support; and I hope you, my friends, will all pray that I may receive that Divine assistance, without which I can not succeed, but with which success is certain."

These were fortunate words. At the threshold of the White House he had thus put himself in relation with the religious world. He dreaded the tempest which was gathering around him, and felt that safety could only be found among the friends of Him whose very word could bring peace from the storm. His gloomy temperament, his natural humbleness, his strong faith in the supernatural, and the very evident thread of superstition which ran through him, in view of what was justly supposed to be his religious character at that time, may reasonably be assumed as sufficient foundation for this new departure, and the world could not have been more pleased, than were Mr. Lincoln's old friends amazed or nonplused. But, perhaps, he had never been so serious before, or felt that he was more true to himself than when he uttered the Christian sentiment given here. There are not wanting some evidences that his preparation had begun a few years before; and probably no better proof of this could be needed than is to be found in the mere fact of his utter concealment of his religious state from the associates who

regarded it as bad, that is, as anti-Christian. In his speech at Chicago, July 10, 1858, Mr. Lincoln used these words :—

“It is said in one of the admonitions of our Lord, ‘As your Father in Heaven is perfect, be ye also perfect.’ The Savior, I suppose, did not expect that any human creature could be perfect as the Father in Heaven; but He said, ‘As your Father in Heaven is perfect, be ye also perfect.’ He set that up as a standard, and he who did most in reaching that standard, attained the highest degree of moral perfection.”

In his speech at Springfield on the 17th of the same month he spoke :—

“He says I have a proneness for quoting Scripture. If I should do so now, it occurs that, perhaps, he places himself somewhat on the ground of the parable of the lost sheep which went astray upon the mountains, and when the owner of the hundred sheep found the one that was lost, and threw it upon his shoulders, and came home rejoicing, it was said that there was more rejoicing over the one sheep that was lost and had been found, than over the ninety and nine in the fold. The application is made by the Savior in this parable, thus: ‘Verily, I say unto you, there is more rejoicing in Heaven over one sinner that repenteth, than over ninety and nine just persons who need no repentance.’ And now if the Judge (Douglas) claims the benefit of this parable, let him repent. Let him not come up here and say: ‘I am the only just person; and you are ninety-nine sinners!’ Repentance before forgiveness is a provision of the Christian system, and on that condition alone will the Republicans grant his forgiveness.”

From these quotations alone it is evident that Mr. Lincoln’s extra reading was not all in an infidel line, or light trash, or in the questionable Burns and

Shakespeare, even at that period; and by these alone must forever fall to the ground the charge that he never uttered a word in any of his speeches or other known writings indicative of the slightest degree of faith in God, the Savior, or, indeed, that he ever uttered the name of the Savior.

On parting with his step-mother in February, 1861, Mr. Lincoln said to her: "Trust in the Lord, and all will be well; we will see each other again."

These words are found in his first inaugural address: "Intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who has never yet forsaken this favored land, are still competent to adjust, in the best way, all our present difficulties." This square position on the Christian side must have sounded strangely to those who claimed him on the other. Was a change already coming over Mr. Lincoln?

In his speech at Ottawa, August 21, 1858, Mr. Lincoln said: "I know that the Judge may readily enough agree with me that the maxim which was put forth by the Savior is true, but he may allege that I misapply it."

At Alton, October 15, 1858, in speaking of the assault made by Mr. Douglas on the sentiments of his "House-divided-against-itself Speech," Mr. Lincoln says: "He has warred upon them as Satan wars upon the Bible."

"Having thus chosen our cause without guile, and with pure purpose, let us renew our trust in God, and go forward without fear and with manly hearts." (Closing words of first message, July 4, 1861.)

“With a reliance on Providence, all the more firm and earnest, let us proceed in the great task which events have devolved upon us.” (First annual message.)

“In full view of my great responsibility to my God and my country, I earnestly beg the attention of Congress and the people to the subject.” (Message of March 6, 1862, on aiding the States to emancipate the slaves.)

“Whatever shall appear to be God’s will I will do.” (Reply, in 1862, to a religious emancipation delegation.)

While it has not pleased the Almighty to bless us with the return of peace, we can but press on, guided by the best light he gives us, trusting that, in His own good time and wise way, all will be well.” (Second annual message.)

Here is Mr. Lincoln’s order appealing to Christian soldiers, November 16, 1862:—

“The President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, desires and enjoins the orderly observance of the Sabbath, by the officers and men in the military and naval service. The importance, for man and beast, of the prescribed weekly rest, the sacred rights of Christian soldiers and sailors, a becoming deference to the best sentiment of a Christian people, and a due regard for the Divine will, demand that Sunday labor in the army and navy be reduced to the measure of strict necessity. The discipline and character of the national forces should not suffer, nor the cause they defend be imperiled, by the profanation of the day or name of the Most High. ‘At this time of public distress,’ adopting the words of Washington in 1776, ‘men may find enough to do in the service of God and their country, without abandoning themselves to vice and immorality.’ The first general order issued by the Father of his Country, after the Declaration of Independence, indicates the spirit in which our institutions were founded and should ever be defended: ‘The General hopes and

trusts that every officer and man will endeavor to live and act as becomes a Christian soldier defending the dearest rights and liberties of his country.

“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”

“In the form approved by their own conscience, render the homage due to the Divine Majesty, for the wonderful things He has done in the Nation’s behalf, and invoke the influence of His Holy Spirit to subdue the anger which has produced and so long sustained a needless and cruel rebellion.” (Thanksgiving Proclamation, July 15, 1863.)

“EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C., }
“May 9, 1864. }

“TO THE FRIENDS OF UNION AND LIBERTY:—

“Enough is known of army operations, within the last five days, to claim our special gratitude to God. While what remains undone demands our most sincere prayers to and reliance upon Him (without whom all effort is vain), I recommend that all patriots at their homes, in their places of public worship, and wherever they may be, unite in common thanksgiving and prayer to Almighty God.

“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”

“GENTLEMEN,—In response to your address, allow me to attest the accuracy of its historical statements, indorse the sentiments it expresses, and thank you, in the Nation’s name, for the sure promise it gives. Nobly sustained, as the Government has been, by all the Churches, I would utter nothing which might in the least appear invidious against any. Yet, without this, it may fairly be said that the Methodist Episcopal Church, not less devoted than the best, is, by its greater numbers, the most important of all. It is no fault in others that the Methodist Church sends more soldiers to the field, more nurses to the hospitals, and more prayers to Heaven than any. God bless the Methodist Church; bless all the Churches; and blessed be

God, who, in this our great trial, giveth us the Churches!" (Mr. Lincoln's answer to Methodist Conference, May, 1864.)

"In regard to the Great Book, I have only to say it is the best gift which God has ever given to man. All the good from the Savior of the world is communicated to us through this book. But for that book, we could not know right from wrong. All those things desirable to man are contained in it. I return you sincere thanks for this very elegant copy of this great Book of God, which you present." (In Mr. Lincoln's remarks to colored men of Baltimore in 1864.)

"If God now wills the removal of a great wrong, and wills that we of the North, as well as you of the South, shall pay fairly for our complicity in that wrong, impartial history will find therein new causes to attest and revere the justice and goodness of God." (Letter to A. G. Hodges, April, 1864.)

These quotations will serve as Mr. Lincoln's own testimony as to the growth of his religion. In the last year his proclamations were very numerous, and the display of religious sentiment was constantly more intense; nor was it of a character to which the most orthodox could object. In his last inaugural he said: "The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether." This was Mr. Lincoln's final verdict. And what was that of his old friends at Springfield? They have held out in their efforts to prove that he was an infidel, was not a Christian, when he left Springfield, and that he made no progress, was not changed the least in his religious faith and feelings at his death. Was he, then, a hypocrite? Were all his appeals to God, to Providence, insincere, and

to cater to the public demand? Did he not accept, and, to some extent, carry out the practical precepts of the New Testament? Did he go out of the bounds commonly assigned to the Christian? Did he avoid any thing which a Christian people might expect of a Christian President? If his own record while President, on this point, is false, then what becomes of the title of "Honest Abe" in which he so much prided, and his right to which is not more boldly defended by any one than by Mr. Herndon? If he were untrue in this, the rest of his career is unworthy of defense. In nothing else can hypocrisy be so infamous as in religion, and in nothing else is the experiment of hypocrisy so dangerous to the individual who tries it. Was Abraham Lincoln, religiously, a hypocrite? Who will dare to assert it? Then, what was he? What do the words from his own mouth prove him to have been? If the efforts of his infidel friends are to be taken for all they might be valued at, it then is only proper to admit, as fully, all his Christian friends claim in the period they represent, and in which their opportunities for a correct judgment were much more reliable.

In Crosby's "Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln," Mr. Lincoln is represented as saying to a clergyman :—

"When I was first inaugurated I did not love Him ; when God took my son, I was greatly impressed, but still I did not love Him ; but when I stood upon the battle-field of Gettysburg I gave my heart to Christ, and I can now say I do love the Savior."

Charles Godfrey Leland says in his "Life of Abraham Lincoln :"—

"As he grew older, his intensely melancholy and emotional temperament inclined him towards reliance in an unseen Providence and belief in a future state ; and it is certain that, after the unpopularity of free-thinkers had forced itself upon his mind, the most fervidly passionate expressions of piety began to abound in his speeches. In this he was not, however, hypocritical."

F. B. Carpenter, the painter of "The Proclamation," a picture representing the President laying his Emancipation Proclamation before his Cabinet, in his "Six Months at the White House," says :—

"In the ordinary acceptation of the term, I would scarcely have called Mr. Lincoln a religious man—and yet I believe him to have been a sincere Christian. A constitutional tendency to dwell upon sacred things, an emotional nature which finds ready expression in religious conversation and revival meetings, the culture and development of the devotional element till the expression of such thought and experience becomes habitual, were not among his characteristics. Doubtless he felt as deeply upon the great questions of the soul and eternity as any other thoughtful man ; but the very tenderness and humility of his nature would not permit the exposure of his inmost convictions, except upon the rarest occasions, and to his most intimate friends. And yet, aside from emotional expression, I believe no man had a more abiding sense of his dependence upon God, or faith in the Divine government, and in the power and ultimate triumph of truth and right in the world. The Rev. J. P. Thompson, of New York, in an admirable discourse upon the life and character of the departed President, very justly observed : 'It is not necessary to appeal to apocryphal stories—which

illustrate as much the assurance of his visitors as the simplicity of his faith—for proof of Mr. Lincoln's Christian character.' If his daily life and various public addresses and writings do not show this, surely nothing can demonstrate it.

"Fortunately there is sufficient material before the public, upon which to form a judgment in this respect, without resorting to apocryphal sources.

"The Rev. Mr. Willets, of Brooklyn, gave me an account of a conversation with Mr. Lincoln, on the part of a lady of his acquaintance, connected with the 'Christian Commission,' who in the prosecution of her duties had several interviews with him. The President, it seemed, had been much impressed with the devotion and earnestness of purpose manifested by the lady, and on one occasion, after she had discharged the object of her visit, he said to her: 'Mrs. —, I have formed a high opinion of your Christian character, and now, as we are alone, I have a mind to ask you to give me, in brief, your idea of what constitutes a true religious experience.' The lady replied at some length, stating that, in her judgment, it consisted of a conviction of one's own sinfulness and weakness, and personal need of the Savior for strength and support; that views of mere doctrine might and would differ, but when one was really brought to feel his need of Divine help, and to seek the aid of the Holy Spirit for strength and guidance, it was satisfactory evidence of his having been born again. This was the substance of her reply. When she had concluded, Mr. Lincoln was very thoughtful for a few moments. He at length said, very earnestly: 'If what you have told me is really a correct view of this great subject, I think I can say with sincerity, that I hope I am a Christian. I had lived,' he continued, 'until my boy Willie died, without realizing fully these things. That blow overwhelmed me. It showed me my weakness as I had never felt it before, and if I can take what you have

stated as a test, I think I can safely say that I know something of that change of which you speak; and I will further add, that it has been my intention for some time, at a suitable opportunity, to make a public religious profession.’”

The Rev. Mr. Gurley, of the New York Avenue Presbyterian Church, which the President and his family attended in Washington, bore the same testimony as to Mr. Lincoln’s purpose “to make a public profession” of his religion.

One, long a helper at the White House, writes in this enthusiastic way about Mr. Lincoln:—

“He reached forth one of his long arms, and took a small Bible from a stand near the head of the sofa, opened the pages of the holy Book, and soon was absorbed in reading them. A quarter of an hour passed, and on glancing at the sofa the face of the President seemed more cheerful. The dejected look was gone, and the countenance was lighted up with new resolution and hope. The change was so marked that I could not but wonder at it, and wonder led to the desire to know what book of the Bible afforded so much comfort to the reader. Making the search for a missing article an excuse, I walked gently around the sofa, and looking into the open book, I discovered that Mr. Lincoln was reading that divine comforter, Job. He read with Christian eagerness, and the courage and hope that he derived from the inspired pages made him a new man. I almost imagined that I could hear the Lord speaking to him from out the whirlwind of battle: ‘Gird up thy loins now like a man: I will demand of thee, and declare thou unto me.’ What a sublime picture was this! A ruler of a mighty Nation going to the pages of the Bible with simple Christian earnestness for comfort and courage, and finding both in the darkest hours

of a Nation's calamity. Ponder it, O ye scoffers at God's Holy Word, and then hang your heads for very shame!"

The Rev. Mr. Gurley wrote of him :—

" I speak what I know, and testify what I have often heard him say, when I affirm the guidance and the mercy of God were the props on which he humbly and habitually leaned ; and that his abiding confidence in God and in the final triumph of truth and righteousness through him and for his sake, was his noblest virtue, his grandest principle, the secret alike of his strength, his patience, and his success."

Between Mr. Lincoln and Bishop Simpson of the Methodist Church, there appears to have sprung up a kind of mutual attachment in the last years of Mr. Lincoln's life. Of him the Bishop said :—

" The constant recognition of God in his public documents shows how completely his mind was under the dominion of religious faith. This is never a commonplace formalism nor a misplaced cant. To satisfy ourselves of Mr. Lincoln's Christian character, we have no need to resort to apocryphal stories that illustrate the assurance of his victories quite as much as the simplicity of his faith ; we have but to follow internal evidences, as the workings of his soul reveal themselves through his own published utterances.

" As a ruler, I doubt if any President has ever showed such trust in God, or in public documents so frequently referred to Divine aid. Often did he remark to friends and delegations that his hope for our success rested in his conviction that God would bless our efforts, because we were trying to do right. To the address of a large religious body, he replied : ' Thanks be unto God, who in our national trials giveth us the Churches ! ' To a minister who said ' he hoped the Lord was on our side, ' he replied

‘that it gave him no concern whether the Lord was on our side or not,’ for he added, ‘I know the Lord is always on the side of right;’ and with deep feeling added, ‘but God is my witness that it is my constant anxiety and prayer that both myself and this Nation should be on the Lord’s side.’”

Now, what more need be said? Is the case not clear? Is the case not made? Do not Mr. Lincoln’s own words, during his Presidency, prove the change which had taken place in his religious character? Does not the evidence of his Christian friends finally leave him among them? Mr. Lincoln tells himself how and when he began to place himself on the Christian side. In his new sphere in such a time, he left his former associations behind him, and the new influences bearing upon him from all sides he felt warmly and kindly. The hands of the Christian friends of the Republic and of freedom were everywhere stretched out to hold him up; their prayers and their earnest friendship; their patriotism gained his good-will and drew him to them. His son’s death, and the carnage of war, and, perhaps, the threats upon his own life, and the prayers of Christians for his preservation he could not withstand. And so, not against his will, as the dreadful war progressed, his sympathies and preferences were developed, and he entered the current whose course he believed to be shaped by Him who does all things best. From this position he never had an opportunity to swerve, even if he had had the inclination.

With the origin and principles of Christianity he now had no quarrel. He said:—

“I have never united myself to any Church, because I have found difficulty in giving my assent, without mental reservation, to the long, complicated statements of Christian doctrine which characterize their ‘Articles of Belief’ and ‘Confessions of Faith.’ When any Church will inscribe over its altar, as its sole qualification for membership, the Savior’s condensed statement of the substance of both Law and Gospel, ‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and thy neighbor as thyself,’ that Church will I join with all my heart and all my soul.”

What manner of man could boldly uphold this grand principle of Christianity? From what other source could he have derived the immortal saying with which he entered upon the closing scenes of his life, “With malice toward none, with charity for all?”

CHAPTER XXVIII.

ANOTHER PICTURE—MR. LINCOLN'S COURTSHIPS—MARY TODD—THE PUGNACIOUS JAMES SHIELDS.

ALTHOUGH Lincoln was always reasonably fond of the society of girls and women, it does not appear that they were objects of especial thought to him, or that he had any sleepless nights on account of them, until long after he became one of the noted men of New Salem. He seemed to regard himself more in the light of a teacher and fun-maker for the young women with whom he associated in Spencer County, Indiana. Most women liked Lincoln, as a boy, and he was really fond of making himself useful to them, and relieving them of many a disagreeable burden. But, according to some veracious writers, he found his main delight, in this association, in the privilege he took to "tease the girls." The purport of this expression may be readily inferred from the general representation of his character at this period, as seen in this history. Much of his doggerel poetry had women for its theme, and the privilege he assumed and the latitude of his positions were indicative of the social vulgarity in which he was reared.

The facts in the following account of Mr. Lincoln's first "love affair" are borrowed from Lamon's "Life of Abraham Lincoln."

Ann Rutledge was the daughter of James Rutledge, a native of South Carolina, and one of the first, or perhaps the first, of the early emigrants to the country about New Salem. Ann was courted by two of the neighbors, partners in business, and finally chose John McNeil, or John McNamar, the latter being his true name. But McNamar, after finding himself in good circumstances with a good home, somewhat mysteriously left on a long journey to the East. At first he wrote to Ann, but finally stopped, and nothing more was heard of him. He had revealed to her his true name, and his object in using another, and told her that he would return, and this he did, but too late to see her. Her faith in his promises was never seriously shaken, but the mystery and uncertainty involved in his absence and silence loosened her sense of obligation to her own promises. In the meantime Lincoln was much in her company, at her father's house and at the homes of one or more of the neighbors. He had "fallen desperately in love with her," and she learned after a time to love him in turn. Finally she consented to marry him, and only waited for him to finish his law studies, and for something to occur to relieve her from her pledge to McNamar. Her friends and relatives were in favor of her immediate marriage to Lincoln, and her own inclinations and judgment began to dispose her to take their advice. But an event soon occurred which put an end to Mr. Lincoln's hopes, as it was also on the verge of destroying his reason and life.

In the Summer of 1835 poor Ann showed signs of declining health, and late in August she died. It was said that her disease was "brain-fever," and no doubt this was true enough as far as it went, but many of the curious, sympathizing friends said she died of a "broken heart."

In the last moments she called Lincoln to her bedside. What passed between them may readily be imagined, but it has never been told. Her death unmanned him, and when her body was placed in the grave at Concord, his reason fled, and his friends thought he was lost. But after watching him with care at the home of Bowlin Greene, one of his admiring friends, for a few weeks, they again allowed him to resume his surveyor's compass and law-books.

Ann was a good and beautiful woman, and the most refined that Lincoln had ever met at that period. The following is his own description of her in answer to the question of a friend many years afterwards as to his running wild over the death of Ann Rutledge:—

"I did really. I ran off the track. It was my first. I loved the woman dearly. She was a handsome girl; would have made a good, loving wife; was natural and quite intellectual, though not highly educated. I did honestly and truly love the girl, and think often, often of her now."

The whole story of Ann Rutledge, so minutely told by Wm. H. Herndon and Mr. Lamon, is no better authenticated than this language of Mr. Lincoln's. And I must stake this language against Mr. Hern-

don's oft-repeated statement that Mr. Lincoln's heart was buried with the body of Ann Rutledge, and that he never loved another woman. Is not Mr. Lincoln's statement substantially that of thousands of other men on the same subject? Does it not show that it was his *first*, and that he had long ago learned to look upon it as others had looked upon their *first*?

Another case from the same authorities will now be given which must also subserve the purpose of depreciating their views of the influence of Ann Rutledge over Mr. Lincoln's heart, and of his very moderate affection for Mary Todd, his wife. Only the very next fall after the death of poor Ann Rutledge, Mary S. Owens, of Kentucky, came to visit or live with her sister, Mrs. Bennett Able (Abel), near New Salem. Able and his wife were numbered among Lincoln's warm friends. They had known all about his affair with Miss Rutledge, and instead of being disgusted with his unmanly folly and weakness after her death, they seemed to sympathize with and value him still higher.

In 1833 Miss Owens had made a short visit to Illinois, and then Lincoln saw her for the first time. Mrs. Able went to Kentucky in the Summer of 1836, and before starting she and Lincoln had a conversation about Mary, and Lincoln said that if she would bring Mary back with her he would marry her. Mrs. Able was really in favor of this scheme, and when she returned, Mary was with her. Lincoln was vain enough to think at once that Mary had not been successful in Kentucky, and had actually come out

to marry him. He, however, set about the work of courtship immediately, and from the outset looked upon Mary as his wife, although he was modest enough not to tell her so. She may have been lacking in some of the fine, gentle traits which characterized Ann Rutledge, but she had a better education, was very beautiful, had a fine head, and a magnificent and attractive body weighing a hundred and fifty pounds. In mental culture and everything else she was more than a match for Mr. Lincoln, and this she was perhaps, able to recognize at once. Still it is probable that she really had some desire to marry Lincoln at that time, and subsequently had good reason to regret that she did not. But as it was, matters did not go smoothly with them. She felt too sure of her hold on Lincoln, and he labored under the same error as to her. So, as might have been expected, they quarreled, and in 1838 she left Illinois, and they never met again. The only communication she ever had from Lincoln after her return to Kentucky was to the effect that he considered her a great fool for not staying out West and marrying him. As the world, to a great extent, looks upon these matters, however erroneous and blind its judgment, Lincoln's banter would receive a very general vote of approval. In 1866, Miss Owens, then married, wrote several letters to Wm. H. Herndon about Mr. Lincoln's affair with her. One of them reads as follows :

“DEAR SIR,—Really you catechise me in true lawyer style ; but I feel you will have the goodness to excuse me

if I decline answering all your questions in detail, being well assured that few women would have ceded as much as I have under all the circumstances.

"You say you have heard why our acquaintance terminated as it did. I, too, have heard the same bit of gossip; but I never used the remark which Madam Rumor says I did to Mr. Lincoln. I think I did on one occasion say to my sister, who was very anxious for us to be married, that I thought Mr. Lincoln deficient in those little links which make up the chain of woman's happiness; at least it was so in my case. Not that I believed it proceeded from a lack of goodness of heart; but his training had been different from mine, hence there was not that congeniality which would otherwise have existed.

"From his own showing, you perceive that his heart and hand were at my disposal; and I suppose that my feelings were not sufficiently enlisted to have the matter consummated. About the beginning of the year 1838 I left Illinois, at which time our acquaintance and correspondence ceased without ever again being renewed.

"My father, who resided in Greene County, Kentucky, was a gentleman of considerable means, and I am persuaded that few persons placed a higher estimate on education than he did.

Respectfully yours,

"MARY S——."

The saying of "Madam Rumor," about which Miss Owens here speaks, and which she denies, was to the effect that she had said to Lincoln, "You would not make a good husband, Abe." With a little excusable vanity Miss Owens says that from Lincoln's own showing it can be seen by any one that he was wholly at her disposal. She refers to his many letters to her. When she was in Illinois, Lincoln was a member of the Legislature, and from the State

Capital he wrote quite often to her, as he continued to do after he had located at Springfield in the practice of his profession.

The two following letters from this correspondence indicate clearly enough what Miss Owens could not have escaped in her own reflections on the subject, that they were written by a man not in love with her, and while he was holding to his honor, was trying to pave the way out of a position in which he felt restless and dissatisfied. Neither the language nor method of these letters is that of the lover; nor, indeed, do they quite comport with the character of an honest man, under the circumstances. Still in these very letters Mr. Lincoln pleads his honest and manly intentions, and back of this, perhaps, no man has a right, or finds a right, to go in the case. These letters, however, bear the general appearance of having been written by one of the most unselfish men in all the world; and how far this appearance is true may be better judged after the reading of another letter which shall also be given, in part:—

“SPRINGFIELD, May 7, 1837.

“MISS MARY S. OWENS:—

“FRIEND MARY,—I have commenced two letters to send you before this, both of which displeased me before I got half done, and so I tore them up. The first I thought was not serious enough, and the second was on the other extreme. I shall send this, turn out as it may. This thing of living in Springfield is rather a dull business, after all; at least it is so to me. I am quite as lonesome here as I ever was anywhere in my life. I have been spoken to by but one woman since I've been here, and

should not have been by her, if she could have avoided it. I've never been to church yet, and probably shall not be soon. I stay away because I am conscious I should not know how to behave myself.

"I am often thinking about what we said of your coming to live at Springfield. I am afraid you would not be satisfied. There is a great deal of flourishing about in carriages here, which it would be your doom to see without sharing in it. You would have to be poor, without the means of hiding your poverty. Do you believe you could bear that patiently? Whatever woman may cast her lot with mine, should any ever do so, it is my intention to do all in my power to make her happy and contented; and there is nothing I can imagine that would make me more unhappy than to fail in the effort. I know I should be much happier with you than the way I am, provided I saw no signs of discontent in you. What you have said to me may have been in the way of jest, or I may have misunderstood it. If so, then let it be forgotten; if otherwise, I much wish you would think seriously before you decide. For my part, I have already decided. What I have said, I will most positively abide by, provided you wish it. My opinion is, that you had better not do it. You have not been accustomed to hardship, and it may be more severe than you now imagine. I know you are capable of thinking correctly on any subject; and, if you deliberate maturely upon this before you decide, then I am willing to abide your decision.

"You must write me a good, long letter after you get this. You have nothing else to do; and, though it might not seem interesting to you after you have written it, it would be a good deal of company to me in this 'busy wilderness.'

"Tell your sister, I do not want to hear any more about selling out and moving. That gives me the hypo whenever I think of it. Yours, etc., LINCOLN."

“SPRINGFIELD, August 16, 1837.

“FRIEND MARY,—You will no doubt think it rather strange that I should write you a letter on the same day on which we parted; and I can only account for it by supposing that seeing you lately makes me think of you more than usual; while at our late meeting we had but few expressions of thoughts. You must know that I can not see you or think of you with entire indifference; and yet it may be that you are mistaken in regard to what my real feelings toward you are. If I knew you were not, I would not trouble you with this letter. Perhaps any other man would know enough without further information; but I consider it my peculiar right to plead ignorance, and your bounden duty to allow the plea. I want, in all cases, to do right; and most particularly so, in all cases with women. I want, at this particular time, more than anything else, to do right with you; and if I knew it would be doing right, as I rather suspect it would, to let you alone, I would do it. And for the purpose of making the matter as plain as possible, I now say that you can now drop the subject, dismiss your thoughts (if you ever had any) from me forever, and leave this letter unanswered, without calling forth one accusing murmur from me. And I will even go further, and say that if it will add anything to your comfort or peace of mind to do so, it is my sincere wish that you should. Do not understand by this that I wish to cut your acquaintance. I mean no such thing. What I do wish is, that our further acquaintance shall depend upon yourself. If such further acquaintance would constitute nothing to your happiness, I am sure it would not to mine. If you feel yourself in any degree bound to me, I am now willing to release you, provided you wish it; while on the other hand, I am willing, and even anxious, to bind you faster, if I can be convinced that it will, in any considerable degree, add to your happiness. This, indeed, is the whole question with me. Nothing would

make me more miserable than to believe you miserable; nothing more happy than to know you were so.

"In what I have now said, I think I can not be misunderstood; and to make myself understood is the only object of this letter.

"If it suits you better not to answer this, farewell. A long life and a merry one attend you. But if you conclude to write back, speak as plainly as I do. There can be neither harm nor danger in saying to me anything you think, just in the manner you think it. My respects to your sister. Your friend, LINCOLN."

While I do not consider myself under obligations to enter into an analysis of these letters, I shall take the liberty to use the freedom I claim in treating all things, men, and subjects of every kind, to say here that I think them mean, mean without mitigation. I have said what these letters meant, what they were designed to do. How many men could be found to put a different construction upon them? They were not "love-letters;" they were not the letters of a man who was in love. That they were devised for the purpose I have intimated is plainly enough proven by Mr. Lincoln's own words in a vulgar and exceedingly unmanly letter written in reference to his affairs with Miss Owens, in the spring of 1838, to the wife of O. H. Browning. He begins this letter by calling Mrs. Browning "Dear Madam," and closes with the words, "Your sincere friend, A. Lincoln." Miss Owens, who was every way his "equal," vulgarly speaking, and to whom he had made a proposition to become his wife, he addressed as "Friend Mary," and signed himself "Yours, etc., Lincoln."

With her he had studiously avoided the use of the word "dear" even. I say studiously because he says that he had written and torn up two letters before he was satisfied with what he had written. Is that the way sincere men write "love-letters?" From the heart the mouth speaks with ease. In his Browning letter, which is too unmanly to be borrowed and used here as a whole, after telling Mrs. Browning all about the way Miss Owens was brought to Illinois by her sister on a bargain with him to marry her, and of his astonishment on hearing of her arrival, and what his reflections were as to her being entirely too willing, Mr. Lincoln says:—

"All this occurred to me on hearing of her arrival in the neighborhood; for, be it remembered, I had not yet seen her, except about three years previously, as above mentioned. In a few days we had an interview; and, although I had seen her before, she did not look as my imagination had pictured her. I knew she was oversize, but she now appeared a fair match for Falstaff. I knew she was called an 'old maid,' and I felt no doubt of the truth of at least half of the appellation; but now, when I beheld her, I could not for my life avoid thinking of my mother; and this not from withered features, for her skin was too full of fat to permit of its contracting into wrinkles, but from her want of teeth, weather-beaten appearance in general, and from a kind of notion that ran in my head that nothing could have commenced at the size of infancy and reached her present bulk in less than thirty-five or forty years; and, in short, I was not at all pleased with her."

Then, after telling of how he thought himself bound to carry out the contract or understanding he

had with Miss Owens's sister, whose admirable character and qualities were unmistakable, he writes.—

“At once I determined to consider her my wife; and, this done, all my powers of discovery were put to work in search of perfections in her which might be fairly set off against her defects. I tried to imagine her handsome, which, but for her unfortunate corpulency, was actually true. Exclusive of this, no woman that I have ever seen has a finer face. I also tried to convince myself that the mind was much more to be valued than the person; and in this she was not inferior, as I could discover, to any with whom I had been acquainted.

“Shortly after this, without attempting to come to any positive understanding with her, I set out for Vandalia, when and where you first saw me. During my stay there I had letters from her which did not change my opinion of either her intellect or intention, but, on the contrary, confirmed it in both.

“All this while, although I was fixed, ‘firm as the surge-repelling rock,’ in my resolution, I found I was continually repenting the rashness which had led me to make it. Through life I have been in no bondage, either real or imaginary, from the thralldom of which I so much desired to be free.”

The opportunity must not be lost here to say that there was some apology in 1837 for “the want of teeth” in this country beauty. While it is really unrefined and indelicate enough for people, men or women, to appear in the presence of one another with decayed and offensive looking teeth or without teeth, in 1882, the same can not be said of that early date in this country.

If the pretty and intelligent Miss Owens was

toothless, she was no worse off than most of her neighbors, who had not been naturally more fortunate. The fastidiousness Mr. Lincoln exhibited on this point was hardly in keeping with some things in himself, and certainly not with the condition of the times, or the spirit of the lover, who is never a critic. After his attempts "to procrastinate the evil day," as he says to Mrs. Browning, and his startling letters, Miss Owens had nothing left her but to say no. What woman of sense or spirit could have done otherwise? Here was a man who did not even address her as kindly as he did other women, who said substantially to her: I'll have you, if you desire it, but I think you better not desire it. I'll stand up to what I have appeared to mean, but you'll find it hard to go along with me. I would like to get rid of you, but it shall be as you say; if you are willing to let the subject drop, I won't mind it in the least; the fact is, I have no interest in the matter at all on my own account, it is simply as you feel and say about it. See now how transparent this one-sided matter was by Mr. Lincoln's own account of it in the letter to Mrs. Browning. He says:—

"After all my suffering on this deeply interesting subject, here I am, wholly, unexpectedly, completely, out of the 'scrape;' and now I want to know if you can guess how I got out of it, out clear in every sense of the term; no violation of word, honor, or conscience. I don't believe you can guess, and so I might as well tell you at once. As the lawyer says, it was done in the manner following, to wit: after I had delayed the matter as long as I thought I could in honor do (which, by the way, had

brought me round into the last fall), I concluded I might as well bring it to a consummation, without further delay; and so I mustered my resolution and made the proposal to her direct; but, shocking to relate, she answered, No. At first I supposed she did it through an affectation of modesty, which I thought but ill became her under the circumstances of her case; but on my renewal of the charge, I found she repelled it with greater firmness than before. I tried it again and again, but with the same success, or rather with the same want of success.

“I finally was forced to give it up; at which I very unexpectedly found myself mortified almost beyond endurance. I was mortified, it seemed to me, in a hundred different ways. My vanity was deeply wounded by the reflection that I had so long been too stupid to discover her intentions, and at the same time never doubting that I understood them perfectly; and also that she whom I had taught myself to believe nobody else would have, had actually rejected me with all my fancied greatness. And to cap the whole, I then, for the first time, began to suspect that I was really a little in love with her. But let it all go. I’ll try and outlive it. Others have been made fools of by the girls; but this can never with truth be said of me. I most emphatically, in this instance, made a fool of myself. I have now come to the conclusion never again to think of marrying, and for this reason I can never be satisfied with any one who would be block-head enough to have me.”

From the preceding pages the reader may, without further light on the subject, be able to make up his mind as to how incurable Mr. Lincoln’s heart wounds had been, and as to whether the memory of Ann Rutledge ever could have interfered seriously with his affection for Mary Todd, or prevented him

from acting as an unincumbered and honorable man should do towards his own wife. If his insanity had been very deep over the irreparable loss of Ann Rutledge, how could he have, so soon after, started into such a business with Mary S. Owens? And so soon after this with Miss Owens, how could he have set up another affair of the kind with Mary Todd?

In a book of Kentucky biographies, I find this brief sketch of Mrs. Lincoln's father:—

“Robert S. Todd, banker, was born in 1792. He was for many years clerk of the Kentucky House of Representatives; was elected to the Legislature from Fayette County, in 1841; was re-elected, and in 1845 was elected to the State Senate, serving four years, and was a candidate for re-election at the time of his death; was President of the Lexington branch of the Bank of Kentucky, from its establishment to the end of his life. He was one of the most distinguished and useful men of Fayette County, and died July 16, 1849. Among his surviving children is the widow of President Abraham Lincoln.”

In 1839 Mary Todd, went to Springfield, Illinois, to live with her sister, who was the wife of Ninian W. Edwards, a son of old Governor Edwards. She was at this time about twenty-one years old, had received a very good education, was more than ordinarily bright and witty, was high-strung and full of family pride, was attractive and brilliant in manners, had a plump and shapely form, with a face which, while it was not void of beauty, was expressive of no small degree of spirit and character. No person could have looked at Mary Todd's face at that time without seeing that she was a woman of high, and

perhaps at times, ungovernable temper. This unfortunate trait is plain enough in all her portraits as Mrs. Lincoln. Nor does it appear that it ever became the object of her especial care to educate or eradicate it.

Not long after her arrival at Springfield, Mr. Lincoln met her, and notwithstanding his recent affair with the other Kentucky girl, and "his heart buried with Ann Rutledge," he was captivated at once. Her wit, manners, talking powers, and general sprightliness carried him away. But other men were not behind Mr. Lincoln in admiration for this proud and spirited girl. Stephen A. Douglas was one of her suitors; and it is maintained that little Douglas became so earnest in the matter as to propose to her to become his wife. But Mary said, No. And for this step only two reasons have been assigned. One, that she detested the moral character of Mr. Douglas, and the other that she designed marrying a man who would some day be President of the United States. The circumstances of her life do show, too, that her heart was consulted in this momentous affair. Although her unreasonable and bad temper had something to do with her leaving the home of her father and step-mother in Kentucky, yet she was not without a peculiar moral strength. Still it must be said that in this, and her religious training, there is not a great deal to touch the admiration or startle the kindly feelings of enthusiasm.

She had said before leaving Kentucky, perhaps in one of her fits of fun or bad humor, that she would

terminate her apparently objectless career as the wife of a President; and it will be seen that, in political foresight, she deserved no little consideration. While she never lost sight of this goal, she did not sacrifice her better feelings or the moral standard to which she held with some consistency.

Mr. Lamon attributes to her this sentiment: "I would rather marry a good man, a man of mind, with hope and bright prospects ahead for position, fame, and power, than to marry all the horses, gold, and bones in the world." Here are no mean, and certainly no ordinary aspirations, and the woman who could utter and maintain them is worthy of the respect of her race.

Lincoln was soon involved in another affair of honor and love with this vivacious woman, and, in fact, proposed marriage to her, and was accepted. Her Illinois friends were all in favor of her marrying Mr. Lincoln, and there is nothing to show that she consulted her relatives in Kentucky as to her intentions, in any way.

So matters progressed until a daughter of Governor Edwards appeared on the ground, also designing to spend some time in the home of her brother. She was a rare beauty, and as a charmer at once stepped to the head in the estimation of the men. Her appearance threw poor Lincoln into a great state of perturbation. Indeed he fell in love with her at once, and began to mourn the misfortune or fate which had thrown him with Mary Todd. His frequent visits to Mr. Edwards's, where both girls stayed, were really

on account of his passion for Matilda Edwards. But his sense of honor never deserted him, and Miss Todd with "that recognizance and pledge of love which I first gave her," was always before him. So he never breathed a word of his feelings to the beauty who had taught him to doubt the propriety of his relations to Mary Todd. But his case became more and more desperate as the moments flew, and when the time came, in January, 1841, for him to be married to Miss Todd, he failed to appear, and the event was indefinitely postponed.

In the Winter of 1840, as has been told, he did not attend the Legislature. His mind was again unhinged, and now more desperately than by reason of the loss of Ann Rutledge. At this emergency Joshua F. Speed came to the rescue, and took him down to Kentucky, where in due time he was able to recognize 'Richard as himself again.'

Joshua Fry Speed, this life-long friend of Abraham Lincoln, was for several years a merchant in Springfield, and for the greater part of that time was a "room-mate" of Lincoln. In the Winter of 1840 he sold his business out, and returned to Kentucky, taking Lincoln, who had just reached the last dangerous crisis in his love affairs, with him. An attachment sprang up between them which was never changed or lost. Mr. Lincoln frequently urged Speed to accept an office under his Administration; but this he did not see fit to do, although by their friendly relations, he was influential in various ways during the Rebellion, for which he had no sympathy.

In love affairs Speed was about as unsatisfactory to himself as Lincoln was to himself or anybody else, and, singularly enough, this man who had nothing to rest upon, and who could not control and regulate himself, when he returned to Illinois, undertook to set Speed right. Speed was working himself into insanity over the thought that he was on the point of marrying a woman for whom he had not the right kind of feelings. They interchanged many remarkable letters about these matters, and through Lincoln's aid Speed was enabled to see his way clearly, was married, and became a model husband, and as happy as his anxious friend could desire. And Speed's success in this untried and serious business of marrying, which they both dreaded so much, gave poor Lincoln great courage in bracing himself for the step he felt he ought to take at no distant day.

It is apparent from his letters to Speed that this man, who was accustomed to fall into fits of insanity on account of his own wandering loves, was able to give wonderfully good advice to others. He was rapidly profiting himself by these letters to Speed. They served to start in him a course of reasoning which a man with a truer and higher Christian code could have drawn with satisfaction and certainty from another source. It is evident from these and other letters to Speed that Mr. Lincoln was slowly drifting into the opinion that he had acted the fool. Speed had been in a condition like his own, and yet his marriage had already turned out well. Mr. Lincoln now began to have some strong feelings of doubt as

to the fairness of his treatment of her whose name he wrote with a long dash. If all men would act as these two did, the social affairs of the world would be wretched beyond repair. The uppermost thing in all these letters, given to the world by Mr. Lamont, seems at first view to be self-happiness. And the one-sided and unphilosophical way of reaching this happiness is taken as the right way; that is, of consulting their own predilections, their own whims and fancies, their own selfhoods. The highest degree of happiness is attained through the happiness of others, in rendering others happy. There can be no doubt of this. It may, on the other hand, be doubted as to whether there can be intelligent and refined happiness, anything but brute happiness; which is not reached in the way of making others happy. The very term happiness is of extremely doubtful use, so much of selfishness or merely animal gratification does there seem to be in it. The end of man is not self-happiness. Happiness is not the grand object of life. The man who works for this end and purpose, has the wrong principle foremost, and has no reason to complain of failure at last. All life is founded on use. To be useful is the great, the paramount object of being. A life of perfect, harmonious usefulness is blissful. The instrumentalities and subjects of this life are out of self, or, at least, look primarily to others. So far as happiness is the result, natural result, unsought, unpremeditated, unthought-of result, of words, deeds, affections, thoughts, and life which have the welfare of the world, the betterment of

others, or the growth and expansion of the beautiful, the good, and the true here and hereafter, in self and out of self in others, as the end, it is enduring and worthy of respect.

Although these letters to Speed have some things admirable about them, little else besides the wretched vein of honor can be found in all Mr. Lincoln's courtships which appeal to the better judgment, or can do ought but detract from the truer, and better, and wiser Lincoln of twenty years later.

The more Mr. Lincoln heard and talked of Speed's successful matrimonial experiments, and thought of his own very strange conduct, the more he began to think of her who was equally interested in the case with himself. The title of "Honest Abe" was in jeopardy too, even in his own estimation; and before he knew the fortunate result of Speed's trial, he began to reflect more seriously of repairing the injury he had done to Mary Todd, as well as to discover whether he was not bound to her by his affections and inclinations as much as he was by his honor. She had suffered by his conduct, and yet she had released him from his obligations, without a change of feeling on her part.

In Lincoln's affair with Mary Todd he acknowledged to Speed that he had only needed such a guide as he had proved to be to Speed. And Mrs. Edwards held that Lincoln was mistaken in his supposed attachment to her husband's sister, that he was really in love with Mary. Lincoln's superstition, as he unwisely called it, also came to his assistance. He

had been providentially involved in Speed's marriage and restoration to good sense, and why should Mary Todd not be providentially concerned in his future welfare? That he had good reason at a later date to believe that she was, remains to be seen. The Edwardses were now opposed to Mary and her uncertain lover renewing their former relation, arguing that they were by education, disposition, etc., unsuited; but this opposition was not successful, as, during the summer and fall of 1842, they met secretly, and soon revived their determination to marry. Several things of more than ordinary interest occurred during this time to render their mutual obligations and inclinations apparent, and so without more ado about it Mr. Lincoln got a license on the 4th of November, 1842, and on the same day he and Mary Todd became no more "twain, but one flesh."

It is probably true that Mr. Lincoln considered himself a martyr to his honor in marrying Mary. He would have to do it; that was simply the state of the case. It was his duty, his duty. That was the way he viewed the case, and he was indiscreet or unmanly enough to say so. There are so many martyrs to duty, and it is such a consolation for them to make it known, and be regarded as honor-and-duty martyrs. I am inclined to the belief that a very large per cent of men, when it comes to the final issue, are exercised in their own minds more or less like Lincoln was, and consider it a condescension and sacrifice for them to marry the women they have courted, and who, to a great extent, are so

utterly unselfish as to give their lives with consummate delight, and without a regret, to the men who, they feel, are the very soul of unwavering love and honor. I am free to say that the sacrifice in nine cases out of ten, so far as moral character, and clean, decent, and correct habits of life are concerned, is on the side of the women. But this theme opens into various channels and is quite endless, and is not further pertinent to the subject matter here.

Mr. Lincoln, the rising lawyer, and his wife went to live at first at the "Globe Tavern" at the enormous expense of two dollars a week, each, for board and lodging; and at last this villainous matter of courting and going crazy was ended forever. Mary had a great task before her. It was not only to make her husband "happy," but also to make him President. She had married a good man, or one who would be good; one with mind, honor, and bright prospects, and her principles were gratified as well as her feelings. "But, O! he was so long, awkward, and ugly."

Lincoln soon found that he was much better off than he expected, and discovered that he really loved his wife, and was "superstitious" and philosophical enough to settle down calmly to the work of life, mere world-life, in which they were now both equally concerned; although he never was quite free, perhaps, of some sad thoughts and moments about his marriage-martyrdom.

Mary Todd, among her attractive qualities, exhibited unusual power as a satirical and burlesque

writer. Whatever may be said for or against this quality, Mrs. Lincoln had rare ability in that way, and could have made her mark in the world by using it. As it was, she did enough to get Lincoln into the most disreputable affair of his life, leaving out of consideration his courtships.

During August and the early part of September, 1842, she wrote several papers which were published in "The Sangamon Journal" at Springfield. These papers seemed to have two objects, one to ridicule James Shields, who was the State Auditor, and the other to have fun. Or, perhaps, more strictly speaking, James Shields being a wonderfully good subject, was merely taken as the instrument for letting out the fun. It was believed that Shields was just thinskin and shallow enough to raise a great bluster, and so furnish new material for the contemplated sport. The editor of "The Journal," while seeing the danger in the mischief, could not resist the temptation to print such cunningly devised political wit. Some of the articles verged on the vulgar very decidedly; some of them were written with no little skill in blank verse, or rhyme; and all of them were exceedingly well executed. While they did not attack the private character of Shields, they placed him in a very ridiculous light, and this was more than the Irishman could stand. The result was that he sent General John D. Whiteside, of Black Hawk War memory, to the editor of "The Journal" to demand the name of the author of the slanderous papers from the "Lost Townships," the residence assumed

by Mary, who signed herself "Rebecca" or "Cathleen." Here is the way she describes the effect upon her nervous system from being apprised of the desperate turn affairs were likely to take on account of her caustic pen:—

"LOST TOWNSHIPS, Sep. 8, 1842.

"DEAR MR. PRINTER,—I was a-standin' at the spring yesterday a-washin' out butter, when I seed Jim Snooks a-ridin' up towards the house for very life like, when, jist as I was a-wonderin' what on airth was the matter with him, he stops suddenly, and ses he, 'Aunt Becca, here's somethin' for you,' and with that he hands out your letter. Well, you see, I steps out towards him, not thinkin' that I had both hands full of butter; and seein' I couldn't take the letter, you know, without greasin' it, I ses, 'Jim, jist you open it and read it for me.' Well, Jim opens it, and reads it; and would you believe it, Mr. Editor, I was so completely dumfounded and turned into stone, that there I stood in the sun a-workin' the butter, and it a-runnin' on the ground, while he read the letter, that I never thunk what I was about till the hull on't run melted on the ground, and was lost. Now, sir, it's not for the butter, nor the price of the butter, but, the Lord have massy on us, I wouldn't have sich another fright for a whole firkin of it. Why, when I found out that it was the man what Jeff seed down to the fair that had demanded the author of my letters, threatenin' to take personal satisfaction of the writer, I was so skart that I tho't I should quill-wheel right where I was."

And from this introduction "Aunt Becca" again assails Shields unsparingly and effectively. In the meantime something had to be done in the business part of the affair. Lincoln was again quietly and rather secretly visiting Mary, and no doubt from his

conversations to some extent she had been sharply appropriating material for the writings from the "Lost Townships." He was, probably, greatly pleased and amused with the whole performance, and was ready to back her in it, if he did not directly aid her. So in "honor" he felt himself bound to stand for her, and accordingly his name was sent to the irate James as the author of one of the letters, but only one. To assume the responsibility for one of them was enough to satisfy the case. Lincoln was at Tremont at this juncture; but time was important, scarred "honor" was crying for "satisfaction," and so the brave Irishman set out with his man, General Whiteside, on a journey to Tremont to have the business settled at once. E. H. Merryman and William Butler hearing of his movements, mounted their horses, and started in hot haste to put Lincoln in charge of the facts, and see that he had fair play. They reached Tremont in advance of Shields and his man. But soon after his arrival on the afternoon of the 17th of September, Shields sent a letter to Lincoln demanding an apology and a "full and absolute retraction" with the suggestive statement that this would prevent consequences which he would greatly regret himself. His note was in such insulting language that Lincoln refused to consider his demand until that was sufficiently modified, and took occasion to say that he too should regret the "consequences" to which the pugnacious Irishman alluded. But Shields was full of wrath, and wanted blood, and so matters went on. Here are Mr. Lincoln's instruc-

tions for the guidance of his friends, which I borrow from Lamon:—

“In case Whiteside shall signify a wish to adjust this affair without further difficulty, let him know, that, if the present papers be withdrawn, and a note from Mr. Shields asking to know if I am the author of the articles of which he complains, and asking that I shall make him gentlemanly satisfaction if I am the author, and this without menace or dictation as to what that satisfaction shall be, a pledge is made that the following answer shall be given:—

“I did write the ‘Lost Townships’ letter which appeared in ‘The Journal’ of the 2d inst., but had no participation in any form in any other article alluding to you. I wrote that wholly for political effect. I had no intention of injuring your personal or private character or standing as a man or a gentleman; and I did not then think, and do not now think, that that article could produce or has produced, that effect against you; and, had I anticipated such an effect, would have forborne to write it. And I will add, that your conduct towards me, so far as I know, had always been gentlemanly, and that I had no personal pique against you, and no cause for any.

“If this should be done, I leave it with you to manage what shall and what shall not be published.

“If nothing like this is done, the preliminaries of the fight are to be:—

“*1st. Weapons.*—Cavalry broad-swords of the largest size, precisely equal in all respects, and such as now used by the cavalry company at Jacksonville.

“*2d. Position.*—A plank ten feet long, and from nine to twelve inches broad, to be firmly fixed on edge on the ground as the line between us, which neither is to pass his foot over upon forfeit of his life. Next, a line drawn on the ground on either (each) side of said plank and parallel with it, each at the distance of the

whole length of the sword and three feet additional from the plank, and the passing of his own such line by either party during the fight shall be deemed a surrender of the contest.

"3d. Time.—On Thursday evening, at five o'clock, if you can get it so; but in no case to be at a greater distance of time than Friday evening at five o'clock.

"4th. Place.—Within three miles of Alton, on the opposite side of the river, the particular spot to be agreed upon by you.

"Any preliminary details coming within the above rules, you are at liberty to make at your discretion; but you are in no case to swerve from these rules, or to pass beyond their limits."

At the appointed time, no adjustment appearing possible, these foes proceeded to Alton, and on the 22d of September, crossed over into Missouri; White-side with Shields as second man, and E. H. Merryman with Lincoln as his second. But Wm. Butler, A. T. Bledsoe, John J. Hardin, and other friends were on hand, determined to effect some kind of settlement. This they finally succeeded in doing by leaving the matter to the arbitration of several of the friends, they making for Lincoln substantially the explanation he had authorized. Mr. Lincoln was absolutely opposed to dueling, and very well knew from the first that there would be no duel in this case. And here is where the ridiculousness of the whole thing appears. The gory Shields and his friends overlooked this entirely. The cavalry broad-swords were procured, and these were of from thirty-six to forty inch blades; then, under Mr. Lincoln's require-

ment, the combatants were not only to stand the length of the two swords apart, but also six feet further, thus actually placing them, at least twelve feet a part. With this arrangement the most they could have done, would have been to touch the points of their swords, if Shields could have measured half of that distance with his arm and sword. Lincoln had made these impossible provisions in full view of this funny side of the case. Even if the distance between the men had not been so preposterously great, the poor Irishman would have had no chance without crossing the board, which would have forfeited his life, while the long body and arm of Lincoln might have rendered his own position disagreeable.

Mr. Lincoln's conduct in this matter was deliberate and premeditated, and this it was that took from him the odium of stooping to the savage and unchristian "code." With him Mr. Shields's case began in fun, and ended in fun. And now for the application of this affair to the really important matter he then had in hand, and which his Illinois biographers think was his saddest misfortune, a burden under which he was never quite able to stand erect; that is, his association with Mary Todd.

Now, Lincoln valued Miss Todd's ability to write, and, perhaps, had no little to do in instigating her to write the letters which led to the difficulty with Shields. Then, it is extremely doubtful whether, he had any part in writing even the one letter for which he was willing to hold himself responsible. He

thought his relations with Mary made it his duty to stand in her place, to shield her.

When Speed was in abject misery about the uncertainty of his affection for the woman he was going to marry, and yet was frantic over the idea of her death, Lincoln had argued that Speed's anxiety for her recovery and health utterly contradicted the suspicion that he did not love her. And now, who will say that his own assumption of responsibility for Mary Todd's misdoings, and all this fuss about a duel with General Shields, did not point to his affection for her, and desire to be responsible for her? If he had felt that she was destined to be such a burden to him, and that marriage with her was so repugnant to him, was this not an excellent occasion to relieve himself of all these troubles? Could he not have chosen rifles, and put an end to his struggles by giving Shields an opportunity to kill him? He evidently feared death more than he did marriage. He had no notion of dying then, nor in any such a way. He and Miss Todd had the same object in view. They both believed in his ultimate success and "greatness;" she even more firmly than he. They were mainly congenial, and especially united on the great purpose; and if it can not be shown that she really made him President, is it, after all, so clear that he was more useful to her than she was to him? The real test of marriage is in this very word, useful. The highest marriage is doubtless that, in which the partners attain the highest degree of usefulness, working from kindred and genial motives. And the

highest possible affection one person can display for another, is in leading him to be the highest and best he possibly can be; in being useful to him in the ways that will make him the most successful, the most intellectual, the most refined, the most virtuous, and the most beneficial in this life with a view to another.

CHAPTER XXIX.

MR. LINCOLN AT HOME AND AMONG HIS BOOKS—THE
LINCOLNS IN THE WHITE HOUSE—THE MISTRESS.

MR. LINCOLN now settled down with more earnestness than he had ever felt to the work of life. His letters to friends soon changed in tone. Not six months after his marriage he wrote to Speed with great vivacity and good humor as to the uncertainty yet of his having a namesake soon at Springfield. In a letter to Speed in 1846 he wrote :—

“We have another boy, born the 10th of March. He is very much such a child as Bob was at his age, rather of a longer order. Bob is short and low, and I expect always will be. He talks very plainly, almost as plainly as anybody. He is quite smart enough. I sometimes fear that he is one of the little rare-ripe sort, that are smarter at about five than ever after. He has a great deal of that sort of mischief that is the offspring of much animal spirits. Since I began this letter, a messenger came to tell me Bob was lost; but by the time I reached the house his mother had found him, and had him whipped; and by now, very likely he is run away again. Mary has read your letter, and wishes to be remembered to Mrs. S. and you, in which I most sincerely join.”

Mrs. Lincoln did not accompany her husband to Washington during his service in Congress, but remained at home in care of her children. But no

other person in the world watched his course with such deep concern as she did. Nor was the judgment of any other, not excepting the discerning politicians, so reliable as to what his course should be. When he had established the reputation of "Honest Old Abe" nothing was so important to him as to keep this reputation. It was a distinction which appealed to the feelings of the masses; and nobody liked it better than Mrs. Lincoln, and would have done so much to aid him in preserving it, both for its own sake and for the stock of political capital there was in it. When Mr. Lincoln could have been appointed Governor of Oregon, in 1852, and sent beyond the line where Presidents may be born or live, she interposed her veto, on the best of grounds. And here her judgment was opposed to that of her husband and all his other friends. They thought it was a long stride in the way he wanted to go. She believed it was the road away from the Presidency, if not to oblivion. And she was right. When Mr. Lincoln was officiously announced in 1846 as a candidate for the Legislature, during his absence from Springfield, she went to the newspaper office and had the announcement taken from the paper. She did not think his reputation would gain anything by this step, and here for the first time her judgment was better than that of Mr. Lincoln and his wise political friends. When her husband was at last, or so soon, nominated for the Presidency, all her four children had been born, and one of them was "dead." When Mr. Lincoln himself heard of the nomination his first

desire was to tell it to her. She was equally concerned with him in it. She had kept his eye and conduct turned toward this event now consummated, with what good fortune as to the final result, she never doubted. When admirers, flatterers, sight-seers, office-seekers, and friends began to roll in upon him, she was found equal to the emergency. She had thought and dreamed of its possibility, and was not unprepared to do her part. And both herself and her children gained the favorable opinion of those who viewed them in the light of the family of the future President. Mrs. Lincoln's bad temper was, perhaps, her greatest misfortune. And if she ever tried to improve and regulate it, her success was hardly noteworthy. Like many another foolish woman, one of her faults was in standing in the way of her husband in the correction of wrong steps in their children. And here she undertook to do with her tongue, in the presence of the children, what she was not likely to accomplish in any other way. She claimed for herself the prerogative of whipping or pampering the children as her whim or temper ran; but she considered Mr. Lincoln's disciplinary proceedings often very inopportune, and met them by tongue-lashing. Indeed this unfortunate temper made Mrs. Lincoln, at times, a regular Xanthippe. But Lincoln soon became master of himself, and his good sense and good-humor were never known to forsake him. Amidst her passion-storms no unkind words ever escaped him. He knew what her wretched temper meant, and waited for the sunshine which he well

understood would come from behind the clouds. Although in most respects a domestic woman, Mrs. Lincoln was not, perhaps, a model housekeeper. In the ornamenting of home in the thousand little ways known to woman's skillful hand, she did not take much interest. The outside of her house, especially received little of her attention. Still, there was some apology for her in the utter indifference of her husband for all these things. He was a good-natured, kind, home man, and to that extent a domestic man; but for the thousand little things that make home charming to the cultured and refined, he had little respect, or rather he was so taken up with other things that he had little inclination to care for these. So, between them, their home at Springfield was not a very inviting place. It had a garden connected with it, and this Mr. Lincoln attempted to cultivate a year or two with his own hands, and then dropped it forever. The yard was also neglected. Few plants or trees ornamented it; and no refined and delicate hands took

"The earth whole for their toy,"

not forgetting that

"The meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears."

If flowers or shrubs were planted they were soon left to themselves to die or live as they could. The sight of all these things was pleasing and grateful to both of them, but they had no taste or disposition to cultivate or care for them. Their lot had a stable on it, and there Mr. Lincoln kept his horse, and there

for a time he sheltered a cow. The cow he milked himself, and the horse he fed, curried, and harnessed. And all this work he did poorly. Little was well done in all these things at the home of Mr. Lincoln. His affections were some place else. His wife was also contented or concerned with other matters. The present and its little things were neglected in waiting for and dreaming of the great ones to come. Here is one of Mr. Lamon's pictures of Mr. Lincoln in his Illinois home:—

“On a winter's morning, this man could be seen wending his way to the market, with a basket on his arm, and a little boy at his side, whose small feet rattled and pattered over the ice-bound pavement, attempting to make up by the number of his short steps for the long strides of his father. The little fellow jerked at the bony hand which held his, and prattled and questioned, begged and grew petulant, in a vain effort to make his father talk to him. But the latter was probably unconscious of the other's existence, and stalked on, absorbed in his own reflections. He wore on such occasions an old gray shawl, rolled into a coil, and wrapped like a rope around his neck. The rest of his clothes were (was) in keeping. ‘He did not walk cunningly, Indian-like, but cautiously and firmly.’ His tread was even and strong. He was a little pigeon-toed; and this, with another peculiarity, made his walk very singular. He set his whole foot flat on the ground, and in turn lifted it all at once, not resting momentarily upon the toe as the foot rose, nor upon the heel as it fell. He never wore his shoes out at the heel and the toe more, as most men do, than at the middle of the sole; yet his gait was not altogether awkward, and there was manifest physical power in his step. As he moved along thus silent, abstracted, his thoughts dimly

reflected in his sharp face, men turned to look after him as an object of sympathy, as well as curiosity. 'His melancholy,' in the language of Mr. Herndon, 'dripped from him as he walked.' If, however, he met a friend in the street, and was roused by a loud, hearty 'good-morning, Lincoln!' he would grasp the friend's hand with one or both of his own, and, with his usual expression of 'howdy, howdy,' would detain him to hear a story; something reminded him of it; it happened in Indiana."

At the time Mr. Lincoln entered upon his office as President one of his children, Eddie, was "dead," and the three remaining sons were, respectively, eight, ten, and eighteen years of age. Robert Todd, the oldest, who, in 1860, had been admitted to Harvard University, went home to accompany the family to Washington, but soon afterwards returned to college. In February, 1862, William Wallace died, after a short illness, leaving only Thomas and Robert. Thomas was named in honor of his father's father. He was a mischievous boy, and not very fond of books and study. He had his own way, and to a great extent, controlled his parents, as anybody would suppose Lincoln's children would do. Like his father, in his early days, Thomas, or "Tad," as he was called, seemed, at times, to be quite fractious in his religious training, although in the main he was a boy of excellent principles. In his simple faith an endless hereafter and a beautiful and happy heaven were not the least bit problematic, and when his good father died the little fellow readily associated him with his brother William in a world where he would certainly be happier than he was in this.

“Tad” could never quite comprehend the virtue of his father’s numerous proclamations appointing days of fasting and prayer, and would conceal food to be eaten on these occasions in secret. Mr. Stanton, for fun, commissioned him a lieutenant, and he soon got a sword and military suit, and in this suit had himself photographed. He had a “stop-page” in his speech, of which he improved as he became older. In 1869 he went to Europe with his mother, and there made some progress in study, but in 1871 he returned home, and after a short illness, died, July 15th of that year. “Tad” was not an especially bright boy, but as he grew older he improved greatly, and his friends hoped for much from him.

On the afternoon of the 4th of March, 1861, the Lincoln family took possession of the White House, and Mrs. Lincoln and her sisters at once set about getting used to the place, and preparing for the first reception which was held on the 9th. A host of friends had accompanied Mr. Lincoln and his family to the Capitol, and many of these took up their residence at the White House. Among them was Ward Hill Lamon, a Springfield lawyer.

Although Mrs. Lincoln was called a “green Western woman,” she had no idea of being second in anything at the White House, which did not come directly in the line of Mr. Lincoln’s duties as President. The reception went off to her taste, and she was quite successful in making a favorable impression, which, unfortunately, she did not maintain.

She had been many years by Mr. Lincoln's side, but she had kept pace with him only in one thing, ambition for distinction. She had received more than an ordinarily fine education for young women at that day in Kentucky, but she had not improved her advantages. As in the case of most young women, her education stopped when she left school, and while Mr. Lincoln improved himself and went upward, she remained where she was, in a great degree. Political matters and the current news of the day, things which could not cultivate and elevate mind and character, she knew, to some extent; but a systematic course of reading, thinking, feeling, and acting, which would have made her a companion for her husband, a guide for her children, and a cultivated, refined, useful, and happy woman, she had not entered upon, and never did do so at any later period. She had shrewdness, had education enough to speak grammatically, and refinement enough to be agreeable, even among refined people, when she chose to be so. She had a person not void of attractiveness, dressed with taste mainly, and in general conducted herself with the dignity and accuracy, perhaps, due to the position she occupied.

During her residence at the White House, "social affairs" in Washington were of the least possible importance; but that she gave satisfaction to those whose frivolous souls "live, move, and have their being" at the National Capitol, in the gay "court" society, does not at all appear. When Mrs. Lincoln entered the White House, she was wholly given to

her ambition for the glory of place. No religious, or even moral, principles guided her steps. Her taste for dress was hardly based upon principles of refinement, but more on mere animal display. In this she was not, however, worse than the majority of her light-minded sex, and, indeed, unfortunately the great mass of the human race. Her extravagance in dress became notable, and in time, was a source of slander, if it did not also aid materially in unhinging her mind.

Mr. Buchanan's commissioner of buildings was in charge of the White House, when Mr. Lincoln entered it, and was by him requested to remain until he could find a suitable successor. This not very necessary official had the care of the public property about the White House, furniture, and so forth, and was a familiar and ceremonious character in the affairs of the President's residence. Mr. Lincoln was anxious to retain this Democrat in his place, but in that he met the very decided opposition of his wife, who had herself fixed upon a man for the place. But her choice was not agreeable to Mr. Lincoln, and he refused to make the appointment. At this turn of the affair Mrs. Lincoln withdrew from the field, and shutting herself up in her room refused to see the President for several days. At last, however, he appeared at the door, and announced that he was ready to capitulate. These welcome words opened the way speedily to his wife's arms. Well she knew they would come. She had tried the experiment before.

In social follies Mrs. Lincoln was an apt learner,

and in these things she did not long remain behind Washington expectations. She could speak the French language, and sometimes attempted it with foreign representatives, much to the regret of Mr. Seward, who feared her lack of ability. The disposition of Ward Lamon to make his quarters at the White House was not according to Mrs. Lincoln's sense of propriety, and this she was not long in letting him know. This fact may or may not have some relation to his very decided exaggerations of her conduct, and the mere mechanical kind of attachment he claimed Mr. Lincoln had for her. That point has been sufficiently discussed in another part of this work. It is only necessary to say here, that those who were familiar with the daily routine in the Lincoln family at the White House were unable to give any thing but most favorable testimony of the genuine relations of Mr. Lincoln and his wife. Mrs. Lincoln's subsequent life, and many of her letters which have become public, only go to prove her entire devotion to his memory, and controvert all statements touching the want of mutual affection between Mr. Lincoln and herself.

In the Summer of 1861, Mrs. Lincoln visited some of the "watering-places," and during the following Winter made social affairs as attractive, at the White House, as the times would admit.

Mrs. Lincoln carried her points as to many things in the general conduct of receptions, dinners, and so on at the President's, and in none of them was she, perhaps, wiser than in deciding that the President

should be her escort, and not that of other women, on all public occasions. While her judgment was often very good, and her insight of men and events at times accurate and valuable, she was extremely selfish, and full of prejudice in the manner of more ignorant and less cultured persons.

Mr. Chase she suspected, and wanted Mr. Lincoln to inquire into his motives. Of Mr. Seward she said: "I wish you had nothing to do with that man. He can not be trusted." Of Andrew Johnson she said: "He is a demagogue, and if you place him in power, Mr. Lincoln, mark my words, you will rue it some day." This she said when Mr. Johnson was about to be appointed Military Governor of Tennessee. She never could bear Johnson, and seemed always foolish enough to believe that he was some way concerned in the assassination plot.

She said McClellan was a humbug, because he talked so much and did so little. She would have put an energetic man in his place. And when Mr. Lincoln would argue that McClellan was a soldier and a patriot, she would repeat: "I tell you he is a humbug, and you will have to find some man to take his place; that is, if you wish to conquer the South."

General Grant she always disliked. She said that he was an obstinate butcher, and thought she would not like to live in the country if he were President.

After the death of her son, William Wallace, Mrs. Lincoln, to a great extent, disappeared from public notice. She was greatly attached to him, and her erroneous mind shrank from death with horror.

Neither her conduct, nor that of Mr. Lincoln, was wise or good touching the loss of this interesting boy. That philosophy which holds the key to a beautiful hereafter for all children should have made wiser and truer parents. There is not wanting evidence, however, that Mr. Lincoln, at least, did not lose the benefits of this "dispensation."

After the death of Mr. Lincoln, his widow remained for several weeks at the President's mansion, Mr. Johnson giving her her own time in which to vacate the premises. Perhaps she never recovered from the shock of her husband's murder, although the last years of her life were passed in comparative peace and quietness.

Congress twice made appropriations for her comfort; still for years she seemed to be greatly troubled about her poverty, and in 1867 created what was, perhaps, a scandal, or at any rate was so termed, in her attempts to sell the clothes she had accumulated in such extravagance at the White House.

Mrs. Lincoln died in Springfield, July 16, 1882. The following obituary notice is taken from "The Cincinnati Commercial:"—

"The public has known for some time that Mrs. Lincoln was in ill-health, but nothing had appeared to indicate that her death at an early date was probable. About the 24th of March, last, she returned from New York, where she had been undergoing treatment, and her health was then noticeably improved. Nothing, however, could fully arouse her from the gloomy state of mind, which has almost perpetually borne upon her since that terrible night when her husband, the foremost man of the world, was shot by her side in Ford's Theater, Washington. Though

her friends had hopes of many happy days for her, she was not able to emancipate herself from the shadow that had clouded her life. After her return, as stated, she took a room at the house of her brother-in-law, the Hon. E. W. Edwards, and had since been little seen except by near friends of the family. Instead of gaining in health she rather declined, and latterly spent much of her time in bed. Within the past few days she had been suffering from an attack of boils, which caused her great pain, and doubtless increased her nervousness.

"On Friday last, she was up, and walked across the room. Again, on Saturday, she walked across the room with a little assistance; but she grew worse later in the day, and about nine o'clock in the evening experienced a paralysis which seemed to involve her whole system, so that she was unable to articulate, to take food, or to move any portion of her body. She soon after passed into a comatose state, and so continued breathing stertorously up till 8.15 P. M. to-night, when she died in the same house, where nearly forty years ago she and Abraham Lincoln were married."

"Mary Lincoln was the daughter of the Hon. R. S. Todd, of Lexington, Kentucky, and was born in December, 1818. She visited Springfield at different times, and in 1839 came here to remain. On November 2, 1842, she was married to Abraham Lincoln, as before stated, at the house of Hon. N. W. Edwards. The newly married pair made their home for some time at Mr. Edwards's, and afterwards boarded at what was then the Old Globe Hotel, where Robert Lincoln, their first child, was born in 1843. The three other children of that marriage, Eddie, Willie, and Thomas (so well known as Tad), are all dead.

"Mrs. Lincoln had three sisters, Elizabeth P., wife of the Hon. N. W. Edwards; Frances J., relict of Dr. William S. Wallace; and Annie, wife of C. M. Smith, a leading merchant of this city, all of whom are now living. Mrs. Wallace is the only sister older than Mrs. Lincoln. There were also several half-sisters in the family.

"Mrs. Lincoln remained in Washington for some time after the tragic death of her husband, and afterward came to Chicago, where she remained several years. She bought property there

and was comfortably situated, but it was evident to her friends that her mind was unbalanced by the immeasurable shock it had received, and in hopes of obtaining relief for her, she was taken to a private retreat at Batavia. On leaving there she was thought to be improved both in physical and mental condition. Soon thereafter she went to Europe, remaining about three years. Returning to this city, she made her home with her sister. With the exception of her trip to New York before mentioned, and a few other brief visits to friends, she has kept herself secluded during later years, and nothing apparently could arouse in her any ambition to mingle with people and shake off, if possible, the thrall of grief. She was a woman of great physical strength, and this doubtless aided to bring her through the long years intervening since her husband's death. In her death the family of Abraham Lincoln is reduced to one only."

On the 19th the "funeral" took place, the following account of which is taken from "The Cincinnati Enquirer:"—

"The altar presented a beautiful appearance, covered as it was with magnificent floral decorations. The floral offerings of the citizens of Springfield consisted of four pieces. The largest piece was a large cross and anchor surmounted by a crown. The base was composed of double hollyhocks, tuberoses, and pansies, arranged in the most beautiful and attractive manner. The next beautiful piece was the 'Gates Ajar,' composed of carnation pinks and tuberoses. A very beautiful pillow of carnation pinks and tuberoses, with the words, 'From the Citizens of Springfield,' worked in forget-me-nots; and last, but not least, was an open Bible, composed of carnation pinks and tuberoses, with the name 'Mary Lincoln' inscribed on the open pages in forget-me-nots. Besides these there were other floral offerings which were very beautiful.

"As the casket was carried from the church, the choir sang, 'Rest, Spirit, Rest.' The *cortege* then re-formed and proceeded to the Lincoln monument at Oak Ridge, where a still larger crowd had congregated. The hearse was driven to the south

side of the monument, while the friends proceeded to the northern side. The remains were here taken in charge by the pall-bearers, and escorted by the Lincoln Guard of Honor. They proceeded to the door of the crypt, while the friends approached from the north. The casket was laid by the side of the sarcophagus in which lie the remains of her illustrious husband.

“Over the doorway leading to the crypt the name ‘Lincoln’ appeared in flowers, and the walls on the interior were completely lined with living green, interspersed with floral emblems, while resting against the sarcophagus was a lyre, and on it a large cross composed of beautiful blossoms.

“All the State officers, city officers, and Federal Court officers attended in a body. Hon. Robert T. Lincoln, Secretary of War, and the only surviving member of the family, was the chief mourner.

“The national colors all day long were suspended at half-mast over the State-house, the Federal Court building, and the court-house.

“On Mrs. Lincoln’s fore-finger was her wedding-ring, bearing the inscription, ‘A. L. to Mary. Love is Eternal.’ The inscription on the silver plate of the casket is ‘Mary, wife of Abraham Lincoln.’”

Robert Todd Lincoln, the only remaining child of President Lincoln, was chosen as a member of the Cabinet of President Garfield, and was continued in the same position by his successor. The following, it is said, is a part of one of Mr. Lincoln’s last conversations with this fine son:—

“Well, my son, you have returned safely from the front. The war is now closed, and we soon will live in peace with the brave men that have been fighting against us. I trust that the era of good feeling has returned with the end of the war, and that henceforth we shall live in peace. Now, listen to me, Robert: you must lay aside your uniform, and return to college. I wish you to read law for three

years, and at the end of that time, I hope that we will be able to tell whether you will make a lawyer or not."

These words are all characteristic of Mr. Lincoln, one of the most extraordinary men of any country or age; a man who, in a marked degree, stood alone among the Presidents, and indeed, all his countrymen. While his personal ambition, during a great part of his life, was that of the mere politician, his thoughts, acts, and conduct were mainly those of a statesman, in the highest sense of that term. While he thought he was the humblest man who had ever been President, he sincerely believed that he was an instrument in the hands of God for the work which was accomplished under him. And who will say not so?

May Heaven forever bless and his countrymen forever cherish the good deeds and the good name of Abraham Lincoln!

CHAPTER XXX.

SOME SAYINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

HOLDING it a sound maxim, that it is better only sometimes to be right than at all times wrong, so soon as I discover my opinions to be erroneous, I shall be ready to renounce them. (Address to the people of Sangamon County in 1832 or 1833.)

Every man is said to have his peculiar ambition. Whether it be true or not, I can say, for one, that I have no other so great as that of being truly esteemed of my fellow-men, by rendering myself worthy of their esteem. (Address to the people of Sangamon County, 1832 or 1833.)

The institution of slavery is founded on both injustice and bad policy. (Protest against resolutions in Illinois Legislature favoring slavery, March 3, 1837.)

My way of living leads me to be about the courts of justice; and there I have sometimes seen a good lawyer, struggling for his client's neck, in a desperate case, employ every artifice to work around, begot, and cover up with many words, some position pressed upon him by the prosecution, which he dared not admit, and could not deny. (Speech on the Mexican War, January 12, 1848.)

Any people, anywhere, being inclined, and having the power, have the right to rise up and shake off the existing government, and form a new one that suits them better. This is a most valuable, a most sacred right; a right,

which we hope, and believe, is to liberate the world. (Same speech.)

It is a quality of revolutions not to go by old lines or old laws; but to break up both, and make new ones. (Same speech.)

As a nation should not, and the Almighty will not, be evaded, so let him attempt no evasion, no equivocation. (Same speech.)

The way for a young man to rise is to improve himself every way he can, never suspecting that anybody wishes to hinder him. Allow me to assure you that suspicion and jealousy never did help any man in any situation. (Letter to Herndon, July 10, 1848.)

An honest laborer digs coal at about seventy cents a day, while the President digs abstractions at about seventy dollars a day. (Internal improvement speech June 20, 1848.)

The true rule in determining to embrace or reject anything, is not whether it have any evil in it, but whether it have more of evil than of good. There are few things wholly evil or wholly good. (Speech on internal improvements, June 20, 1848.)

I insist that if there is anything that it is the duty of the whole people never to intrust to any hands but their own, that thing is the preservation and perpetuity of their own liberties and institutions. And if they shall think, as I do, that the extension of slavery endangers them more than any or all other causes, how recreant to themselves if they submit the question, and with it, the fate of their country, to a handful of men bent on temporary self-interest. (Speech in answer to Mr. Douglas at Peoria, October, 1854.)

This declared indifference, but as I must think real zeal for the spread of slavery, I can not but hate. I hate

it because of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself; I hate it because it deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world; enables the enemies of free institutions with plausibility to taunt us as hypocrites; causes the real friends of freedom to doubt our sincerity; and especially because it forces so many really good men among ourselves into an open war with the very fundamental principles of civil liberty, criticising the Declaration of Independence, and insisting that there is no right principle of action but self-interest. (Same speech.)

When the white man governs himself, that is self-government; but when he governs himself, and also governs another man, that is more than self-government—that is despotism. (Same.)

Slave States are places for poor white people to remove *from*, not to remove *to*; new free States are the places for poor people to go to and better their condition. For this use, the Nation needs these Territories.

Slavery is founded in the selfishness of man's nature; opposition to it, in his love of justice.

In our greedy chase to make profit of the negro, let us beware lest we "cancel and tear to pieces" even the white man's charter of freedom. (Same.)

Some men, mostly Whigs, who condemn the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, nevertheless hesitate to go for its restoration, lest they be thrown in company with the Abolitionist. Will they allow me, as an old Whig, to tell them, good-humoredly, that I think this is very silly? Stand with anybody that stands *right*. Stand with him while he is right, and *part* with him when he goes wrong. (Same.)

Little by little, but steadily as man's march to the grave, we have been giving up the *old* for the *new* faith. Near eighty years ago we began by declaring that all men are created equal; but now from that beginning we have

run down to the other declaration that for *some* men to enslave *others* is a "sacred right of self-government." These principles can not stand together. They are as opposite as God and Mammon; and whoever holds to one must despise the other. (Same.)

It is not fair for you to assume that I have no interest in a thing which has, and continually exercises, the power of making me miserable. (Letter, August 24, 1855.)

Friends, I agree with you in providence, but I believe in the providence of the most men, the largest purse, and the longest cannon. (Brief address to the Springfield Abolitionists in 1856.)

We will speak for freedom and against slavery, as long as the Constitution of our country guarantees free speech, until everywhere on this wide land, the sun shall shine and the rain shall fall and the wind blow upon no man who goes forth to unrequited toil. (Speech in the campaign of 1856.)

I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men, but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness in what respects they did consider all men created equal, equal with "certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This they said, and this they meant. They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor yet that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact, they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit. (Speech at Springfield, Ill., June 26, 1857.)

If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could then better judge what to do, and how to do it. (House-divided-against-itself-speech, July 17, 1858.)

"A house divided against itself can not stand." I believe this Government can not endure permanently, half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved; I do not expect the house to fall, but do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South. ("House-divided-against-itself-speech.")

So I say, in relation to the principle that all men are created equal, let it be as nearly reached as we can. If we can not give freedom to every creature, let us do nothing that will impose slavery upon any other creature. (Speech at Chicago, July 10, 1858.)

I leave you, hoping that the lamp of liberty will burn in your bosoms until there shall no longer be a doubt that all men are created free and equal. (Same speech.)

In pointing out that more has been given you, you can not be justified in taking away the little which has been given him. All I ask for the negro is, that if you do not like him, let him alone. If God gave him but little, that little let him enjoy. (Speech at Springfield, July 17, 1858.)

The Democracy of to-day hold the liberty of one man to be absolutely nothing, when in conflict with another man's right of property. Republicans, on the contrary, are both for the man and the dollar, but in case of con-

flict, the man before the dollar. (Letter to Boston Republicans, April 6, 1859.)

This is a world of compensations, and he who would be no slave must consent to have no slave. Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves; and, under a just God, can not long retain it. (Same letter.)

All honor to Jefferson—to the man who, in the concrete pressure of a struggle for national independence by a single people, had the coolness, forecast, and capacity to introduce into a merely revolutionary document an abstract truth, applicable to all men and all times, and so to embalm it there, that to-day and in all coming days it shall be a rebuke and a stumbling-block to the harbingers of reappearing tyranny and oppression. (Same letter.)

I have found that it is not entirely safe, when one is misrepresented under his very nose, to allow this misrepresentation to go uncontradicted. (Speech at Columbus, O., September, 1859.)

There are two ways of establishing a proposition. One is, by trying to demonstrate it upon reason; and the other is, to show that great men in former times have thought so and so, and thus to pass it by the weight of pure authority. (Same speech.)

Labor is the great source from which nearly all, if not all, human comforts and necessities are drawn. (Speech at Cincinnati, September, 1859.)

What the robber demanded of me—my money—was my own; and I had a clear right to keep it; but it was no more my own than my vote is my own; and the threat of death to me to extort my money, and the threat of destruction to the Union to extort my vote, can scarcely be distinguished in principle. (Speech at Cooper Institute, February 27, 1860.)

If our sense of duty forbids this, then let us stand by our duty, fearlessly and effectively. Let us be diverted by none of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are so industriously plied and belabored—contrivances such as groping for some middle ground between the right and the wrong, vain as the search for a man who should be neither a living man nor a dead man; such as a policy of “do n’t care” on a question about which all true men do care; such as Union appeals beseeching true Union men to yield to disunionists, reversing the divine rule, and calling, not the sinners, but the righteous to repentance; such as invocations to Washington, imploring men to unsay what Washington said, and undo what Washington did.

Neither let us be slandered from our duty by false accusations against us, nor frightened from it by menaces of destruction to the Government, nor of dungeons to ourselves. Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the end, dare to do our duty, as we understand it. (Speech at Cooper Institute.)

I am sure, however, that I have not the ability to do any thing unaided of God. (Short speech at Newark, New Jersey, February, 1861.)

The intention of the lawgiver is the law. (First Inaugural Address.)

I hold that in the contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments. (First Inaugural Address.)

I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and, to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union shall be faithfully executed in all the States. Doing this, which I deem to be only a simple duty on my part, I

shall perfectly perform it, so far as is practicable, unless my rightful masters, the American people, shall withhold the requisition, or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary. (First Inaugural Address.)

The central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy. (First Inaugural Address.)

A majority held in restraint by Constitutional check and limitation, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people. (First Inaugural Address.)

Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws?

Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends? (First Inaugural Address.)

If the Almighty Ruler of nations, with his eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North, or on your side of the South, that truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal, the American people. (First Inaugural Address.)

Intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who has never yet forsaken this favored land, are still competent to adjust, in the best way, all our present difficulties. (First Inaugural Address.)

In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you.

You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the Government; while I shall have the most solemn one to "preserve, protect, and defend" it.

The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they

will be, by the better angels of our nature. (First Inaugural Address.)

I hope to deal in all things fairly with Judge Douglas, and with the people of the State, in this contest. And if I should never be elected to any office, I trust I may go down with no stain of falsehood upon my reputation, notwithstanding the hard opinions Judge Douglas chooses to entertain of me. (Rejoinder to Douglas at Freeport, August 27, 1858.)

I would despise myself if I supposed myself ready to deal less liberally with an adversary than I was willing to be treated myself. (Rejoinder to Douglas's speech at Charleston, September 18, 1858.)

It is safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination. (First Inaugural Address.)

It is as much the duty of Government to render prompt just against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between private individuals. (First Annual Message.)

It has been said that one bad general is better than two good ones; and the saying is true, if taken to mean no more than that an army is better directed by a single mind, though inferior, than by two superior ones at variance and cross-purposes with each other. . . .

In a storm at sea, no one on board can wish the ship to sink; and yet, not unfrequently, all go down together, because too many will direct, and no single mind can be allowed to control. (First Annual Message.)

Nor is there any such thing as a free man being fixed for life in the condition of a hired laborer. . . .

Labor is prior to and independent of capital. Capital is only the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor is the superior of

capital, and deserves much the higher consideration. (First Annual Message.)

The prudent, penniless beginner in the world labors for wages awhile, saves a surplus with which to buy tools or land for himself, then labors on his own account another while, and at length hires another beginner to help him. This is the just, and generous, and prosperous system, which opens the way to all, gives hope to all, and consequent energy and progress and improvement of condition to all. (First Annual Message.)

I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. (Letter to Mr. Greeley, August 22, 1862.)

Labor is like any other commodity in the market: increase the demand for it, and you increase the price of it. (Annual Message, December 1, 1862.)

Peace does not appear so distant as it did. I hope it will come soon and come to stay; and so come as to be worth the keeping in all future time. It will then have been proved that among freemen there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that they who take such appeal are sure to lose their case and pay the cost. And there will be some black men who can remember that, with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet, they have helped mankind on to this great consummation, while I fear there will be some white ones unable to forget that with malignant heart and deceitful speech they have striven to hinder it. (Letter, August 26, 1863.)

The radicals and conservatives each agree with me in some things and disagree in others. I could wish both to agree with me in all things; for then they would agree with each other, and would be too strong for any foe from

any quarter. They, however, choose to do otherwise, and I do not question their right. I, too, shall do what seems to be my duty. I hold whoever commands in Missouri or elsewhere responsible to me, and not to either radicals or conservatives. It is my duty to hear all; but, at last, I must, within my sphere, judge what to do and what to forbear. (Letter, October 5, 1863, to Missouri factionists.)

The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, and the American people, just now, are much in want of one. We all declare for liberty; but in using the same *word* we do not all mean the same *thing*. With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and the product of his labor; while with others the same word may mean for some men to do as they please with other men, and the product of other men's labor. Here are two, not only different, but incompatible things, called by the same name, liberty. And it follows that each of these things is, by the respective parties, called by two different and incompatible names—liberty and tyranny.

The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep's throat, for which the sheep thanks the shepherd as a *liberator*, while the wolf denounces him for the same act, as the destroyer of liberty, especially as the sheep was a black one. Plainly, the sheep and the wolf are not agreed upon a definition of the word liberty; and precisely the same difference prevails to-day among us human creatures, even in the North, and all professing to love liberty. (Address in Baltimore April 18, 1864.)

Gold is good in its place, but living, brave, patriotic men are better than gold. (Address at the White House November 10, 1864.)

Our Government was not established that one man might do with himself as he pleases, and with another man too. . . . I say that, whereas God Almighty has

given every man one mouth to be fed, and one pair of hands adapted to furnish food for that mouth, if anything can be proved to be the will of Heaven, it is proved by this fact, that that mouth is to be fed by those hands, without being interfered with by any other man, who has also his mouth to feed, and his hands to labor with. (September, 1859.)

At elections, see that those, and only those, are allowed to vote who are entitled to do so by the laws. (October, 1863.)

They have concluded that it is not best to swap horses while crossing the river. (June, 1864.)

Was it possible to lose the Nation, and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. (April, 1864.)

With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in. (Second Inaugural Address.)

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